Airbus A330 – Ice and Rain Protection Systems

DO NOT USE FOR FLIGHT – TRAINING USE ONLY

DO NOT USE FOR FLIGHT – TRAINING USE ONLY

End

Dangers of Interaction with Modular and Self-Healing Avionics Applications: Redundancy Considered Harmful

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Abstract

Redundancy is one of the primary techniques for the engineering of safety-critical systems. Back-up resources can be called upon to mitigate the failure of primary systems. Traditionally, operator intervention can be required to manually switch between a failed unit and redundant resources. However, programmable systems are increasingly used to automatically detect failures and reconfigure underlying systems excluding faulty components. This creates problems if operators do not notice that their underlying systems have been reconfigured. In this paper, we examine a number of additional concerns that arise in the present generation of redundant, safety-critical applications. A range of innovative ‘self-healing’ avionics applications are providing new benefits through the application of redundancy. They are also raising serious questions about the operators’ ability to maintain situation awareness as control passes from primary to secondary and tertiary applications. Two recent in-flight interruptions involving a Boeing 777 and an Airbus A330 are used to illustrate the argument.

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Introduction

Redundancy is one of the most widespread techniques for reducing the impact of failure in safety-critical systems. Additional components can be deployed to provide secondary resources that maintain functionality following the failure of primary systems. Over the years, many different variations have been developed:

Static redundancy assumes that several redundant systems are operating at the same time. Although any one component may provide sufficient functionality for an application, majority voting is used to determine the outcome of the duplicated operation or computation. The intention is that if one element fails then it will be outvoted by the majority of other ‘healthy’ peers. A key strength of this approach is that there is no need to continually detect the possibility of a failure – unless the number of failed components may exceed the number of healthy peers. Dynamic redundancy relies upon one master system – if it fails then control passes to a redundant resource. In hot dynamic techniques, the secondary system is running in the background and may quickly resume primary operation. In cold dynamic techniques, the backup application must be restarted and brought up to the point at which the primary application failed. A key issue in all of these dynamic techniques is that it must be possible to determine when a primary system has failed so that the back-up resource can take over operations.

Although these distinctions will be familiar to many safety-critical engineers, it is worth reiterating them here because they represent the starting point for a range of more advanced techniques that are being deployed in complex applications. For example, commercial aircraft are equipped with inertial reference units to supply attitude, flight path vector, track, heading, accelerations, angular rates, ground speed, vertical speed and aircraft position. These have traditionally been separate from the air data computers that calculate barometric altitude, speed, Mach, angle of attack and temperature. However, the close interconnection between these data sources has led to the integration of inertial reference units and air data systems into single units known as air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU). The critical nature of these components has led to the application of redundancy within aircraft such as the Airbus A330 which provides three ADIRUs within the air data and inertial reference system (ADIRS). Each part of each of the three ADIRUs can operate separately in the case of the failure of the other part hence it is possible for the inertial reference unit of ADIRU 1 to continue to operate even though a fault has been noted for the air data component of that ADIRU [1]. Figure 1 shows how multi-level redundancy is also being used as a key architectural tool within the Boeing 777 ADIRU. The unit is divided into seven fault containment modules or areas. Each of these is physically

and electrically isolated from the others. This feature enables operators to continue flying until the number of fault-free modules falls below a minimum specified by the component manufacturer. This fault tolerance supported lower operating costs, for instance, by reducing the potential disruption to aircraft operations from unscheduled maintenance.

Figure 1 —Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) Architecture (ATSB, [2], p.5)

Case Study One: A330 In-flight Interruption

This paper uses two recent in-flight ‘upsets’ to illustrate some of the increasingly complex failure modes that affect the engineering of redundant avionics. Both focus on the ADIRU architectures mentioned above. The first case study occurred in October 2008 when an Airbus A330-303 departed Singapore for Perth, Australia [1]. The problems for the crew began when the autopilot with a range of aircraft system failure indications during the cruise. While the crew was evaluating the situation, the aircraft abruptly pitched nose-down and descended 650 ft. After returning the aircraft to 37,000 ft, the crew commenced actions to deal with multiple failure messages. A second uncommanded pitch-down event occurred, and the aircraft lost 400 ft. The crew made an emergency broadcast to air traffic control diverted to make a successful landing. The initial report into the incident indicates that, at the time the autopilot disconnected, there was a fault with the inertial reference (IR) part of the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) number 1.

A key theme in this paper is that recent applications of redundancy have increased the complexity of avionics. This presents considerable barriers to accident investigators who must piece together the complex events and contributory factors that led towards an adverse event. For this reason, we use Events and Causal Factors (ECF) diagrams to provide an overview of the case study incident. This approach helps to map key areas of the many pages of text that are used in the official reports of the two case studies. ECF diagrams were originally developed by the US Department of Energy. It is important to stress, however, that this is only one of several different notations that might be used to provide a similar overview [3]. The focus here is less on the technique used for the analysis than on the role that redundancy played in the causes of potential accidents [4].

Figure 1 illustrates the initial events leading to the first case study incident. As can be seen, the upset is believed to have been triggered by a discrepancy between channels of PRIM1 – this is the first of three flight control primary computers. The PRIMs help to ensure that the aircraft remains within a ‘safe’ flight envelope by automatically monitoring and commanding control surface movements. In normal operation, one of these three PRIMs acts as a master sending commands to the others that execute them using servo-controls. This illustrates the level of redundancy in complex avionics systems because each of the three redundant PRIMs can be allocated to receive input from the redundant ADIRU architectures describe above. At the start of the incident, PRIM1 was acting as the master when the discrepancy was detected; this led to the disconnection of autopilot 1 and the inertial reference system function of ADIRU 1 began to indicate ‘Fail’. ADIRU 2 and ADIRU 3 seem to operate normally throughout the flight.

A second key theme in this paper is that partly as a consequence of the engineering complexity of redundant systems, it is increasingly difficult for the crews to identify and respond to adverse events. As can be seen from figure 1, the loss of the autopilot led to an Electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) warning message and a series of master caution chimes. The captain then attempted to engage autopilot 2 and then autopilot 1 without success. The crew confirmed and cleared the message from the ECAM but were then presented with a NAV IR1 FAULT message.

Meanwhile, the airspeed and altitude readings on the captain’s primary flight display provided fluctuating and, at times, contradictory information with stall and overspeed warnings. Uncertainty over the indications on his own display led the Captain to rely on standby instrumentation and then to use the First Officer’s Primary Flight Display.

Figure 2 — Initial Problems Affecting a Flight Control Primary Computer (PRIM1)

Figure 3 — Second Event and Temporary Solutions

Figure 3 extends the initial analysis from the previous ECF diagram to consider subsequent events and also to analyze factors that affected the reliability of the Captain’s Primary Flight Display. As can be seen, the Captain’s Primary Flight Display usually presented data from ADIRU 1, following the presentation of the NAV IR1 FAULT, the source of data was switched to Inertial Reference unit 3 on ADIRU 3. However, this did not automatically switch the source for Air Data References, which continued to be ADIRU 1. This illustrates the complexity of interaction with redundant systems as crews struggle to ensure that they receive data from a reliable source without knowing for sure which of the alternate ADIRU’s is providing reliable information. The problems with the Captain’s Primary Flight Display could not be resolved before a second uncommanded pitch down. The uncertainty created by crew interaction with their redundant systems was exacerbated by the way in which the master flight control primary computer was switched from PRIM1 to PRIM 2 following the first pitch down event. The subsequent indication of a fault on PRIM 3 then triggered a further change in the master from PRIM 2 back to PRIM 1 and it was only in subsequent discussions with the operators maintenance watch unit in Sydney, while the flight was still in the air that the crew decided to switch off PRIM 3. At the time of writing this paper, there is continued uncertainty over the precise ways in which interactions between these different layers of redundancy, between the ADIRUs and the PRIMs, contributed to the symptoms that faced the crew during this incident.

Case Study Two: B777 In-flight Interruption

The second incident occurred during August 2005 and involved a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft on an international passenger flight from Australia to Malaysia. As with the A330, this resulted in a significant upset while flying on autopilot. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s investigation again focused on the role of the ADIRU. Although the units were made by a different manufacturer and had a different architecture, as explained in the opening sections, both case incidents were exacerbated by the use of redundancy that is intended to mitigate the impact of failure in safety critical systems. The anomaly in the B-777 had existed in original versions of the ADIRU software, and had not been detected in the testing and certification process for the unit.

Figure 4 — Deferred Maintenance on Fault Tolerant ADIRU’s

The opening sections of this paper described how designers of the B777 ADIRU enabled aircraft operators to continue flying and defer maintenance even after a failure had been logged against a fault containment area. Figure 4 shows how an initial failure of accelerometer number 5 in 2001 triggered a maintenance message for the on-board maintenance computer; this was known as an ADIRU MM 34-20010 event. Such messages could be read by maintenance teams using a ground-based terminal. However, these messages were not directly visible to the crew. Some ADIRU events can, however, be displayed in-flight on the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). If such an in-flight warning occurs, then the ADIRU must be replaced with a serviceable unit within three days. As can be seen in Figure 4, the crew did not receive such a warning following the 2001 accelerometer failure and so the ADIRU was not replaced. The aircraft manufacturer noted that: “the ADIRU can be dispatched with MM 34-20010 present until such time that the operator deems it prudent to remove the ADIRU to avoid a schedule interruption due to occurrence of the ADIRU Status message. The decision to remove the ADIRU based on the presence of MM 34-20010 only is made by the operators on an economic basis, not a safety basis” [2, p.8].

Figure 5 shows how ADIRU software was developed to check the status of critical components and to allow the unit to continue operation if minimum criteria for the availability of FCAs were met. The implementation of this requirement was flawed in early versions of the code. However, up to version v-03 this problem was mitigated by additional checks in other areas of the application. A renewed requirement to improve shop repair capability led to the flaw being exposed again in OPS v-04. The OPS software up to and including v-07, therefore, contained a bug such that after a power cycle the ADIRU would not recognise that accelerometer number 5 was unserviceable. Figure5 also denotes how a maintenance message was generated following the 2001 fault on accelerometer number

5. However, the fault status was not checked by the ADIRU following a power up for the reasons presented previously. This combination of events led to use of data from the failed accelerometer when a further fault was detected in 2005 with accelerometer number 6.

Figure 5 illustrates key similarities between the A330 and the B-777 incidents. The masking of redundant failures undermined the ability of human operators to diagnose and respond to the problems that confronted them. As can be seen, in the following ECF diagram the crew of the B-777 was faced with incorrect underspeed then overspeed condition warnings as well as slip/skid indicator for full right indication following the failure of accelerometer number 6. At the same time, correct indications were presented for the pitch and roll values on the primary flight display. Standby equipment was also unaffected by the fault. The crew were, therefore, unsure which of the instruments to trust. Their uncertainty was exacerbated by design decisions that stemmed from the underlying philosophy of marking redundant failures during continued operations, mentioned in previous sections. The pilot

was faced with a situation that designers had not considered to be possible. The auto throttle system remained active and the underspeed/overspeed warnings suggested that the malfunction may have been related to these functions. In consequence, the pilot attempted to disconnect the autothrottle by pressing the thrust lever disconnect switch and pushing the autothrottle engage switch to toggle it off. However, these attempts were ineffective because the crew failed to switch the autothrottle arm switch from ARMED to OFF. In consequence, the autothrottle continued to increase thrust in response to the low-speed data that was erroneously being supplied from the ADIRU and the fault accelerometer.

Conclusions and Further Work

Redundancy continues to provide significant benefits to the engineering and operation of complex, safety-critical systems. However, this paper has used two recent incidents to illustrate potential hazards as static and dynamic techniques are being extended to support multiple levels of redundancy. The A330 mishap shows that crews may not be able to easily determine the source of a problem or conversely to identify reliable data sources when multiple redundant processing units, such as PRIM 1 to 3, call on data from multiple redundant sources, specifically ADIRU 1 to 3, each of which provides access to multiple duplicated components. We have also used the case study incidents to illustrate concerns about ‘self healing’ systems in which redundancy is used to justify increased maintenance intervals as routine operations are conducted in the presence of failed components. Again, hazards focus on human interaction with complex redundant architectures – in this case maintenance teams must identify failed components when they are eventually able to work on an application. If they do not correct faults then there is a danger that they will continue to be masked from the crew until further failures eventually undermine redundant architectures.

Afterword

Since writing the initial draft of this paper, a further incident has occurred. The autopilot of an A330 again disconnected with a NAV IR 1 Fault ECAM message denoting a problem with ADIRU Number 1. In this incident the crew followed the advice that the manufacturer issued following the first case study in this paper; the crew selected the IR 1 push-button to OFF and the ADR 1 push-button to OFF and landed successfully. The ATSB interim press release states; “It is very early in the investigation and too soon to draw any conclusions as to specific causal factors involved in this incident. As it appears to be a similar event to a previous event involving an A330 aircraft (AO-2008-070 on 7 Oct 2008) it will be included as part of the earlier investigation” [5]. It would appear that the crew were able to benefit from the lessons learned in the previous incident; however, it is also clear that we have further lessons to learn in the application of advanced redundancy techniques for safety-critical software.

References

1.             Australian Transport Safety Bureau. In-Flight Upset Event 240Km North-West of Perth, WA, Boeing Company 777-2000, 9M-MRG. Aviation Occurrence Report 200503722, Canberra, Australia, 2007.

2.             Australian Transport Safety Bureau, In-Flight Upset 154km West of Learmonth, WA, VH-QPA, Airbus A330-303, Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2008-070 Preliminary, 2008.

3.             C.W. Johnson. Failure in Safety-Critical Systems: A Handbook of Accident and Incident Reporting, University of Glasgow Press, Glasgow, Scotland, ISBN 0-85261-784-4, 2003.

4.             C. M. Holloway and C.W. Johnson. “Why System Safety Professionals Should Read Accident Reports.” In

T. Kelly (ed.), The First IET International Conference on System Safety, Institute of Engineering and Technology, Savoy Place, London, 325-331, 6-8th June 2006, ISBN 0-86341-646-2, 2006.

5.             Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Qantas Airbus A330 incident, 480km North West of Perth on 27 December 2008, Media Release, 2nd January 2009.

Biography

Chris.W. Johnson, DPhil, MA, MSc, FBCS, CEng, CITP, Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8RZ, Scotland, UK, telephone +44 (141) 330 6053, facsimile +44 (141) 330 4913, e-mail – Johnson@dcs.gla.ac.uk, web page http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson

Chris Johnson is Professor of Computing Science at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. He heads a small research group devoted to improving the reporting and analysis of incidents and accidents across safety-critical domains ranging from healthcare, to the military to aviation and rail.

C. Michael Holloway, NASA Langley Research Center, 100 NASA Road, Hampton, VA 23681-2199, USA. Telephone -(757) 864-1701, facsimile -(757) 864-4234, e-mail -c.m.holloway@nasa.gov.

C. Michael Holloway is a senior research engineer at NASA Langley Research Center. His primary professional interests are system safety and accident analysis for software intensive systems. He is a member of the IEEE, the IEEE Computer Society, and the System Safety Society

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Flight 447 Search For Black Boxes: French Sub Hears “Faint’ Signal

FolhaOnline – LeMonde – ALT LAW Chatter – FAB Nota 39

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UPDATE II: Not to be misunderstood:  BEA Press Release, June 23, 2009 (Emphasis mine)

No signals transmitted by the flight recorders’ locator beacons have been validated up to now. In the context of the sea searches that are under way, work is undertaken on a regular basis that is aimed at eliminating any doubts related to any sounds that may be heard, and any findings will be made public.

UPDATE: As one would expect the French Government denies the LeMonde Article…

(AP) The official, an aide to France’s minister in charge of transport, Jean-Louis-Borloo, denied a report in the French newspaper Le Monde that French ships had picked up a signal from the black boxes.

French military ships searching in the area where the plane crashed have “heard sounds” but “the black boxes have not been detected,” she said. The aide spoke on condition of anonymity because she was not authorized to be publicly named.

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French navy finds sign of the black box of Airbus, says newspaper (English Translated)(Emphasis mine)

23/06/2009 – 04h41 da Folha Online Atualizado às 07h31.

The French Navy located in this Tuesday, a weak signal from the black box of the Air France Airbus who disappeared on May 31 in the Atlantic Ocean, the report shows the French newspaper Le Monde. ” Air France does not confirm the news and the military did not comment on the matter.

The newspaper reported that Argonaut was mini-submarino to the place to check the sound object in the region where the plane crashed – the approximately 850 km from the archipelago of Fernando de Noronha (PE). The search for black-boxes are made with the greatest urgency possible, since the batteries of the flag of the equipment lasts 30 days.

The report does not reveal the source of the information, nor the exact location of the area where the equipment was located. “The searches have become complicated [because of the topography of the ocean],” says “Le Monde”. According to the newspaper, the black-boxes “still have the autonomy to approximately eight days.” The beacons that emit the sound signals for the location are the size of a large stack and are connected to the black box.

The French Commission of Investigation (BEA), French government agency responsible for investigation of the accident, said that equipment, which store data crucial to explain the accident, have not been “located” with precision. The body said that this is not the first time that researchers detect underwater noises, and they are all investigated. At the beginning of the investigation, the director of BEA, Paul-Louis Arslanian, came to ask for caution in searches, even because there was the assumption that the sensors could be separated from the equipment after the fall…

For BEA, the black box is considered essential to clarify the causes of the accident, which occurred in Rio-Paris route. Investigations continue but no conclusive explanation of what may have knocked the plane. It is known that the plane had an electrical failure and depressurization of the cabin, because alerts were sent during the type of flight.

A failure in external sensors that measure the speed of the aircraft, the Pitot, was identified as a possible cause of the accident. The president of EADS (European Society of Aeronautic and Defense, which controls Airbus), Louis Gallois, “this type of accident , there is [only] questions. ” “It is the convergence of different causes, creating an accident. It is essential that everyone knows what happened.”

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LEMONDE.FR | 23.06.09 | 06h59  •  Mis à jour le 23.06.09 | 11h50

Search flight Rio-Paris: questions about the signals received (English Translated)(Emphasis mine)

The investigation into the causes of the crash of the Air France A330 operating the flight Rio-Paris, who disappeared on June 1st in the Atlantic off the coast of Brazil, will it grow in the coming days? Perhaps, if the black boxes from the aircraft – the flight recorders – are “physically” located and, more importantly, it is possible to return to the surface. In any case, the “hope” that has sprouted, Tuesday 23 June, after the submarine Nautile pocket of Ifremer has made a dive after having received a signal. Story of what we know and questions that remain.

According to information collected by Le Monde, the buildings of the French Navy who are trying to find the remains of the A330 of Air France have received a very low faint signal.

It was considered that this signal could come from the black boxes from the aircraft. This led, Monday 22 June, the submarine Nautilus to make a dive. The aim is to try to physically “get their hands on these black boxes and power them up: the black boxes are located in the tail of the aircraft, it is not certain that the submarine can retrive.

Asked about the search operation, a spokesman for the Bureau of Investigation and Analysis (BEA) – the french official body responsible for the technical investigation – said that these black boxes have not yet been precisely ” localized. An official of the BEA is however expected in the day.

“We are still in research phase,” said on Europe 1, Philippe Guillemet, the commander of the “Why Not?” Vessel Ifremer on this area of research. “The acoustic waves, it receives, but nothing is confirmed, unfortunately,” continued the captain, who, when asked “you have not spotted any of the black boxes?” replied: “Absolutely.”

The search for these black boxes is anything but simple. Firstly, the tags contained in the flight recorders emit signals that are “be received” in a radius of 2 km. Secondly, because the place where the Air France plane crashed is characterized by a relief submarine very tormented the funds at around 5 000 m deep. (Read the article “Rio-Paris Flight: gear submarine mobilized to retrieve the black boxes”). Finally, at these depths, the visibility is zero, the seabed is plunged into darkness.

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ADR DISAGREE CHATTER

Comment/Question:  As I understand it, the various ‘protections’ are reduced under ‘alternate law’ – but some remain, including ‘angle of attack’ protection? Basically, that if the nose gets too high at low speed, the protection pushes it down for you? Please set me straight if either of those assumptions are wrong.

There are 3 modes of FBW degradation… plus Abnormal Law (for upset attitude).

If you degrade from Normal law, you have ALTN 1, ALTN 2, then Direct law…

Anything below that, it’s Mechanical Control… (for temporary total loss of electrics).

Notes:

* = Only in case the AOA, of the remaining ADRs, disagrees with the AOA (as computed by PRIMs)

(1) = Protection is totally lost, in in case of VS1g computation (loss of weight, or slat/flap position).

(2) = Protection is lost, in case of dual ADR failure (or ADR DISAGREE)

(3) = Protection is lost, in case of triple ADR failure (or ADR DISAGREE)

(4) = Bank angle limitation remains effective in ALT 1, which uses roll normal. However since ALT 1 is generally an unprotected law, all protection marks on the PFD are in amber for simplicity.

(5) = When both elevators have failed, only pitch mechanical backup is available, by using the manual pitch trim control (THS). “MAN PITCH TRIM ONLY” is displayed in red on the PFDs.

Pitch ALT = Same as normal, refer to remaining protection boxes below it.

Lat NORM = As per normal law

Roll DIR = Roll as per Direct Law, no Bank Angle protection. Max roll rate approx 20 – 25deg/sec depending on speed & config. Spoilers 2, 3, 6 inhibited, except in case of of additional failures affecting lateral control.

Yaw ALT = The dutch roll damping function is available, and damper authority is limited to +/- 4 deg rudder (CONF 0) and +/- 15deg (in other configuration). Turn coordination is also provided, except in CONF 0.

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(Yaw Alt = still no need to press rudder for turns… rudder trim still avail).

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They got an ADR disagree ECAM message, by that time, they’re in ALT 2.

Comment/Question: So the question is, even if the pitots/ASIs are under-reporting the airspeed, do the ‘protections’ go on getting their airspeed information from them? And if so, could that explain all those ‘stall warnings’ that have been reported, even though the aeroplanes in question were not stalling?

The stall warnings can come from either of these:

1. Indicated airspeed below Vsw (stall warning speed)… since the Vsw will be indicated on the speedtape…

2. The AoA computed by the PRIMs (Attitude vs vertical drift at current gross weight = a calculated IAS < Vsw).

Am not sure on the detailed mechanics of stall warnings at unreliable airspeed. As far as I know, there is no difference between stall warning #1 and #2 above. The reason being is, you can have ADR problems or IRU problems… I’ll have another look in the books…

Hence the QRH says “Respect Stall Warnings” despite ECAM saying “Risk of Undue Stall Warning”…

In the case of Air Caraibes, they were at manual thrust when the mess happened, so they already had the “thrust/pitch” speed relationship and made the judgment call of… “it’s a false stall warning”… no matter what the speed tape says…

In the case of Air France, they were at autothrust when the [event] happened… one would be at risk of not having the thrust/pitch speed relationship in one’s head beforehand… they would be in the same “blank” regarding to thrust/pitch relationship based on the risk you mentioned earlier, “could the speed tape indicate a speed slower than their speed” (although you directed at the rudder travel limiter, you actually were on to this…)

The AoA vane compared to AoA computer by PRIM compared to speed tape could have resulted in the system determining there was an error… that’s what the computers knew… what did it then do? Basically “Guys, something is wrong with the speed I’m getting, sort it out and fly the plane until you know which one is wrong”. But what the pilots saw could have been a progressively slowing IAS on the speed tape…

Air Caraibes case also had wild and rapid fluctuations of the speed tape, which given they were already on the manual thrust, they could just say to the the PFD… “U’re bluffing! sod the stall warning!”.

The crew on AF447 didn’t have that ironic luxury…

“STALL??? Is it real stall? or fake stall? What does the QRH say?”

“Technical recommendations:

- Respect stall warning, and disregard the “RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING” STATUS message if Displayed on ECAM.”

What would you do? Follow or not follow?

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Resgate de Corpos do navio da Marinha /

FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA

22/06/2009 – 17h49 Nota 39 – 22.06.09

INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE

The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command report that, in this Monday, March 22, remain possible sighted wreckage about 1100 km north of Fernando de Noronha. No bodies were sighted. The landing ship dock-Rio de Janeiro was informed of the location of these materials.

Reached the port of Recife, to 11.15, the tanker Admiral Motta Gastão bringing the latest body found, and remains, and small amount of wreckage and luggage. The body and the remains were delivered to representatives of the Federal Police and the Legal Medical Institute of Pernambuco (IML). The material collected will be available to the Bureau d’Investigations et D’Analysis of I’Aviation Pour la Securite Civile (BEA).

Completed three weeks of operation, the aircraft flew about 1,350 hours and was conducted visual searches in 320,000 square kilometers, amounting to more than twice the size of the state of Ceará.

There was no change in number of vessels involved in search, but the effective military Navy rose to 885, increasing to 1,100 the number involved in the operation. The conduct adopted for the work remains unchanged in relation to information provided previously.

CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA

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End

Air France Airbus A332 (F-GZCP) ACARS Messages – Past Three Months

(F-GZCP) ACARS database search

This database is created with the input from different acarsd servers

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MARCH 2009

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 1 Msg no: M78A
Flight id: AF0459 [GRU-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0753/+35.21-010.71
———————————————————-[ 25/03/2009 08:53 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 1499
Flight id: AF0508 [CDG-CAI]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR508
———————————————————-[ 25/03/2009 14:29 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 5 Msg no: F09A
Flight id: AF0366 [CDG-PHL]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#M1B/ORYOAAF.REJPWI,125635,053,,CB007,CLIMB.053,,CB007,CLIMB/GAORYOAAF/TS125918,26030965B1
———————————————————-[ 26/03/2009 13:59 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 0 Msg no: S04A
Flight id: AF0000 []  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 26/03/2009 23:55 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 3 Msg no: S06A
Flight id: AF0365 [PHL-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 26/03/2009 23:56 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 6 Msg no: M16A
Flight id: AF0365 [PHL-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0016/+39.80-074.53
———————————————————-[ 27/03/2009 01:16 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 10a8
Flight id: AF0134 [CDG-BOM-]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR134
———————————————————-[ 27/03/2009 11:32 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 1 Msg no: S86A
Flight id: AF0135 [BOM--CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 28/03/2009 06:48 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 0 Msg no: M14A
Flight id: AF0456 [CDG-GRU]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#1008/+48.32-000.07
———————————————————-[ 28/03/2009 11:08 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 6 Msg no: M72A
Flight id: AF0459 [GRU-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0817/+35.81-010.15
———————————————————-[ 29/03/2009 10:17 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 2 Msg no: S80A
Flight id: AF0762 [CDG-CKY]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 29/03/2009 15:25 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 4 Msg no: S07A
Flight id: AF0767 [CKY-DKR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 30/03/2009 03:30 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 1 Msg no: S88A
Flight id: AF0796 [CDG-BKO]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 30/03/2009 18:38 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 5 Msg no: S25A
Flight id: AF0791 [BKO-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 31/03/2009 05:41 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 2 Msg no: C01A
Flight id: AF0732 [CDG-NIM-OUA]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#CFB.1/FLR/DBN013/FR0903310945 73340004ECU2B 1,ECU2A,,,,,,FUEL FILTER CLOGGED,HARD
———————————————————-[ 31/03/2009 11:47 ]-

x

---

APRIL 2009

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S52A
Flight id: AF0731 [OUA-NIM-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 01/04/2009 05:00 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 1451
Flight id: AF0218 [CDG-BOM-]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR218
———————————————————-[ 02/04/2009 12:02 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 2 Msg no: S02A
Flight id: AF0051 [ORD-LFPG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 04/04/2009 07:21 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 7c7c
Flight id: AF0524 [CDG-CAI]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR524
———————————————————-[ 04/04/2009 17:15 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 0 Msg no: S86A
Flight id: AF0521 [CAI-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 05/04/2009 04:57 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 4 Msg no: M27A
Flight id: AF0456 [CDG-GRU]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#1056/+37.54-005.97
———————————————————-[ 05/04/2009 12:52 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 8 Msg no: M73A
Flight id: AF0459 [GRU-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0715/+35.50-010.44
———————————————————-[ 06/04/2009 09:11 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: d1ec
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 06/04/2009 23:54 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 042a
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 08/04/2009 15:46 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0762
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 08/04/2009 23:53 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 172e
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 09/04/2009 00:12 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 3207
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 09/04/2009 15:57 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S43A
Flight id: AF0824 [CDG-PNR]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 09/04/2009 23:40 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 7 Msg no: S28A
Flight id: AF0833 [PNR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 11/04/2009 05:16 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 4 Msg no: F00C
Flight id: AF0192 [CDG-BLR]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#M1BWRVOBL.VOMM/GAORYOAAF/SP90770101/TS092106,11040937E0
———————————————————-[ 11/04/2009 11:22 ]-

ACARS mode: H Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 5 Msg no: S51A
Flight id: AF0191 [BLR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 12/04/2009 06:19 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 7 Msg no: S78A
Flight id: AF0192 [CDG-BLR]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 12/04/2009 11:42 ]-

ACARS mode: H Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 3 Msg no: M58A
Flight id: AF0191 [BLR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0435/+47.11+019.17
———————————————————-[ 13/04/2009 06:36 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 8 Msg no: S56A
Flight id: AF0378 [CDG-DTW]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 13/04/2009 14:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0070
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR377
———————————————————-[ 14/04/2009 04:03 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0485
Flight id: AF0377 [KDTW-LFPG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR377
———————————————————-[ 14/04/2009 09:39 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 6 Msg no: S25A
Flight id: AF0791 [BKO-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 15/04/2009 05:14 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: a412
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 17/04/2009 00:23 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0577
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 17/04/2009 00:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 209d
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 17/04/2009 15:46 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 6765
Flight id: AF0573 [JIB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR573
———————————————————-[ 19/04/2009 05:19 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 5 Msg no: S56A
Flight id: AF0896 []  [Air France]
Message content:-

———————————————————-[ 20/04/2009 12:10 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 2 Msg no: F02A
Flight id: AF0897 [BZV-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#M1B/ORYOAAF.PRG/DTLFPG,08L,115,034707,048/GAORYOAAF/CA/TS031235,21040957B1
———————————————————-[ 21/04/2009 05:12 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 8 Msg no: S66A
Flight id: AF0444 [CDG-GIG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 21/04/2009 12:25 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 26 Block id: 2 Msg no: M78A
Flight id: AF0447 [GIG-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
VER/046/A340/A SCH/AF0447/SBGL/LFPG/21APR/2200 ETA/0903/LFPG/08R /22APR/0633/ /
———————————————————-[ 22/04/2009 08:33 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 7 Msg no: S86A
Flight id: AF0018 [CDG-EWR]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 22/04/2009 14:14 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 1 Msg no: D15A
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#DFBR04/A33004,1,1 C1,.F-GZCP,09APR22,23.25.19,KEWR,LFPG,AFR019XXXX,4000,297 C2,013,05.0,000000,SE5N14,VN5014,AF3013,000,016,016 C3,013.3,00711,0.244,111,0.11,111,00,0,00,111,0.08,X C4,013.3,00731,0.246,111
———————————————————-[ 23/04/2009 01:26 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0396
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR019
———————————————————-[ 23/04/2009 07:10 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 5 Msg no: S95A
Flight id: AF0833 [PNR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 25/04/2009 05:31 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 7 Msg no: S58A
Flight id: AF0018 [CDG-EWR]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 25/04/2009 14:02 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 8 Msg no: M33A
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#2333/+41.14-073.51
———————————————————-[ 26/04/2009 01:34 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2Z Block id: 9 Msg no: M86A
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
Paris CDG-
———————————————————-[ 26/04/2009 07:50 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 1577
Flight id: AF0218 [CDG-BOM-]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 position report N47.86017E8.49102 FL37000 ft./12139 m.
———————————————————-[ 26/04/2009 11:55 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 1126
Flight id: AF0217 [BOM--CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR217
———————————————————-[ 27/04/2009 06:02 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 0 Msg no: S36A
Flight id: AF306L []  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 27/04/2009 11:14 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 5U Block id: 4 Msg no: M10A
Flight id: AF0306 [CDG-SEA]  [Air France]
Message content:-
VER/046/A340/M SCH/AF0306/LFPG/KSEA/27APR/0830 WXR/METF/EGLL/BIKF/BGSF
———————————————————-[ 27/04/2009 11:25 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0106
Flight id: AF0309 [SEA-LFPG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR309
———————————————————-[ 27/04/2009 23:19 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0399
Flight id: AF0309 [KSEA-LFPG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR309
———————————————————-[ 28/04/2009 07:14 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 1 Msg no: M29A
Flight id: AF0796 [CDG-BKO]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#1703/+36.42-004.80
———————————————————-[ 30/04/2009 19:04 ]-

---

MAY 2009

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 26 Block id: 0 Msg no: M17A
Flight id: AF0791 [BKO-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
VER/046/A340/A SCH/AF0791/GABS/LFPG/30APR/2245 ETA/0417/LFPG/08L /01MAY/0402/ /
———————————————————-[ 01/05/2009 06:02 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 6 Msg no: M12A
Flight id: AF0456 [CDG-GRU]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0940/+46.48-003.36
———————————————————-[ 01/05/2009 11:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 7 Msg no: F27A
Flight id: AF0459 [GRU-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#M1B/ORYOAAF.REJPWI,231543,053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053,,CB007,CRUISE.053
———————————————————-[ 02/05/2009 09:02 ]-

ACARS mode: T Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 5 Msg no: S58A
Flight id: AF0378 [LFPG-DTW]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 02/05/2009 14:37 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 00d6
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR377
———————————————————-[ 03/05/2009 04:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 6 Msg no: S23A
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 03/05/2009 09:59 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 824f
Flight id: AF0508 [CDG-CAI]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR508
———————————————————-[ 03/05/2009 14:38 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 9 Msg no: D03B
Flight id: AF0503 [CAI-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#DFB C5,811296,18521,06244,02598,5H11H11111111H,00001,26064,2,192 C6,811297,02623,02765,00335,1H111111111111,00001,26064,0 N1,094.42,094.4,094.4,099.8,0691,XXX.X,02569,XX.XX,XX.XX N2,094.42,094.4,094.4,099.
———————————————————-[ 04/05/2009 09:36 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 9 Msg no: S58A
Flight id: AF0038 [CDG-IAH]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 04/05/2009 17:00 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: B6 Block id: 7 Msg no: J98A
Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
/PIKCPYA.ADS.F-GZCP141D41B65B5489859C041D0D1D4B265BFA8985BFFF1D5F465D494985805280
———————————————————-[ 05/05/2009 07:30 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 0 Msg no: S83A
Flight id: AF0897 [BZV-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 07/05/2009 05:17 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 0 Msg no: S53A
Flight id: AF0898 [CDG-FIH-]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 07/05/2009 11:38 ]-

ACARS mode: X Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 2 Msg no: S62A
Flight id: AF0899 [FIH-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 08/05/2009 05:08 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 8 Msg no: S32A
Flight id: AF0456 [CDG-GRU]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 08/05/2009 11:04 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 0 Msg no: M10A
Flight id: AF0459 [GRU-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0658/+35.19-010.71
———————————————————-[ 09/05/2009 08:56 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 03c0
Flight id: AF0378 [LFPG-DTW]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR378
———————————————————-[ 09/05/2009 14:35 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 5U Block id: 7 Msg no: M12A
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
VER/046/A340/M SCH/AF0377/KDTW/LFPG/10MAY/0135 WXR/META/YYZ /YUL
———————————————————-[ 10/05/2009 04:13 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: H1 Block id: 9 Msg no: D06A
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-LFPG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#DFBR01/A33001,1,1 C1,.F-GZCP,09MAY10,06.08.42,KDTW,LFPG,AFR377XXXX,5000,717 C2,002,06.0,000000,SE5N14,VN5014,AF3013,000,052,052 C3,N36.3,38990,0.813,111,1.03,111,10,0,01,111,1.02,X C4,N36.4,38991,0.812,111
———————————————————-[ 10/05/2009 10:00 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S63A
Flight id: AF0018 [LFPG-KEWR]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 10/05/2009 14:23 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 6 Msg no: M96A
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#2324/+41.14-073.48
———————————————————-[ 11/05/2009 01:24 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 80 Block id: 5 Msg no: M50A
Flight id: AF0019 [EWR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
VER/046/A340/M SCH/AF0019/KEWR/LFPG/10MAY/2300 FTX/ADDRESS/MAINTENA BJR.EN CABINE TOILET L54 FUITE DESSOUS LAVABO NIVEAU EVAC.+SIEGE 4K INOP ELEC.MERCI CDB CAMUS
———————————————————-[ 11/05/2009 06:52 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 4 Msg no: S55A
Flight id: AF0038 [LFPG-KIAH]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 11/05/2009 17:00 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: B0 Block id: 2 Msg no: J29A
Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
/KZWY.AFN/FMHAFR031,.F-GZCP,,045907/FPON38124W078339,1/FCOADS,01/FCOATC,01E36F
———————————————————-[ 12/05/2009 06:59 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 8eb0
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 13/05/2009 00:21 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: a981
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 13/05/2009 15:39 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: bdff
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 14/05/2009 00:08 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: d7b8
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 14/05/2009 15:33 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: ec07
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 15/05/2009 00:12 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0746
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 15/05/2009 15:31 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 4c01
Flight id: AF0530 [CDG-DXB]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR530
———————————————————-[ 17/05/2009 00:01 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 07fe
Flight id: AF0529 [DXB-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR529
———————————————————-[ 17/05/2009 15:30 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 6 Msg no: S50A
Flight id: AF0562 [CDG-BEY]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 18/05/2009 16:59 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 4 Msg no: S95A
Flight id: AF0561 [BEY-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 19/05/2009 13:06 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 51bd
Flight id: AF0561 [BEY-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR561
———————————————————-[ 22/05/2009 13:04 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0538
Flight id: AF0010 [CDG-JFK]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR010
———————————————————-[ 22/05/2009 17:02 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 1 Msg no: S19A
Flight id: AF0011 [JFK-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 23/05/2009 09:46 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 4 Msg no: S73A
Flight id: AF0378 [CDG-DTW]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 23/05/2009 14:31 ]-

ACARS mode: B Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 5 Msg no: M13A
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0201/+43.35-081.42
———————————————————-[ 24/05/2009 04:04 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S88A
Flight id: AF0377 [DTW-LFPG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 24/05/2009 09:45 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0bd5
Flight id: AF0508 [CDG-CAI]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR508
———————————————————-[ 24/05/2009 14:23 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 63e1
Flight id: AF0503 [CAI-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR503
———————————————————-[ 25/05/2009 09:57 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S57A
Flight id: AF0192 []  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 26/05/2009 10:57 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 1542
Flight id: AF0191 [BLR-CDG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR191
———————————————————-[ 27/05/2009 07:27 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 7 Msg no: M12A
Flight id: AF0192 []  [Air France]
Message content:-
#1040/+47.95+007.03
———————————————————-[ 27/05/2009 12:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 9 Msg no: S82A
Flight id: AF0191 [BLR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 28/05/2009 09:40 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 44a0
Flight id: AF0508 [CDG-CAI]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR508
———————————————————-[ 28/05/2009 14:40 ]-

ACARS mode: G Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 7 Msg no: S94A
Flight id: AF0503 []  []
———————————————————-[ 29/05/2009 10:02 ]-

ACARS mode: 1 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: ** Block id: @ Msg no: 0d73
Flight id: AF0366 [LFPG-PHL]  [Air France]
Message content:-
SBS-1 Callsign: AFR366
———————————————————-[ 29/05/2009 14:10 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 7 Msg no: M93A
Flight id: AF0365 [PHL-LFPG]  []
Message content:-
#2318/+39.84-074.54
———————————————————-[ 30/05/2009 01:18 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: Q0 Block id: 3 Msg no: S13A
Flight id: AF0365 [PHL-LFPG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 30/05/2009 07:36 ]-

ACARS mode: E Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 2 Msg no: M12A
Flight id: AF0192 [CDG-BLR]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0930/+48.92+003.79
———————————————————-[ 30/05/2009 11:30 ]-

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 6 Msg no: S56A
Flight id: AF0191 [BLR-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 31/05/2009 07:27 ]-

ACARS mode: R Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: 2F Block id: 0 Msg no: M14A
Flight id: AF0444 [CDG-GIG]  [Air France]
Message content:-
#0936/+47.31-001.30
———————————————————-[ 31/05/2009 11:36 ]-

---

JUNE 2009

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: _ Block id: 0 Msg no: S72A
Flight id: AF0447 [GIG-CDG]  [Air France]
———————————————————-[ 01/06/2009 00:53 ]-

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ANAD Style Report

F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0053 20090601	AF0447 (GIG-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1136 20090531	AF0444 (CDG-GIG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0727 20090531	AF0191 (BLR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1130 20090530	AF0192 (CDG-BLR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0736 20090530	AF0365 (PHL-LFPG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0118 20090530	AF0365 (PHL-LFPG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1410 20090529	AF0366 (LFPG-PHL)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1002 20090529	AF0503 ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1440 20090528	AF0508 (CDG-CAI)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0940 20090528	AF0191 (BLR-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1240 20090527	AF0192 ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0727 20090527	AF0191 (BLR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1057 20090526	AF0192 ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0957 20090525	AF0503 (CAI-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1423 20090524	AF0508 (CDG-CAI)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0945 20090524	AF0377 (DTW-LFPG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0404 20090524	AF0377 (DTW-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1431 20090523	AF0378 (CDG-DTW)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0946 20090523	AF0011 (JFK-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1702 20090522	AF0010 (CDG-JFK)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1304 20090522	AF0561 (BEY-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1306 20090519	AF0561 (BEY-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1659 20090518	AF0562 (CDG-BEY)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1530 20090517	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0001 20090517	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1531 20090515	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0012 20090515	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1533 20090514	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0008 20090514	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1539 20090513	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0021 20090513	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0659 20090512	AF0031 (IAH-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1700 20090511	AF0038 (LFPG-KIAH)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0652 20090511	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0124 20090511	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1423 20090510	AF0018 (LFPG-KEWR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1000 20090510	AF0377 (DTW-LFPG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0413 20090510	AF0377 (DTW-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1435 20090509	AF0378 (LFPG-DTW)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0856 20090509	AF0459 (GRU-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1104 20090508	AF0456 (CDG-GRU)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0508 20090508	AF0899 (FIH-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1138 20090507	AF0898 (CDG-FIH-)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0517 20090507	AF0897 (BZV-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0730 20090505	AF0031 (IAH-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1700 20090504	AF0038 (CDG-IAH)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0936 20090504	AF0503 (CAI-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1438 20090503	AF0508 (CDG-CAI)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0959 20090503	AF0377 (DTW-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0440 20090503	AF0377 (DTW-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1437 20090502	AF0378 (LFPG-DTW)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0902 20090502	AF0459 (GRU-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1140 20090501	AF0456 (CDG-GRU)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0602 20090501	AF0791 (BKO-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1904 20090430	AF0796 (CDG-BKO)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0714 20090428	AF0309 (KSEA-LFPG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	2319 20090427	AF0309 (SEA-LFPG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1125 20090427	AF0306 (CDG-SEA)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1114 20090427	AF306L ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0602 20090427	AF0217 (BOM–CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1155 20090426	AF0218 (CDG-BOM-)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0750 20090426	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0134 20090426	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1402 20090425	AF0018 (CDG-EWR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0531 20090425	AF0833 (PNR-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0710 20090423	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0126 20090423	AF0019 (EWR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1414 20090422	AF0018 (CDG-EWR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0833 20090422	AF0447 (GIG-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1225 20090421	AF0444 (CDG-GIG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0512 20090421	AF0897 (BZV-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1210 20090420	AF0896 ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0519 20090419	AF0573 (JIB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1546 20090417	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0040 20090417	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0023 20090417	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0514 20090415	AF0791 (BKO-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0939 20090414	AF0377 (KDTW-LFPG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0403 20090414	AF0377 (DTW-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1440 20090413	AF0378 (CDG-DTW)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0636 20090413	AF0191 (BLR-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1142 20090412	AF0192 (CDG-BLR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0619 20090412	AF0191 (BLR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1122 20090411	AF0192 (CDG-BLR)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0516 20090411	AF0833 (PNR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	2340 20090409	AF0824 (CDG-PNR)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1557 20090409	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0012 20090409	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	2353 20090408	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1546 20090408	AF0529 (DXB-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	2354 20090406	AF0530 (CDG-DXB)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0911 20090406	AF0459 (GRU-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1252 20090405	AF0456 (CDG-GRU)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0457 20090405	AF0521 (CAI-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1715 20090404	AF0524 (CDG-CAI)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	0721 20090404	AF0051 (ORD-LFPG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1202 20090402	AF0218 (CDG-BOM-)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0500 20090401	AF0731 (OUA-NIM-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1147 20090331	AF0732 (CDG-NIM-OUA)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0541 20090331	AF0791 (BKO-CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1838 20090330	AF0796 (CDG-BKO)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0330 20090330	AF0767 (CKY-DKR-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1525 20090329	AF0762 (CDG-CKY)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1017 20090329	AF0459 (GRU-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	1108 20090328	AF0456 (CDG-GRU)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0648 20090328	AF0135 (BOM–CDG)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1132 20090327	AF0134 (CDG-BOM-)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0116 20090327	AF0365 (PHL-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	2356 20090326	AF0365 (PHL-CDG)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	2355 20090326	AF0000 ()
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1359 20090326	AF0366 (CDG-PHL)
F-GZCP	39644F	(A332 AF)	1429 20090325	AF0508 (CDG-CAI)
F-GZCP		(A332 AF)	0853 20090325	AF0459 (GRU-CDG)

---

END

——-

The “Big” News Out of Paris: 1st “Made in China” Airplane

LeMonde (1st Made in China) Airplane – FAB Nota 37/38 – A330 Seating Chart

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No news in the French press last week or over the weekend on Air France Flight 447, except that the good times are here again for the European aircraft industry.  Meanwhile in Brazil, the first 11 bodies have been identified.

Of these first eleven, ten were Brazilian (five females – five males) and the other nationality (male) has not been made public by the Brazilian medical examiners.

Pretty shameful for reputable French newspapers such as Le Monde and Le Figaro to not mention the families of Flight 447 all week except for the official French/Air France position:  “let the good times roll“…

For more info on the new “Made in China” airplane, see my post last Thursday, “Sign of the Times” USA No Longer A Superpower In The Aircraft Industry?” for background and video of the 1st flight test.

Seriously.  Not kidding….

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LE MONDE | 22.06.09 | 15h13  •  Mis à jour le 22.06.09 | 15h13

Dominique Gallois

Airbus Set to Deliver First “Made in China” Airplane… (English Translation)(Emphasis mine)

After the air show, the upcoming week begins by the first delivery of an Airbus A320 assembled in China. The European aircraft manufacturer to deliver the first plane out of the factory in Tianjin to the Dragon Aviation Leasing. This aircraft will be operated by the regional Sichuan Airlines and has made its test flight in May on board the first Chinese engineer trained to do so by Airbus.

The decision to install an assembly plant in China, the first outside Europe, is the rpart of a contract for 150 planes from Beijing in December 2005. The Tianjin plant is modeled on that of Hamburg (Germany). All sections to be assembled first in the German factory before joining the [Tianjin factory] after one to two months at sea.

A PROMISING MARKET

… A dozen medium-haul A319-A320 are to be delivered this year, before the rate increases to only four aircraft monthly by the end of 2011. The Chinese aviation market has become second behind the United States… at Le Bourget, Airbus tried to break the gloom by announcing contracts worth 12.9 billion dollars (9.3 billion euros).

While the results are well below the record 98 billion dollars recorded in the previous fair in 2007 when the sector was at its peak. However, its rival Boeing has received a firm order for two medium-haul 737-800 for 153 million dollars and a letter of intent for seven 777-300.

These ads Airbus are divided into 58 firm orders for 6.4 billion dollars and 69 intent to purchase $ 6.5 billion. This should enable Airbus to move towards the target of 300 gross orders in 2009 despite the [world-wide economic] crisis. In 2008, [Airbus] had accumulated more than 700 orders.

The ^48th edition of the Salon du Bourget has attracted a total of 360 000 visitors, “roughly the same level as in 2007, according to Commissioner General of the Exhibition, Louis Le Portz. The visitors were slightly fewer: 140 000 against 150 000 two years ago. “Overall, of course we had less visitors, however, the atmosphere was very studious,” says Mr. Le Portz .

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Resgate de Corpos do navio da Marinha /

FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA

21/06/2009 – 19h14 Nota 38 – 21.06.09

INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE

The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command report that, in this Sunday, June 21, there were only supposed sightings of wreckage of the aircraft rugged that distance about 1100 km north of Fernando de Noronha. The corvettes Jaceguai (Brazilian Navy) and Windy (French Navy) were informed of the postponement. The weather conditions were satisfactory for the visual search throughout the day.

The tanker Admiral Gastão Motta follows shift in Recife, carrying a body and remains, and small amount of wreckage and luggage. Remains an estimated arrival at the port of Recife on Monday, March 22, at 10am. The body and the remains will be handed to representatives of the Federal Police and the Legal Medical Institute of Pernambuco (IML). The material collected will be available to the Bureau d’Investigations et D’Analysis of I’Aviation Pour la Securite Civile (BEA).

We reiterate that the organs of the press interested in registering the arrival of the tanker Admiral Gastão Motta, the Port of Recife, should register via the following email address: imprensa.fab @ gmail.com (Command of the Air / Brazilian Navy) . The ship’s captain, Captain-de-Fragata Ednaldo Blum de Oliveira Santos, will be available for press conference.

CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA

—————-

20/06/2009 – 18h05 Nota 37 – 20.06.09

INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE

The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Commandreport that, in this Saturday, June 20, weather conditions were satisfactory for the visual search, but no wreckage or bodies were seen.

The twentieth day of searches, reports that the aircraft A-99 employed to conduct missions in Operation of imaging will no longer be used, since there is already a well delineated area of concentration of the wreckage, the basic goals of its destination, scanning electron. The R-99 flew over 100 hours and fulfill a key role in the operation, especially in its initial phase. The tanker Admiral Gastão Motta is shifting to Recife, bringing a body and a small amount of wreckage and luggage.

The estimate of arrival at the port of Recife is on Monday, March 22, at 10am. The body and the remains will be handed to representatives of the Federal Police and the Legal Medical Institute of Pernambuco (IML). The material collected will be available to the Bureau d’Investigations et D’Analysis of I’Aviation Pour la Securite Civile (BEA).

The Landing Ship Dock-Rio de Janeiro is already in the search. The organs of the press interested in registering the arrival of the tanker Admiral Gastão Motta, the Port of Recife, should register via the following email address: press. fab@gmail.com (Command of the Air / Brazilian Navy). After the arrival of the vessel there will be a press conference with the captain, Captain-de-Fragata Ednaldo Blum de Oliveira Santos.

CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA

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A330-200 Seating

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end