"We the people" tell the government what to do, it doesn't tell us. Our Constitution is a document in which "We the people" tell the government what it is allowed to do. "We the people" are free. Ronald Reagan Farewell Address 1989
“… Obama administration officials who were in key positions on Sept. 11, 2012, acknowledge that a range of mistakes were made the night of the attacks on the U.S. missions in Benghazi, and in messaging to Congress and the public in the aftermath.
The officials spoke to CBS News in a series of interviews and communications under the condition of anonymity so that they could be more frank in their assessments. They do not all agree on the list of mistakes and it’s important to note that they universally claim that any errors or missteps did not cost lives and reflect “incompetence rather than malice or cover up.” Nonetheless, in the eight months since the attacks, this is the most sweeping and detailed discussion by key players of what might have been done differently.
“We’re portrayed by Republicans as either being lying or idiots,” said one Obama administration official who was part of the Benghazi response. “It’s actually closer to us being idiots.”
…The list of mea culpas by Obama administration officials involved in the Benghazi response and aftermath include: standing down the counterterrorism Foreign Emergency Support Team, failing to convene the Counterterrorism Security Group, failing to release the disputed Benghazi “talking points” when Congress asked for them, and using the word “spontaneous” while avoiding the word “terrorism.”
The Foreign Emergency Support Team known as “FEST” is described as “the US Government’s only interagency, on-call, short-notice team poised to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.” It even boasts hostage-negotiating expertise. With U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens reported missing shortly after the Benghazi attacks began, Washington officials were operating under a possible hostage scenario at the outset. Yet deployment of the counterterrorism experts on the FEST was ruled out from the start. That decision became a source of great internal dissent and the cause of puzzlement to some outsiders.
Thursday, an administration official who was part of the Benghazi response told CBS News: “I wish we’d sent it.”…”
King Obama
Drones in the sky o’re the land of the free,
“The Messiah” Obama spying on you and me.
Tapping our phones and e-mail too,
He is afraid of what we can do.
He wants our guns and ammo you see,
Cause his tyranny, is not to be.
We are free people in this land,
But not under the Kings heavy hand.
He is working hard almost everyday,
To try and take our rights away.
GOD given rights he can try and take,
Afraid that will be one tremendous mistake!
Millions have served this great land,
Many have died from an enemies hand.
I cherish this land and freedom too,
I was proud to serve America and of course you.
Black verses white and tween men and women too,
He has started wars to divide me and you.
Take from the makers everything he can,
To GIVE to the takers in this great land.
Between Fast & Furious and Benghazi,
The King is a liar as we all can see.
Lie to America every chance he gets,
There is no lie that he regrets.
We must hold firm to survive this regime,
And send’em packin’ in twenty fourteen.
We will survive there is no doubt,
This is the land of the free that I shout!!
” … Addressing the Benghazi fallout pre-emptively before Erdogan spoke, Obama said that ‘at my direction, we’ve been taking a series of steps that were recommended by the review board.’ He spoke of various measures he was recommending, to ‘learn the lessons of Benghazi.’ But he referred to the murders of four Americans there as an ‘incident,’ not a terror attack.
And his remarks focused on ‘properly funding’ the State Department and Pentagon-run security at diplomatic posts, shifting the burden to Congress to ‘provide resources and new authorities so that we can implement all the recommendations of the Accountability Review Board which issued a report last month. ‘We’re not going to be able to do this alone,’ Obama said. ‘We need Congress.’
The review board is under fire for failing to interview high-level Obama administration figures, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Interviewing Clinton, Republicans on Capitol Hill have said, would have provided insights into who was accountable for lapses in security that left the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya vulnerable to attack.
Islamist terrorists attacked the consulate on Sept. 11, 2012, killing U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other U.S. personnel. But despite Obama’s plea for more funding, money was not an issue in the months before the Benghazi attack when consular officials in Libya asked the State Department for more security forces.
Those requests were repeatedly denied, and neither Hillary Clinton nor other State Department officials have raised a lack of funding as the reason more special forces were not on the scene. On the night of the Benghazi attack, the State Department refused to authorize an existing special forces team in the Libyan capital city of Tripoli to board a military C-130 plane headed to Benghazi, despite their readiness to intervene.
The Obama administration said later that the decision was made because the forces would not have arrived at the consulate, which was under attack, in time to make a difference. The State Department has been silent on the question of how it knew how long the armed, military-style assault from Islamist terror groups would last.
Obama addressed the need to for ”increasing intelligence and warning capabilities’ at ‘diplomatic posts around the world,’ and asked Congress for money to ‘increase the Marine Corps contingents’ at State Department facilities. He also said he wanted additional funding to equip the Department of Defense to respond lightning-quick in times of crisis…”
” …The Benghazi-related emails released by the White House late May 15 exclude the critical emails between administration officials that were sent during the crucial first two days after the deadly jihadi attack that killed four Americans last September. The 100 pages of partially redacted emails also conclude with a dismissive message from CIA chief David Petraeus.
“Frankly, I’d just as soon not use this,” Petraeus said about the heavily edited, four-sentence “talking points” that the White House used to downplay Al Qaeda’s role in the Sep. 11 attack on the poorly protected diplomatic compound.
“This release is long overdue [but] there are relevant documents the Administration has still refused to produce,” said a May 15 statement from Brendan Buck, press secretary to House Majority Leader John Boehner. “We hope, however, that this limited release of documents is a sign of more cooperation to come,” he added.
The two-day gap — the first released email was sent 67 hours after the attack began — plus the Petraeus comment, undermines the White House’s explanation for the rewrite. Officials, including spokesman Jay Carney, say CIA officials — not White House and State Department officials — rewrote a quick-reaction CIA report that had attributed the attack to an al-Qaeda affiliate.
“Even the smallest amount of scrutiny [shows the emails don’t] support their explanation,” said a May 15 tweet from Buck. “The White House’s explanation appears NOWHERE in the actual [email] documents. Nowhere. Not even a hint of it,” Buck added.
After the attack, White House officials used the edited talking points to bolster repeated claims that the organized attack was an unpredictable, spontaneous violent riot by Libyans who were angry about a California-made YouTube video.
The little-known video was sharply critical of Mohammad, the central prophet in Islam. The video was repeatedly cited by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the crisis, which began only eight weeks before the 2012 election.
GOP legislators plan to continue investigating the September cover-up of al-Qaeda’s role, and the current cover-up over the White House’s role in rewriting the CIA report. GOP officials also say more whistleblowers will testify in Congress about the attackers and the White House’s failure to send reinforcements to the beleaguered U.S. diplomats and soldiers.
An interim House report into the cover-up “found that ‘senior State Department officials requested the talking points be changed to avoid criticism for ignoring the threat environment in Benghazi and that those changes were ultimately made,” said the Buck statement.
“Those findings are confirmed by the emails released today … [and] the seemingly political nature of the State Department’s concerns raises questions about the motivations behind these changes and who at the State Department was seeking them,” he concluded…”
“… I have never been an officer, so I can’t speak to this; I have one question to ask:
What is the price of disobedience to your career?
This question is the most pertinent to me. Those of us who have been in any positions of command have been forced, at one time or another, to decide whether following an order or following it “in a different direction” were prudent courses of action. But I want the answers that I may never get.
I want to know why Lt. Col. Gibson didn’t just go anyway?
I want the names of the souless careerists at AFRICOM who left those men to die.
I want to know what happened to putting your career aspirations secondary to saving lives.
As to the first, there are those that are going to tell me “you weren’t there” and call me “monday morning quarterback” and point out how wrong I am and how the foundation of our system is civilian control and obedience to orders, even when we don’t agree with them; and BTW how dare I question this man who was only doing his duty.
I know all of that, and you are entitled to your opinion, just as I; but it is pertinent here to talk about disobedience because disobedience would have put more guns in the fight. Disobedience may have turned this into something other than a blood bath. In my opinion, disobedience in this case, and of this magnitude would have been something absolutely justifiable in the face of any UCMJ action…
…Not the President, SoS, Chief of Staff, or AFRICOM 6 Actual could have stopped me from getting on that aircraft and flying to Benghazi short of actually shooting me. My career wouldn’t mean a big stack of excrement to me at that point. I wouldn’t care if you busted me to low-ass scum sucking private and sent me to Leavenworth to make little rocks out of big rocks in the hot sun; me, my men, and that aircraft would be headed into battle. How’s about you court-martial me if I live?
But as I type those words, maybe I should issue a caveat here; maybe I don’t know the whole story. Maybe 26 of the largest CID agents from the AFRICOM protective detail tackled Col. Gibson right there on the tarmac because he began attempting to steal the aircraft with his men and had to be physically restrained. Maybe there was a stand off like the shower scene in “The Rock” with everyone screaming “STAND DOWN!” The only way to truly know this story and what happened that day is to get Col. Gibson before Congress and have him tell his story. I for one, am on the edge of my seat waiting to hear the ground truth of that day.
As to the second, I have my pencil and paper ready. I promise you that this writer is not going to forget what you did.
And as to the third, I am dishearteningly disappointed that we have reached a point in our zero defects, zero tolerance for mistakes and zero margin for error military operational mentality that we have someone with the training and tools to affect the battle to reinforce the people who are fighting to save the most powerful man in the world’s personal representative and no one thought that it was important enough to try to save the President in Name Only from his spineless, weak-ass, leading from behind, “I will just go back to bed and hope this will all go away” version of non-leadership. The very idea that senior officials would follow an order that directs them to NOT assist men under fire tells me much about how bad the culture has become…”
“I knew wherever I was that you thought of me and that if I got in a tight place, you would come — if alive.” This statement was contained in a letter dated March 10, 1864, written by Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. It expresses an ageless ethos among warriors, especially those within the U.S. military. The commitment to come to the aid of fellow Americans in times of duress and danger has always been one of the foundations of America’s fighting forces. Yet that appears to have changed on Sept. 11, 2012, in Benghazi, Libya, when no effort was made to respond to the calls for help by U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and his CIA team at the U.S. Consulate facility.
Why was there no attempt to save the lives of the ambassador and his colleagues, beyond sending an unarmed drone to observe their demise? The congressional committees investigating the events in Benghazi seem to have focused on the Sunday talk-show statements of Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, who blamed the attack on an obscure anti-Islam video made by a relatively unknown man in California.
While it certainly is important for legislators to determine whether Mrs. Rice was misleading the American public as part of a White House-orchestrated misinformation plan, it is more important to determine why there was no rescue effort. With Mrs. Rice’s name off the table for secretary of state, Congress needs to focus on the military. The excuse that U.S. military forces in the area could not have arrived in time to save Stevens and his team is unacceptable. That means the U.S. military commanders involved determined how long it was going to take the attackers to overrun and kill the Americans in Benghazi. Because their assessment was that it would be done before they could arrive, they chose not to try.
Even if the live video from the drone over the consulate showed that the team in Benghazi had been killed, a military operation still would have been required. It is impossible to determine from an intelligence drone what enemy intentions are and to ascertain the status of other Americans and allies in the vicinity.
The ethos does not apply just to saving lives but includes the notion that no dead American will be left to fall into enemy hands. In 1993, Task Force Ranger fought an 18-hour battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, against a tribal militia numbering in the thousands. I was there as the commander of the Delta Force and bore responsibility for getting 99 warriors out of the city that day after having accomplished our primary mission. The mission was to capture a band of loyalists and supporters of a warlord and tribal leader named Mohammed Aideed. We succeeded in that task rather quickly, but when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down, the mission changed to one that was even more critical. The battle is chronicled in the book and movie “Black Hawk Down.”
What most people do not realize is that the special operations forces involved in that fierce fight, which claimed 15 U.S. lives, were fighting over the bodies of two of their comrades. Both the pilot and the co-pilot of the crashed helicopter were killed on impact and trapped in the twisted wreckage. No one was willing to leave their bodies behind because everyone lived by a code that is encapsulated in the fifth stanza of something called the Ranger Creed: “I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy.”
Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta had multiple options with which to respond to the consulate attack, yet he explained that he was not willing to commit U.S. forces without knowing exactly what was going on at the scene. That is an unacceptable response from the man in charge of our military. Aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet could have responded with close air-support platforms, or U.S. Marines in the region could have been dispatched, probably from Sigonella, Italy, a U.S. base in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, a U.S. Navy SEAL team and a U.S. Army Special Forces battalion were co-located with the U.S. Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany, and both are trained and designated for rescue operations. Why did CNN reach the consulate before any military or U.S. government elements?
Americans must demand answers about why there was no effort to save Stevens and his team — or, as a last resort, to recover their bodies and return them to American control. It would seem that a special investigation by a bipartisan team is in order. The actions of the military during the Benghazi attack must be examined thoroughly. Did the military refuse to respond? Or was it told to “stand down”? Who gave the order not to respond? Why did U.S. leadership decide to let the bodies of Stevens and his cohorts fall into Libyan hands? These questions must be asked, but it appears that these are not concerns of the congressional committees.
Americans who are sent by the U.S. government to perform duties that are considered important to U.S. interests must know that all efforts will be made to protect them and to respond if they are attacked. It is an ethos that is fundamental to our identity as a nation, and we failed to live up to it in Benghazi.
Dec 26, 2012 Retired Lt. Gen. Jerry Boykin is executive vice president at the Family Research Council and was an original member of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force.
Long ago I was a SEAL officer and I attended many joint and combined operational planning meetings in the USA, abroad, and on ships at sea. This type of rescue mission is called a “NEO” operation, for Non-combatant Evacuation Operation. Every embassy and consulate has and practices all kinds of emergency evac plans, in concert with the US military.
For example, Marines and SEALs practice NEO ops prior to deploying on every float, as a VERY high priority mission. They involve full dress-rehearsals, with civilian role players, helos, landing craft, rounding up stranded stragglers, opfor ambushes, role-playing “angry mobs,” fighting your way to LZs or even beaches while protecting a gaggle of civilians down to babies etc. Conducting successful NEO ops is a TOP TOP TOP military and state department mission priority. I cannot emphasize this enough. NEO ops are planned and practiced over and over and over.
When the alarm goes off worldwide that an embassy or consulate is being attacked, the entire U.S. military swings into rescue mode, without waiting for any orders from the White House. The military does all of the operational planning and begins to execute the rescue op.
The one thing they CAN’T do is cross an international border without permission from POTUS. So the US Military will be inbound full-steam-ahead to make the rescue, and all they need from POTUS is a “proceed” order. In this case, they got a “stand down” instead.
This is at the POTUS level, it is not a decision taken at State. State and the military (JCS) should be in the Situation Room with POTUS soon after a critical incident like this begins, so all decisions can be made in real time. (I have heard nowhere that POTUS went into the Situation Room at all. Apparently he went to the Oval Office briefly, but not down to the Situation Room, where the “war planning” screens, full staffs and commo tools are all located for dealing with a major crisis.)
But if POTUS punts after a brief Oval Office meeting with Dempsey and Hillary and goes upstairs to the family quarters….the stranded Americans will die. Only POTUS can give the order to cross international borders. Only POTUS can allow US warplanes to give air support to Americans battling on the ground in a foreign country. If POTUS makes himself unavailable, the Americans will die.
Even the VEEP or Secretary of State cannot make that call. The VEEP can only do it if the POTUS is determined to be medically unable to perform his functions. If the POTUS goes upstairs and turns off his phone, there is nothing anybody can do about it. Nothing. And the besieged Americans will die.
On Friday an anonymous Pentagon insider (”Doug”) called into Rush with a lot of new details about this disgraceful fiasco. But what we really need now is for a high-ranking officer with insider knowledge to go public, risk his pension and career, and tell the truth.
The blame for this humiliating and shameful national disgrace is pointing directly at the POTUS, and America needs to know why the inbound rescue operation was aborted.
Source & Name Withheld
U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet 31ST FIGHTER WING “RETURN WITH HONOR”
MISSION
The mission of the 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Base, Italy, is to deliver combat power and support across the globe to achieve U.S. and NATO objectives. The 31st FW maintains two F-16 fighter squadrons, the 555th FS and the 510th FS, capable of conducting offensive and defensive air combat operations.
In peacetime, the 31st FW prepares for its combat role by maintaining aircraft and personnel in a high state of readiness. The 31st FW also includes the 603rd Air Control Squadron, capable of providing air surveillance, control and communications. The 31st FW is the only U.S. fighter wing south of the Alps. This strategic location makes the wing critical to operations in NATO’s southern region.
Beginning July 1994, the wing provided combat support for NATO’s first-ever operational mission, Deny Flight, an effort to limit the war in Bosnia through imposition of a no-fly zone. And in August and September 1995, 31st FW F-16s flew more than 400 combat sorties during Operation Deliberate Force. Operation Deny Flight ended with the formal signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, and the wing’s emphasis shifted to support what is now Operation Deliberate Forge. In March 1999, in support of Operation Allied Force, U.S. and allied forces assembled at Aviano Air Base, Italy, to react if called upon by NATO leadership.
In 2000, the wing began its full-fledged participation in the Expeditionary Air Force. From March to September 2000, the 510th and 555th Fighter Squadrons conducted back-to-back deployments to Ahmed Al Jaber AB, Kuwait, in support of Operation Southern WATCH. The wing’s support of Operation Iraqi Freedom began in late 2003. The 31st FW continued deploying forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF, with personnel supporting combat operations every year since 2003.
The only significant deviation from this pattern occurred in 2007 when the 555th FS deployed to Kunsan AB, Republic of South Korea, to provide theater support to the U.S. Forces Korea commander. This marked the first time in history that an entire USAFE fighter unit deployed to Asia.
In March 2011, the 31st FW played a major role in the United Nations’ response to the crisis in Libya, known as Operation Odyssey Dawn in enforcing no-fly zone UNSR 1973. The wing hosted four flying units and more than 1,350 personnel during the 15-day operation, March 17-31. It worked around the clock to launch 2,250 flying operations out of Aviano AB. As OOD came to an end on March 31, so began Operation Unified Protector, with NATO taking the lead until the operation’s conclusion Oct. 31.
The 31st FW has one assigned geographically separated unit, the 731st Munitions Squadron at Camp Darby, Italy. The wing also supports numerous other geographically separated units.
FOR REFERENCE
NATO Operations In Libya By Country
Country
Personnel
Aircraft
Sorties
Cruise Missiles
Main air base
Belgium
170
6
60
Araxos base in south-western greece
Bulgaria
160
0
0
Canada
560
11
358
Trapani-Birgi and Sigonella
Denmark
120
4
161
0
Sigonella, Sicily
France
800
29
1,200
currently operating from French Air Bases of Avord, Nancy, St Dizier, Dijon and Istres, as well as Evreux and Orléans for planes engaged in logistics.
Greece
0
0
0
Aktion and Andravida military air fields in Crete
Italy
12
600
Gioia del Colle, Trapani, Sigonella, Decimomannu, Amendola, Aviano, Pantelleria
Jordan
30
12
Cerenecia, Libya
Netherlands
200
7
sardinian base, decimomannu
Norway
140
6
100
Souda Bay, Crete
Qatar
60
8
Souda Bay, Crete
Romania
205
Spain
500
7
Sweden
122
8
78
0
Sigonella
Turkey
6
Sigonella Air Base in Italy
UAE
35
12
Decimomannu, Sardinia
UK
1300
28
1,300
18
Gioia del Colle, Italy and RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus
US
8507
153
2,000
228
TOTALS
12,909
309
5,857
246
AFRICOM: AF, Navy still flying Libya missions Jun. 30, 2011
Air Force and Navy aircraft are still flying hundreds of strike missions over Libya despite the Obama administration’s claim that American forces are playing only a limited support role in the NATO operation. An Africa Command (AFRICOM) spokeswoman confirmed Wednesday that since NATO’s Operation Unified Protector (OUP) took over from the American-led Operation Odyssey Dawn on March 31, the U.S. military has flown hundreds of strike sorties. Previously, Washington had claimed that it was mostly providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and tanker support to NATO forces operating over Libya.
“U.S. aircraft continue to fly support [ISR and refueling] missions, as well as strike sorties under NATO tasking,” AFRICOM spokeswoman Nicole Dalrymple said in an emailed statement. “As of today, and since 31 March, the U.S. has flown a total of 3,475 sorties in support of OUP. Of those, 801 were strike sorties, 132 of which actually dropped ordnance.” A White House report on Libya sent to Congress on June 15 says that “American strikes are limited to the suppression of enemy air defense and occasional strikes by unmanned Predator UAVs against a specific set of targets.” The report also says the U.S. provides an “alert strike package.”
Dalrymple named the Air Force’s F-16CJ and Navy’s EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft as the primary platforms that have been suppressing enemy air defenses. However, those F-16s are not solely drawn from units based in Spangdahlem, Germany, or Aviano, Italy. The service has reportedly deployed U.S.-based units to Europe to conduct these operations.
Earlier this month, Malta Today reported that two F-16s from the 77th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, made emergency landings on the island. The 20th Fighter Wing is based at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C. The AFRICOM spokeswoman did not address why U.S.-based units were deployed for the mission. The Navy’s Growlers are based at Whidbey Island, Wash.
However, those may not be the only strike aircraft flying over Libya. Last week, Air Force F-15E crews attending the Paris Air Show, along with their public affairs officer, said they could not talk about their activities in Libya during Odyssey Dawn because they are not able to comment on “current operations.”
AFRICOM couldn’t immediately say when the last U.S. strike sortie over Libya was flown. The fact that the U.S. is conducting strike missions over Libya should not come as a surprise, said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, the service’s former intelligence chief. “It’s no surprise to me that we’ve been participating, because we’re a member of NATO,” Deptula said.
What is different now, he said, is that sorties are planned differently under NATO control. Deptula said it is not particularly surprising that additional units would be brought in to support those operations. The revelation comes as a debate rages in Washington over the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which calls for the president to ask Congress for permission to deploy American forces into combat longer than 60 days. If the Congress does not grant that permission within that span, U.S. forces must be withdrawn within 30 days.
“It’s not necessarily a violation of the War Powers Resolution,” said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, now associate director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, and visiting professor of the practice at Duke University School of Law. “[But] it does raise questions about the scope and intensity of our participation versus how it’s been represented.”
Others disagreed. The president is in clear violation of the War Powers Resolution, said Robert Turner, co-founder of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia. Under the legal definition of hostilities, even providing logistical support or intelligence data qualifies as such, he said, never mind firing missiles from Predator UAVs or F-16 fighters.
However, the resolution itself is unconstitutional because treaties are effectively part of the Constitution the way the framers wrote the document, he said. “Legally, this is his discretion, but he is in clear violation of the statute,” Turner said. “The reason he’s not bound by that is because the statute is clearly unconstitutional.”
Dunlap said he is less sure. “It does raise that specter [of violating the Constitution], but in any event, it doesn’t seem to track with what we’ve been told about the relatively benign participation of U.S. forces,” he said. The Obama administration has said that the War Powers Resolution does not apply to the Libya operation because the U.S. role is limited.
The White House declined to comment on how 801 strike sorties constitutes “limited” involvement, but Harold Koh, a State Department legal adviser, said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday that “when U.S forces engage in a limited military mission, that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops, and limited risk of serious escalation, and employs limited military means, we are not in the kind of hostilities of the kind envisioned by the War Powers Resolution.”
He said there have been “no active exchanges of fire with hostile forces” despite AFRICOM’s statement that weapons had been dropped during 132 sorties. Many in Congress on both sides of the aisle vehemently disagree with the White House’s contention.
Most air assets involved in the campaign are reconnaissance aircraft, including the U-2 high-altitude spy plane, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System ground surveillance aircraft and the Navy’s P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. The U.S. provides nearly 70 percent of the NATO operation’s ISR capacity, according to the White House report.
Additionally, the Air Force is still providing EC-130J aircraft to the operation to conduct psychological warfare operations by broadcasting coercive messages. The remaining aircraft operating in the theater are aerial refueling tankers, including KC-10s and KC-135s. The U.S. also provides the majority of the alliance’s tanker capability.
USS George H.W. Bush (AT SEA) — The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator (UCAS-D) completed its first ever carrier-based catapult launch from USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) off the coast of Virginia today.
“Today we saw a small, but significant pixel in the future picture of our Navy as we begin integration of unmanned systems into arguably the most complex warfighting environment that exists today: the flight deck of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,” said Vice Adm. David Buss, commander, Naval Air Forces, the Navy’s “Air Boss”.
The unmanned aircraft launched from the deck of George H.W. Bush at 11:18 a.m. It executed several planned low approaches to the carrier and safely transited across the Chesapeake Bay to land at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md., after an approximately 65-minute flight.
Buss called the launch a “watershed event” in naval aviation and said he expects that decades from now, a future “Air Boss” will have a picture of the X-47B launching from Bush behind his or her desk just as he has a picture of aviation pioneer Eugene Ely’s first-ever landing on the deck of a ship in 1911 behind his desk today.
Completing another important first for the UCAS-D program, the team demonstrated the ability to precisely navigate the X-47B within the controlled airspace around an aircraft carrier at sea and seamlessly pass control of the air vehicle from a “mission operator” aboard the carrier to one located in the Mission Test Control Center at NAS Patuxent River for landing.
“The flight today demonstrated that the X-47B is capable of operation from a carrier, hand-off from one mission control station to another, flight through the national airspace, and recovery at another location without degradation in safety or precision,” said Matt Funk, lead test engineer for the Navy UCAS program.
Prior to the catapult launch on Tuesday, the UCAS test team also conducted deck-handling and ship-integration testing to demonstrate the capability to safely operate the X-47B in the dynamic, unforgiving environment of an aircraft carrier flight deck.
“This event is a testament to the teamwork, professionalism and expertise of everyone involved with X-47B program,” said Rear Adm. Mat Winter, program executive officer for Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons. “Their work will positively impact future unmanned aviation development for years to come.”
Over the next few weeks, the X-47B aircraft will fly approaches to the ship multiple times and eventually land on the pitching flight deck, said Navy UCAS Program Manager Capt. Jaime Engdahl.
The UCAS team will conduct additional shore-based testing with the X-47B at NAS Patuxent River in the coming months before its final carrier-based arrested landing demonstration later this summer.
In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued new defense strategic guidance (DSG)—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense—which serves as a foundational document in establishing national security interests, the threats to these interests, and the fiscal realities that guide our military posture. The DSG directed a rebalance of forces, with a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region, as well as continued emphasis on the Middle East. Using the DSG as a point of departure, the Secretary of Defense recently directed a strategic choices and management review in light of budget realities—such as sequestration—and strategic uncertainty. This review will continue to help the Air Force to identify the major strategic choices that we must make to properly and realistically plan for the future.
Although the future is uncertain, we know that the capability to sustain national priorities hinges upon a strong and capable Air Force. Over the last 12 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required Air Force capabilities to help force rogue regimes from power and then to provide critical support to land forces engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and the Air Force currently plans to maintain these capabilities.
In addition, the expected military challenges of the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Africa suggest an increasing reliance on airpower, not only by America and her allies, but also by her adversaries. The defining characteristics of American airpower—range, speed, flexibility, precision, persistence, and lethality—have played a crucial role in cultivating stability in these regions, a trend that will only increase in the future. The sheer geographic size and extended lines of communication of the Asia-Pacific region, along with the developing military expansion of potential regional adversaries, demand an air force that is postured to ensure stability and preserve U.S. interests.
The Air Force is committed, along with our joint partners and allies and through cooperative military relationships, to ensuring global and regional stability and mutual freedom of access to the global commons to secure our common interests around the world.
The Air Force’s technological advantage is threatened by the worldwide proliferation of advanced technologies, including integrated air defenses, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles with precision-capable warheads, and advanced air combat capabilities.
Advances in adversarial capabilities in space control and cyber warfare may also limit U.S. freedom of action. Some of these technologies are attained with relatively minimal cost, greatly reducing the barriers to entry that have historically limited the reach and power of non-state actors, organized militias, and radical extremists. We live in an age of surprise, where individual acts can be powerful and the effects can be global. Today’s strategic environment presents a broad range of threats and an unpredictable set of challenges, ranging from non-state actors to nuclear armed nations.
We must continue to invest in our science and technology base to ensure that the future balance of power remains in our favor. This requires flexibility, versatility, and a shift to inherently agile, deployable, and networked systems from those designed for fixed purposes or limited missions.
One initiative that we continue to pursue as we consider the strategic environment is the Air-Sea Battle concept. Air-Sea Battle is an operational concept focused on the ways and means that are necessary to overcome current and anticipated anti-access and area denial threats. By focusing on increased integration and interoperability between all Services, the concept ensures that joint forces maintain the ability to project power and protect national interests despite the proliferation of anti-access/area denial threats worldwide. The concept is not a strategy, nor does it target a specific adversary, but instead focuses on acquiring pre-integrated, joint capabilities. Beyond conflict, the Air-Sea Battle concept can enhance response to humanitarian missions where weather or geography may deny access.
Even as we rebalance our forces, we are aware that the time, place, and nature of the next contingency can never be predicted with certainty. When contingencies arise, we must maintain the ability to respond immediately and effectively if called to action. To align with the DSG, the Air Force has traded size for quality. We aim to be a smaller, but superb, force that maintains the agility, flexibility, and readiness to engage a full range of contingencies and threats.
Fiscal Environment
We recognize that because our Nation is striving to reduce spending and our military is transitioning operations from the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region, the Air Force must adapt to a relatively static or reduced budget.
However, reliance by the joint team and the Nation on our unique ability to provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power constrains Air Force options in reducing or terminating capabilities or missions. Therefore, we are working hard and making real progress in eliminating unnecessary expenses and ensuring more disciplined use of resources. Nonetheless, the fiscal environment requires us to make trades between force structure, readiness, and modernization among the core missions to ensure the highest quality and ready Air Force possible.
Fiscal Year 2013 Sequestration Effects
As a result of the triggering of the 2011 Budget Control Act’s sequestration provision, the Air Force is implementing significant reductions to our fiscal year 2013 (FY13) operations. If the post-sequester Budget Control Act funding caps remain in effect, the Air Force will be unable to achieve our agenda of reinvigorating readiness and aligning to the DSG. In both the short- and long-term, sequestration will have devastating impacts to readiness, will significantly affect our modernization programs, and may cause further force structure reductions.
Sequestration will force the Air Force to reduce expenditures by around $10 billion in FY13. These actions include a planned furlough of more than 170,000 civil service employees, an 18 percent reduction in flying training and aircraft maintenance, and deferment of critical facility requirements (including runway and taxiway repairs).
Many of these actions severely degrade Air Force readiness. Lost flight hours will cause unit stand downs which will result in severe, rapid, and long-term unit combat readiness degradation.
We have already ceased operations for one-third of our fighter and bomber force. Within 60 days of a stand down, the affected units will be unable to meet emergent or operations plans requirements. Lost currency training requires six months to a year to return to current suboptimal levels, with desired flying proficiency for crewmembers requiring even longer.
Sequestration impacts are already occurring, and the FY14 President’s Budget (PB) does not assume the costs of recovering the readiness impacts from even a partial year of sequestration.
Depot delays will also result in the grounding of some affected aircraft. The deferments mean idled production shops, a degradation of workforce proficiency and productivity, and corresponding future volatility and operational costs. It can take two-to-three years to recover full restoration of depot workforce productivity and proficiency. In our space portfolio, sequestration will force the elimination of some system redundancies, as well as other preventative maintenance actions designed to minimize risk. All of these sequestration impacts negatively affect Air Force full-spectrum readiness at a time when we have been striving to reverse a declining trend in this critical area.
As a result of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, the Air Force has been able to make limited funding transfers and reprogramming actions that will help alleviate the most problematic and immediate FY13 funding shortfalls. However, the decisions that we have been forced to make in short-term spending may increase total costs over the long run. For example, sequestration cuts to Air Force modernization will impact every one of our investment programs. These program disruptions will, over time, cost more taxpayer dollars to rectify contract restructures and program inefficiencies, raise unit costs, and delay delivery of validated capabilities to warfighters in the field. The drastic reduction to modernization programs reduces our Air Force’s competitive advantage and decreases the probability of mission success in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sequestration Effects in FY14 and Beyond
The President’s Budget includes balanced deficit reduction proposals that would allow Congress to replace and repeal sequestration in FY13 and the associated cap reductions in FY14 – 21. If sequestration is not replaced, however, the Air Force will have to rebuild degraded unit readiness, accept further delays to modernization, absorb the backlog in depot maintenance inductions, and invest additional funding to restore infrastructure. While the Air Force has made every effort to minimize impacts to readiness and people, the bow-wave of reductions, deferments, and cancellations associated with sequestration will challenge the strategic choices made in the FY14 budget submission.
The exact impacts of sequestration on Air Force resources in FY14 and beyond depend on congressional action. We do know, however, that the national fiscal situation will require some reductions that may increase risk to our readiness, force structure, and our ability to modernize an aging aircraft inventory. In addition, the outcome of the strategic choices and management review may drive further changes.
As we navigate the uncertain way ahead, in order to mitigate risk in critical areas like readiness, force structure, and modernization, and to avoid a hollow force, we will continue to work with Congress to develop force shaping options, urgently seek another base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, and ask for relief from legislative restrictions on the reduction of excess force structure and from mandatory expenditures on programs that we have proposed to retire or terminate. To slow the growth in military compensation while also fully supporting the all volunteer force, we also request congressional support on limiting the basic military pay raise to one percent and allowing sensible TRICARE fee and pharmacy co-pay changes.
In spite of these fiscal challenges, the Air Force will continue to strive to balance reductions across the force to maintain the capabilities of the remaining forces and keep the Air Force strong.
5/10/2013 - WASHINGTON (AFNS) – Appearing before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense to testify about the service’s fiscal 2014 budget request, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III also addressed Congressional concerns over media reports about the findings of a recent missile wing inspection.
The 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., received an overall, passing “Satisfactory” rating during a Consolidated Unit Inspection by Air Force Global Strike Command, March 4 to13. Twenty-two areas were inspected during the CUI, with the missile wing earning an “Outstanding” rating in one area, “Excellent” ratings in 14 areas, and “Satisfactory” ratings in six areas. One area was rated “Marginal.”
Donley said the ICBM force, which maintains a high state of readiness as part of its mission, remains a safe, secure and reliable element of the nation’s nuclear triad, and what was found represents the stronger inspection process the Air Force adopted as it reinvigorated the nuclear enterprise. “We have made substantial progress in restoring the confidence, I think, of our entire [Department of Defense] and Congressional leadership in the Air Force’s management of this important responsibility,” Donley said. “It is a number one responsibility for our Air Force that we take very, very seriously.”
As a result of the inspection and further review, unit leaders identified proficiency shortfalls compounded by an attitude of complacency among a small number of officers. They sent a call-for-action email to missile crew members to re-emphasize the high standards expected in the nuclear mission area. It identified areas for improvement, outlined expectations, and reinforced pride and importance of the mission.
“I believe this is the kind of commander intervention that prevents the incidents that occurred in 2007,” Welsh said. “They took very aggressive action early to make sure that there was no question in the minds of their crew force that marginal behavior or satisfactory-just-above-the-line was not acceptable.”
The inspection also allowed the unit commanders to assess performance of the crew members to identify individuals that require more training. The 91st Operations Group identified 17 crew members who required more training–approximately five to six from each of the three missile squadrons. Currently, the 17 officers identified are going through what Welsh described as a retraining program that should last roughly 60 days.
Welsh made it clear that he feels the marginal findings do not present a risk to the Air Force’s nuclear mission, but are a result of identifying a potential problem before it has the ability to snowball — the exact reason the Air Force has inspections. The service uses assessments and inspections as tools for commanders to assess people, processes and performance.
“I don’t believe we have a nuclear surety risk at Minot Air Force Base,” Welsh said. “I believe we have commanders who are taking very aggressive action to ensure that never occurs. And in that respect, this is a good thing.” Talking about the Airmen who perform the nuclear deterrence mission, Welsh reaffirmed his confidence in them.
“Their performance is really exceptional day-to-day … it has to be. There is no other option,” he said. “And I think our commitment is that we make sure we keep that motivation as they move up through the ranks, and make sure they understand that the Air Force recognizes it.”
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, PATUXENT RIVER, Md. – The Navy’s X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) demonstrator completed its first-ever arrested landing here May 4, another key step to mature the system for its historic carrier-based tests later this month.
“Landing an unmanned aircraft on an aircraft carrier will be the greatest singular accomplishment for the UCAS demonstration and will serve as the culmination of over a decade of Navy unmanned carrier integration work”, said Capt. Jaime Engdahl, Navy UCAS program manager. “Shore based arrested landing testing here at NAS Patuxent River is our final check that the X-47B can meet that objective.”
During Saturday’s test, the X-47B used a tailhook on the aircraft to catch a carrier representative cable, known as the MK-7 arresting gear, to quickly stop the aircraft. This is known as an arrested landing, the type of recovery required aboard aircraft carriers. The MK-7 arresting gear is an underground installation of actual carrier equipment that accommodates structural tests and aircraft/arresting gear compatibility studies with all models of U.S. Navy carrier aircraft.
“Shore-based testing allows our combined Navy/Northrop Grumman team to control test conditions before taking the aircraft to the ship,” said Matt Funk, Navy UCAS test team lead. “We are gradually building up to the maximum load conditions we expect to see during an arrested landing aboard an aircraft carrier.”
This month the aircraft will undergo sea-based carrier testing, catapulting from the carrier deck and potentially completing landings aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77).
“The entire system has performed very well across a large set of shore-based testing events including aircraft performance, flying qualities, navigation performance, catapult launches, and precision landings designed to stress system operation,” Engdahl said. “Our final carrier-landing software simulation shows excellent performance, flight test results are very good, and we are confident the X-47B will perform well on the ship.”
The X-47B is a tailless, autonomous aircraft designed with unique features for an unmanned aircraft, such as carrier suitable landing gear and structure. While the X-47B itself will not be used for operational use, the UCAS-D program is developing a concept of operations and demonstrating technologies for use in follow-on unmanned carrier based aircraft programs.
“This actual demonstration of the X-47B unmanned carrier operations is a first, essential step toward developing a carrier-based unmanned system for the U.S. Navy,” said Rear Adm. Mat Winter, who leads the Program Executive Office for Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons. “A carrier-based unmanned aircraft will increase carrier strike group relevance, provide opportunities for training and readiness cost avoidance and enable our future forward deployed carrier air wings to provide continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.”
Videos: Broadcast quality video can be downloaded at the links below:
The mission of the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) is to mature technologies for a carrier (CV) suitable unmanned air system (UAS), while reducing risk for UAS carrier integration and developing the critical data necessary to support potential follow-on acquisition programs.
Description
In the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Navy was directed to restructure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program and develop an unmanned, longer- range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide greater aircraft carrier standoff capability, to expand payload and launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.
The Navy UCAS program will develop and demonstrate a CV suitable unmanned air system in support of persistent, penetrating surveillance, and penetrating strike capability in high threat areas. The Navy UCAS program will evolve technologies required to conduct Launch, Recovery, and Carrier Controlled Airspace (CCA) operations and Autonomous Aerial Refueling (AAR) . In FY13, the Navy plans to achieve UCAS CV demonstration objectives. In FY14, the Navy plans to achieve probe & drogue (USN style) and boom/receptacle (USAF style) AAR demonstration.
The X-47B made a successful first flight in February 2011 and is now at NAS Patuxent River, Md., undergoing shore-based carrier suitability testing in preparation for sea trials in 2013.
Specifications
Overall Length: 38.2 feet Wingspan: 62.1 Feet Height: 10.4 feet Aircraft Carrier Takeoff Gross Weight: approximately 44,500 pounds Speed: High subsonic Power Plant: one Pratt & Whitney F100-220U engine Payload Provisions: 4500 pounds, plus allowance for electro-optical, infrared, radar and electronic support measures sensors Autonomous Aerial Refueling Provisions: US Navy and US Air Force styles Contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation
Program Status
ACAT: Pre-Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Production Phase: Demo Inventory: 2
“… The Internal Revenue Service asked tea party groups to see donor rolls. It asked for printouts of Facebook posts. And it asked what books people were reading. A POLITICO review of documents from 11 tea party and conservative groups that the IRS scrutinized in 2012 shows the agency wanted to know everything — in some cases, it even seemed curious what members were thinking. The review included interviews with groups or their representatives from Hawaii, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas and elsewhere.
The long-awaited Treasury Department inspector general report released Tuesday says the agency itself decided some of its questions to conservative groups were way over the line — especially the one about donors. The Internal Revenue Service asked tea party groups to see donor rolls. It asked for printouts of Facebook posts…
Some of the letters asked for copies of the groups’ Web pages, blog posts and social media postings — making some tea party members worry they’d be punished for their tweets or Facebook comments by their followers. And each letter had a stern warning about “penalties of perjury” — which became intimidating for groups that were being asked about future activities, like future donations or endorsements. In one instance, the American Patriots Against Government Excess was asked to provide summaries or copies of all material passed out at meetings. The group had been reading “The 5000 Year Leap” by Cleon Skousen and the U.S. Constitution…”
“… The story told by Lois Lerner in Friday’s IRS apology continues to fall apart faster than Al Capone’s audit defense. Last night, the Washington Post revealed that the effort to target opponents of the Obama administration was not limited to just one office in Cincinnati, but encompassed three other offices as well — one of which was IRS headquarters in Washington DC…
The story told by Lois Lerner in Friday’s IRS apology continues to fall apart faster than Al Capone’s audit defense. Last night, the Washington Post revealed that the effort to target opponents of the Obama administration was not limited to just one office in Cincinnati, but encompassed three other offices as well — one of which was IRS headquarters in Washington DC…
Let’s raise a red flag on the Shulman claim. It’s very convenient for Shulman to claim now that he was briefed in May 2012, because he testified twice in March 2012 that nothing of this sort was happening at the IRS. However, the IRS chief counsel — the top attorney in the organization — was informed in August 2011 of this targeting. Just how likely would it have been that Shulman’s chief lawyer would have failed to mention this for nine months, and waited to brief him on it until Shulman was almost out the door? I’d call that extremely unlikely, and even putting that aside, it still leaves the question of why Shulman never bothered to let anyone know about it, even as a private citizen.
Clearly, this strategy was no isolated incident. Four separate offices spread far across the country worked to put this targeting in place against the political opponents of the White House. That alone smacks of higher-level coordination, at either the IRS Commissioner level or above. The fact that it took place in the IRS’ Washington headquarters also shows that it was no rogue effort that ran wild due to lack of supervision. This was purposeful…” –Ed Morrissey – Hotair
“… The Internal Revenue Service wrote to the Richmond Tea Party last year demanding to know the names of all its financial donors and volunteers, as part of a 55-question inquisition into its application for tax-exempt status, MailOnline has learned.
The agency wanted to know ‘the names of the donors, contributors, and grantors’ for every year ‘from inception to the present.’ It also demanded ‘the amounts of each of the donations, contributions, and grants and the dates you received them.’ ‘How did you use these donations, contributions, and grants?’ the IRS asked. ‘Provide the details.’
And in addition to the names of board members, officers and employees, the nation’s taxing authorities insisted on knowing the names of everyone who helped the Richmond Tea Party without compensation. ‘Please identify your volunteers,’ the January 9, 2012 letter from the IRS read. The agency also required the Virginia conservative group to provide copies of sections of its website that only its members can access.
And in addition to the names of board members, officers and employees, the nation’s taxing authorities insisted on knowing the names of everyone who helped the Richmond Tea Party without compensation. ‘Please identify your volunteers,’ the January 9, 2012 letter from the IRS read. The agency also required the Virginia conservative group to provide copies of sections of its website that only its members can access.
The IRS ultimately identified approximately 300 such organizations, many of which were independently organized in 2009 and 2010 under the larger ‘tea party’ banner. Those groups had a decisive impact in the 2010 midterm congressional elections, and became a thorn in the side of the Democratic party, costing it race after race, especially in the House of Representatives, which shifted to Republican control.
In the nearly three years since the IRS began looking more closely at conservative nonprofit groups than others, 125 of the 300 target organizations have been approved for tax-exempt status. Another 25 withdrew their applications. The remainder are still waiting.
The Office of Inspector General’s timeline shows that in Washington, senior officials with the IRS were made aware of the practice by at least August 4, 2011. On that date, the chief counsel of the IRS met with the agency’s Rulings and Agreements unit ‘so that everyone would have the latest information on the issue.’
But during a press gaggle about Air Force One on Monday, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney insisted the White House was unaware of the investigation or its political implications until last month.
‘My understanding,’ Carney told reporters while en route to New York City for the president’s appearance at political fundraising events, ‘is that the White House Counsel’s Office was alerted in the week of April 22nd of this year, only about the fact that the IG was finishing a review about matters involving the office in Cincinnati. But that’s all they were informed as a normal sort of heads-up.’
‘And we have never – we don’t have access to, nor should we, the IG’s report or any draft versions of it.’ Asked whether heads would roll at the IRS if the IG’s report concludes that there was substantial wrongdoing, Carney was cautious.
‘I think you’re getting ahead of it,’ he told a reporter, according to a transcript released by the White House. ‘I think you heard from the President on this today and how he feels about it. But the “if” is very important, so we’re not going to start predicting outcomes if we don’t know what the conclusions of the IG report are.’
The Washington Post reported on Friday that the IRS has apologized for its practices, which sought to scrutinize conservative nonprofit groups ‘that criticized the government and sought to educate Americans about the U.S. Constitution.’
In early 2012 a group of tea party organizations refused the IRS’s requests for what they considered overreaching information about their operations, instead asking the House Oversight and Government Affairs Committee to investigate. That committee wrote in June 2012 to the IRS inspector general, asking for ‘periodic updates’ on its investigation.
California Republican Rep. Darrel Issa, who chairs the committee, has promised it will ‘aggressively follow up’ on the IG’s findings. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor said in a statement Friday that the IRS ‘cannot target or intimidate any individual or organization based on their political beliefs.’
‘The House will investigate this matter,’ Cantor promised. Add appearing on the Fox News Channel on Sunday, Michigan Republican Rep. Mike Rogers said the IRS had ‘agents who were engaged in intimidation of political groups.’ ‘I don’t care if you’re a conservative, a liberal, a Democrat or a Republican,’ he said. ‘This should send a chill up your spine. It needs to have a full investigation.’
President Obama echoed that sentiment during a press conference on Monday, sayign any IRS personnel who played political favorites ‘have to be held fully accountable. … And you should feel that way regardless of party. I don’t care whether you’re a Democrat, independent or a Republican.’
‘At some point, there are going to be Republican administrations. At some point, there are going to be Democratic ones. Either way,’ the president said, ‘you don’t want the IRS ever being perceived to be biased and anything less than neutral in terms of how they operate.’
Richmond Tea Party Executive Director Larry Nordvig did not immediately respond to a request for comment. But in 2012 his organization lashed out at the IRS for making ‘unreasonable documentation requests.’
‘This illustrates everything the American people find unacceptable from their government,’ the group said in a press release. ‘A simple request for tax-exempt status should not take years to complete, involve hundreds of pages of documentation, require hundreds of volunteer hours, and request private information we should never have to disclose.’
‘This grants the Federal Government the dangerous power to selectively stymie those voices with which they disagree, bogging them down in endless paperwork and compliance costs so that they are unable to spend time serving the principles they founded their organization to advance.’
The Virginia organization said it applied for 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status on December 28, 2009 and waited nearly 10 months for a response, which consisted of 17 questions and a two-week deadline. That demand was made on the opening day of the Virginia Tea Party Convention, which the Richmond Tea Party organized in large part.
‘We fully complied,’ the group wrote, ‘providing over 500 pages of documentation. We received no response for over a year. Eventually the IRS sent a letter dated January 9, 2012, thanking us for our “complete and thorough responses” from the first request,’ but then asking 55 more questions in 12 parts – ‘including the totally inappropriate request for a full list of our donors and volunteers. We were given the same two-week timeframe for completion.’
Alan P. Dye, a nonprofit attorney with the Washington, D.C. firm of Webster, Chamberlain & Bean, told MailOnline that he represents six tea party groups that have been waiting for periods of up to 30 months for the IRS to issue rulings.
‘They’re very pissed off,’ he said, ‘and they have every right to be pissed off.’…”
“… The IRS said over the weekend it is in the process of independently confirming the dates mentioned on the timeline of events contained in the inspector general report, “but we believe the [inspector general's] timeline is correct.” The IRS said the report supports its view that its missteps weren’t politically motivated and were limited to lower-level workers.
The IRS also said the report reflects that “IRS senior leadership was not aware of this level of specific details” at the time of a March 2012 hearing where Mr. Shulman denied any targeting of conservative groups. Mr. Shulman, who no longer works for the IRS, declined to comment.
The new details suggest that agency workers were examining statements in applications for tax-exempt status to determine whether groups had political leanings.
Tax-exempt social-welfare groups organized under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code are allowed to engage in some political activity, but the primary focus of their efforts must remain promoting social welfare. That social-welfare activity can include lobbying and advocating for issues and legislation, but not outright political-campaign activity. But some of the rules leave room for IRS officials to make judgment calls and probe individual groups for further information.
Organizing as such a group is desirable, not just because such entities typically don’t have to pay taxes, but also because they generally don’t have to identify their donors.
IRS officials said last week that the focused review of conservative groups was initiated by lower-level civil servants in the IRS Cincinnati office, not by political appointees in Washington, and that it wasn’t politically motivated. They say it stemmed from a misguided effort to centralize review of a growing number of applications for tax-exempt 501(c)(4) status. But questions continued to swirl about the failure of IRS officials to disclose the problems until the inspector general’s report was about to become public.
The timeline contained in the draft report indicates that IRS scrutiny of tea-party and other conservative groups began as early as 2010 and came to the attention of Ms. Lerner, the head of the tax-exempt-organizations division, at least by the following year.
The report’s timeline indicates that the criteria were changed to be more neutral in July 2011 after Ms. Lerner “raised concerns.” The criteria for heightened scrutiny continued to evolve over the next year or so, even as complaints from tea-party groups—and questions from GOP lawmakers—mounted over IRS inquiries to various groups about their activities.
Letters from Ms. Lerner in April and May 2012 responding to questions by Republican lawmakers made no mention of the problems that had surfaced in the IRS unit. According to the draft report, on April 24 and 25 of last year, officials in Ms. Lerner’s office were reviewing “troubling questions” that had been asked of organizations, including “the names of donors.”
Ms. Lerner’s April 26 letter to Mr. Issa, the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, said that “there are instances where donor information may be needed…such as when the application presents possible issues of…private benefit.”
The report indicates that in 2010 and 2011, some IRS workers weren’t just singling out groups because their names contained certain words, as IRS officials suggested on Friday, but appeared to be probing for indications of political interests or leanings.
According to the report, by June 2011 some IRS specialists were probing applications using the following criteria: “issues include government spending, government debt or taxes; education of the public by advocacy/lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live’; statements in the case file criticize how the country is being run.”…”
“… The Internal Revenue Service is now facing a class action lawsuit over allegations that it improperly accessed and stole the health records of some 10 million Americans, including medical records of all California state judges.
According to a report by Courthousenews.com, an unnamed HIPAA-covered entity in California is suing the IRS, alleging that some 60 million medical records from 10 million patients were stolen by 15 IRS agents. The personal health information seized on March 11, 2011, included psychological counseling, gynecological counseling, sexual/drug treatment and other medical treatment data.
“This is an action involving the corruption and abuse of power by several Internal Revenue Service agents,” the complaint reads. “No search warrant authorized the seizure of these records; no subpoena authorized the seizure of these records; none of the 10,000,000 Americans were under any kind of known criminal or civil investigation and their medical records had no relevance whatsoever to the IRS search.
IT personnel at the scene, a HIPPA facility warning on the building and the IT portion of the searched premises, and the company executives each warned the IRS agents of these privileged records,” it continued. According to the case, the IRS agents had a search warrant for financial data pertaining to a former employee of the John Doe company, however, “it did not authorize any seizure of any healthcare or medical record of any persons, least of all third parties completely unrelated to the matter,” the complaint read.
The class action lawsuit against the IRS seeks $25,000 in compensatory damages “per violation per individual” in addition to punitive damages for constitutional violations. Thus, compensatory damages could start at a minimum of $250 billion…”
On Monday, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) fired back on assertions by the IRS that its efforts to target conservative groups were relegated to low-level employees. “Of course not,” he told Breitbart News. McConnell noted that he had raised the issue of IRS targeting of conservatives in 2012, and further noted that the Washington Post “dismissed it as a bunch of red herrings.”
The scandal, McConnell said, extends up the chain. “The Obama effort to shut up opponents isn’t limited to the IRS,” he stated. “It applies to the FCC [Federal Communications Commission], SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission], FEC [Federal Elections Commission], HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] …. And you remember, the Obama campaign last year published a list of eight businessmen who it believed were enemies.”
McConnell further noted reports that the Department of Health and Human Services had been contacting businesses “skeptical about the implementation of Obamacare and asking them to contribute money to sell the program to the American people. That’s absolutely improper if not illegal. This administration will stop at nothing to get its way. It will do anything it can to silence its critics.”
McConnell said would not trust any Democrat-led investigation into the IRS scandal. He added with regard to a House investigation of the IRS’ activities, “I’m confident they will do it in the way in which it ought to be conducted, with a high level of skepticism about an agency trying to silence the critics of the Obama administration.”
He also added that the recent IRS revelations were “just the beginning of the story. This is no little thing. This is a big thing. The good news about it is they finally got caught. They finally messed with an agency everybody fully understands. When they try to quiet the critics through other agencies, it doesn’t get attention. This does. Everybody understands the IRS and how powerful they are. This is just one example of an administration-wide effort to silence critics.”
“… When a Tennessee lawyer asked the IRS for tax-exempt status for a mentoring group that trained high school and college students about conservative political philosophy, the agency responded with a list of 95 questions in 31 parts, including an ultimatum for a list of everyone the group had trained, or planned to train. ‘Provide details regarding all training you have provided or will provide,’ the IRS demanded. ‘Indicate who has received or will receive the training and submit copies of the training material.’ That question was part of the tax collection agency’s February 14, 2012 letter to Kevin Kookogey. founder of the group Linchpins of Liberty. He had submitted his application 13 months earlier. ‘Can you imagine my responsibility to parents if I disclosed the names of their children to the IRS?’ he asked MailOnline. It’s ‘an impossible question to answer fully and truthfully,’ he said, ‘without disclosing the names of anyone I ever taught, or would ever teach, including students.’…”
“… ProPublica, a left-leaning nonprofit organization that does investigative journalism, often sharing it with outlets like the Washington Post, offers its own revelation on the news that the Internal Revenue Service was targeting Tea Party groups. It was the recipient of some of the IRS documents. These were documents that even ProPublica admits the IRS should not have been giving out according to the agency’s own rules:
The same IRS office that deliberately targeted conservative groups applying for tax-exempt status in the run-up to the 2012 election released nine pending confidential applications of conservative groups to ProPublica late last year.
The IRS did not respond to requests Monday following up about that release, and whether it had determined how the applications were sent to ProPublica.
In response to a request for the applications for 67 different nonprofits last November, the Cincinnati office of the IRS sent ProPublica applications or documentation for 31 groups. Nine of those applications had not yet been approved—meaning they were not supposed to be made public. (We made sixof those public, after redacting their financial information, deeming that they were newsworthy.)…”
“… The IRS cover letter sent with the documents was from the Cincinnati office, and signed by Cindy Thomas, listed as the manager for Exempt Organizations Determinations, whom a biography for a Cincinnati Bar Association meeting in January says has worked for the IRS for 35 years. (Thomas often signed the cover letters of responses to ProPublica requests.) The cover letter listed an IRS employee named Sophia Brown as the person to contact for more information about the records. We tried to contact both Thomas and Brown today but were unable to reach them.
After receiving the unapproved applications, ProPublica tried to determine why they had been sent. In emails, IRS spokespeople said ProPublica shouldn’t have received them…”
“… Levin should not be surprised that the IRS was caught targeting Tea Party groups when senators are sending these kinds of letters. “And he wonders why the IRS gets caught using partisan criteria to investigate Americans,” said Smith. Democratic Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (N.H.), Tom Udall (N.M.), and Al Franken (Minn.) sent a similar letter to Shulman in February 2012, asking for the IRS to investigate tax-exempt groups they believed were engaged in political activities. Similar letters were also sent to the IRS by Sen. Max Baucus (D., Mont.) in 2010 and House Democrats in 2012, the Atlanticreported on Monday…”
“… Perhaps their strategy of distraction may work in the short-term with a Washington press corps pulled in a multitude of different directions, but Senate Democrats have a serious political problem that will haunt them as they head into an already-difficult election cycle. When these Senate Finance Committee hearings come to pass it would be a remarkable act of bravery and candor for one of these IRS bureaucrats to appropriately ask Max Baucus and others why they’re not sitting at the witness tables next to them, instead of continuing in their charade of faux outrage. Because Senate Democrats today have just as much explaining to do as the IRS…”
Mandated by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense’s annual report discusses China’s military and security strategies, technological advancements in its capabilities, military doctrine, and security issues in the Taiwan Strait.
2008: The introduction states that “the United States continues to encourage China to participate as a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the stability, resilience and growth of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, in particular in the area of its expanding military power and how that power might be used.”
2009: The 2009 edition states that “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for “local wars under conditions of informatization.”
2012: The executive summary states, “China’s leaders are placing a priority on fostering a positive external environment to provide the PRC with the strategic space to focus on economic growth and development. At the same time, Chinese leaders seek to maintain peace and stability along their country’s periphery, expand their diplomatic imfluence to facilitate access to markets, capital, and resources, and avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countries.”
2013: For the first time, the Pentagon officially accuses the Chinese of launching cyber attacks against the U.S. Department of Defense.
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional military conflict. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment. However, as China’s interests have grown and as it has gained greater influence in the international system, its military modernization has also become increasingly focused on investments in military capabilities to conduct a wider range of missions beyond its immediate territorial concerns, including counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional military operations. Some of these missions and capabilities can address international security challenges, while others could serve more narrowly-defined PRC interests and objectives, including advancing territorial claims and building influence abroad.
To support the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) expanding set of roles and missions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustained investment in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (what PLA strategists refer to as “counter-intervention operations”). The PLA also continued to improve capabilities in nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional strike; advanced fighter aircraft; limited regional power projection, with the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning; integrated air defenses; undersea warfare; improved command and control; and more sophisticated training and exercises across China’s air, naval, and land forces.
During their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and then-PRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.” Within that framework, the U.S. Department of Defense seeks to build a military-to-military relationship with China that is sustained and substantive, while encouraging China to cooperate with the United States, our allies and partners, and the greater international community in the delivery of public goods. As the United States builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with China, it also will continue to monitor China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development and encourage China to be more transparent about its military modernization program. In concert with its allies and partners, the United States will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.
ANNUAL UPDATE DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS
China’s military engagement with other countries seeks to enhance China’s international presence and influence by improving relationships with foreign militaries, bolstering China’s international and regional image, and assuaging other countries’ concerns about China’s rise. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) engagement activities assist its modernization through the acquisition of advanced weapons systems and technologies, increased operational experience both throughout and beyond Asia, and access to foreign military practices, operational doctrine, and training methods.
In January 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense released information about the PLA’s 2012 military diplomacy, which it stated had stood severe tests under a difficult international and regional situation throughout the year. In 2012, senior military officials from at least 25 countries visited China, including officials from Australia, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Senior PLA officials visited at least 33 countries, including India, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. The PLA participated in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), carried out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief work in Pakistan and conducted the second global goodwill voyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG HE training vessel. PLA leaders participated in various multilateral meetings, including the Defense Ministers’ Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum Security Policy Conference.
Combined Exercises. PLA participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit through increased influence and enhanced ties with partner states and organizations. Such exercises provide the PLA opportunities to improve capabilities and gain operational insights by observing tactics, command decision-making, and equipment used by more advanced militaries.
In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21 joint exercise and training events with foreign militaries, compared to 32 during the entire 11th Five-Year Plan period (2006-2010). These activities included military exercises with SCO members, naval exercises, ground forces training, peacekeeping, and search and rescue operations/missions. China also conducted joint training for operations other than war, including the 2011 COOPERATION SPIRIT humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) exercise with Australia. China observed KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeeping exercise in Mongolia – the first time it had done so. The PLA Navy conducted maritime exercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand and counter-piracy exercises with France and the United States.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted unprecedented bilateral training during 2011, including its first bilateral air exercise with Pakistan and training with air forces in Belarus and Venezuela. In contrast, the PLA Air Force participated in only one bilateral exercise in 2012 – an airborne training exercise with Belarus in November. PEACE MISSION 2012, conducted under the auspices of the SCO, did not include PLA Air Force participation as in the past, and instead focused on what SCO nations called “counterterrorism” training, which more closely resembles training to suppress armed opposition within a member country.
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Over the past ten years, China has increased its commitment to UN PKO by approximately ten fold, building to its current level of approximately 2,000 personnel in 11 operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This level of support has been steadily maintained since 2008 and is the highest among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. In total, China has deployed more than 21,000 troops to 30 UN missions and bears 3.93 percent of the UN’s current peacekeeping budget of $7.23 billion.
PKO participation can serve various objectives, including improving China’s international image, obtaining operational experience, providing opportunities to gather intelligence, and advancing the PLA’s “New Historic Missions” by taking on roles and generating capabilities for operations far beyond China’s borders. China is currently taking steps to meet these objectives by committing civilian police, military observers, engineers, logistics support, and medical troops to UN missions while abstaining from missions that might result in regime change or lack host country consent. In 2012, China for the first time deployed infantry to a UN PKO. This “guard unit,” as Chinese media described it, is tasked with security for the PLA engineering and medical formed military units in its contingent deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). These forces, likely no more than 50 personnel from the 162nd Motorized Infantry Division, are equipped with armored vehicles, enabling them to provide fixed-site security and convoy escorts.
Chinese Arms Sales. From 2007 to 2011, Chinese arms sales totaled approximately $11 billion. As of this report’s publication, data for 2012 arms sales was not yet available. China primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction with economic aid and development assistance to support broader foreign-policy goals such as securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting its increasing political influence among host-country elites, and building support in international forums. Arms sales, however, also can reflect the profit-seeking activities of individual arms trading companies and efforts to offset defense-related research and development costs. For example, China continues to develop and market unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012, unveiled a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long, which will likely be marketed to developing countries.
From the perspective of China’s arms customers (most of whom are developing countries), Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers, although they are also generally of lower quality and reliability. Chinese arms also come with fewer political strings attached, which is attractive to those customers who may not have access to other sources of arms for political or economic reasons. China also offers relatively generous terms and flexible payment options to some customers. Counter-Piracy Efforts. China continues to support counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, a commitment which began in December 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navy deployed its 12th escort formation, which included two guided missile frigates and one oiler. Operational highlights for this formation included the retrieval of 26 crew members of the fishing vessel Xufu-1 from Somalia following their release by pirates in July 2012 (an operation that was recognized by China’s Central Military Commission); and the first combined counter-piracy exercise with the U.S. Navy. After its departure from the Gulf of Aden, the 11th escort formation visited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the first time for the PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgaria and Israel. Ships engaged in counter-piracy also conducted port calls in Australia, Mozambique, and Thailand during 2012.
Territorial Disputes. Senior Chinese officials have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as a “core interest” and all officials repeatedly state China’s opposition to and willingness to respond to actions it perceives as challenging this core interest. In 2012, this was demonstrated by Chinese actions at Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
The Chinese government maintains that its maritime rights extend to virtually the entire South China Sea and often illustrates this claim using a “nine-dash line” that encompasses much of the South China Sea area. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguous about the precise meaning of the nine-dash line; to date, China has not clarified the meaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis. In April 2012, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels and Philippine coast guard vessels engaged in a protracted standoff at Scarborough Reef, after the Philippine Navy attempted to conduct a fishing enforcement action against Chinese fishermen.
Although overt tensions between China and the Philippines subsided by year’s end, both sides continue to claim jurisdiction over the reef. Chinese law enforcement vessels have maintained an almost continuous presence ever since.
In November 2012, China also added a map which contained the nine-dash line to all of its new passports. This action elicited negative responses from other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s increased reference in official government materials to the nine-dash line is a source of concern to its neighbors and other nations because, at a minimum, it creates an impression that China is not merely claiming all the land features within the nine-dash line, but it may also be claiming a special sovereign status of all the water and the sea-bed contained therein. China claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (what the Chinese refer to as the Diaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea, territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan. In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyo announced plans to purchase three of the five islets from private Japanese owners. In response, in September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased the three islands. China protested the move and since that time has regularly sent maritime law enforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) to patrol near the Senkakus to protect its claims; this has included regular Chinese maritime operations within 12nm of the islands. On September 25, China published a white paper entitled, “Diaoyu Dao, an ’Inherent Territory’ of China.” In addition, in September 2012, China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law. In December 2012, China submitted information to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding China’s extended continental shelf in the East China Sea that includes the disputed islands.
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Dealing with a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primary mission despite decreasing tensions there – a trend which continued following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in January 2012. In this context, should deterrence fail, the PLA could be called upon to compel Taiwan to abandon independence or to re-unify with the mainland by force of arms while defeating any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
Cross-Strait Stability. China and Taiwan have reached 18 agreements for cross-Strait cooperation on economic, cultural, and functional issues, but Taiwan authorities and the broader Taiwan public do not support negotiation on issues directly related to sovereignty.
China and Taiwan have also undertaken some combined security and police operations, and held a combined maritime rescue exercise in August 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14 vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sides equally represented. Also in August, Chinese and Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects in a human-trafficking and prostitution ring – a first collaborative effort to combat human trafficking.
During a mid-October 2011 speech, President Ma stated that a cross-Strait peace agreement with China might be attainable in 10 years, but backed down immediately in the face of widespread negative public reaction and Ma specified the conditions under which he would pursue such an agreement. Despite occasional signs of impatience, China appears content to respect Taiwan’s current approach to cross-Strait relations. In November 2012, Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected general secretary of the CCP Central Committee sent a message to President Ma (in the latter’s capacity as chairman of the ruling Kuomintang Party), emphasizing the need to continue promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. This early message suggests that China under Xi Jinping may be willing to follow President Hu Jintao’s multi-pronged strategy for developing cross-Strait relations rather than compelling unification through the use of force. President Hu in his report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 used language that promoted peaceful reunification and called for both sides to explore political relations and make reasonable arrangements to discuss the creation of a military confidence-building mechanism.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
Second Artillery. The Second Artillery controls China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
By December 2012, the Second Artillery’s inventory of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwan stood at more than 1,100. This number reflects the delivery of additional missiles and the fielding of new systems. To improve the lethality of this force, the PLA is also introducing new SRBM variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.
China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.
The Second Artillery continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems. In recent years, the road-mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).
PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLA Navy has the largest force of major combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. China’s naval forces include some 79 principal surface combatants, more than 55 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants.
In the most publicized PLA Navy modernization event of 2012, after a year of extensive sea trials, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September 2012. The PLA Navy successfully conducted its first launch and recovery of the carrier-capable J-15 fighter on November 26, 2012. The Liaoning will continue integration testing and training with the aircraft during the next several years, but it is not expected to embark an operational air wing until 2015 or later. China also continues to pursue an indigenous aircraft carrier program (the Liaoning is a refurbished vessel, purchased from Ukraine in 1998), and will likely build multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade. The first Chinese-built carrier will likely be operational sometime in the second half of this decade. The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force. China continues the production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are currently operational, and up to five may enter service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade. The JIN-class SSBN will carry the new JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of more than 4,000 nm. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.
China also has expanded its force of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). Two SHANG-class SSNs (Type 093) are already in service, and China is building four improved variants of the SHANG-class SSN, which will replace the aging HAN-class SSNs (Type 091). In the next decade, China will likely construct the Type 095 guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN), which may enable a submarine-based land-attack capability. In addition to likely incorporating better quieting technologies, the Type 095 will fulfill traditional anti-ship roles with the incorporation of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).
The current mainstay of the Chinese submarine force is modern diesel powered attack submarines (SS). In addition to 12 KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s (eight of which are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM), the PLA Navy possesses 13 SONG-class SS (Type 039) and eight YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). The YUAN-class SSP is armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also includes an air-independent power system. China may plan to construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.
Since 2008, the PLA Navy has embarked on a robust surface combatant construction program of various classes of ships, including guided missile destroyers (DDG) and guided missile frigates (FFG). During 2012, China continued series production of several classes, including construction of a new generation of DDG. Construction of the LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued, with one ship entering service in 2012, and an additional three ships under various stages of construction and sea trials, bringing the total number of ships of this class to six by the end of 2013. Additionally, China launched the lead ship in a follow-on class, the LUYANG III- class DDG Type 052D), which will likely enter service in 2014. The LUYANG III incorporates the PLA Navy’s first multipurpose vertical launch system, likely capable of launching ASCM, land attack cruise missiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and anti-submarine rockets. China is projected to build more than a dozen of these ships to replace its aging LUDA-class destroyers (DD). China has continued the construction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A), with 12 ships currently in the fleet and six or more in various stages of construction, and yet more expected. These new DDGs and FFGs provide a significant upgrade to the PLA Navy’s area air defense capability, which will be critical as it expands operations into “distant seas” beyond the range of shore-based air defense.
Augmenting the PLA Navy’s littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea, is a new class of small combatant. At least six of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056) were launched in 2012. The first of these ships entered service on February 25, 2013; China may build 20 to 30 of this class. These FFLs augment the 60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercing catamaran missile patrol boats (PTG) (Type 022), each capable of carrying eight YJ-83 ASCMs, for operations in littoral waters.
The PLA Navy also increased its amphibious force in 2012. Two YUZHAO-class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type 071) were accepted into service during the year bringing the total of YUZHAO LPDs to three. PLA Air Force (PLAAF). China bases approximately 500 combat aircraft within unrefueled operational range of Taiwan and has the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. China continues to field increasingly modern 4th generation aircraft, but the force still consists mostly of older 2nd and 3rd generation aircraft, or upgraded variants of those aircraft.
Within two years of the J-20 stealth fighter’s first flight in January 2011, China tested a second next generation fighter prototype. The prototype, referred to as the “J-31,” is similar in size to a U.S. F-35 fighter and appears to incorporate design characteristics similar to the J-20. It conducted its first flight on October 31, 2012. China continues upgrading its H-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the late 1950s Soviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant that possesses greater range and will be armed with a long-range cruise missile. China also uses a modified version of the H-6 aircraft to conduct aerial refueling operations for many of its indigenous aircraft, increasing their combat range.
The PLA Air Force possesses one of the largest forces of advanced SAM systems in the world, consisting of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 battalions and domestically produced HQ-9 battalions. China’s aviation industry is developing a large transport aircraft (likely referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These heavy lift transports are needed to support airborne command and control (C2), logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and reconnaissance operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.
Developments in China’s commercial and military aviation industry indicate improved aircraft manufacturing, associated technology, and systems development capabilities. Some of these advances have been made possible by business partnerships with Western aviation and aerospace firms (including cleared U.S. defense contractors), which provide overall benefit to China’s military aerospace industry. China will continue to seek advancement in aerospace technology, capability, and proficiency to rival Western capabilities.
PLA Ground Force. The PLA is investing heavily in modernizing its ground force, emphasizing the ability to deploy campaign-level forces across long distances quickly. This modernization is playing out with wide-scale restructuring of PLA ground forces that includes a more rapid, flexible special operations force equipped with advanced technology; improved army aviation units utilizing ultra-low altitude mobility helicopters armed with precision-guided munitions; and command and control (C2) capabilities with improved networks providing real-time data transmissions within and between units. In addition, the PLA has focused its modernization efforts on transforming from a motorized to a mechanized force, as well as improving the ground force’s armored, air defense, aviation, ground-air coordination, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. PLA ground forces have benefited from increased production of new equipment, including the Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. New air defense equipment includes the PLA ground force’s first medium-range SAM, the CSA-16, as well as domestically-produced CSA-15s (a copy of the Russian SA-15) and a new advanced self-propelled air defense artillery system, the PGZ-07. PLA ground force restructuring is highlighted by the development of brigades as a key operational echelon for combat in diverse terrain and under complex electromagnetic conditions.
The ground force is a proponent of joint operations since it requires transport from other forces to operate beyond China’s borders. To assist with its power projection needs, PLA ground forces have practiced using commercial transport assets such as roll-on/roll-off ships, to conduct maritime crossing operations. However, broader joint operations capability are still the primary goal for the ground force, a goal that is now a mandate for all the military services following the General Staff Department’s (GSD) December 2011 creation of the Military Training Department to versee all PLA training, ensuring all military services realize the “prominence of joint training.” Space Capabilities. In 2012, China conducted 18 space launches. China also expanded its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological, and communications satellite constellations. In parallel, China is developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.
During 2012, China launched six Beidou navigation satellites. These six satellites completed the regional network as well as the in-orbit validation phase for the global network, expected to be completed by 2020. China launched 11 new remote sensing satellites in 2012, which can perform both civil and military applications. China also launched three communications satellites, five experimental small satellites, one meteorological satellite, one relay satellite, and a manned space mission. China continues to develop the Long March 5 (LM-5) rocket, which is intended to lift heavy payloads into space. LM-5 will more than double the size of the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) payloads China is capable of placing into orbit. To support these rockets, China began constructing the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center in 2008. Located on Hainan Island, this launch facility is expected to be complete around 2013, with the initial LM-5 launch scheduled for 2014.
Military Information Operations. Chinese writings have outlined the five key features at an operational level of a maturing Chinese information operations (IO) strategy. First, Chinese authors emphasize defense as the top priority and indicate that Computer Network Defense (CND) must be the highest priority in peacetime; Chinese doctrine suggests that “tactical counteroffensives” would only be considered if an adversary’s operations could not be countered. Second, IO is viewed as an unconventional warfare weapon, which must be established in the opening phase of the conflict and continue during all phases of war. Third, IO is characterized as a preemption weapon to be used under the rubric of achieving information dominance and controlling the electromagnetic spectrum. Fourth, IO is seen as a tool to permit China to fight and win an information campaign, precluding the need for conventional military action. Fifth, potential Chinese adversaries, in particular the United States, are seen as “information dependent.” An IO campaign includes actions taken to seize and maintain campaign information superiority, unify command campaign information operational forces, carry out information warfare-related reconnaissance, and offensive and defensive information warfare methods.
According to a PLA military manual, there are many types of supporting IO to campaigns including an island-landing campaign IO, blockade campaign IO, fire power attack campaign IO, border counterattack campaign IO, counter-landing campaign IO, and counter-airstrike campaign IO. These IO campaigns can be sub-divided into joint campaign IO and combined arms campaign IO. Depending on the military services involved in the campaign, IO can be further divided into army campaign, navy, air force, and strategic missile force campaign IO. Their primary tasks are to protect the PLA’s campaign information systems, collect intelligence from enemy information systems, destroy enemy information systems, and weaken the enemy’s ability to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during war. The PLA continues to conduct frequent military exercises demonstrating advances in information technology and information integration of its military forces. China has performed integrated joint combat operations exercises showcasing intelligence acquisition, joint command, joint strike, and support operations, increasingly incorporated information technology and information integration into its annual training requirement. A number of annual exercise series, including the Vanguard, Lianhe, and Joint Education series have increased required integration and full reliance on information technology for command of complex operations. In 2012, according to PLA newspapers, many military exercises banned paper maps and orders altogether. Also in 2012, there was an increasing emphasis on PLA command academies participating in joint exercises using command information technologies, which indicates proficiency on such platforms is now a requirement for graduation to higher command positions.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE MILITARY DOCTRINE AND TRAINING
In 2012, the PLA heavily emphasized training under realistic, high-technology conditions. The Chinese aim to operate in “informatized” conditions by emphasizing system-of-systems operations, a concept similar to U.S. network-centric warfare. This requires inking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable of unified action. These operational training reforms are a result of the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), which was last published in mid-2008 and became standard across the PLA on January 1, 2009.
Since that time, the PLA has pushed to achieve OMTE objectives by emphasizing realistic training conditions, training in complex electromagnetic and joint environments, and integrating new and high technologies into the force structure. A result of these changes is a more flexible year-round training cycle, which is a departure from the Soviet-style conscript-dependent training cycles that were prominent throughout the PLA over the previous decades.
Additionally, the PLA is laying the foundation for future changes in military doctrine. To develop a new cadre of officers, the PLA is reforming its academies to cultivate junior officers proficient with and capable of leveraging technology in all warfighting functions for joint operations. The National University of Defense Technology’s year-long joint operations staff officer course is serving as a pilot for a future national-level program. The course allows junior officers to rotate to the command elements of other PLA services to enhance their skills in joint operations planning and preparation.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
China relies on foreign technology, acquisition of key dual-use components, and focused indigenous research and development (R&D) to advance military modernization. The Chinese utilize a large, well-organized network to facilitate collection of sensitive information and export-controlled technology from U.S. defense sources. Many of the organizations composing China’s military-industrial complex have both military and civilian research and development functions. This network of government-affiliated companies and research institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies or knowledgeable experts under the guise of civilian research and development. The enterprises and institutes accomplish this through technology conferences and symposia, legitimate contracts and joint commercial ventures, partnerships with foreign firms, and joint development of specific technologies. In the case of key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia, China has utilized its intelligence services and employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and export controls.
A high-priority for China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy is its Civil-Military Integration policy to develop an innovative dual-use technology and industrial base that serve both military and civilian requirements. China’s defense industry has benefited from integration with its expanding civilian economy and science and technology sectors, particularly sectors with access to foreign technology. Examples of technologies include: advanced aviation and aerospace (hot section technologies, avionics and flight controls), source code, traveling wave tubes, night vision devices, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, and information and cyber technologies. Differentiating between civil and military end-use is very challenging in China due to opaque corporate structures, hidden asset ownership, and the connections of commercial personnel with the central government. Some commercial entities are affiliated with PLA research institutes, or have ties to and are subject to the control of government organizations such as the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission. In March 2012, Hui Sheng Shen and Huan Ling Chang, both from Taiwan, were charged with conspiracy to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act after allegedly intending to acquire and pass sensitive U.S. defense technology to China. The pair planned to photograph the technology, delete the images, bring the memory cards back to China, and have a Chinese contact recover the images.
In June 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC), a subsidiary of U.S. aerospace firm and defense contractor United Technologies Corporation (UTC), pleaded guilty to illegally providing military software used in the development of China’s Z-10 military attack helicopter. UTC and two subsidiaries agreed to pay $75 million and were debarred from license privileges as part of a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice and State Department.
PWC “knowingly and willfully” caused six versions of military electronic engine control software to be “illegally exported” from Hamilton Sundstrand in the United States to PWC in Canada and then to China for the Z-10, and made false and belated disclosures about these illegal exports.
In September 2012, Sixing Liu, aka “Steve Liu,” was convicted of violating the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and possessing stolen trade secrets. Liu, a Chinese citizen, returned to China with electronic files containing details on the performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Liu developed critical military technology for a U.S. defense contractor and stole the documents to position himself for employment in China.
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY NATIONAL-LEVEL PRIORITIES AND GOALS
China’s leaders characterize the first two decades of the 21st century as a “strategic window of opportunity.” They assess thatduring this period, both domestic and international conditions will be conducive toexpanding China’s “comprehensive national power,” a term that encapsulates all elements of state power, including economic capacity,military might, and diplomacy. China’s leaders anticipate that a successful expansion of comprehensive national power will serveC hina’s strategic objectives, which include: perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, sustaining economic growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing China’s status as a great power.
China’s leaders routinely emphasize the goal of reaching critical economic and military benchmarks by 2020. These benchmarks include successfully restructuring the economy to maintain growth and increase the quality of living of China’s citizens to promote stability; making major progress in military modernization; and attaining the capability to fight and win potential regional conflicts, including those related to Taiwan, protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), defense of territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and the defense of western borders. Statements by Chinese leaders indicate that, in their view, the development of a modern military is necessary for China to achieve greater power status.
These statements also indicate that the Chinese leadership views a modern military as a critical deterrent to prevent actions by outside powers that could damage Chinese interests, or to allow China to defend itself against such actions should deterrence fail. Since China launched its “reform and opening” in late 1978, the essential elements of China’s strategy to accomplish these goals have remained relatively constant. Rather than challenge the existing global order, China has adopted a pragmatic approach to international relations and economic development that seeks to strengthen the economy, modernize the military, and solidify the CCP’s hold on power. China balances the imperative to reassure countries that its rise is “peaceful” with the imperative to strengthen its control over existing sovereignty and territorial claims.
China regards stable relations with its neighbors and the United States as essential to its stability and development. China continues to see the United States as the dominant regional and global actor with the greatest potential to both support and, potentially, disrupt China’s rise. In addition, China remains concerned that should regional states come to view China as a threat, they might balance against China through unilateral military modernization or through coalitions, possibly with the United States. Many Chinese officials and the public see the U.S. rebalance to Asia as a reflection of “Cold War thinking” and as a way to contain China’s rise.
Despite its desire to project an image of a developing country engaged in a peaceful development strategy, China’s efforts to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity (underpinned by growing economic and military capabilities) have occasionally manifested in assertive rhetoric and behavior that generate regional concerns about its intentions. Prominent examples of this include China’s response to Japan’s arrest of a PRC fishing trawler captain following a collision with Japanese coast guard vessels in 2010, its use of punitive trade policies as an instrument of coercion, its actions to shield North Korea from the international response to its sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, and its action to pressure Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea. Official statements and media during these situations indicate that China sees itself as responding to perceived threats to its national interests or provocations by outside actors. China’s lack of transparency surrounding its growing military capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased concerns in the region about China’s intentions. Absent a move towards greater transparency, these concerns will likely intensify as the PLA modernization progresses.
Origin of the “New Historic Missions”
In 2004, former President Hu Jintao articulated a mission statement for the armed forces titled, the “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” These “new historic missions” focus primarily on adjustments in the leadership’s assessment of the international security environment and the expanding definition of national security. These missions were further codified in a 2007 amendment to the CCP Constitution. The missions, as currently defined, include:
Provide an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position.
Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategic opportunity for national development.
Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests.
Play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.
According to official writings, the driving factors behind the articulation of these missions were: changes in China’s security situation, challenges and priorities regarding China’s national development, and a desire to realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’s objectives. Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted “the historic missions embody the new requirements imposed on the military by the Party’s historic tasks, accommodate new changes in our national development strategy, and conform to the new trends in global military development.” While these missions are not expected to replace the defense of China’s sovereignty in importance, implications for PLA modernization may be increased preparation for and participation in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, interaction with the international community that allows the PLA more opportunities to learn from other militaries, and greater efforts to improve PLA logistics and transport capabilities.
China’s Territorial Disputes
China’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied throughout its history. Some disputes led to war, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contested border with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In more recent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled eleven land-based territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. Several disputes continue over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and ownership of potentially rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits.
The East China Sea contains approximately seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100 billion barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench (which almost reaches Japan’s shore). In early 2009, Japan accused China of violating a June 2008 agreement providing for joint exploration of oil and natural gas fields, and claimed that China unilaterally drilled beneath the demarcation line, extracting reserves from the Japanese side. China, Japan, and Taiwan continue to dispute possession of the nearby Senkaku Islands.
The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast and Southeast Asian security considerations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including over 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups and other land formations within its “nine-dash line” claim – claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands, makes the same claims as the PRC. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelf claims in the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam; in its protest to the U.N. Commission, China included the ambiguous nine-dash line and reiterated that it has “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.”
Despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India, tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh (which China asserts is part of Tibet, and therefore of China), and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to assert their claims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank, claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. This represented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution. The then-governor of Arunachal Pradesh announced that India would deploy more troops and fighter jets to the area. An Indian newspaper reported that the number of Chinese border violations had risen from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September 2012.
Power Projection Capability. There has also been an active debate among military and civilian theorists in China concerning future capabilities the PLA should develop to advance China’s interests beyond traditional requirements. Some senior officers and civilian theorists advocate an expansion of the PLA’s power projection capabilities to facilitate missions well beyond Taiwan and regional disputes. Publicly, Chinese officials contend that increasing the scope of China’s maritime capabilities is intended to build capacity for international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and protection of sea lanes. The commissioning of the PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier in 2012, in addition to serving as a symbol of national prestige, exemplifies these aspirations.
Indicators of Decision and Intent. There are several possible indicators of change in Chinese decision-making, depending on the issue. This intent could be reflected through speeches in regional and multi-national organizations, commentary in official, domestic newspapers or prominent Chinese think tanks, adjustments to China’s Defense White Paper, changes in talking points with civilian and military interlocutors, disposition of forces, and changes in military diplomacy.
PLA MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
The PLA’s level of engagement with foreign militaries continues to grow significantly. At the operational level, this engagement provides the PLA with opportunities to share doctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures with other militaries – both modern and developing. At the strategic level, China uses military engagement as a platform for demonstrating the PLA’s growing capabilities, its status as a modern military, and its potential role as a responsible security partner. Senior-level visits and exchanges provide China with opportunities to increase military officers’ international exposure, communicate China’s positions to foreign audiences, better understand alternative world views, and advance foreign relations through interpersonal contacts and military assistance programs. Expanded PLA travel abroad enables China’s military officers to observe and study foreign military command structures, unit formations, and operational training.
The PLA is participating in a growing number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises. The PLA derives political benefit from these exercises in terms of increased influence and enhanced ties with partner states and organizations. These exercises also contribute to PLA modernization by providing opportunities to improve capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. The PLA gains operational insight by observing tactics, command decision making, and equipment used by more advanced militaries.
PLA participation or observer status in military training exercises of nations in possession of U.S. military equipment, systems, and weapons may, in certain circumstances, have unintended consequences that could result in the unauthorized disclosure of defense articles, technical data, or defense services to China. Public Law 101-246 – the Tiananmen Sanctions – prohibits the transfer or disclosure of U.S.-origin defense articles, defense services, technical data, and/or technology to China. Additionally, Public Law 94-329 – the Arms Export Control Act – and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations list China as a nation for which U.S. policy denies the transfer or export of defense articles (including technical data) and defense services.
Beijing primarily conducts arms sales to enhance foreign relationships and to generate revenue to support its domestic defense industry. China’s arms sales range from small arms and ammunition to joint development or transfer of advanced weapons systems.
Chinese companies sell mostly to developing countries where China’s low-cost weapons sales serve a strategic purpose. For example, China maintains strong and longstanding military–technical cooperation with Pakistan, which includes arms sales and defense industrial cooperation. With other countries of strategic importance to China, such as Sudan, arms sales and other security assistance deepen developing ties and balance China’s energy imports.
As China’s regional and international interests grow more complex, the PLA’s international engagement will expand, especially in the areas of peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy, humanitarian asistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and joint exercises. In addition to furthering PLA modernization, the focus of these engagements will likely remain on building China’s political ties, assuaging fears about China’s rise, and building China’s external influence, particularly in Asia.
China’s Military Leadership
The PLA is the armed instrument of the CCP and, organizationally, is subordinate to the Party apparatus. Career military officers are CCP members, and units at the company level and above have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, also led by the political officers and commanders.
The PLA’s highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the CCP and President. Other members include several vice chairmen, the commanders of the military services, and the directors of the four general headquarters departments.
China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) is not equivalent to the “defense ministry” in most other nations, but rather is a small office coordinating military-related tasks where responsibility overlaps between the civilian government and the armed forces, including foreign military relations, mobilization, recruitment, “national defense education,” and civil support to military operations. The Minister of Defense is a uniformed military officer, a member of the State Council (the country’s chief administrative authority), and also a CMC member.
Following the increasing professionalization of the PLA, the military now holds fewer formal positions in key political bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the passing of China’s revolutionary generation, few national leaders have served in the military: the Politburo Standing Committee has not had a uniformed member since 1997 and only 4 of the 25 current Politburo members have military experience. However, the PLA remains an influential player in China’s defense and foreign policy due to the CMC’s special bureaucratic status and the PLA’s near monopoly on military expertise. Even as the PLA remains subordinate to top Party leadership direction as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, longstanding bureaucratic coordination issues and China’s increasingly active media landscape have sometimes led to PLA-associated actions or statements that appear to diverge from the positions of China’s other key bureaucratic actors, especially on national sovereignty or territorial issues.
Members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping’s appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC chairman, and his expected selection as state president in the spring, represent the first clean transfer of power in recent decades. Prior to becoming China’s new commander-in-chief, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian vice chairman. Xi’s father was an important military figure during the Chinese communist revolution and a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as secretary to a defense minister early in his career and would have had ample opportunities to interact with the PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials Xi has emphasized increasing mutual trust between Beijing and Washington.
Vice Chairman Fan Changlong is Beijing’s top uniformed officer. He formerly commanded the Jinan Military Region (MR), a test bed for new operational concepts and technology that has been at the forefront of the PLA’s joint training efforts in recent years. Fan was the longest serving of China’s seven MR commanders at the time of his promotion to the CMC. He also spent 35 years in the Shenyang MR where he reportedly served in the same unit as outgoing CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou, the PLA’s top political officer. Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang—the first career air force officer promoted to CMC vice chairman—previously served on the CMC as PLA Air Force commander where he oversaw rapid force modernization and expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He vocally advocated for increasing the PLA Air Force’s role within the larger PLA including arguing in 2009 that the air force should lead the development of offensive space capabilities. Xu may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLA Air Force officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since the Cultural Revolution period, and—at 54—the youngest in PLA history.
Chang Wanquan was appointed Minister of National Defense at the National People’s Congress in March 2013. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA’s third most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Chang previously oversaw the PLA’s weapons development and space portfolio as head of the General Armament Department. He is a veteran of China’s border skirmishes with Vietnam and held top posts across military regions.
Chief of the General Staff Department Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, and intelligence. He served as “commander-in-chief” of China’s 60th anniversary military parade in 2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Fan is the first Beijing Military Region commander to move directly to Chief of the General Staff Department. He was the youngest military region commander when he was promoted to lead the Beijing Military Region in 2007.
General Political Department Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLA’s political work to include propaganda, discipline, and education. He previously served as Political Commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region, which borders Vietnam and the South China Sea. Zhang assumed that position at a relatively young age and is unusual among the other newly appointed CMC members for spending his entire career in one military region. Zhang also participated in China’s border conflict with Vietnam and supported disaster relief efforts following a January 2008 snowstorm in southern China.
General Logistics Department Director Zhao Keshi is responsible for overseeing PLA support functions including finances, land, mining, and construction. Zhao spent his entire career in the Nanjing MR responsible for a Taiwan contingency and most recently served as its Commander. He was also reportedly an exercise commander in the large military drills that induced the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhao has written on defense mobilization and reserve construction.
General Armament Department Director Zhang Youxia is responsible for overseeing the military’s weapons development and space program. Nicknamed “General Patton,” he has rare experience as a combat commander during China’s brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one of China’s military “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi Jinping’s father in the 1940s.
PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the navy since 2006 and on the CMC since 2007—only the second PLA Navy Commander to do so in recent decades. Under Wu, the navy has increased its out-of-area exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign naval exchanges, and initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first career navy officer to serve as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Wu held leadership positions in two of the PLA Navy’s three fleets, spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.
PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLA’s military engagement activities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led the PLA side in key military-to-military exchanges with the United States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the Strategic Security Dialogue component of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ma has significant operational experience both as a pilot and staff officer in multiple military regions.
Second Artillery Commander Wei Fenghe oversees China’s strategic missile forces and bases. Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in the Second Artillery headquarters before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General Staff – the first officer from the Second Artillery to do so. In that role, Wei met frequently with foreign delegations, including senior U.S. officials, affording him greater international exposure than previous Second Artillery commanders.
FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS OVERVIEW
Although Taiwan continues to dominate the PLA’s force modernization agenda (see Chapter Five: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency), Beijing is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve extended-range power projection and operations in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare. Current trends in China’s weapons production will enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia well beyond Taiwan, in the South China Sea, western Pacific, and Indian Ocean. Key systems that have been either deployed or are in development include ballistic missiles (including anti-ship variants), anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.
The need to ensure trade, particularly oil supplies from the Middle East, has prompted China’s navy to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Disputes with Japan over maritime claims in the East China Sea and with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea have led to renewed tensions in these areas. Instability on the Korean Peninsula could also produce a regional crisis involving China’s military. The desire to protect energy investments in Central Asia, along with potential security implications from cross-border support to ethnic separatists, could also provide an incentive for military investment or intervention in this region if instability surfaces.
China’s political leaders have also charged the PLA with developing capabilities for missions such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counterterrorism operations. These capabilities will increase Beijing’s options for military influence to press its diplomatic agenda, advance regional and international interests, and resolve disputes in its favor. China has become more involved in HA/DR operations in response to the “New Historic Missions.” China’s ANWEI-class military hospital ship (the Peace Ark) has deployed throughout East Asia and to the Caribbean.
China has conducted more than ten joint military exercises with the SCO members, the most prominent being the PEACE MISSION series, with China and Russia as the main participants. China continues its Gulf of Aden counter-piracy deployment that began in December 2008. Outside of occasional goodwill cruises, this represents the PLA Navy’s only series of operational deployments beyond the immediate western Pacific region.
PLA FUTURE CAPABILITIES
Nuclear Weapons. China’s official policy on nuclear weapons continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear force structure able to survive an attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy. The new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and missile defense capabilities. The PLA has deployed new command, control, and communications capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability to command and control multiple units in the field. Through the use of improved communications links, the ICBM units now have better access to battlefield information, uninterrupted communications connecting all command echelons, and the unit commanders are able to issue orders to multiple subordinates at once, instead of serially via voice commands.
China has consistently asserted that it adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of two stated commitments: China will never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear-weapon state, and China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply, including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high-altitude bursts would constitute a first use. Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. However, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.
China will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, nuclear force (sometimes described as “sufficient and effective”), to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging retaliatory nuclear strike.
PLA Underground Facilities
China maintains a technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting all aspects of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given China’s NFU nuclear policy, China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear blow while ensuring leadership and strategic assets survive. China determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid to late 1980s. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and NATO air operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War. A new emphasis on “winning hi-tech battles” in the future precipitated research into advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable, deeply-buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort detected throughout China for the last decade.
Land-Based Platforms. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited range CSS-3 (DF-4). This force is complemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMs for regional deterrence missions. By 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include additional CSS-10 Mod 2 and enhanced CSS-4 ICBMs.
Sea-Based Platforms. China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with three already delivered and as many as two more in various stages of construction. The JIN-class SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability. After a round of successful testing in 2012, the JL-2 appears ready to reach initial operational capability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based at Hainan Island in the South China Sea would then be able to conduct nuclear deterrence patrols.
Future Efforts. China is working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. China’s official media also cite numerous Second Artillery training exercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, and launch operations under simulated combat conditions, which are intended to increase survivability. Together with the increased mobility and survivability of the new generation of missiles, these technologies and training enhancements strengthen China’s nuclear force and enhance its strategic strike capabilities. Further increases in the number of mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBN deterrence patrols will force the PLA to implement more sophisticated command and control systems and processes that safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force.
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). As part of its planning for military contingencies, China continues to develop measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, particularly by the United States. China’s approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD characterizes as “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities. China is pursuing a variety of air, sea, undersea, space and counter-space, and information warfare systems and operational concepts to achieve this capability, moving toward an array of overlapping, multilayered offensive capabilities extending from China’s coast into the western Pacific. China’s 2008 Defense White Paper asserts, for example, that one of the priorities for the development of China’s armed forces is to “increase the country’s capabilities to maintain maritime, space, and electromagnetic space security.”
An essential element, if not a fundamental prerequisite, of China’s emerging A2/AD regime is the ability to control and dominate the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace. PLA authors often cite the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed “information blockade” or “information dominance,” and to seize the initiative and gain an information advantage in the early phases of a campaign to achieve air and sea superiority. China is improving information and operational security to protect its own information structures, and is also developing electronic and information warfare capabilities, including denial and deception, to defeat those of its adversaries. China’s “information blockade” likely envisions employment of military and non-military instruments of state power across the battlespace, including in cyberspace and outer space. China’s investments in advanced electronic warfare systems, counter-space weapons, and computer network operations (CNO) — combined with more traditional forms of control historically associated with the PLA and CCP systems, such as propaganda and denial through opacity, reflect the emphasis and priority China’s leaders place on building capability for information advantage. In more traditional domains, China’s A2/AD focus appears oriented toward restricting or controlling access to China’s periphery, including the western Pacific. China’s current and projected force structure improvements, for example, will provide the PLA with systems that can engage adversary surface ships up to 1,000 nm from China’s coast.
China is also developing weapons for its entire military to project force further from its coast. Current and projected missile systems will allow the PLA to strike regional air bases, logistical facilities, and other ground-based infrastructure. Chinese military analysts have concluded that logistics and power projection are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating transportation, communications, and logistics networks. China is fielding an array of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, ground- and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces, and cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at risk throughout the region.
Counter-Space. PLA strategists regard the ability to utilize space and deny adversaries access to space as central to enabling modern, informatized warfare. Although PLA doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and would serve a key role in enabling A2/AD operations. Publicly, China attempts to dispel any skepticism over its military intentions for space. In 2009, PLA Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang publically retracted his earlier assertion that the militarization of space was a “historic inevitability” after President Hu Jintao swiftly contradicted him. General Xu Qiliang is now a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the second highest-ranking officer in the PLA.
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counter-space capabilities. China demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic kill anti-satellite capability to low Earth orbit when it destroyed the defunct Chinese FY-1C weather satellite during a test in January 2007. Although Chinese defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies, no additional anti-satellite programs have been publicly cknowledged.
A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable “informatized” warfare, claiming that “space is the commanding point for the information battlefield.” PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance…and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations also states that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors…will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”
Information Operations. New technologies allow the PLA to share intelligence, battlefield information, logistics information, weather reports, etc., instantaneously (over robust and redundant communications networks), resulting in improved situational awareness for commanders. In particular, by enabling the sharing of near-real-time ISR data with commanders in the field, decision-making processes are facilitated, shortening command timelines and making operations more efficient.
These improvements have greatly enhanced the PLA’s flexibility and responsiveness. “Informatized” operations no longer require meetings for command decision-making or labor-intensive processes for execution. Commanders can now issue orders to multiple units at the same time while on the move, and units can rapidly adjust their actions through the use of digital databases and command automation tools. This is critical for joint operations needed to execute A2/AD. However, to fully implement “informatized” command and control, the PLA will need to overcome a shortage of trained personnel and its culture of centralized, micro-managed command.
The PLA GSD Fourth Department (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) would likely use information operations (IO) tools, to include jamming/EW, CNO, and deception to augment counter-space and other kinetic operations during a wartime scenario. “Simultaneous and parallel” operations would involve strikes against U.S. warships, aircraft, and associated supply craft and the use of IO to affect tactical and operational communications and computer networks. The PLA would likely rely on IO to disrupt the U.S. capability to use navigational and targeting radar.
Maritime. The PLA Navy is in the forefront of China’s A2/AD developments, having the greatest range and staying power within the PLA to interdict third-party forces. In a near-term conflict, PLA Navy operations would likely begin in the offshore and coastal areas with attacks by coastal defense cruise missiles, maritime strike aircraft, and smaller combatants, and extend as far as the second island chain and Strait of Malacca using large surface ships and submarines. As the PLA Navy gains experience and acquires larger numbers of more capable platforms, including those with long-range air defense, it will expand the depth of these operations further into the Western Pacific. It will also develop a new capability for ship-based land-attack using cruise missiles. China views long-range anti-ship cruise missiles as a key weapon in this type of operation and is developing multiple advanced types and the platforms to employ them for this purpose.
These platforms include conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines (KILO SS, SONG SS, YUAN SSP, SHANG SSN), surface combatants (LUYANG III DDG [Type 052D], LUZHOU DDG [Type 051C], LUYANG I/II DDG [Type 052B/C], SOVREMENNY II-class DDG, JIANGKAI II FFG [Type 054A], JIANGDAO FFL [Type 056]), and maritime strike aircraft (JH-7 and JH-7A, H-6G, and the SU-30 MK2).
China would face several short-comings in a near-term A2/AD operation. First, it has not developed a robust, deep water anti-submarine warfare capability, in contrast to its strong capabilities in the air and surface domains. Second, it is not clear whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes in sea areas beyond the first island chain. However, China is working to overcome these shortcomings.
Air and Air Defense. China’s future air force A2/AD capabilities will be bolstered by the development of a 5th generation fighter force, which is not likely to be fielded before 2018. Key characteristics of fifth generation fighters include high maneuverability, lack of visibility on radar due to very low observable stealth shaping, and an internal weapons bay. Other key features of these aircraft are modern avionics and sensors that offer more timely situational awareness for operations in network-centric combat environments, radars with advanced targeting capabilities and protection against enemy electronic countermeasures, and integrated electronic warfare systems with advanced communication and GPS navigation functions.
These next generation aircraft will improve China’s existing fleet of fourth generation aircraft (Russian built Su-27/Su-30 and indigenous J-10 and J-11B fighters) by utilizing low-observable platforms to support regional air superiority and strike operations. Additionally, China’s continuing upgrades to its bomber fleet may provide the capability to carry new, longer-range cruise missiles.
Similarly, the acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including the BZK-005, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), will increase China’s ability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations. China’s ground-based air defense A2/AD capabilities will likely be focused on countering long-range airborne strike platforms with increasing numbers of advanced, long-range SAMs. China’s current air and air defense A2/AD components include a combination of advanced long-range SAMs – its indigenous HQ-9 and Russian SA-10 and SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. China continues to pursue the acquisition of the Russian extremely long-range S-400 SAM system (400 km), and is also expected to continue research and development to extend the range of the domestic HQ-9 SAM to beyond 200km.
Ballistic Missile Defense. China has made efforts to go beyond defense from aircraft and cruise missiles to gain a ballistic missile defense capability in order to provide further protection of China’s mainland and strategic assets. China’s existing long-range SAM inventory offers limited capability against ballistic missiles. The SA-20 PMU2, the most advanced SAM Russia offers for export, has the advertised capability to engage ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,000km and speeds of 2,800m/s. China’s domestic CSA-9 long-range SAM system is expected to have a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 500km. China is proceeding with the research and development of a missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes (>80km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. In January 2010, and again in January 2013, China successfully intercepted a ballistic missile at mid-course, using a ground-based missile.
Cyber Activities Directed Against the Department of Defense. In 2012, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating information. China is using its computer network exploitation (CNE) capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs. The information targeted could potentially be used to benefit China’s defense industry, high technology industries, policymaker interest in US leadership thinking on key China issues, and military planners building a picture of U.S. network defense networks, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis. Although this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper notes China’s own concern over foreign cyberwarfare efforts and highlighted the importance of cyber-security in China’s national defense.
Cyberwarfare in China’s Military. Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve Chinese military operations in three key areas. First and foremost, they allow data collection for intelligence and computer network attack purposes. Second, they can be employed to constrain an adversary’s actions or slow response time by targeting network-based logistics, communications, and commercial activities. Third, they can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during times of crisis or conflict.
Developing cyber capabilities for warfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings. Two military doctrinal writings, Science of Strategy, and Science of Campaigns identify information warfare (IW) as integral to achieving information superiority and an effective means for countering a stronger foe. Although neither document identifies the specific criteria for employing computer network attack against an adversary, both advocate developing capabilities to compete in this medium.
The Science of Strategy and Science of Campaigns detail the effectiveness of IW and CNO in conflicts and advocate targeting adversary C2 and logistics networks to affect their ability to operate during the early stages of conflict. As Science of Strategy explains, “In the information war, the command and control system is the heart of information collection, control, and application on the battlefield. It is also the nerve center of the entire battlefield.”
In parallel with its military preparations, China has increased diplomatic engagement and advocacy in multilateral and international forums where cyber issues are discussed and debated. Beijing’s agenda is frequently in line with Russia’s efforts to promote more international control over cyber activities. China and Russia continue to promote an Information Security Code of Conduct that would have governments exercise sovereign authority over the flow of information and control of content in cyberspace. Both governments also continue to play a disruptive role in multilateral efforts to establish transparency and confidence-building measures in international fora such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ASEAN Regional Forum, and the UN Group of Governmental Experts. Although China has not yet agreed with the U.S. position that existing mechanisms, such as international humanitarian law, apply in cyberspace, Beijing’s thinking continues to evolve.
Role of Electronic Warfare (EW) in Future Conflict
An integral component of warfare, the PLA identifies EW as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological advantages. Chinese EW doctrine emphasizes using electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress or deceive enemy electronic equipment. PLA EW strategy focuses on radio, radar, optical, infrared, and microwave frequencies, in addition to adversarial computer and information systems.
Chinese EW strategy stresses that it is a vital fourth dimension to combat and should be considered equally with traditional ground, sea, and air forces. Effective EW is seen as a decisive aid during military operations and consequently the key to determining the outcome of war. The Chinese see EW as an important force multiplier and would likely employ it in support of all combat arms and services during a conflict.
PLA EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations testing the military’s understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance, which helped improve their confidence in conducting force-on-force, real-equipment confrontation operations in simulated electronic warfare environments. The advances in research and deployment of electronic warfare weapons are being tested in these exercises and have proven effective. These EW weapons include jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems. EW systems are also being deployed with other sea and air-based platforms intended for both offensive and defensive operations.
Systems and Capabilities Enabling Power Projection. China has prioritized land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs to extend its strike warfare capabilities further from its borders. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The Second Artillery has deployed more than 1,100 SRBMs to garrisons across from Taiwan and is fielding cruise missiles, including the ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile. China continues to field an ASBM based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile that it began deploying in 2010.
Known as the DF-21D, this missile provides the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.
The PLA Navy continues the development and deployment of ship, submarine, and aircraft-deployed ASCMs, Russian- and Chinese-built. New long-range air-launched cruise missiles for the H-6 bomber fleet extend the PLA’s strike range.
The PLA Air Force is continuing a modernization effort to improve its capability to conduct offensive and defensive off-shore operations such as strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, and early warning and reconnaissance missions. China continues its development of stealth aircraft technology, with the appearance of a second stealth fighter following on the heels of the maiden flight of the J-20 in January 2011. In an effort to address its strategic airlift deficiency, as mentioned earlier in this report, China is also developing a heavy lift transport aircraft, possibly identified as the Y-20.
Capabilities to Realize a “Blue Water” Navy. The PLA Navy remains at the forefront of the military’s efforts to extend its operational reach beyond East Asia and into what China calls the “far seas.” Missions in these areas include protecting important sea lanes from terrorism, maritime piracy, and foreign interdiction; providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; conducting naval diplomacy and regional deterrence; and training to prevent a third party, such as the United States, from interfering with operations off China’s coast in a Taiwan or South China Sea conflict. The PLA Navy’s ability to perform these missions is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The PLA Navy’s goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of several months, similar to the United Kingdom’s deployment to the South Atlantic to retake the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. However, logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles, particularly in the Indian Ocean.
In the last several years, the PLA Navy’s distant seas experience has primarily derived from its ongoing counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and long-distance task group deployments beyond the first island chain in the western Pacific. China continues to sustain a three-ship presence in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese merchant shipping from maritime piracy. This operation is China’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Asia region.
Additionally, the PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those coastal states. Of note, the United States has observed over the past year several instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii. One of those instances was during the execution of the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August 2012. While the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful, the activity undercuts China’s decades-old position that similar foreign military activities in China’s EEZ are unlawful. The PLA Navy has made long-distance deployments a routine part of the annual training cycle. In 2012, it deployed task groups beyond the first island chain seven times with formations as large as seven ships.
These deployments are designed to complete a number of training requirements, including long-distance navigation, C2, and multi-discipline warfare in deep sea environments beyond the range of land-based air defense. The PLA Navy’s force structure continues to evolve, incorporating more platforms with the versatility for both offshore and long-distance operations. In addition to the recently-commissioned KUZNETSOV-class aircraft carrier (CV) Liaoning, China is engaged in series production of the LUYANG-class III DDG, the JIANGKAI-class II FFG, and the JIANGDAO-class FFL. China will also begin construction on a new Type 081-class landing helicopter assault ship within the next five years. China will probably build several aircraft carriers over the next 15 years.
Limited logistical support remains a key obstacle preventing the PLA Navy from operating more extensively beyond East Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean. China desires to expand its access to logistics in the Indian Ocean and will likely establish several access points in this area in the next 10 years (potential sites include the Strait of Malacca, Lomboc Strait, and Sunda Strait). These arrangements will likely take the form of agreements for refueling, replenishment, crew rest, and low-level maintenance. The services provided will likely fall short of U.S.-style agreements permitting the full spectrum of support from repair to re-armament.
China’s Maritime Security Approach
During the 2012 Scarborough Reef and Senkaku Island tensions, the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships were responsible for directly managing the disputes on a daily basis, while the PLA Navy maintained a more distant presence away from the immediate vicinity of the contested waters. China prefers to use its civilian maritime agencies in these disputes, and use the PLA Navy further ashore from disputed areas or as an escalatory measure. The five civilian agency entities, commonly referred to as the “Five Dragons” are: Anti-Smuggling Bureau (ASB): Subordinate to the General Administration of Customs and Ministry of Public Security. Armed entity responsible for criminal investigations and smuggling cases along China’s inland border posts and rivers.
China Coast Guard (CCG): Subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security. Active duty maritime police force responsible for combating maritime crime. China Maritime Surveillance (CMS): Subordinate to the State Oceanic Administration and Ministry of Land and Resources. Responsible for asserting China’s marine rights and sovereignty claims in disputed maritime regions.
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC): Subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture. Enforces PRC fisheries laws and handles fishery disputes with foreign entities across China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Maritime Safety Administration (MSA): Subordinate to the Ministry of Transport. Responsible for safety of life at sea (SOLAS), maritime pollution control, and cleanup, port inspection, and maritime investigation.
In the next decade, an expanded and modernized force of civilian maritime ships will afford China the capability to more robustly patrol its territorial claims in the ECS and SCS. China is continuing with the second half of a modernization and construction program for its maritime law enforcement agencies. The first half of this program, from 2004-2008, resulted in the addition of almost 20 ocean-going patrol ships for the CMS (9), Bureau of Fisheries (BOF) (3), Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) (3), and China Coast Guard (2). The second half of this program, from 2011-2015, includes at least 30 new ships for the CMS (23), BOF (6), and MSA (1). Several agencies have also acquired ships that were decommissioned from the PLA Navy. Some old patrol ships will be decommissioned during this period. In addition, MLE agencies will likely build more than 100 new patrol craft and smaller units, both to increase capability and to replace old units. Overall, CMS total force level is expected to increase 50 percent by 2020 and BOF by 25 percent. MSA, China Coast Guard, and Maritime Customs force levels will probably remain constant, but with larger and more capable units replacing older, smaller units. Some of these ships will have the capability to embark helicopters, a capability that only a few MLE ships currently have. The enlargement and modernization of China’s MLE forces will improve China’s ability to enforce its maritime sovereignty.
Military Operations Other Than War. China’s military continues to emphasize Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) including emergency response, counter-terrorism, international rescue, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and various other security tasks. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper cited the use of its military for these purposes as a means of maintaining social harmony and stability. These missions support the “New Historic Missions” while enabling the PLA opportunities to acquire operational and mobilization proficiency in addition to strengthening civil-military relations.
According to Chinese media, between 2008 and 2011, the PLA employed more than 2.4 million active-duty forces, roughly 7.82 million militia and reservists, and more than 6,700 aircraft sorties for MOOTW, including high-profile events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2011 evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya. Within the past year,
China’s MOOTW experience has included dispatching soldiers to work with civilian entities to provide disaster relief in Yunnan Province following a 5.6 magnitude earthquake in September, and counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the PLA has increasingly committed itself to UN peacekeeping operations and continues military engagements as a member of the SCO.
In December 2011, the Military Operations Other Than War Research Center was founded at the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing, indicating MOOTW’s growing role in the PLA following the establishment of guidelines and regulations for such operations during the preceding two years. This increased emphasis of MOOTW provides the PLA experience with joint operations and various command and control scenarios.
Depending on the nature of the operation, PLA resources for MOOTW can be under the command of local jurisdiction or up to the highest levels of civilian and military leadership, allowing the PLA to rapidly respond to unexpected events.
Precision Strike
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (< 1,000 km): The Second Artillery had more than 1,100 SRBMs at the end of 2012, a modest increase over the past year. The Second Artillery continues to field advanced variants with improved ranges and more sophisticated payloads, while gradually replacing earlier generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km): The PLA is fielding conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships (including aircraft carriers) operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,000 km): The PLA is developing conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), increasing its capability for near-precision strike out to the second island chain. The PLA Navy is also improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China (thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launched LACMs for stand-off, precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20.
Ground Attack Munitions: The PLA Air Force has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles as well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs.
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: The PLA Navy is deploying the domestically-produced, ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM; the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from Russia; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM on China’s Russian-built KILO SS. It has, or is acquiring, nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B. China is working to develop a domestically-built supersonic cruise missile capability. The pace of ASCM research, development, and production has accelerated over the past decade.
Anti-Radiation Weapons: China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known as the YJ-91 into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.
Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions: The PLA is developing or deploying artillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300 mm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliber MRL (out to 220 km).
Second Artillery: As detailed elsewhere in this report, the Second Artillery is expanding its conventional MRBM force and developing IRBMs to extend the distance from which it can threaten other countries with conventional precision or near-precision strikes.
China’s Internal Security Forces
China’s internal security forces primarily consist of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the PLA. The PAP is a paramilitary organization whose primary mission is domestic security. It falls under the dual command of the CMC and the State Council. Although there are different types of PAP units, such as border security and firefighting, the largest is internal security. PAP units are organized into “contingents” in each province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city. In addition, 14 PLA divisions were transferred to the PAP in the mid- to late-1990s to form “mobile divisions” that can deploy outside their home province. The official budget for China’s internal security forces exceeds that of the PLA.
The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order,” with duties including anti-riot and anti-terrorism. There are approximately 1.9 million MPS police officers spread throughout local public security bureaus across the country.
The PLA’s main mission is external security, but assumes internal stability missions when needed. For example, the PLA may provide transportation, logistics, and intelligence. China may also task the militia to assist local public security forces with internal security roles, including protection of infrastructure and maintaining public order.
Chinese leaders perceive threats to the country’s internal security coming from popular protests regarding social, economic, environmental, and political problems. Beijing also perceives a security challenge from external non-state actors, such as the separatist East Turkestan Independence Movement and its reported connection with ethnic Uighur nationalist movements in the Xinjiang region. China activated security forces, but not the PLA, in 2012 to quell incidents ranging from anti-foreign sentiment to socio-economic protests. China deployed paramilitary police in September to control anti-Japanese protesters across multiple cities during the Senkaku Islands dispute. Also in September, paramilitary police mobilized to a Foxconn Manufacturing factory in Shanxi province to put down a riot involving poor pay and working conditions. MPS forces and paramilitary police have deployed multiple times in 2012 to Sichuan and Qinghai provinces to control unrest over self-immolations of monks protesting Chinese rule over Tibet.
RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION OVERVIEW
The PLA continues to decrease its reliance on foreign weapons acquisitions in more capability areas as China’s defense-industrial and research bases mature. However, the PLA still looks to foreign assistance to fill some critical near-term capability gaps. China continues to leverage foreign investments, commercial joint ventures, academic exchanges, the experience of repatriated Chinese students and researchers, and state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage to increase the level of technologies and expertise available to support military research, development, and acquisition. Beijing’s long-term goal is to create a wholly-indigenous defense industrial sector, augmented by a strong commercial sector, to meet the needs of PLA modernization and to compete as a top-tier producer in the global arms market.
China draws from diverse sources to support PLA modernization, including: domestic defense investments, indigenous defense industrial development, a growing research and development/science and technology base, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition.
MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDS
On March 5, 2013, Beijing announced a 10.7 percent increase in its annual military budget to $114 billion, continuing more than two decades of sustained annual defense spending increases. Analysis of data from 2003 through 2012 indicates China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.7 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period. China has the fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable levels, despite lowering its economic growth forecast in 2012 to 7.5 percent from 8 percent in 2011. Continued increases will support PLA modernization efforts and facilitate China’s move toward a more professional force.
Estimating China’s Actual Military Expenditures. Using 2012 prices and exchange rates, the DoD estimates that China’s total actual military-related expenditure for 2012 falls between $135 billion and $215 billion. However, it is difficult to estimate actual PLA military expenses due to China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition from a command economy. China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure, such as procurement of foreign weapons and equipment.
2012 Defense Budget Comparison (Adjusted for Inflation) Billion (USD)
China (Official Budget) $106.7
Russia (National Defense Budget) $61.3
Japan $58.0
India $45.5
Republic of Korea $29.2
Taiwan $10.8
Comparison of China’s official defense budgets with those of other regional powers.
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN CHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Defense Sector Reform. China’s defense industry has undergone a dramatic transformation since the late 1990s and its companies and research institutes continue to re-organize in an effort to improve weapon system research, development, and production capabilities. China also continues to improve business practices, streamline bureaucracy, shorten developmental timelines, and improve quality control.
In 1998, China adopted a comprehensive strategy for improving defense industrial capabilities. This strategy called for selective modernization in key capabilities areas, increased civil-military industrial integration to leverage available dual use technologies, and the acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, materiel and technologies. An overarching goal of these reforms was to introduce the “Four Mechanisms” of competition, evaluation, supervision, and encouragement into the entire defense industrial system. In
1999, the State Council implemented structural reforms within defense industries to increase competition and efficiency and to make China’s defense industry more responsive to the PLA’s operational requirements. Each of China’s five state-owned defense conglomerates was split into two enterprises, creating a parallel structure in which each would produce both defense and civilian products, encouraging the potential for competition. The production of civilian-use commercial products allows legitimate access to the latest industry and dual-use technologies, which can then be used to support military production. Commercial operations also provide revenue streams to support defense-related activities.
In 2003, the Sixteenth Party Congress introduced the concept of locating military potential in civilian capabilities. It calls for building a civilian industrial sector capable of meeting the needs of military force modernization. In a further move to strengthen the defense sector and improve oversight, China created a new super ministry in 2008. The Ministry of Industry and Informatization (MIIT) was charged with facilitating civil-military integration and the coordinated development of advanced technology and industry. Other structural reforms were adopted to strengthen defense research, development, and production and to bring them more in line with market principles.
China is also emphasizing integration of defense and civilian sectors to leverage output from China’s expanding science and technology base. Select defense firms operate research institutes with academic departments, some of which are capable of granting advanced degrees. These institutes serve to focus scientific research on cutting-edge military technologies and to groom the next generation of scientists and engineers who will support defense research, development, and production. These institutes also provide an access point to international resources and scientific research networks. Chinese practitioners and students at these defense institutes regularly attend conferences, present research findings, and publish scholarly articles.
The China Academy of Sciences (CAS) also plays a key role in facilitating research that supports advancements in military modernization. The CAS Institute of Mechanics is one example, with a mission focus on scientific innovation and high tech integration in aerospace technology, environmental engineering, and energy resources. Specific areas of emphasis include nano-scale and micro-scale mechanics, high temperature gas and supersonic flight technologies, and advanced manufacturing.
In May 2012, the Institute announced successful acceptance testing of its new super-large JF12 hypersonic wind tunnel (reportedly the largest in the world), capable of replicating flying conditions at mach 5 to 9. This project was one of eight detailed in China’s National Mid-and-Long-Term Scientific and Technological Development Outline Plan (2006-2020). This facility and others like it sponsored by CAS will support research and development efforts in China’s civilian and military aerospace sector.
Military Equipment Modernization Trends. China’s defense industry resource and investment prioritization and allocation favors missile and space systems, followed by maritime assets and aircraft, and, lastly, ground force materiel. China is developing and producing increasingly advanced systems, augmented through selected investments into foreign designs and reverse engineering. However, China’s defense industries are increasing the quality of output in all of these areas as well as increasing overall production capacities. Over the past decade, China has made dramatic improvements in all defense industrial production sectors and is comparable to other major weapon system producers like Russia and the European Union in some areas.
Missile and Space Industry. China’s production of a range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles for the PLA and for export has likely been enhanced by upgrades to primary final assembly and rocket motor production facilities over the past few years. China’s space launch vehicle industry is expanding to support satellite launch services and the manned space program. The majority of China’s missile programs, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are comparable to other international top-tier producers, while its surface-to-air missile systems lag behind global leaders. China’s missile industry modernization efforts have positioned it well for the foreseeable future.
Naval/Shipbuilding Industry. Shipyard expansion and modernization have increased China’s shipbuilding capacity and capability, generating benefits for all types of military projects, including submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, and sealift assets.
China continues to invest in foreign suppliers for some propulsion units, but is becoming increasingly self-reliant. China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, a renovated Russian KUZNETSOV-class hull, in September 2012. China is among the top ship-producing nations in the world and is currently pursuing an indigenous aircraft carrier program. To date, China has not produced a non-carrier surface combatant larger than a destroyer, but is outfitting theses ships with increasingly sophisticated anti-surface, -air and –subsurface defensive and offensive capabilities. China is using more sophisticated ship design and construction program management techniques and software, and it is improving in most areas of the maritime sector.
Armament Industry. There have been production capacity advances in almost every area of PLA ground forces systems, including production of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense artillery systems, and artillery pieces. However, China still relies on foreign acquisition to fill gaps in select critical technical capabilities, such as turbine aircraft engines. China is capable of producing ground weapons systems at or near world standards however, quality concerns persist with some export equipment.
Aviation Industry. China’s commercial and military aviation industries have advanced to indigenously produce improved versions of older aircraft and modern fourth-to-fifth generation fighters and attack helicopters. China’s commercial aircraft industry has invested in high-precision and technologically advanced machine tools, avionics, and other components that can also be used in the production of military aircraft. However, production in the aircraft industry will be limited by its reliance on foreign sourcing for dependable, proven aircraft engines, as well as a continued lack of skilled personnel and facilities. Infrastructure and experience for the production of large-body commercial and military aircraft are believed to be limited, but growing with new investments. China is developing fourth and fifth generation aircraft that incorporate stealth and low-observable technologies (including carbon fiber and other specialty materials), and it is pursuing an indigenous heavy-lift military transport. Although China is modernizing its aviation industry, it lags behind in the production of reliable high performance aircraft engines.
Foreign Technology Acquisition. Key areas where China continues to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts through targeted foreign technologies include engines for aircraft and tanks, solid state electronics and micro processors, guidance and control systems, and enabling technologies such as cutting-edge precision machine tools, advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment, and computer-assisted design, manufacturing and engineering. China often pursues these foreign technologies for the purpose of reverse engineering or to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts.
Russia has been China’s primary weapons and materiel provider, selling China advanced fighter aircraft, helicopters, missile systems, submarines, and destroyers. Relying on Russian components for several of its production programs, China purchased production rights to Russian weapon designs. Though still committed to filling capability gaps with Russian equipment, this trend is changing as China becomes more self-sufficient in research, development, and production.
Science and Technology Development Goals Through 2020. China’s National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), issued by the State Council in February 2006, seeks to transform China into an “innovation-oriented society by 2020.” The plan defines China’s science and technology focus in terms of “basic research,” “leading-edge technologies,” “key fields and priority subjects,” and “major special items,” all of which have military applications.
Basic Research. As part of a broad effort to expand basic research capabilities, China identified five areas that have military applications as major strategic needs or science research plans requiring active government involvement and funding:
Material design and preparation;
Manufacturing in extreme environmental conditions;
Aeronautic and astronautic mechanics;
Information technology development; and
Nanotechnology research.
In nanotechnology, China has progressed from virtually no research or funding in 2002 to being a close second to the United States in total government investment. Leading-edge Technologies. China is focusing on the following technologies for rapid development:
Information Technology: Priorities include intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc networks, and virtual reality technologies;
New Materials: Priorities include smart materials and structures, high-temperature superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies;
Advanced Manufacturing: Priorities include extreme manufacturing technologies and intelligent service advanced machine tools;
Advanced Energy Technologies: Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies, alternative fuels, and advanced vehicle technologies;
Marine Technologies: Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring technologies, fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies, and deep-sea operations technologies; and
Laser and Aerospace Technologies: Priorities include development of chemical and solid laser state technologies to ultimately field a weapons-grade system from ground-based and airborne platforms.
Key Fields and Priority Subjects. China has identified certain industries and technology groups with potential to provide technological breakthroughs, remove technical obstacles across industries, and improve international competitiveness. Specifically, China’s defense industries are pursuing advanced manufacturing, information technology, and defense technologies. Examples include radar, counter-space capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies.
Major Special Items. China has also identified 16 “major special items” for which it plans to develop or expand indigenous capabilities. These include core electronic components, high-end universal chips and operating system software, very large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing, next-generation broadband wireless mobile communications, high-grade numerically controlled machine tools, large aircraft, high-resolution satellites, and lunar exploration.
Foreign Arms Acquisition. China seeks some high-tech components and certain major end items that it has difficulty producing domestically, particularly from Russia. China is pursuing advanced Russian defense equipment such as the SA-21 (S-400) surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter aircraft. Between 2011 and 2012, Russia agreed to sell China IL-76 transport aircraft and Mi-171 helicopters. Russia’s concerns about intellectual property protections will affect the types and quantities of advanced arms or associated production technologies it is willing to transfer to China. China also has signed significant purchase contracts with Ukraine in recent years, including contracts for assault hovercraft and aircraft engines.
Espionage Supporting Military Modernization. China utilizes a large, well-organized network of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research institutes, and computer network operations to facilitate the collection of sensitive information and export-controlled technology, as well as basic research and science that supports U.S. defense system modernization. Many of the organizations comprising China’s military-industrial complex have both military and civilian research and development functions.
This network of government-affiliated companies and research institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies or knowledgeable experts under the guise of civilian research and development. The enterprises and institutes accomplish this through technology conferences and symposia, legitimate contracts and joint commercial ventures, partnerships with foreign firms, and joint development of specific technologies.
As in previous years, China utilized its intelligence services and employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and export controls to obtain key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia. Based on investigations conducted by the law enforcement agencies of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Commerce, China continues to engage in activities designed to support military procurement and modernization. These include economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, export control violations, and technology transfer.
In August 2010, Noshir Gowadia was convicted of providing China with classified U.S. defense technology. This assisted China in developing a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of rendering a cruise missile resistant to detection by infrared missiles.
In September 2010, Chi Tong Kuok was convicted for conspiracy to illegally export U.S. military encryption technology and smuggle it to Macau and Hong Kong. The relevant technology included encryption, communications equipment, and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment used by U.S. and NATO forces.
In September 2010, Xian Hongwei and Li Li were arrested in Hungary and later extradited to the United States for conspiring to procure thousands of radiation-hardened Programmable Read-Only Microchips, classified as defense items and used in satellite systems, for the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation. Both defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced in September 2011 to two years in prison.
In January 2012, Yang Bin was arrested in Bulgaria and later extradited to the United States based on a December 2011 criminal indictment related to the attempted export of military-grade accelerometers used in “smart” munitions, aircraft, and missiles.
In July 2012, Zhang Zhaowei, a naturalized Canadian citizen, was arrested while entering the United States, based on a sealed January 2011 indictment alleging Zhang attempted to illegally acquire and export military gyroscopes used in unmanned aerial systems and for tactical missile guidance.
In September 2012, Zhang Mingsuan was arrested in the United States and indicted after attempting to acquire up to two tons of aerospace-grade carbon fiber. In a recorded conversation, Zhang claimed he urgently needed the fiber in connection with a scheduled Chinese fighter plane test flight.
In addition, multiple cases identified since 2009 involved individuals procuring and exporting export controlled items to China. These efforts included attempts to procure and export radiation-hardened programmable semiconductors and computer circuits used in satellites, restricted microwave amplifiers used in communications and radar equipment, export-restricted technical data, and thermal imaging cameras. There were also at least two cases in 2011 in which U.S. companies working on Department of Defense contracts subcontracted manufacturing work on small arms and replacement parts to Chinese companies in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.
China’s Arms Exports
From 2007 to 2011, China signed approximately $11 billion in agreements for conventional weapons systems worldwide, ranging from general purpose materiel to major weapons systems.
In 2012 and the coming years, China’s arms exports will likely increase modestly as China’s domestic defense industry improves. Chinese defense firms are marketing and selling arms throughout the world with the bulk of their sales to Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. In 2012, China unveiled the Yi Long tactical unmanned aerial vehicle, which will probably be marketed to developing countries.
Pakistan remains China’s primary customer for conventional weapons. China engages in both arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with Islamabad, including co-production of the JF-17 fighter aircraft, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, F-7 fighter aircraft, early warning and control aircraft, tanks, air-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and cooperation on main battle tank production.
Sub-Saharan African countries view China as a provider of low-cost weapons with fewer political strings attached compared to other international arms suppliers. China uses arms sales as part of a multifaceted approach to promote trade, secure access to natural resources, and extend its influence in the region.
FORCE MODERNIZATION FOR A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY OVERVIEW
Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions between and among mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s strategy toward
Taiwan continues to be influenced by what it sees as positive developments in Taiwan’s political situation and approach to engagement with Beijing. However, China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of persuasion and coercion to deter or repress the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.
The two sides made progress in expanding cross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts; China addressed in limited terms Taiwan’s expressed desire for greater international space through its decision not to oppose Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the World Health Assembly.
Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, however, there have been no signs that China’s military disposition opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to
Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.
CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
China appears prepared to defer the use of force, as long as it believes that unification over the long-term remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat to use force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress, and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence.
China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.” The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included:
Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
Internal unrest on Taiwan;
Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
Foreign troops stationed on Taiwan.
Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China;” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur; or, if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.
CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN
The PLA is capable of increasingly sophisticated military action against Taiwan. It is possible China would first pursue a measured approach characterized by signaling its readiness to use force, followed by a deliberate buildup of force to optimize the speed of engagement over strategic deception. Another option is that China would sacrifice overt, large-scale preparations in favor of surprise to force rapid military and/or political resolution before other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, China would seek to:
Deter potential U.S. intervention;
Failing that, delay intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; and,
Fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.
Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. In addition to direct military engagement, PLA writings describe potential alternative solutions—air blockades, missile attacks, and mining to force capitulation. China could declare that ships en route to Taiwan must stop in mainland ports for inspection and/or transshipment prior to transiting to Taiwan ports. China could also attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches to ports, in effect closing port access and diverting merchant traffic. The PLA employed this method during the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fire exercises. There is a risk, however, that China would underestimate the degree to which any attempt to limit maritime traffic to and from Taiwan would trigger countervailing international pressure and military escalation. China today probably could not enforce a full military blockade, particularly if a major naval power intervened. However, its ability to do so will improve significantly over the next five to ten years.
Limited Force or Coercive Options. China might use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, likely in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the populace’s confidence in the Taiwan leadership. Similarly, PLA special operations forces could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.
Air and Missile Campaign. Limited SRBM attacks and precision strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities, could be conducted in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s will to fight.
Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets and/or the entire island.
The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better defended offshore island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities.
Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation includes significant, if not prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan’s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease China’s ability to achieve its objectives. Moreover, China does not appear to be building the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign.
THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT
Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with the possibility of U.S. intervention has largely dominated China’s military modernization program. Despite decreased cross-strait tensions since 2008, Taiwan remains a primary military focus.
Missile Forces. The Second Artillery is prepared to conduct SRBM attacks and precision strikes against Taiwan’s air defense systems, air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, C2 and communications facilities, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight.
Air Forces. The PLA Air Force has maintained a force posture that provides it with a variety of capabilities to leverage against Taiwan in a contingency. First, it has stationed a large number of advanced aircraft within an unrefueled range of Taiwan, providing them with a significant capability to conduct air superiority and ground attack operations against Taiwan. Second, a number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense of China’s mainland against a counterattack. Third, China’s development of support aircraft provide it improved ISR to support PLA Air Force operations in a contingency.
Navy Forces. The PLA Navy is improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new platforms that are positioned to strike Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict. The additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within the first island chain and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict. The PLA Navy currently lacks the massive amphibious lift capacity that a large-scale invasion of Taiwan would require.
Ground Forces. Increasingly armed with more modern systems such as armed attack helicopters, the PLA ground forces are conducting joint training exercises that will prepare them for a Taiwan invasion scenario. Training, including amphibious landing training, is often conducted under realistic conditions, including all-weather and at night. Improved networks provide real-time data transmissions within and between units, enabling better command and control during operations. Additionally, the PLA Army’s ongoing fielding of advanced air defense equipment is significantly enhancing the self defense of key command and control elements and other critical assets assessed as likely tasked for potential use against Taiwan.
As the number of these new systems grows in the PLA ground forces, the ability of an amphibious invasion force to successfully defend cross-Strait amphibious lodgments against counterattacks by both legacy and advanced weaponry will inevitably increase.
TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
Taiwan has historically relied upon multiple military variables to deter PLA aggression: the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the 100 mile Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense. China’s increasingly modern weapons and platforms (more than 1,100 ballistic missiles, an anti-ship ballistic missile program, ships and submarines, combat aircraft, and improved C4ISR capabilities) have largely negated many of these factors.
Taiwan has taken important steps to build its war reserve stocks, grow its defense industrial base, improve joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and increase its officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
These improvements partially address Taiwan’s eroding defensive advantages. Taiwan is following through with its transition to a volunteer military and reducing its active military end-strength from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel to create a “small but smart and strong force.” Under this plan, which is slated for completion by December 2014, the cost savings from a smaller force will free up resources to increase volunteer salaries and benefits, although these savings are not sufficient to cover the costs of volunteers.
However, the transition has led to additional personnel costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the volunteer system, diverting funds from foreign and indigenous acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. The actual number of active-duty service members is approximately 235,000 – well below the 275,000 currently authorized. In addition, Taiwan military spending has dropped to approximately 2 percent of GDP – well below President Ma’s pledge of 3 percent. China’s official defense budget is about 10 times that of Taiwan. Realizing that Taiwan cannot match China’s military spending, Taiwan is working to integrate innovative and asymmetric measures into its defense planning in order to counter-balance China’s growing capabilities.
U.S. policy toward Taiwan derives from its One-China Policy, based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). U.S. policy opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by either side. The United States continues to support peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides.
Consistent with the TRA, the United States has helped to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability.
To this end, the United States has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010. This includes, most recently, in September 2011, the U.S. announcement of its intent to sell to Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of defensive arms and equipment, including an advanced retrofit program for Taiwan’s F-16 A/B fighter jets, training, and spare parts for Taiwan’s air force.
U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT
Over the past two decades, the PRC has steadily transformed a poorly equipped, ground forces-centric military into a more capable force that is assuming diverse missions well beyond China’s shores. Given this trajectory, the need for a robust U.S.-China military-to-military relationship that builds trust and helps manage friction continues to grow. During their January 2011 summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and PRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of [their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S. China relationship.” Both sides have repeatedly endorsed this objective.
The fundamental purpose for two countries to conduct military-to-military relations is to gain a better understanding of how each side thinks about the role and use of military power in achieving political and strategic objectives. It is precisely during periods of tension when a working relationship is most important. Over the long term, a fully functioning relationship should help both parties develop a more acute awareness of the potential for cooperation and competition. Sustained and substantive military-to-military contacts at all levels can help reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and the risks of miscalculation.
The United States bases its contacts and exchanges with China’s military on the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, mutual interest, continuous dialogue, and mutual risk reduction. The Department of Defense conducts them in a manner consistent with the provisions of Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000, which provide the Secretary of Defense sufficient latitude to develop a program of exchanges with China that supports U.S. national interests.
The complexity of the security environment both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, calls for a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of the United States and China. The U.S. position is that our engagement with China should expand cooperation in areas of mutual interest, provide a forum to candidly address areas of disagreement and mprove mutual understanding. The United States sees value in sustained and reliable military ties and regards the military relationship as an integral component of a comprehensive U.S.-China relationship.
Sustained military engagement underpins U.S. policy objectives of promoting China’s development in a manner consistent with international rules and norms and that contributes to regional and global problem-solving. The U.S. National Defense Strategy emphasizes that U.S. defense interaction with China will be long-term and multi-dimensional.
U.S. military-to-military engagement with China serves three general purposes in support of the broader relationship. First, it allows the U.S. and PRC militaries to build cooperative capacity. This is achieved through activities that enhance or facilitate our ability to interact at a tactical or operational level. Second, engagement fosters understanding of each others’ military institutions in ways that dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue.
Third, military engagement allows senior leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges. These interactions can facilitate common approaches to challenges and serves as a bridge to build more productive working relationships.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN 2012 – HIGHLIGHTS
2012 was a year of positive momentum in the military relationship between the United States and China. Although the 2012 military-to-military engagement plan was not finalized until April 2012, PRC Vice President Xi Jinping’s successful visit to the Pentagon and meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta in February set the tone for a positive atmosphere that continued through the year.
Although both nations underwent political transitions in November, the robust schedule of engagements proceeded without interruption – selected visits are highlighted below (see complete list of 2012 engagements at Appendix II).
High Level Visits. Along with PRC Vice President Xi Jinping’s February visit to the United States, PRC Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie traveled to the United States in May, visiting San Francisco; Naval Air Station, San Diego; Washington, DC; SOUTHCOM Headquarters in Miami; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Ft. Benning, Georgia; and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
PACOM Commander Admiral Samuel Locklear visited China in June, where he had meetings in Beijing and visited the Guangzhou Military Region Headquarters, observed tank live fire demonstrations in Guilin, and received briefings at the South Sea Fleet Command Headquarters in Zhanjiang and toured a PLA Navy destroyer.
In August, PRC Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Cai Yingting, visited the United States, making stops in New York; Washington, DC; Fort Hood, TX; and PACOM Headquarters in Honolulu. Secretary Panetta visited China in September, where he met with senior military and civilian leaders in Beijing and gave an address to cadets at the PLA’s Armed Forces Engineering Academy (several of whom he shared lunch with afterward). Secretary of Defense Panetta then traveled south to Qingdao, where he visited China’s North Sea Fleet headquarters and toured a SONG-class diesel electric submarine and a JIANGKAI II-class guided missile frigate. Secretary of Defense Panetta invited China to participate in RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC), PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, and PACIFIC ANGEL exercises.
Finally, at the end of November 2012, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus conducted a visit to China that included meetings in Beijing and visits to the PLA Navy’s bases in Zhoushan and Daxie Dao, where he toured the Peace Ark hospital ship, a JIANGKAI II-class guided missile frigate, and a YUAN-class SSP submarine.
Recurrent Exchanges. A full slate of recurrent exchanges was also conducted in 2012. These events form the backbone of defense policy-level discussions for the two nations and serve as a more regularized, routine mechanism for dialogue than high-level visits, with their less-predictable schedules.
In May, on the margins of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. James Miller participated in the Department of State-led second annual Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD). Under Secretary Miller also led the Department of Defense delegation to the S&ED, where he spoke at the final security track plenary session (hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo) on the state of
U.S.-China military-to-military relations. Under Secretary Miller’s PRC counterpart, then-Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Ma Xiaotian, also participated in both the SSD and the S&ED. The PACOM-led Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) plenary session (focused on maritime safety) took place in Qingdao in September, with preparatory working group meeting in June (future meetings may also focus on safe air intercept practices).
In October 2012, the two sides conducted the annual Defensive Policy Coordination Talks (DPCTs) at the Pentagon, with maritime safety/security and regional/global security issues the focus of the agenda. In addition to beginning negotiations for the 2013 military-to-military engagement plant, the DPCTs set the stage for Under Secretary Miller to conduct the annual Defense Consultative Talks (DCTs) in December at the Pentagon. The DCTs are the highest-level annual defense dialogue between the United States and China.
Academic, Functional Exchanges. In June 2012, 29 PLA generals, primarily from the ground forces, visited the United States as part of a delegation of students in the strategic “Dragons” course at the PLA National Defense University (NDU). The U.S. NDU “Capstone” course conducted a reciprocal visit to China the following month.
In August, a PLA Civilian Personnel System delegation visited the United States (and Canada) to learn more about integration of civilian and military personnel in the Department of Defense. The visit increased mutual institutional understanding and covered issues including promotion systems, ranking equivalency, casualty compensation, and incorporating retired military personnel into civilian roles.
In September, just days before Secretary of Defense Panetta’s visit to China, the United States and China conducted their first bilateral counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden. In November 2012, the PRC hosted experts from the U.S. Army Pacific for an annual Disaster Management Exchange (DME), which included a table-top exercise where both sides discussed possible responses to an earthquake in a third country.
In December 2012, the PACOM Command Surgeon led a military medical delegation to China, the first delegation of its kind, in an effort to chart out more robust cooperation.
SPECIAL TOPIC: SPACE-BASED IMAGING AND REMOTE SENSING
China has developed a large constellation of imaging and remote sensing satellites under a variety of mission families. These satellites can support military objectives by providing situational awareness of foreign military force deployments, critical infrastructure, and targets of political significance. Since 2006, China has conducted 16 Yaogan remote sensing satellite launches.
The Yaogan satellites conduct scientific experiments, carry out surveys on land resources, estimate crop yield, and support natural disaster reduction and prevention. Additionally, China has launched two Tianhui satellites designed to conduct scientific experiments and support land resource surveys and territory mapping with a stereoscopic imaging payload. China has three Huanjing disaster monitoring satellites currently on orbit (the third of which was launched in November 2012). The Ziyuan series of satellites are used for earth resources, cartography, surveying, and monitoring. China also operates the Haiyang ocean monitoring constellation and Fengyun weather satellites in low Earth and geosynchronous orbits. China will continue to increase its on-orbit constellation with the planned launch of 100 satellites through 2015. These launches include imaging, remote sensing, navigation, communication, and scientific satellites, as well as manned spacecraft.
SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA’S FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER
The most significant development in the PLA Navy over the past year has been the sea trials and commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. The Liaoning was commissioned and entered service with the PLA Navy on September 25, 2012. The carrier most likely will conduct extensive local operations focusing on shipboard training, carrier aircraft integration, and carrier formation training before reaching an operational effectiveness in three to four years. The carrier could operate in the East and South China Seas in the nearer term and may be used for other mission sets as needed.
The carrier will most likely be based at Yuchi in the Qingdao area in the near term, although Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island is also a possibility, particularly after an operational air wing is formed. The base under construction at Yuchi features a deep draft harbor with replenishment, repair, and maintenance facilities. The Qingdao area also supports nearby airfields for aircraft maintenance and repair.
The J-15 aircraft conducted its first takeoffs and landings from the Liaoning on November 26, 2012. Subsequently, at least two aircraft conducted multiple landings and takeoffs from the ship. The J-15 carrier-based fighter is the Chinese version of the Russian Su-33. The J-15 is designed for ski-jump takeoffs and arrested landings, as required by the configuration of the Liaoning.
Although the J-15 has a land-based combat radius of 1200 km, the aircraft will be limited in range and armament when operating from the carrier, due to limits imposed by the ski-jump takeoff and arrested carrier landings.
The formation of carrier battle groups will enable the PLA Navy to conduct comprehensive operations and enhance its long-range operational capabilities. Although reports have surfaced regarding the construction of a second Chinese aircraft carrier in Shanghai, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has dismissed these claims.
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA AIR FORCE STEALTH AIRCRAFT
The PLA seeks to develop aircraft with low observable features, advanced avionics, super-cruise engines, and stealth applications, as demonstrated by the January 2011 flight test of the J-20 prototype and recent observations of a second indigenously-produced aircraft with stealth features. China seeks to develop these advanced aircraft to improve its regional airpower projection capabilities and strengthen its ability to strike regional airbases and facilities. China’s first fifth generation fighter is not expected to enter service prior to 2018, and China faces numerous challenges to achieving full operational capability, including developing high-performance jet engines.
The PLA Air Force has observed foreign military employment of stealth aircraft and views this technology as a core capability in its transformation from a predominantly territorial air force to one capable of conducting offensive and defensive operations. The PLA Air Force also perceives there is an imbalance between offensive and defensive operations due to advances in stealth aircraft and related technologies with stealth aircraft providing an offensive operational advantage that denies an adversary the time to mobilize and conduct defensive operations. The PLA Air Force also sees the offensive advantage to combining an aircraft’s stealthy features with information systems that enhance situational awareness and improve coordination of forces during combat.
The development of stealth aircraft incorporated with advanced fifth generation capabilities, including super-cruise engines and advanced avionics, would make the aircraft capable of supporting a variety of tactical and regional missions. Furthermore, stealth aircraft the size of China’s J-20 could be used as a multi-role fighter to strike ground targets within the region in addition to supporting air superiority missions beyond China’s borders. Although China’s second developmental fifth generation fighter is smaller in size than the J-20, this aircraft (tentatively identified as the J-31) may be designed for multi-role missions, providing China with a second stealth platform for regional operations. In addition to manned fighter aircraft, the PLA Air Force also views stealth technology as integral to unmanned aircraft, specifically those with an air-to-ground role, as this technology will improve the system’s ability to penetrate heavily protected targets.
The PLA recognizes the technological challenges posed by the next generation of advanced fighters, and has concerns about its ability to counter U.S. 5th generation aircraft, such as the F-22 and F-35. In response, the PLA Air Force has emphasized the need to develop systems and training to defend against the employment of foreign stealth technology in combat. In addition, the PLA Air Force believes that it should not focus solely on defense against stealth technology, but must also emphasize offensive capabilities to counter an adversary’s use of stealth technology, to include the use of long-range attack capabilities to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground.
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSES
China has developed a national integrated air defense system (IADS) to defend key strategic cities and borders, territorial claims, and forces against threats from the air. Overall, China’s IADS represents a multilayered defense consisting of weapons systems, radars and C4ISR platforms working together to counter multiple types of air threats at various ranges and altitudes. One of China’s primary goals is to defend against precision strike munitions such as cruise and ballistic missiles, especially those launched from long distances. In order to counter precision strike munitions, China has developed advanced long-range SAM systems, airborne early warning platforms, and C2 networks. Defense against stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles is also a growing priority. Another aspect of China’s IADS development is the deployment of land-based air defense brigades beyond the eastern coast of China and improving the air defense of China’s naval fleets in the ECS and SCS. This is part of China’s longstanding effort to expand its capabilities from focusing on territorial defense to supporting both defensive and offensive operations.
Air Defense Weapons. China’s air force and navy employ land- and sea-based SAMs and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and its ground forces employ short- and medium-range SAMs and AAA in extensive numbers. The PLA Air Force employs one of the largest forces of advanced long-range SAM systems in the world, including SA-20 battalions acquired from Russia and domestically-produced HQ-9 battalions. China has shown interest in acquiring Russia’s newest long-range SAM, the S-400 TRIUMF, but a contract has not been signed yet and Russian officials have stated China would not receive the S-400 until at least 2017. This SAM can target aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Early Warning Network. Another element of China’s multilayered IADS is its extensive ground-based radar network. In the past, this ground-based early warning network and China’s Russian-acquired SAMs primarily protected Beijing and other key strategic locations in the eastern part of the country. China has since developed the KONGJING-2000 (KJ-2000) airborne early warning aircraft to provide coverage at long ranges and low altitudes for faster response and command targeting to weapons systems. In the future China may expand its national early warning network to protect China’s territorial air space and waters farther from the mainland, as well as to provide space defense. This effort would include China’s growing constellations of reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communications satellites. China is also improving reconnaissance technologies to include infrared, multiple-spectrum, pulsed doppler, phased array, and passive detection. Over-the-horizon skywave radar is also an important component of China’s improvement in its strategic early warning capabilities.
C4ISR Network. China’s IADS also includes a C4ISR network to connect early warning platforms, SAM and AAA, and command posts in order to improve communication and response time during operations. The network is intended to include battle damage assessment capability. China continues to make progress on command, communication, and control systems. China’s air defense brigades are training to use this information network and mobile C2 platforms to connect different types of weapons systems’ operations together by sending automated targeting information to them simultaneously. Weapon systems that are geographically separate, in different units, and a mix of older and newer battalions could achieve compatibility through the use of networked C2. China is also using simulation systems to attempt to train for command of air defense operations in realistic operational conditions, including network warfare. China has deployed air defense brigades employing its newest SAM system to the western part of China to train for long-distance mobility and operations in high-altitude conditions, including operations in the conditions of network warfare.
“I said that death is a part of life, so often we have to find a way to make life a part of death.”
—Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD), ranking member of the House Oversight Committee
I think the dam is about to break on Benghazi. We’re going to find a system failure before, during, and after the attacks. We’re going to find political manipulation seven weeks before an election. We’re going to find people asleep at the switch when it comes to the State Department, including Hillary Clinton. The bond that has been broken between those who serve us in harms way and the government they serve is huge — and to me every bit as damaging as Watergate. Senator Graham
Issa: Muller and Pickering declined to testify to Congress re: Accountability Review Board report
counterterror expert mark thompson says he wanted special emergency FEST team to respond to Benghazi but was told that option had been taken off the table at a meeting earlier in the night. White House previously told CBS News that’s not FEST’s purpose. However, Thompson today testified that’s precisely, in his view, the purpose of FEST.
The following is the transcript of Gregory Hicks’ testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on the events of Sept. 11, 2012, in Libya.
GREGORY HICKS, FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION IN LIBYA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As — as I remember September 11, 2012, it was a routine day at our embassy, and until we saw the news about Cairo – and I remember sending a text message to Ambassador Stevens saying, “Chris, are you aware of what’s going on in Cairo?” And he said no. So I told him that the embassy — in another text – that the embassy had been stormed, and they were trying to tear down our flag. And he said, “Thanks very much.” And, you know, then I went on with — with — with business.
Closed — closed the day, and I went back to my villa and was relaxing, watching a television show that I particularly like, and at 9:45 p.m. — and all times will be Libyan times, a six-hour time difference — the RSO John Martinec ran into my villa yelling, “Greg! Greg! The consulate’s under attack.” And I stood up and reached for my phone because I had an inkling or thought that perhaps the ambassador had tried to call me to relay the same message. And I found two missed calls on the phone, one from the ambassador’s phone and one from a phone number I didn’t recognize.
And I punched the phone number I didn’t recognize, and I got the ambassador on the other end. And he said, “Greg, we’re under attack.” And I was walking out of the villa, on my way to the Tactical Operations Center, because I knew we would all have to gather there to mobilize or try to mobilize a response. And it was also a — a bad cell phone night in Tripoli. Connections were weak. And I said, “OK,” and the line cut.
As I walked to the Tactical Operations Center, I tried to reach back on both of the numbers, the unknown number and the ambassador’s personal number and got no response. When I got to the Tactical Operations Center, I told people that the ambassador — that I had just talked to the ambassador and what he said. At the time, John Martinec was on the phone with Alec Henderson in Benghazi, the RSO there, and I asked one of our D.S. agents who — what number did I reach Ambassador Stevens on.
And he said, “Oh, that’s Scott Wickland’s telephone. Scott Wickland was Ambassador Steven’s agent in charge, his personal escort for that night, and was with him in the villa during the attack. So I asked — when John Martinec got off the telephone, I asked him what was going on. And he said that the consulate had been breached, and there were at least 20 hostile individuals armed in the — in the compound at the time. So I next called the annex chief to ask him if he was in touch with the Benghazi annex to activate our emergency response plan.
REP. DARRELL ISSA: “Please explain the annex chief so that people that don’t know as much would understand that. No, go ahead, please.”
HICKS: “OK, thank you. And he said that he had been in touch with the annex in Benghazi, and they said they were mobilizing a response team there to go to the — to our facility and provide reinforcements and to repel the attack.
With that knowledge, I called the operations center at the State Department, approximately 10 p.m. to report the attack and what we were doing to respond to it. The next thing I did was to begin calling the senior officials in the government of Libya that I knew at the time. And so, I dialed first the President Magariaf’s chief of staff and reported the attack and asked for immediate assistance from the government of Libya to assist our folks in Benghazi.
I followed that up with a call to the prime minister’s chief of staff to make the same request and then to the MFA, America’s director. MFA is Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The defense attache was, at the same time, calling the leadership of Libya’s military with the same purpose, to ask them for assistance.
Once that was done, I called again to Washington to report that these — actions had been commenced. Over the night we — over that night, that is basically how our team operated. I was talking to the government of — of Libya, reporting to the State — State Department through the operations center, and also staying in touch with the annex chief about what was going on.
Let me step back one minute, if I could, and say that I also discussed with the annex chief about mobilizing a Tripoli response team, and we agreed that we would move forward with a — chartering a plane from Tripoli to fly a response team to Benghazi to provide additional reinforcements. The defense attache was also reporting through his chain of command, back to AFRICOM and to the joint staff here in Washington about what was going on in the country. David McFarland, our political section chief, had just returned from Benghazi, where he had been our principle officer for the previous 10 days. And so, he jumped into this picture by reaching out to his contacts in – in Benghazi and trying to get them, at the local level there, to respond to the attack. And he also was in touch with our local employee there, as well — excuse me if I check my notes here.
This is a long — the attack unfolded in four phases or the night unfolded in four phases. The first phase was the attack on our consulate. This story is well known, I think.
The Benghazi response — the consulate was invaded, the — Villa C where the ambassador and Sean Smith and Scott Wickland were hiding in the safe area was set on fire. The attackers also went into another building. They were unable to enter the tactical operations center in Benghazi, because of improvements to that facility that had been made.
They — Scott attempted to lead the ambassador and Sean Smith out of the burning building. He managed to make it out. He tried repeatedly to go back in to try to rescue Sean and the ambassador but had to stop due to exposure to smoke.
The response team from from the annex in Benghazi, six individuals, drove the attackers out of our compound, and secured it temporarily. There have been estimates as high as 60 attackers were in the compound at one particular time. There were repeated attempts by all of the RSOs and by the response team from the annex to go into the burning building and recover — try to save Sean and the ambassador. They found Sean’s body and pulled it out but he was no longer responsive.
They did not find the ambassador.
I spoke with a medical officer, one of our medical officers after the attack and the heroism of these individuals in repeatedly going into a petroleum based fire cannot be understated. Petroleum — according to this — to our regional medical officer, petroleum based fires emit enormous amounts of Cyanide gas. They told me one full breath of that would incapacitate and kill a person if exposed to it.
A second — it was noticed that a second wave of attackers was coming to attack the facility. And our teams evacuated, five RSOs and Sean Smith in one vehicle that suffered heavy fire, but they managed to break through and get to the annex, and in — the annex team also withdrew from the facility and the second wave of attackers took it over.
After the second phase of the evening occurs, the timing is about 11:30 or so. The second phase commences after the teams have returned to the annex, and they suffer for about an hour and a half probing attacks from terrorists. They are able to repulse them and then they desist at about 1:30 in the morning.
The Tripoli response team departs at about midnight and arrives at about 1:15 in Benghazi. If I may step back again to Tripoli and what’s going on there at this point. At about 10:45 or 11:00 we confer, and I asked the defense attache who had been talking about AFRICOM and with the joint staff, ”Is anything coming? Will they be sending us any help? Is there something out there?“ And he answered that, the nearest help was in Aviano, the nearest — where there were fighter planes. He said that it would take two to three hours for them to get onsite, but that there also were no tankers available for them to refuel. And I said, ”Thank you very much,“ and we went on with our work.
Phase III begins with news that the ambassador – the ambassador’s body has been recovered, and David McFarland, if I recall correctly, is the individual who began to receive that news from his contacts in Benghazi. We began to hear also that the ambassador has been taken to a hospital. We don’t know initially which hospital it is, but we — through David’s reports we learned that it is in a hospital which is controlled by Ansar Sharia, the group that Twitter feeds had identified as leading the attack on the consulate.
We’re getting this information as the Tripoli response team arrives in Benghazi at the airport. Both our annex chief and the annex chief in Benghazi and our defense attache are on the phone during this period trying to get the Libyan government to send vehicles and military — and-or security assets to the airport to assist our response team.
At this point, this response team looks like it may be a hostage rescue team, that they’re going to — we’re going to need to send them to try to save the ambassador who is in a hospital that is, as far as we know, under enemy control.
Our contacts with the government in Tripoli are telling us that the ambassador is in a safe place, but they imply that he is with us in the annex in Benghazi, and we keep telling them no, the — he is not with us. We do not have his — we do not have him.
About 12:30 at the same time that we see the Twitter feeds that are asserting that Ansar Sharia is responsible for the attack, we also see a call for an attack on the embassy in Tripoli. And so we begin to – we — we had always thought that we were in — under threat, that we now have to take care of ourselves and we began planning to evacuate our facility. When I say our facility, I mean the State Department residential compound in Tripoli, and to consolidate all of our personnel in — at the annex in Tripoli.
We have about 55 diplomatic personnel in the two annexes.
On that night if I may go back, I would just like to point out that with Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith in Benghazi there are five diplomatic security agents — assistant regional security officers. With us in — in our residential compound in Tripoli, we have the RSO John Martinek, three assistant regional security officers protecting 28 diplomatic personnel. In addition, we also have four special forces personnel who are part of the training mission.
During the night, I am in touch with Washington keeping them posted of what’s happening in Tripoli and to the best of my knowledge what I am being told in Benghazi. I think at about 2 p.m. the — 2 a.m., sorry, the Secretary of State Clinton called me along with her senior staff were all on the phone, and she asked me what was going on. And, I briefed her on developments.
Most of the conversation was about the search for Ambassador Stevens. It was also about what we were going to do with our personnel in Benghazi, and I told her that we would need to evacuate, and that was — she said that was the right thing to do.
At about 3 a.m. I received a call from the prime minister of Libya. I think it is the saddest phone call I have ever had in my life. He told me that Ambassador Stevens had passed away. I immediately telephoned Washington that news afterwards, and began accelerating our effort to withdraw from the Villas compound and move to the annex.
The — excuse me.
Our team responded with amazing discipline and courage in Tripoli in organizing withdrawal. I have vivid memories of that. I think the most telling, though, was of our communications staff dismantling our communications equipment to take with us to the annex and destroying the classified communications capability.
Our office manager, Amber Pickens, was everywhere that night just throwing herself into some task that had to be done. First she was taking a log of what we were doing. Then she was loading magazines, carrying ammunition to the — carrying our ammunition supply to the — our vehicles, and then she was smashing hard drives with an axe.
Allen Greenfield, our management officer, was a whirlwind of activity organizing the vehicles to — lining them up, finding the drivers, making sure everybody was getting the things that they would need for the coming days.
John Martinek was a mountain of moral support, particularly to the guys who were in Benghazi, just on the phone talking them through the whole ordeal.
David McFarland on the phone constantly all the time talking to his contacts in Benghazi urging — urging them to help.
Lieutenant Colonel Phillips and Lieutenant Colonel Arnt and Lieutenant Colonel Gibson mountains of strength. I’m still in awe of them. They asked me, in one of the phone calls, when were you going to move to the annex, and I said, ”We’ll move at dawn,“ because none of our people had great experience driving the armored suburbans that we were going to have to use.
Our local staff drove for us as part of our security procedures. They of course were not there that night, and we would have to go through check points, militia check points on the way to the annex to get there, and I didn’t want our people to be going through those check points, because I didn’t know what to expect from the militias.
And so we moved at dawn. We arrived at the annex, at least my group I think at about 4:45 perhaps, maybe 5 a.m., and a few minutes later came the word of the mortar attack.
If I could return to Benghazi a little bit and talk through Tripoli. I am sorry if I bounce back and forth.
The Tripoli team was — basically had to stay at the Benghazi airport because they had no transport and no escort from the — the Libyans. After the announcement of Chris’ passing, military escorted vehicles arrived at the airport. So the decision was made for them to go to the annex. One of the — before I got the call from the prime minister, we’d received several phone calls on the phone that had been with the ambassador saying that we know where the ambassador is, please, you can come get him.
And our local staff engaged on those phone calls admirably, asking very, very good, outstanding, even open ended questions about where was he, trying to discern whether he was alive, whether they even had the ambassador, whether that person was with the ambassador, send a picture, could we talk to the ambassador?
Because we knew separately from David that the ambassador was in a hospital that we believe was under Ansar Sharia’s call, we — we suspected that we were being bated into a trap, and so we did not want to go send our people into an ambush.
And we didn’t.
We sent them to the annex. Shortly after we arrived at the annex the mortars came in. The first was long. It landed actually among the Libyans that escorted our people. They took casualties for us that night. The next was short, the next three landed on the roof killing Glen and Tyrone, and severely wounded David.
They didn’t know whether any more mortars were going to come in. The accuracy was terribly precise. The call was the next one is coming through the roof, maybe if it hit — two of the guys from team Tripoli climbed up on the roof and carried Glen’s body and Tyrone’s body down. One guy, Mark Si, full combat gear, climbed up there strapped David a large man, to his back, carried him down a ladder and saved him.
In Tripoli, we had — the defense attache had persuaded the Libyans to fly their C-130 to Benghazi and wanted to airlift — we had — since we had consolidated at the annex, and the Libyan government had now provided us with external security around our facilities, we wanted to send further reinforcements to Benghazi.
We determined that Lieutenant Gibson and his team of special forces troops should go. The people in Benghazi had been fighting all night. They were tired. They were exhausted.
We wanted to make sure the airport was secure for their withdrawal. As Colonel Gibson and his three personnel were — were getting in the cars, he stopped. And he called them off and said — told me that he had not been authorized to go. The vehicles had to go because the flight needed to go to Tripoli — I mean, to Benghazi. Lieutenant Colonel Gibson was furious. I had told him to go bring our people home. That’s what he wanted to do — paid me a very nice compliment. I won’t repeat it here.
So the plane went. I think it landed in Benghazi around 7:30. The other thing that we did was — and I — and I want to mention Jackie Lavesk’s name in this hearing. She was our nurse. We initially thought that we would — that she should go to Benghazi. One of the special forces with Lieutenant Colonel Gibson’s team was — was our last military-trained medic available. He had a broken foot in a cast. I still remember him walking — walking to go and get in the car with his machine gun, carrying a machine gun on his shoulder.
Jackie, I — I — I refused to allow her to go to Benghazi, because I knew we had wounded coming back. I knew David was severely wounded. And I knew others were wounded as well. And Jackie had just made terrific contacts with a hospital in town. And so, we sent — we went her — I sent her to that hospital to start mobilizing their E.R. teams and their doctors to receive our wounded.
So when the charter flight arrived in Tripoli, we had ambulances at the hospital — at the — at the airport waiting. Their doctors were ready and waiting for our wounded to come in, to be brought in to the operating room. And they certainly saved David Oven’s leg. And they may have very well have saved his life. And they treated our other wounded as well, as if they were their own.
” …Those of us who covered the legal travails of both Clintons during the 1990s, and their rocky relationship with the investigation-inclined Republican Congress would have instantly recognized Cheryl Mills. She is a rare figure in Washington, one who put loyalty and discretion ahead of ambition. And she is ferocious.
Mills is now the counselor and chief of staff to Clinton at the State Department. In the Clinton Administration, she served as deputy White House counsel, and was one of the most influential voices behind the scenes. The internal clashes usually centered on whether to turn over what the president’s enemies were demanding, or to hunker down and fight. She almost invariably led the resistance, an inclination that Hillary Clinton shared.
Few of us outside the inner circle of the White House actually got to hear that voice until Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial in the Senate. The BBC called her “the shining star of the defense team,” an assessment that just about everyone else in Washington shared.
“We cannot uphold the rule of law only when it is consistent with our beliefs,” Mills argued that day. “We must uphold it even when it protects behavior that we don’t like or is unattractive or is not admirable or that might even be hurtful.”…”
” … Pentagon officials have denied a request from a House Republican chairman for access to documents on last year’s terrorist attack in Benghazi. “I am deeply disappointed in the Department’s response and am committed to continuing the Armed Services Committee’s oversight into the tragedy at Benghazi,” House Armed Services Committee chief Rep. Buck McKeon (R-Calif.) said in a statement Wednesday.
In April, McKeon asked for all classified information that went into the Department of Defense (DOD) assessment of its response to the attack, which resulted in the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans. “The department has made every effort to provide the committee a comprehensive understanding of [its] actions” in Benghazi, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Elizabeth King said in a May 1 letter to McKeon and Ranking Member Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.)…”
“… Obama administration officials are finally letting the attorney for a Benghazi whistleblower get a security clearance — but the clearance is at such a low level that it will probably slow the congressional probe of how the administration handled last year’s terrorist attack on the embassy in Benghazi, Libya. Victoria Toensing represents an unnamed government official who can help explain the reaction of top government officials to the jihadi attack on the U.S diplomatic site in Benghazi and killed four Americans last Sept. 11. The official may also be able to explain if officials rewrote intelligence reports and took other actions to minimize media coverage of the administration’s errors and the perceived role of Al Qaeda jihadis…
Toensing’s client will not be able to testify at public or closed-door hearings because he or she has not been able to prepare classified testimony with the aid of a lawyer, Toensing told The Daily Caller. Toensing, who previously held top-level security clearances while working as a Deputy Attorney General at the Justice Department’s anti-terrorism unit, has asked government officials to update her past clearances to let her work with her client. But the officials initially refused to provide her with the needed forms, she said…”
A source with intimate information about the events that happened on the ground in Benghazi the night the U.S. Consulate and the CIA annex was attacked by terrorists told Breitbart News that, ultimately, only the President of the United States, or someone acting on his authority, could have prevented Special Forces either on the ground or nearby from helping those Americans who were under deadly assault.
“According to the source, when the attack on the Consulate occurred, a specific chain of command to gain verbal permission to move special-forces in must have occurred. SOCAFRICA commander Lieutenant Col. Gibson would have contacted a desk officer at the time, asking for that permission.
That desk officer would have called Marine Corps Col. George Bristol, then in command of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara. From there, Bristol would have made contact with Rear Admiral Brian Losey, then Commander of Special Operations Command Africa. Losey would have contacted four-star General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. AFRICOM at the time.
“Ham answers directly to the President of the United States,” said the source. It wasn’t a low-level bureaucrat making the call, the source adamantly added. That call may have been made early in the engagement. Both Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey testified in January that they had no further communication with President Barack Obama after an initial briefing in the early hours of the Benghazi crisis, which continued through the night.
But what about then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton? “I have a hard time thinking it was Hillary alone. Hillary may have tried to circumvent the counterterrorism board and deal with this. I think in order for her to tell General Ham, ‘No, you’re not going to get involved,’ she would have had to talk to the president. The president would have had to say, ‘No, take your commands from Hillary.’ He would have had said something, because Ham does not work for the Department of State; he works directly for the president,” the source explained…”
Hillary Rodham Clinton,Secretary of State; Andrews Air Force Base,Joint Base, MD; September 14, 2012
“This has been a difficult week for the State Department and for our country. We’ve seen the heavy assault on our post in Benghazi that took the lives of those brave men. We’ve seen rage and violence directed at American embassies over an awful internet video that we had nothing to do with. It is hard for the American people to make sense of that because it is senseless, and it is totally unacceptable…”
” … Two of the whistle-blowers’ opening statements were obtained by Fox News, and in the statements they affirm their credentials and credibility in testifying about what happened last Sept. 11 in Libya.
“I am a career public servant,” Greg Hicks’ statement reads. “Until the aftermath of Benghazi, I loved every day of my job.” He was deputy chief of mission in Libya and became top U.S. diplomat in the country after Ambassador Chris Stevens was killed in the terror attack.
The other statement, by Mark Thompson of the State Department Counterterrorism Bureau, is mostly biographical. Testimony also is due Wednesday from Eric Nordstrom, a diplomatic security officer who was formerly the regional security officer in Libya.
The administration has parried Republican allegations lately by arguing that the attack is old news, that the State Department already has investigated it and that Republicans are engaged in a political witch hunt. ..”
” … The military has conducted hundreds of assessments for battles throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. At the platoon level, an “After Action” critique is required whenever there are American fatalities. But at the highest level, there has been no military After Action assessment about Benghazi.
The fight at the U.S. consulate waxed and waned for ten hours. Yet during that time, the Marine Force Recon unit on Sigonella Air Base, 500 miles away, was never deployed and not one F-16 or F-18 was dispatched. Granted, Force Recon and fighter aircraft weren’t on alert and did not appear on the Pentagon’s official list of “hostage rescue forces.” But they were one phone call away, and no general asked for them. Ten hours provided adequate time for a range of ad hoc responses. Commanders are expected to adapt in battle.
Pentagon spokesman George Little said, “We have repeatedly stated that . . . our forces were unable to reach it in time to intervene to stop the attacks.” That is true only if the Pentagon is incapable of improvising. If you see people in a burning house, you do your best to help immediately; you don’t wait for the fire department to respond in a normal manner. If called upon, the Marines on Sigonella would have gathered whoever was on hand and piled into one of a dozen military planes parked at the base. The Benghazi airport 90 minutes away was secure; CIA operatives were standing on the runway, because they had improvised by hiring a plane and flying in from the embassy in Tripoli, 400 miles away. A fighter jet could have refueled at that airport, with the CIA providing cover. Instead, the military ordered four Special Operations soldiers at the Tripoli embassy not to fly to Benghazi and join the CIA team.
The military did nothing, except send a drone to watch the action. Defense Secretary Panetta later offered the excuse, “You can’t willy-nilly send F-16s there and blow the hell out of place. . . . You have to have good intelligence.” As a civilian, Mr. Panetta probably didn’t know that 99 percent of air sorties over Afghanistan never drop a single bomb. General Dempsey, however, knew it was standard procedure to roar menacingly over the heads of mobs, while not “blowing the hell out of them.” A show of air power does have a deterrent effect and is routinely employed.
A mortar shell killed two Americans during the tenth hour of the fight. A mortar tube can be detected from the air. The decision whether to then bomb should have resided with a pilot on-station — not back in Washington. As for the alleged lack of “good intelligence,” three U.S. operations centers were watching real-time video and talking by cell phone with those under attack. Surely that comprises “good intelligence.”…”
“… Cummings asked Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to “provide an unclassified response to these specific allegations” that the U.S. military had a team in Europe and could have responded quickly.
Elizabeth King, the assistant secretary of Defense for legislative affairs responded to Cummings in a letter Tuesday, saying a special force team was training in Croatia but was able to do little more than “pre-positioning” in Italy “because exact conditions on the ground in Benghazi were unknown.”
“From the moment the (team) was ordered to move, it did not stand down until after all personnel (including the fallen) had been evacuated from Benghazi in a little over 12 hours after the initiation of the attack,” King said…”
Mark Knoller | Monday, November 12, 2012 | DoD TV Pool Report
Here’s the TV Pool Report verbatim on Defense Secretary Panetta’s comments about Benghazi, spoken today in session with reporters aboard his flight to Perth, Australia:
“One of the things that we are doing right now is we are involved in an assessment btwn DOD and the state department to look at the embassies in that region and what additional steps need to be taken in order to ensure the security of our embassies. So we do need to look at how we can A, improve security and 2, be able to effectively respond if there are any threats.
With regards to Benghazi itself, I think this has been pointed out, we moved very quickly to deploy the forces that we thought were important to deal w/ the threats in the region. We deployed those forces as quickly as we could. But the problem w/ Benghazi itself is the events there were happening on rapid pace, that attack was largely over by the time of response.”
Q – more troops? “The fact is, we had them deployed to the key areas that we needed to have them move from. And you know, we have so many bases in the area, obviously Sigonella was one of those bases, but Rota as well as other bases in the region. The fundamental fact is this: in order for us to be able to move quickly –we have to have some advance notice that something is going to happen and in this case we didn’t have that. When we were informed the attack was already happening, and to be able to respond quickly when an attack is already going on, just make it very difficult to be able to move as quickly as we would have wanted to.”
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