Archive for June, 2009


Cap-n-Tax Maze – M. Katharine Ham Video – Bill Appendix Analysis – EPA Base Case


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As a follow up to my previous posting (Cap n Trade Bill: Where Will You Be When The Lights Go Out?), I have been reading the cap n trade bill.  I know that I’m not the smartest person however I majored in Economics and I still don’t understand this bill.  How can an American be taxed on individual carbon usage based on some complex formula that depends on a tree being cut in a jungle in Brazil or how many trucks are on the road in India at any given time, not to mention the Chinese industrial output.

This bill is very complicated for the average American.  The devil is in the details and the Dems know the American population cares more about Michael Jackson’s death than carbon credits.  One day the American people will wake up and won’t be able to recognize our once great country from another euro socialist country.

Yesterday, a caller on Rush’s show mentioned that included in the cap n trade bill is a provision for a home inspector to evaluate a home’s energy efficiency and this bill includes the California mandates.  If an older home does not have upgraded appliances, green windows/insulation, etc., the home may not be sold until the “green” upgrades have been completed.  The socialist/dems cap n trade bill is nothing more than a copy cat grand experience from  the European socialist.

The dems are creating a master nanny state.  They will control every aspect of our daily lives.  They will tell us what to eat, what to drive, when to turn down our air conditioner, when to go to the doctor, and what prescriptions we can take depending on age, health, and whatever the centralized plan tells us to do.

aWarning to my younger readers:  The following post and content is beyond the 140 maximum character limit of tweeter.  Reading of this posting may require longer than the normal 2 minute attention span.

The idea that carbon dioxide is a carcinogen that is harmful to our environment is almost comical. Every time we exhale, we exhale carbon dioxide.  Every cow in the world, you know when they do what they do you’ve got more carbon dioxide.” John Boehner


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There is no evidence that this is the case just computer models and scare forecasts. Neither the scientific questions, nor the cost benefit analysis has been subject to any critical independent analysis.

The Australian Cap-n-Trade Maze diagram above illustrates the sequence of decisions that should be made before  a bill is passed.If the answer to ANY ONE of the boxed questions is NO, there is no justification for Australia rushing ahead with its Cap-n-Tax Bill. This Maze, although light-hearted, has a factual basis and conveys some very serious messages.

It is highly unlikely that anyone could honestly answer Yes to every question, which is what is required to justify passage of the bill.  This suggests that there is a high likelihood that the bill will have NO CLIMATE EFFECT WHATSOEVER and thus a costly exercise in self delusion.



Mary Katharine Ham tries to explain cap n trade:



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Below are the first notes/sections  that I have reviewed of the proposed socialist tax bill.  The 1st section below contains my first notes/review from the 108 page HR2454 Analysis Appendix (pdf) of the bill:

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Page 56

This analysis is a cost-effectiveness analysis, not a cost-benefit analysis. As such, the benefits of reducing GHG emissions were not determined in this analysis.


Page 65

The structure of the IGEM model tends to lead to larger GDP impacts for a given allowance price than the ADAGE model.

• The compensated elasticity of labor supply is the driving force behind the relatively large economic impacts for a given allowance price in IGEM. The second stage of the household decision process is the allocation of full consumption between leisure and goods and services. The parameter that governs this decision plays a dominant role in model outcomes. Unfortunately there is not a consensus in the literature about what value this parameter should take.

In ADAGE, this consumption- leisure parameter is adopted from values of related parameters in the empirical literature. Much of the empirical literature examines the effect of a real wage increase on the willingness to supply additional labor hours without simultaneously considering the impact on labor force participation. Attempts to combine both impacts in a single parameter have yielded estimates ranging from 0.1 to 0.6 for the compensated elasticity of labor supply.

IGEM estimates the time-varying compensated elasticity of labor supply as part of a comprehensive model of household behavior and finds values ranging from 0.8 to 1.0. (Jorgenson et. al 2008).  In a sensitivity case run for a previous EPA analysis, the consumption-leisure trade off in IGEM was constrained so that the average compensated labor supply elasticity was reduced from its estimated value of 1.03 to a constrained value of 0.48. In this sensitivity the decline in GDP was reduced by approximately 20%, and the decline in consumption was reduced by 50%.

Jorgenson et. al (2008) shows an experiment reducing the compensated labor supply elasticity that reduces GDP impacts by 25 to 20 percent.

Goettle and Fawcett (2009) ran an experiment as part of the EMF-22 exercise reducing the compensated labor supply elasticity in half, and found the resulting welfare impact was also halved.

Jorgenson et al. (2009a) describes an experiment reducing the responsiveness of labor supply from 0.8 to 0.3 in IGEM reduces the impact on GDP by a third, and reduces the impact on household consumption by 70 to 80%. This bounded range of outcomes is useful in the absence of a definitive consensus on the value of the compensated elasticity of labor supply that should be used in these models.

Changes in consumption may be a better measure of the costs of H.R. 2454 than changes in GDP since utility (and thus welfare) is a direct function of consumption.

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Page 91

H.R. 2454 requires EPA to establish a reverse auction that would yield an appropriate financial incentive to spur deployment of CCS, neither over- or under-incentivizing the technology.

A fixed portion of allowances are reserved for incentivizing carbon capture and storage technology (starting at 1.75% of allowances and rising to 5% through 2050).

• The reverse auction was not specifically included in IPM.  Instead, some scenarios were modeled with a range of bonus values to simulate a spectrum of incentives that could result in an actual reverse auction.

• In all scenarios, the first 3 GW of CCS capacity receive a $100 per ton bonus and the next 3 GW receive $90 per ton, since H.R. 2454 sets the bonus level for the first 6 GW of CCS deployed.

• For subsequent capacity, the core IPM H.R. 2454 scenario has a bonus of $40 per ton. The capacity assumed to be built due to other sources of funding (such as the bill’s early deployment provisions) also receives the bonus allowance value. A total of up to 72 GW of capacity is eligible for bonus allowances in this bill.

• There is significant uncertainty with regards to CCS technology availability and cost, thus making it difficult to ascertain the precise level of incentive that will lead to any given level of CCS deployment. The reverse auction approach for CCS bonus allowances is designed to elicit from market participants the minimum per-ton bonus value necessary to incentivize CCS deployment.

Key Results and Insights:

In IPM, a price of $40 per ton of CO2 sequestered resulted in the highest penetration of new CCS capacity (of the bonus values modeled). The bonus allowance pool was fully expended.

Lowering the amount to $30 per ton yields a lower deployment of CCS, with allowances remaining in the pool. Funds thus go unclaimed because the per-ton incentive is insufficient to incentivize the technology.

Raising the amount to $50 per ton reduces deployment for a different reason: it depletes the total funds earlier by spending more per ton than was necessary to make deployment economic.

These findings apply to any range of potential bonus amounts, not specifically to the values used here. A reverse auction would theoretically elicit the optimal value for maximizing deployment with dedicated funds.

The total value of financial incentive available for the CCS bonus is a function of the allowance price.


Page 95

Feasibility constraints have been updated for in IPM in order to limit the market penetration of the various electricity generating sources to ensure realistic build patterns in response to CO2 regulatory policies.

• These limits are imposed on new renewable, nuclear, and coal with CCS technology.

• The limits were determined based upon various factors, including:

1. Historical deployment patterns

2. Potential to expand domestic engineering, construction, and manufacturing base

3. Ability to educate and train workforce (this is particularly true for new coal with CCS and nuclear plants due to the highly technical nature of building these facilities)

• Because new nuclear and new coal with CCS are both complicated technologies that require sophisticated planning, engineering, and construction support, the same engineering/construction firms would be building both of these facilities and there would be a dynamic between the greater resources needed to build one technology relative to the other, in addition to the inherent limitations of increasing the skilled workforce.

To reflect this dynamic, EPA has incorporated a technology curve in the model, whereby the amount of new nuclear and coal with CCS is limited but also incorporates a trade-off between each technology (i.e., if you build more of one, you must build less of the other).

The amount of each technology that is built in IPM is determined in an economic manner, up to the limits.

• CCS retrofits to the existing coal fleet are also limited in IPM, and are constrained separately on the assumption that these projects can be handled by smaller and more specialized firms.

• In this analysis, only CCS retrofit penetration limitations were reached.


Page 99

Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM)

IGEM is a model of the U.S. economy with an emphasis on the energy and environmental aspects.

• It is a dynamic model, which depicts growth of the economy due to capital accumulation, technical change and population change.

• It is a detailed multi-sector model covering 35 industries.

• It also depicts changes in consumption patterns due to demographic changes, price and income effects.

• The model is designed to simulate the effects of policy changes, external shocks and demographic changes on the prices, production and consumption of energy, and the emissions of pollutants.

• The main driver of economic growth in this model is capital accumulation and technological change. It also includes official projections of the population, giving us activity levels in both level and per- capita terms.

• Capital accumulation arises from savings of a household that is modeled as an economic actor with “perfect foresight.”

• This model is implemented econometrically which means that the parameters governing the behavior of producers and consumers are statistically estimated over a time series dataset that is constructed specifically for this purpose.

This is in contrast to many other multi-sector models that are calibrated to the economy of one particular year.

• These data are based on a system of national accounts developed by Jorgenson (1980) that integrates the capital accounts with the National Income Accounts.

• These capital accounts include an equation linking the price of investment goods to the stream of future rental flows, a link that is essential to modeling the dynamics of growth.

• The model is developed and run by Dale Jorgenson Associates for EPA.

• Model Homepage: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/papers/papers.html

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Page 100

Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE)

ADAGE is a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model capable of examining many types of economic, energy, environmental, climate-change mitigation, and trade policies at the international, national, U.S. regional, and U.S. state levels.

• To investigate policy effects, the CGE model combines a consistent theoretical structure with economic data covering all interactions among businesses and households.

• A classical Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework is used to describe economic behaviors of these agents.

ADAGE has three distinct modules: International, U.S. Regional, and Single Country.

• Each module relies on different data sources and has a different geographic scope, but all have the same theoretical structure.

• This internally consistent, integrated framework allows its components to use relevant policy findings from other modules with broader geographic coverage, thus obtaining detailed regional and state-level results that incorporate international impacts of policies.

• Economic data in ADAGE come from the GTAP and IMPLAN databases, and energy data and various growth forecasts come from the International Energy Agency and Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy.

• Emissions estimates and associated abatement costs for six types of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are also included in the model.


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Republicans point out that the Waxman-Markey bill would create a convoluted federal bureaucracy that would control key sectors of the economy and of our lives. Minority Leader John Boehner created the above graphic, showing how the bill is intended to work.  HT:  Power Line


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logo_epasealEPA’s Updates to EPA Base Case 2009

Using the Integrated Planning Model (IPM). This document catalogs the list of updates in EPA Base Case 2009 from EPA Base Case2006 (v3.01) using the Integrated Planning Model (IPM).

IPM and EPA Modeling Applications Using IPM

EPA uses the Integrated Planning Model (IPM) to analyze the projected impact ofenvironmental policies on the electric power sector in the 48 contiguous states and theDistrict of Columbia. Developed by ICF Resources, Inc. and used to support public and private sector clients, IPM is a multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the electric power sector.

It provides forecasts of least-cost capacity expansion,electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies for meeting electricity demand, environmental, transmission, dispatch, and reliability constraints. IPM can be used toe valuate the cost and emissions impacts of proposed policies to limit emissions of sulfurdioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), and mercury (Hg) from the electric power sector and is used extensively by EPA to support regulatory activities.

Among the factors that make IPM particularly well suited to model multi-emissionscontrol programs are (1) its ability to capture complex interactions among the electric power, fuel, and environmental markets; (2) its detail-rich representation of emissioncontrol options encompassing a broad array of retrofit technologies along with emissionreductions through fuel switching, changes in capacity mix and electricity dispatchstrategies; (3) its capability to model a variety of environmental market mechanisms, such as emissions caps, allowances, trading, and banking; and its ability to generate thedetailed, location-specific emission data required for air quality modeling.

IPM’s ability tocapture the dynamics of the allowance market and its provision of a wide range ofemissions reduction options are particularly important for assessing the impact of multi emissions environmental policies for the power sector.

IPM is a single sector, linear programming model that captures the economicbe havior of the power sector. By itself, IPM is limited in its ability to capture broaderenergy and environmental policy, such as an economy wide cap and trade program.However, the model is often employed by EPA in conjunction with broader macroeconomic models to help provide deeper resolution of the power sector in the shorter term, which is an inherent weakness of broader econometric models which do not have detailed technology or power sector representation.

EPA’s IPM Base Case 2006 (v3.0) and v3.01:

In the Fall of 2006, EPA released Base Case 2006 (v3.0) using IPM, whichincluded extensive updates of IPM’s assumptions, inputs, and capabilities. The modelwas again updated in the Summer of 2007 for purposes of climate modeling (v3.01). Inpreparing these base cases, EPA obtained input from nationally recognized experts infuels, technology, and power system operation. Power companies provided informationon generating resources and emission controls. EPA also obtained input from RegionalPlanning Organizations, States, and their constituent organizations. Key updates included:

  • Coal Supply and Transportation Assumptions
  • Natural Gas Assumptions
  • Federal and State Emission Regulations and Enforcement Actions
  • Cost and Performance of Generating Technologies and Emission Controls
  • Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) emissions
  • Power System Operating Characteristics and Structure
  • Electric Generating Unit Inventory
  • Modeling Time Horizon and Run Years (2010, 2015, 2020, 2025)
  • Carbon capture and storage for potential (new) units
  • Biomassco-firing capability for existing coal boilers
  • Updated constraints on new nuclear and renewable capacity builds

More recently, EPA released Base Case 2009 using IPM. This version of themodel provides additional modeling capabilities, includes several important updates, andincorporates key provisions of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).Among the notable features of this base case are:

1) Revised electricity demand**

2) Updated power technology costs*

3) Carbon capture and storage for existing coal plants

4) Updated natural gas supply and price projection

5) Renewable portfolio standards and climate programs at the State level*

6) Updated constraints on new nuclear, renewable, and coal with CCS capacity

The detailed assumptions for IPM v3.0, titled “Documentation for EPA Base Case2006 (v3.0) Using the Integrated Planning Model” (November 2006), can be found at:http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/epa-ipm/index.html#docs.

The following document summarizes the key features and changes found in EPA’sBase Case Base Case 2009 using IPM.

* Assumption derived from the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook

(AEO) 2009 Reference Case (March version), (http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/).

1a. Electricity Demand. The electric load assumptions in EPA Base Case 2009 are shown in the table below. These values were derived based on the electricity sales forecast in EIA’s AEO2009. The revised growth rate used in the reference case is just under 1%, compared to agrowth rate of 1.5% in past IPM modeling applications.

Net Energy for Load in EPA Base Case 2009 (GWh)

2010      4,055,098

2015      4,182,129

2020      4,395,125

2025      4,619,295

1b. Demand Elasticity,EPA traditionally does not apply an endogenous demand response in IPM for electricity demand. In the context of climate analyses, EPA will include an endogenousdemand response for some scenarios when revised demand projections are not available from macroeconomic models, or when otherwise warranted to provide additional insights from IPM. EPA employs an elasticity of 0.5 within IPM to be consistent with computable general equilibrium models that the Agency employs1. Scenarios with this feature areindicated as such.

2. Potential (New) Unit Costs. All costs for potential units have been updated to reflect AEO 2009 levels, and are generally 50% higher than past IPM modeling applications employed by EPA (v3.0). The tables below show the cost and performance characteristics of the modeled potential(new) build units. In addition to the potential build units modeled in EPA Base Case v3.0, one additional potential build unit is included in EPA Base Case 2009 – an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) with Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS)technology. Previously, an Advanced Combined Cycle (ACC) with CCS was modeled(v3.01), but this technology has since been removed from Base Case 2009. The cost andperformance characterization of IGCC with CCS is based on the characteristics of the IGCC, but also includes cost adders and heat rate penalties attributable to the CCS component. The IGCC with CCS is assumed to have a 90% CO2 capture rate and incur a$15 per metric ton of CO2 transportation and storage cost, which is added to the variable operating cost of the unit.

2 1 For more detail on the economy-wide models EPA employs, see http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/modeling.html.

2 Dooley, et al. Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geologic Storage (pg 36). Battelle Memorial Institute, April 2006.

Performance and Unit Cost Assumptions for Potential (New) Capacity from Conventional Technologies in EPA Base Case 2009 (See pdf file for diagram)

Performance and Unit Cost Assumptions for Potential (New) Renewable and Non-Conventional Technology Capacity in EPA Base Case 2009 (See pdf file for diagram)

3. CCS Retrofit for Existing Units. EPA has also included a new CCS retrofit option for existing units larger than 400 MW in Base Case 2009, available to the more efficient units in the coal fleet. This assumption is based upon a 2006 study commissioned by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) and reflects the cost of the capture technology as well as the energy penalty and subsequent capacity de-rating associated with capturing carbon from a power plant.

4. Updated Natural Gas Supply and Price Projection. The natural gas supply curves are based on the same assessment of available gasresource through the U.S. and Canada as used in ICF’s Gas Market Model (GMM),including resources in Alaska and the Mackenzie Delta area of the Canadian arctic. TheBase Case assumes that pipelines will be built to transport gas from these two areas toNorth American demand markets. The curves assumes a Mackenzie Delta gas pipeline isbuilt in 2015 with a capacity of 1 Bcfd, and an Alaska pipeline is built in 2020 with an initialcapacity of 4 Bcfd, which is expanded in 2023 to 6 Bcfd. Together, gas production fromMackenzie Delta and Alaska make up roughly 11 percent of gas supplies by 2030.

The gas supply curves also assume significant growth in North American liquefiednatural gas (LNG) imports, based on projected growth in liquefaction capability and takinginto account the expect growth in gas demand in other importing countries in Europe andAsia. LNG imports are expected to grow to over 7 Bcfd, or roughly 11 percent of gassupplies by 2030.5. Renewable portfolio standards and climate programs at the State level A number of States have recently established renewable portfolio standards(RPS), and EPA has incorporated those requirements in Base Case 2009. They aremodeled based upon EIA’s updated AEO 20094 and result in considerably morerenewable energy penetration in EPA’s reference case 2009 using IPM. Although manyStates are considering RPS policies, EIA generally includes only policies that were firmlyin place and reasonably fleshed out at the time AEO 2009 was finalized.

EPA has also updated the existing stock of renewables that is assumed to be inplace at the beginning of the IPM modeling time horizon. To reflect the recent growth inrenewables, particularly wind, the existing renewable generation capacity has beencalibrated to EIA’s AEO 2008 results for 2010.A number of States have also adopted either State-level or regional climateprograms. EPA includes those State and regional programs with sufficient specificity onemission targets, applicability, coverage, and policy mechanism to allow representation in IPM. The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was the only regionalprogram that met these criteria and was therefore included in Base Case 2009 modeling.

4 Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook 2009, Legislation and Regulations

(http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo08/leg_reg.html).

State programs in Oregon and Washington State, which also have sufficiently specific requirements, were carried forward from v3.0.5

6. Feasibility Constraints. EPA Base Case 2009 includes feasibility constraints, which are designed to limit the market penetration of the various electricity generating sources in order to ensure realistic build patterns from IPM as CO2 regulatory policies are modeled. These limits are imposed on all renewable potential (new) build types individually, all renewable potential build types collectively, new nuclear units, coal with CCS, and CCS retrofits for existing coal units. In addition, a 20% cap is set on the amount of electricity generation in a model region that can come from intermittent power (e.g., wind).

climateweatherNew nuclear builds are not allowed until after 2015 because of the time needed for licensing and construction, and new coal with CCS is limited in 2015 to those projects that have dedicated funding or are otherwise incentivized (this is typically dependant upon features or provisions of specific proposals that are analyzed with this version of the model). New coal with CCS can not be built in 2015 on an economic basis in this version of IPM.

The feasibility assumptions for new nuclear, new coal with CCS, and total new renewable capacity are developed using factors based on the current capacity to design, manufacture, engineer, and construct these types of power generating technologies. For new nuclear and new coal with CCS, analysis indicates that only a few large engineering and construction firms currently have the capacity to handle these very large and complicated projects. It was assumed that these firms could build either type of technology and that resources would become available to support an increase in their capacity to handle these projects by 50% over each successive 5 year time period.

The constraints on these technologies thus reflect a generating capacity limitation (in gigawatts) based upon the ability to design and construct these projects, factoring in the aforementioned growth rate over time. In addition, there is a relationship between the amount of new nuclear and new coal with CCS that can be built, depending on the relative amount of resources required by each technology. Assuming that the same firms can generally undertake and manage the design, engineering, and construction of either type of technology, they are able to design and build more of one technology and less of theother in response to the relative economics and the demand for the technologies. This relationship is captured in Production Possibility Curves for nuclear and IGCC with CCS within the model. These curves are presented at the end of this section.

A CCS retrofit option is also available for existing coal units in Base Case 2009, and this technology is also limited in the model. The CCS retrofit option is allowed after 2015 and its growth rate is similar to nuclear and new coal with CCS capacity (i.e., incrementally increasing by 50% in each successive five year period). However, unlike nuclear and new coal with CCS, it is assumed that CCS retrofit projects can be handled by smaller firms since they do not require the same magnitude of resources that the larger, new power plants require. Thus, they are constrained independently and are not affected by the extent of growth in other technologies.

5 Documentation for EPA Base Case 2006 (v3.0), Section 3: Power System Operation Assumptions

(http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/epa-ipm/index.html).

Renewable energy technologies are also limited in the model. The initial 2015 limit was derived from recent build patterns and also incorporated a 50% growth rate for every 5 year time period, the same rate for new nuclear and new coal with CCS. Wind power is constrained separately from all other renewables and also assumes a 50% growth rate every 5 years. Other renewables are limited to 10 GW in 2015 and a linear growth of 5 GW every five years thereafter.


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See Also:

HotAir: Video Energy Czar hasn’t read cap & tax, eitherEnvironmental Economics

CBO:  The Distributional Consequences of a Cap-and-Trade Program for CO2 Emissions (pdf)

EPA Website For Kids: Animation of how the planet’s water cycle is likely affected by climate change

Back to business: Stop the cap-and-tax bill By Michelle Malkin • July 6, 2009


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FAB Honors Victims – Family Compensation Lawsuit – Chatter: ACARS Msgs Decoded & FCOM Reports


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29/06/2009 – — 19h39 19h39 (English Translation)

Navy search teams to honor victims of Flight 447, families do not attend

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Navy official who worked in the searches by the Air France plane that made Monday a tribute to the victims of the tragedy with the flight 447, which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean on May 31 with 228 people on board. The ceremony took place in Recife, on board the frigate Bosísio, boat which carried the majority of the 51 bodies recovered.

The act also sought ecumenical official FAB (Brazilian Air Force) who also acted in the search operation, closed this Friday (26) after 26 days. According to the advice of the Navy, the families of the relatives of victims were invited to attend the ceremony, but no family attended.

According to the agency, the costs of travel to Recife are be assumed by their families, because the Navy was not able to bear those costs. The Navy reported that some family members welcomed the invitation, but informed that they could not attend.

At the ceremony today, the official Navy threw overboard three crowns of flowers in tribute to the victims. Other five boats participated in the searches that followed the frigate during the tribute.

In the event, military authorities speak on the operation of search and made a prayer in tribute to the victims. By this Monday, only 14 of the 51 bodies recovered had been identified.

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29/06/2009  – —  15h01 15h01 (English Translation)

Air France has until tomorrow to anticipate the family of victim compensation Flight 447

Air France has until this Tuesday (30) to deposit the value of 30 minimum wages – R $ 13,950 – monthly for women and children of the engineer Walter Carrilho Nascimento Junior, 42, killed in the crash of the Airbus company , on May 31 this year. The plane carrying 228 people when they fell into the Atlantic Ocean.

The decision by Judge Magno Alves de Asuncion, the 28th Civil Vara Rio, published in the last 17 days. He partially accepted the request in advance of the amount made by the widow on behalf of three children and minors. If the airline breaks the decision until the trial’s final action, [Air France] is subject to a fine of $ 1,000 [per day]. The company has been notified and has not appealed, according to the ECJ (Court of Justice).

According to the court, the 30 minimum wages were calculated based on gross monthly income of the victim and should be available to the familys for 24 months by means of monthly judicial deposit. By this action, the widow claimed that she and the children are financially dependent on the engineer to household expenses, including the payment of school tuition and was also attached to the process of finding a psychiatrist who contends that she and the children need treatment for the initial period of two years.

“If there is no doubt that the victim get on the plane of the defendant company [Air France], which is required to provide the transport service, so why not apply, in addition to the provisions of the Civil Code, the rules of the Code of Consumer Protection , said the judge.

The first hearing between the company and the family of Walter Carrilho was designated for the day July 30, 2009. According to TJ, accepts the appeal decision.


radio_imagesRadio Chatter/ MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS

You never know what you may hear on the radio! Below are the most recent on-line  aviation chatter and message board discussions.  Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).

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After a lot of research through dozens – if not hundreds of pages – from the A330 manuals, coming from different sources, others, and I have managed to identify the meaning of the ACARS messages.

To explain it simply is not easy. Let’s just say that the messages represent two of the functions of the CMC – Central Maintenance Computer – of the airplane :

1/- A report from the flight warning computer on what is showing on the instrument panels : PFDs, ECAM…etc…

2/- A report from the different BITEs that are present in each system, comparators…etc… They are , I repeat once again, totally transparent to the flight crew, but for us they could give a better picture of what is happening.

I confess I had a terrible problem sorting things out as I started with the assumption that the messages came out on the ground telex machine in their order of detection…It is not so, and we’ve arrived at a logical linkage of all the messages.

I also had to very carefully take caution as to whether these messages are genuine failures or just transients. I now believe that these faults / failures are for real and there was no indication – or logical explanation – of a return to normal functions.

So I propose that first we’d introduce the messages as they appeared on the initial summary document, then  we will walk through what we think was the actual chain of events.

Bear with us, it’s quite interesting.

So here is the decode of all the messages in the order of the first summary :

0210Z

A/P OFF : The AFS monitors the air data from the ADRs. Any brutal variation of CAS, ALT, Mach causes the A/P to disengage : here, as the pitot system is suspect, a variation of 20kt or Mach.04 for .45 second is enough to disconnect both FDs and the A/P.

Reactive windshear detection: with the ADRs been rejected by the AFS,, AoA is not accessible any more.

F/CTL Alternate Law : is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition. The flight Control Laws revert , from “Normal Law” to “Alternate Law 2”. The Prims are in charge of the voting and elimination of a duff ADR, but it takes them 10 seconds to do so (threshold is 16 kt / 10 sec.

Flight Director Flag on captain’s PFD

Flight Director Flag on F/O’s PFD

Auto Throttle OFF (These last three should have appeared at the same time as the A/P OFF warning.)

TCAS Fault : Result of the loss of the associated ADR (for altitude data)

Speed Limit Flag on Captain’s PFD

Speed Limit Flag on F/O’s PFD ( these two result of rejected Airspeed information by the EFCS, might be a sign of the PROT LOST, which hasn’t been indicated)

Rudder Travel Limiter Fault is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition.

EFCS 1 Fault on Maintenance Status

EFCS 2 Fault on Maintenance Status

Probe-Pitot 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 / (9DA. Relates to Heating element PITOT 1

Primary Flight Computer #2 (ADIRU1 signal to Prim 2)

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0211Z

FPV Flag on Captain’s PFD

FPV Flag on F/O’s PFD

Speed or Mach function on ISIS (Suspect loss of ADIRU 3 for ISIS MACH )

IR2 Fault (Discrete data streams = Pitot, Static , TAT, OAT to ADIRU 2)

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0212Z

ADR DISAGREE : TOOK IT A LONG TIME TO APPEAR NOW !

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0213Z

Primary Flight Computer #1 Fault (Crew manipulation suspected, on ADR DISAGREE C/L )

Secondary Flight Computer #1 Fault ——Idem———————-

ADR2 Fault on Maintenance Status Another very late message

Intermittent Fault on FMGEC #1

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0214Z

Cabin Vertical speed Advisory. We now believe that this advisory message is just a result of ADR data

There is a glaring conclusion : there is no way that the ACARS have been transmitted in the order of the summary.

First, because we find a 0212z event in the middle of the 0211 ones, and the same for two 0213Z’s between 0214z messages…

Secondly, it is also obvious that the ADR DISAGREE message/warning is too late in view of all the happenings that should have been its consequences.

But looking at the system, we can see in fact the trouble-shooting “reasoning” of the system facing multiple incoherent data at the same time.

The explanation will come in the second part, in which we deal with the time tags and propose one – for us the most logical – chain of events.

————-

In the discussions I’ve had with several other parties, it did appear that the ACARS decode done by the Eurocockpit is definitely not in order (which isn’t surprising)…

BUT, it also appeared that the leaked ACARS Headers List we saw early on that was leaked to the press, also was not in order, which baffled most of us

We have so far believed that the messages would be timestamped in order… Which was, correct, but, it was correct to the minute… within the minute, nothing guarantees it.

Here is the “original” list:

acarsaf447d

It appears that there are some prioritizing of messages within the same minute. This can explain why in the latter parts, there were some stuff not in order but the minutes were still stamped to time of occurence.

Certain parts really gave some puzzling and befuddlement (is that even a word?)… stuff like, why did the NAV DISAGREE come out so late, and why was there an IR problem when we’re suspecting an ADR problem… etc, etc, etc.

The clues lie much deeper than originally thought, and again, the Air Caraibes internal technical note provided one of the best assistance in understanding the AF447 ACARS messages… of course, technical drawings, wirings, fault isolation possibilities of the CMC messages… the documents I have (which is still far from what’s required) already 153 pages… with many more pages to print and scour through.

This is still far from finished… The data  posted still have some further reading to cross check, like, how does the Air Data Module work such as air data sampling rates, self data storage, how it starts and reboots when needed, data filtering functions, and what functions it carries in each probe (certain documents reveal multiple functions), etc, etc….

And then how come an ADR affect the IR functions of the ADIRUs, etc etc, denergizing ADIRU after ADR switch off doesn’t give the OFF light, etc etc… and many many more stuff…

All the above, must then be cross checked with the background systems information and general logic (from the FCOMs) to cross check further interrelationships between components and modules, where the data is pooled and channeled to downstream users and via which processors etc.

This does put a test to my systems engineering knowledge to the limit from previous works (which coincidentally, involved ADRs and IRs, and integration into NAV and output displays, etc)…

We have some way to go… but this is what’s deduced for the moment… The expanded explanation is incomplete, it is subject to change, subject to ammendments, and albeit backed by documentation, there’s no guarantee that this is correct… but then, it’s better than just picking stuff out of the air.

This is the list reordered…

———-

0209 START

0210 34-11-15-0 FLR EFCS2

EFCS1, AFS – PROBE PITOT 1+2/2+3/1+3 (9DA)

9DA=HEATING ELEMENT PITOT 1 (6DA1/PHC1)

Heating Element Pitot 1 suspected failed.

———-

0210 27-93-34-0 FLR EFCS1

EFCS2-FCPC2(2CE2) WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2

No Data from ADIRU 1, ADR 1 & 2 no sending signal to FCPC2

No ADR Data from ADIRU 1 to PRIM2.

———-

0210 27-90-45-5 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS1

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

———-

0210 27-90-45-0 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS2

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

———-

0210 22-10-00-0 WRN AUTO FLT

AP OFF

Autopilot Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting autopilot into making the wrong actions.

Commence AP/FD FAULT ISOLATION PROCEDURE

System Filter & Check:

– DISAGREE AOA Sensor Data in FCPCs

– DISAGREE PITOT PROBE Data in FCPCs

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 2

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 3

– FAIL ADIRU 2 and 3

– FAIL ADIRUs

———-

0210 22-62-01-0 WRN AUTO FLT

REAC W/S DET FAULT

Loss of 2 ADRs, autopilot cannot provide Windshear Protection.

———-

0210 27-91-00-5 WRN F/CTL

ALTN LAW

2 ADR REJECTED, NAV DISAGREE NOT YET CONCLUDED – FAULT ISOLATION IN PROGRESS

———-

0210 22-83-00-2 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for LEFT seat.

———-

0210 22-83-01-2 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD SPD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for RIGHT seat.

———-

0210 22-30-02-5 WRN AUTO FLT

A/THR OFF

Autothrust Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting Autothrust into making the wrong actions.

———-

0210 34-43-00-5 WRN NAV

TCAS FAULT

Loss of ADR1 to Transponder 1 (if selected) or Loss of ADR2 to Transponder2 (if selected)

Loss of Mode C.

This is downstream of loss of ADR.

———-

0210 22-83-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

———-

0210 22-83-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

———-

0210 27-23-02-0 WRN F/CTL

RUD TRV LIM FAULT

Loss valid of ADR Data (require 2 ADRs) for FMGC/AFS

FMGC Flight Envelope Module locks in Rudder Travel for safety.

———-

0211 34-12-34-0 FLR IR2

EFCS1X,IR1,IR3, ADIRU2 (1FP2)

ADIRU2(1FP2) – ADR2 self monitoring & PHC rejects own data

Loss of discrete data from ADR2 = PITOT 2, STATIC 2L, STATIC 2R, TAT 2, AOA 2.

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

———-

0211 34-12-00-0 FLR ISIS

ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION

SUSPECT LOSS OF ADIRU1 AND/OR ADIRU3 FOR ISIS MACH

Suspect Loss of ADIRU3

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

———-

0211 34-12-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO FPV

———-

0211 34-12-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO FPV

———-

0212 34-10-40-0 WRN NAV

ADR DISAGREE

NAV DISAGREE DISCOVERED – FAULT ISOLATION COMPLETED

Due to no further ADR faults occuring.

———-

0213 27-90-02-5 WRN F/CTL

PRIM1 FAULT

———-

0213 27-90-04-0WRN F/CTL

SEC1 FAULT

———-

0213 22-83-34-9FLR AFS

FMGEC1(1CA1)

———-

0214 34-10-36-0WRN MXSTAT

ADR2

RESULT OF 32-12-34-0

———-

0214 21-31-00-2WRN ADVSRY

CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

LOSS OF ADR DATA

————

******Be warned, the above is still incomplete******

******More cross checking is needed******

The failures here aren’t simply upstream faults leading to downstream failures, but there are some “same level” data feed, and “upstream” data feeds… and I do not guarantee the above is correct.*****


** DISCLAIMER ** CANNOT VERIFY ACCURACY OF THE BELOW FCOM CURRENCY**

A330diagramaFunções

Description extracted on the whole as written on A330-200 FCOM (=Flight Crew Operating Manual)

(Original Author Note: All Images relating to this Post not  uploaded)
Airbus 330-200 ACARS FLIGHT REPORTS
Flight reports provide real time information to the ground concerning the aircraft current situation and position.
Several types of flight reports are available :
the Position report: provides current aircraft position
the Progress report: provides data relative to the destination
the Flight-Plan report: provides the active route
the Performance Data report: provides performance data currently used by FMS. (=Flight Management System)
These reports may be manually initiated via a dedicated prompt or automatically sent in response to a ground request or upon specific conditions.
POSITION REPORT
This report is sent:
manually via a MCDU prompt or (=Multi Function Control & Display Unit) following a ground request or automatically upon sequencing a designated reporting fix (designated by the ground in a uplink message).
The manual POSITION REPORT downlink prompt is displayed on the REPORT page POS prompt.
Img1.
Note: Position report are initiated from active flight plan only.
Img2.
POSITION report content
The downlinked message contains exactly the REPORT page data.
PROGRESS REPORT

A progress report contains data relative to the aircraft arrival time and EFOB (=Estimated Fuel On Board) at destination for the active F-PLN. (=Flight Plan)
This downlink message is automatically sent following : a ground request or a change of destination or a change of runway or a specific event. The possible events that can be selected in the navigation database policy file are:
X minutes to Top of Descent
Z minutes to Destination
ETA changes more than
W minutes from the previous report. (=Estimated Time Arrive)
X, Z and W are minutes of time set in the navigation database policy file.
The progress report cannot be manually sent by the crew via a dedicated MCDU prompt. =MultiFunction Control & Display Unit)
PROGRESS report content
Flight Number
Arrival Airport Ident
Destination Runway Ident
Predicted remaining fuel
ETA at destination
Reason for report (specific event, ground request…).
FLIGHT PLAN REPORT
The F-PLN report broadcasts flight plan data to the ground. Only data from the active flight plan can be sent.
This downlink message is sent to the ground : automatically following a ground request manually by the crew using a prompt displayed on the ACARS FUNCTION page. (Refer to ACARS page description). This prompt may be invalidated through the navigation database policy file.
The Flight Plan report can be downlinked either while on ground or in flight during any flight phase.
FLIGHT PLAN report content
The report contains the active and alternate flight plan.
PERFORMANCE DATA REPORT
The Performance Data report is a downlink message that allows the transmission of performance data (GW, FUEL, CG…) relative to the active F-PLN. (= Gross Weight, Center of Gravity)
This message is automatically sent following a ground request. Manual sending is not possible.
PERFORMANCE DATA report content
Sends to the ground :
Current GW
Cruise Altitude
Current CG
Fuel on Board
Block Fuel
Reserve Fuel
Cost Index
Top of Climb Temperature
Climb Transition Altitude
Tropopause Altitude
Taxi Fuel
ZFW (=Zero Fuel Weight)
ZFWCG (=Zero Fuel Weight Center of Gravity)
TURBULENCE DAMPING FUNCTION
The purpose of the turbulence damping function is to damp the structural modes induced by atmosphere turbulence.
The function uses the Nz accelerometer and two dedicated Ny accelerometers. The PRIMs compute a turbulence damping command, which is added to the normal law command for the elevator and the yaw damper.
This function is automatically monitored and becomes inoperative for the remainder of the flight, when a failure is detected. In addition, it may be manually inhibited by switching off the TURB DAMP pushbutton on the overhead panel, when it is considered that comfort is degraded instead of being improved, and no failure is detected.
It is only available if the following conditions are met:
Aircraft in flight.
Aircraft speed greater than 200 knots.
Autopilot engaged or normal law active.
Aircraft within the normal flight envelope.
LATERAL CONTROL

LATERAL NORMAL LAW

When the aircraft is on the ground (in “on ground” mode), the sidestick commands the aileron and roll spoiler surface deflection. The amount of control surface deflection that results from a given amount of sidestick deflection depends upon aircraft speed. The pedals control rudder deflection through a direct mechanical linkage.
When the aircraft is in the “in flight” mode, normal law combines control of the ailerons, spoilers (except N° 1 spoilers), and rudder (for turn coordination) in the sidestick. While the system thereby gives the pilot control of the roll and heading, it also limits the roll rate and bank angle, coordinates the turns, and damps the dutch roll.
The roll rate requested by the pilot during flight is proportional to the sidestick deflection, with a maximum rate of 15° per second when the sidestick is at the stop.
When the aircraft is in “flare” mode, the lateral control is the same as in “in flight” mode.
BANK ANGLE PROTECTION
Inside the normal flight envelope, the system maintains positive spiral static stability for bank angles above 33°. If the pilot releases the sidestick at a bank angle greater than 33°, the bank angle automatically reduces to 33°.
Up to 33°, the system holds the roll attitude constant when the sidestick is at neutral. If the pilot holds full lateral sidestick deflection, the bank angle goes to 67° (indicated by a pair of green bar lines “=” on the PFD) and no further.
Img3.
If the angle-of-attack protection or high speed protection is operative, the bank angle goes to 45° and no further, if the pilot holds full lateral sidestick deflection.
If high speed protection is operative, the system maintains positive spiral static stability from a bank angle of 0°, so that with the sidestick released, the aircraft always returns to a bank angle of 0°.
When bank angle protection is active, auto trim is inoperative.
If the bank angle exceeds 45°, the autopilot disconnects and the FD bars disappear. The FD bars return when the bank angle decreases to less than 40°.
SIDESLIP TARGET

Should an engine failure occur, the sideslip indication is slightly modified to ensure that optimum pilot rudder application is made to achieve optimum climb performance (ailerons to neutral and spoilers retracted).
In takeoff configuration, when asymmetrical thrust is detected (30 % N1 (GE) or 0.25 EPR (PW/RR)), and at least one engine is above 80 % N1 (GE) or 1.3 EPR (PW/RR), the sideslip indication will change from yellow to blue.
Img4.
Crew response is normal and instinctive:
Zero, beta target value for optimum performance with appropriate rudder application.
Accelerate if beta target cannot be zeroed with full rudder. The computation is made by the PRIM. (=Primary computer)
PITCH CONTROL
A330sidestick
GROUND MODE
Ground mode is active on ground. It is a direct relationship between sidestick deflection and elevator deflection without auto trim.
The THS is automatically set at 4° UP (inside the green band). Manual setting according to CG has priority for take off.
The rotation maneuver is flown in direct law with full authority.
Immediately after the aircraft becomes airborne the flight mode is progressively blended in.
The reverse process occurs after touch down.
FLIGHT MODE
The normal law flight mode is a load factor demand law with auto trim and full flight envelope protection.
It provides control of elevator and THS from the side stick controllers to achieve a load factor proportional to stick deflection, independent of speed.
With the side stick at neutral, wings level, the system maintains 1 G in pitch corrected for pitch attitude, and there is no need for the pilot to trim with speed or configuration changes.
Pitch trim is automatic in both manual mode and when the autopilot is engaged.
In normal turns (up to 33° of bank) no pitch correction is required once the turn is established.
The flight mode is active from TO to landing according to the logic (page 1).
Automatic pitch trim is frozen in the following cases:
Manual trim order
Radio altitude below 100 ft for flare
Load factor lower than 0.5 g
In high speed protection
When angle of attack protection is active, THS is limited between setting at entry in protection and 2° nose down (i.e. further nose up trim cannot be applied).
Similarly when the load factor is higher than 1.3 g, or when the bank angle gets outside ± 33°, the THS is limited between the actual setting and 2° nose down.
Control with autopilot engaged


The autopilot orders are limited by the PRIM
A force must be overcome to move the sidestick with the autopilot engaged. If the pilot moves the side stick to overcome this force the autopilot will disconnect.
All protections remain effective.
FLARE MODE
The flight mode changes to flare mode at landing, when passing 100 feet.
Flare mode is a direct stick-to-elevator relationship (with some damping provided by load factor and pitch rate feedbacks). In addition, at 50 feet, a slight pitch down elevator order is applied, so that the pilot has to move the stick rearwards to maintain a constant path, so as to reproduce conventional aircraft aerodynamic characteristics.
PROTECTIONS
Normal law provides complete flight envelope protection as follows :
Load factor limitation
Pitch attitude protection
High angle-of-attack (AOA) protection
High speed protection
LOAD FACTOR LIMITATION
The load factor is automatically limited to:
+ 2.5 g to – 1 g, slats retracted
+ 2 g to 0, slats extended
PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION

Pitch attitude is limited to 30° nose up (progressively reduced to 25° at low speed), and to 15° nose down (indicated by green symbols “=” on the PFD pitch scale (Refer to 1.31.40)).
HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

Under normal law, when angle of attack becomes greater than prot, the system switches the elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode in which the angle of attack is proportional to the sidestick deflection.
That is, in the prot range, from prot to max, the side stick commands directly. However the angle of attack will not exceed max, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick the angle of attack returns to prot and stays there.
This protection, against stall and windshear, has priority over all other protections.
The autopilot will disconnect if the protection is active.
V prot, V max and V floor conditions vary according to the weight and the configuration
V prot and V max displayed on the PFD are computed by the PRIM. (=Primary computer) floor activation logic is provided by the PRIM.
Note:
At takeoff prot is equal to max for 5 seconds.
FLOOR

is activated through autothrust system when:
is greater than a threshold depending on the aircraft configuration, the ground speed variation, and the difference between ground speed and air speed or, Sidestick deflection above 14° and:
pitch altitude greater than 25°, or
AOA protection active
FLOOR inhibition: (Refer to 1.22.30).
To leave the angle of attack protection the sidestick must be pushed :
More than 8° forward, or,
More than 0° forward for at least 1 second when <>
HIGH SPEED PROTECTION
The aircraft automatically recovers following a high speed upset. Depending on the flight conditions (high acceleration, low pitch attitude), the High Speed Protection is activated at/or above VMO/MMO.
When it is activated, the pitch trim is frozen. Positive spiral static stability is introduced to 0° bank angle (instead of 33° in normal law), so that with the sidestick released, the aircraft always returns to a bank angle of 0°. The bank angle limit is reduced from 67° to 45°.
As the speed increases above VMO/MMO, the sidestick nose-down authority is progressively reduced, and a permanent nose-up order is applied to aid recovery to normal flight conditions.
The High Speed Protection is deactivated when the aircraft speed decreases below VMO/MMO, where the usual normal control laws are recovered.
The autopilot disconnects when high speed protection goes active.
Note:
OVER SPEED ECAM warning is provided at:
VMO + 4 kt MMO + 0.006
LOW ENERGY WARNING
A low energy aural warning “SPEED SPEED SPEED” repeated every 5 seconds indicates to the pilot that the aircraft energy becomes lower than a threshold under which to recover a positive flight path angle through pitch control, the thrust must be increased.
It is available in configuration 2, 3 and full between 100 and 2000 ft.
The low energy warning is computed by the PRIM’s from the following inputs:
Aircraft configuration
Air speed deceleration rate
Flight path angle It is inhibited when:
TOGA is selected
Below 100 ft RA Above 2 000 ft RA
Alpha floor or GPWS alert is triggered
In alternate or direct law
If both RA are failed.
The low energy warning is triggered during deceleration before alpha floor (unless alpha floor is triggered by stick deflection), the delay between the two warnings depends on deceleration rate.
NORMAL LAW

GENERAL
Flight control normal law provides:

3 Axis control

Flight envelope protection

Maneuver load alleviation

DESCRIPTION
The Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) supplies temperature, anemometric barometric and inertial parameters to the EFIS system (PFD and ND) and to other user systems (FMGC, FADEC, PRIM, SEC, FWC, SFCC, ATC, GPWS, CMC, CPC).

ADIRs

the message IRS IN ALIGN becomes amber if engines are running or flashes green if IRS alignment is faulty.

The system includes: three identical ADIRU’s (Air Data and Inertial Reference Units).

Each ADIRU is divided in two parts, either of witch can work separately in case of failure in the other:

the ADR (Air Data Reference) part which supplies barometric altitude, speed, Mach, angle of attack, temperature and overspeed warnings.

the IR (Inertial Reference) part which supplies attitude, flight path vector, track, heading, accelerations, angular rates, ground speed, vertical speed and aircraft position.

Note:

The ADIRU gives the true heading instead of magnetic heading:

above 82° North

above 73° North between 90° and 120° West (magnetic polar region)

above 60° South

one ADIRS control panel located on the overhead panel for modes selection (NAV, ATT, OFF) and failure indications.

2 GPS receivers, which are connected to the IR part of the ADIRU’s for GP/IR hybrid position calculation. four types of sensors :

pitot probes (3) static pressure probes (STAT) (6)

angle of attack sensors (AOA) (3)

total air temperature probes (TAT) (2)

These sensors are electrically heated to prevent from icing up.

eight ADMs (Air Data Modules) which convert pneumatic data from pitot and static probes into numerical data for the ADIRUs.

a switching facility for selecting ADR3 or IR3 for instrument displays in case of ADIRU 1 or 2 failure.

a MAG / TRUE pushbutton switch for polar navigation.

AC BUS provides to normal electrical supply. DC BUS provides a back up possibility through internal inverter.

PROBES LOCATION

Img6.

PROBES SCHEMATIC

Img7.

Note: ADIRU

ADIRU 1 is supplied by CAPT probes,

ADIRU 2 is supplied by F/O probes

ADIRU 3 is supplied by STBY probes and CAPT TAT

ADIRS SCHEMATIC

Fig8.

CONTROLS AND INDICATORS

OVERHEAD PANEL

Img9.

1 ADR pb sw OFF :

Air data output disconnected FAULT lt:

This amber light comes on associated with an ECAM caution if a fault is detected in the air data reference part.

2 IR pb sw

OFF: Inertial data output disconnected.

FAULT lt: This amber light comes on associated with an ECAM caution when a fault affects the respective IR.

steady : the respective IR is lost. flashing: the attitude and heading information may be recovered in ATT mode.

3 IR 1(2) (3) mode rotary sel

OFF: The ADIRU is not energized.ADR and IR data are not available.

NAV: Normal mode of operation.Supplies full inertial data to aircraft systems.

ATT: IR mode supplying only attitude and heading information if the system loses its ability to navigate.The heading must be entered through the MCDU and has to be reset frequently (about every 10 minutes).

4 ON BAT lt

Comes on amber when one or more IRS is supplied only by the aircraft battery.

It also comes on for a few seconds at the beginning of the alignment but not for a fast realignment.

Note:

if, when the aircraft is on the ground at least one ADIRU is supplied by batteries:
an external horn sounds the ADIRU light comes on amber on the SERVICE INTERPHONE BAY panel.

PEDESTAL

Img10.

1 AIR DATA and ATT HDG sel

NORM: ADIRU 1 supplies data to PFD1, ND1, DDRMI and ATC 1.ADIRU 2 supplies data to PFD2, ND2 and ATC2.

CAPT ON 3 : ADR 3 or IR 3 replaces ADR 1 or IR 1 F/O

ON 3 : ADR 3 or IR 3 replaces ADR 2 or IR 2

MAIN INSTRUMENTS PANEL
At high latitude above 82.5° North or 60.5° South (or entering the north magnetic polar region :

latitude 73.5° N and longitude between 117.5° W and 92.5° W) the ADIRUs replace magnetic heading by true heading on EFIS and DDRMI.

In addition the GRID track appears on ND.

When the aircraft is in close proximity to these regions (latitude above 82° North or 60° South or approaching the north magnetic polar region :

73° N and longitude between 90° W and 120 W) the ADIRU will trigger a message on ND “SELECT TRUE REF” requesting to change north reference.

1 NORTH REF pb sw TRUE (in): Pressing this pushbutton selects the true heading for instrument displays.

TRUE light comes on blue. The ND displays GRID track values if position is above 65° N or S. MAG (out): Magnetic heading is selected.

WARNINGS AND CAUTIONS


E / WD: FAILURE TITLEconditions

AURAL WARNING MASTER LIGHT SD PAGE CALLED LOCAL WARNING FLT PHASE INHIB

STALL WARNING (No ECAM message)

An aural stall warning is triggered when the AOA (=Angle Of Atack) is greater than a predetermined angle

This angle depends on– the Slats / Flap position– the Speed / Mach– the F / CTL law (normal, alternate / direct) Cricket + STALL (synthetic voice)

MASTER WARN NIL NIL NIL

OVERSPEED– VMO / MMO

aircraft speed / mach greater than VMO + 4 kt / MMO + 0.006

– VLE aircraft speed greater than VLE + 4 kt with L / G not uplocked or L / G doors not closed

– VFE aircraft speed greater thanVFE + 4 kt with slats or / and flaps extended.

CRC ADR 1(2)(3) FAULT SINGLE CHIME MASTER CAUT

ADR FAULT lt 1, 4, 8, 10 ADR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT

IR 1(2)(3) FAULT IR FAULT lt 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10

IR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT 1, 4, 8, 10

HDG DISCREPANCY

difference between heading on CAPT and F / O displays greater than 5° in TRUE or than 7° in MAG CHECK HDG (on ND and PFD) 4, 8

ATT DISCREPANCY

difference between roll or pitch angle displayed on CAPT and F / O PFD greater than 5° CHECK ATT (on PFD)

ALTI DISCREPANCY

difference between altitude displayed on CAPT and F / O PFD greater than:

– 500 ft if baro ref STD is selected

– 250 ft if QNH is selected CHECK ALT (on PFD)

E / WD: FAILURE TITLE

conditions

AURAL WARNING MASTER LIGHT SD PAGE CALLED LOCAL WARNING FLT PHASE INHIB

EXTREME LATITUDEA / C enters in polar area, the crew must select true reference

SINGLE CHIME MASTER CAUT NIL NIL 4, 5, 7, 8

IR NOT ALIGNED

Problem detected during IR alignment NIL

FM/IR POS DISAGREE

discrepancy between a/c position computed by FMS and position given by IRs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10

BARO REF DISCREPANCY

discrepancy between F/O and captain baro ref. 3, 4, 8

MEMO DISPLAY
IRS IN ALIGN XXX IR XXX IN ATT ALIGN

messages appear in green during an IR alignment.

TRUE NORTH REF appears in green when the NORTH REF pushbutton switch is at TRUE. The message is pulsing during 10 seconds in phase 1 or 2 or at slats extension.

ADIRS SWTG appears in green when either AIR DATA or ATT HDG selector is not in NORM position.

** DISCLAIMER ** CANNOT VERIFY ACCURACY OF THE ABOVE CHATTER/FCOM CURRENCY**

end

S.280 Report Full Briefing Package

After a lot of research through dozens – if not hundreds of pages – from the A330 manuals, coming from different sources, others, and I have managed to identify the meaning of the ACARS messages.

To explain it simply is not easy. Let’s just say that the messages represent two of the functions of the CMC – Central Maintenance Computer – of the airplane :

1/- A report from the flight warning computer on what is showing on the instrument panels : PFDs, ECAM…etc…

2/- A report from the different BITEs that are present in each system, comparators…etc… They are , I repeat once again, totally transparent to the flight crew, but for us they could give a better picture of what is happening.

I confess I had a terrible problem sorting things out as I started with the assumption that the messages came out on the ground telex machine in their order of detection…It is not so, and thanks to Mandala’s good work, we’ve arrived at a logical linkage of all the messages.

I also had to very carefully take caution as to wheter these messages are genuine failures or just transients. I now believe that these faults / failures are for real and there was no indication – or logical explanation – of a return to normal functions.

So I propose that first we’d introduce you to the messages as they appeared on the initial summary document, then Mandala would walk you through what we think was the actual chain of events.

Bear with us, it’s quite interesting.

So here is the decode of all the messages in the order of the first summary :

0210Z

A/P OFF : The AFS monitors the air data from the ADRs. Any brutal variation of CAS, ALT, Mach causes the A/P to disengage : here, as the pitot system is suspect, a variation of 20kt or Mach.04 for .45 second is enough to disconnect both FDs and the A/P.

Reactive windshear detection: with the ADRs been rejected by the AFS,, AoA is not accessible any more.

F/CTL Alternate Law : is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition. The flight Control Laws revert , from “Normal Law” to “Alternate Law 2”. The Prims are in charge of the voting and elimination of a duff ADR, but it takes them 10 seconds to do so (threshold is 16 kt / 10 sec.

Flight Director Flag on captain’s PFD

Flight Director Flag on F/O’s PFD

Auto Throttle OFF (These last three should have appeared at the same time as the A/P OFF warning.)

TCAS Fault : Result of the loss of the associated ADR (for altitude data)

Speed Limit Flag on Captain’s PFD

Speed Limit Flag on F/O’s PFD ( these two result of rejected Airspeed information by the EFCS, might be a sign of the PROT LOST, which hasn’t been indicated)

Rudder Travel Limiter Fault is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition.

EFCS 1 Fault on Maintenance Status

EFCS 2 Fault on Maintenance Status

Probe-Pitot 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 / (9DA. Relates to Heating element PITOT 1

Primary Flight Computer #2 (ADIRU1 signal to Prim 2)

0211Z

FPV Flag on Captain’s PFD

FPV Flag on F/O’s PFD

Speed or Mach function on ISIS (Suspect loss of ADIRU 3 for ISIS MACH )

IR2 Fault (Discrete data streams = Pitot, Static , TAT, OAT to ADIRU 2)

0212Z

ADR DISAGREE : TOOK IT A LONG TIME TO APPEAR NOW !

0213Z

Primary Flight Computer #1 Fault (Crew manipulation suspected, on ADR DISAGREE C/L )

Secondary Flight Computer #1 Fault ——Idem———————-

ADR2 Fault on Maintenance Status Another very late message

Intermittent Fault on FMGEC #1

0214Z

Cabin Vertical speed Advisory. We now believe that this advisory message is just a result of ADR data

There is a glaring conclusion : there is no way that the ACARS have been transmitted in the order of the summary.

Firstly because we find a 0212z event in the middle of the 0211 ones, and the same for two 0213Z’s between 0214z messages…

Secondly, it is also obvious that the ADR DISAGREE message/warning is too late in view of all the happenings that should have been its consequences.

But looking at the system, we can see in fact the trouble-shooting “reasoning” of the system facing multiple incoherent data at the same time.

The explanation will come in the second part, in which we deal with the time tags and propose one – for us the most logical – chain of events.

————-

In the discussions I’ve had with several other parties, it did appear that the ACARS decode done by the Eurocockpit is definitely not in order (which isn’t surprising)…

BUT, it also appeared that the leaked ACARS Headers List we saw early on that was leaked to the press, also was not in order, which baffled most of us…

We have so far believed that the messages would be timestamped in order… Which was, correct, but, it was correct to the minute… within the minute, nothing guarantees it.

Here is the “original” list:

pic

It appears that there are some prioritizing of messages within the same minute. This can explain why in the latter parts, there were some stuff not in order but the minutes were still stamped to time of occurence.

Certain parts really gave some puzzling and befuddlement (is that even a word?)… stuff like, why did the NAV DISAGREE come out so late, and why was there an IR problem when we’re suspecting an ADR problem… etc, etc, etc.

The clues lie much deeper than originally thought, and again, the Air Caraibes internal technical note provided one of the best assistance in understanding the AF447 ACARS messages… of course, technical drawings, wirings, fault isolation possibilities of the CMC messages… the documents I have (which is still far from what’s required) already 153 pages… with many more pages to print and scour through.

This is still far from finished… The data posted still have some further reading to cross check, like, how does the Air Data Module work such as air data sampling rates, self data storage, how it starts and reboots when needed, data filtering functions, and what functions it carries in each probe (certain documents reveal multiple functions), etc, etc….

And then how come an ADR affect the IR functions of the ADIRUs, etc etc, denergizing ADIRU after ADR switch off doesn’t give the OFF light, etc etc… and many many more stuff…

All the above, must then be cross checked with the background systems information and general logic (from the FCOMs) to cross check further interrelationships between components and modules, where the data is pooled and channeled to downstream users and via which processors etc.

This does put a test to my systems engineering knowledge to the limit from previous works (which coincidentally, involved ADRs and IRs, and integration into NAV and output displays, etc)…

We have some way to go… but this is what’s deduced for the moment… The expanded explanation is incomplete, it is subject to change, subject to ammendments, and albeit backed by documentation, there’s no guarantee that this is correct… but then, it’s better than just picking stuff out of the air.

This is the list reordered…

0209 START

0210 34-11-15-0 FLR EFCS2

EFCS1, AFS – PROBE PITOT 1+2/2+3/1+3 (9DA)

9DA=HEATING ELEMENT PITOT 1 (6DA1/PHC1)

Heating Element Pitot 1 suspected failed.

0210 27-93-34-0 FLR EFCS1

EFCS2-FCPC2(2CE2) WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2

No Data from ADIRU 1, ADR 1 & 2 no sending signal to FCPC2

No ADR Data from ADIRU 1 to PRIM2.

0210 27-90-45-5 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS1

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

0210 27-90-45-0 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS2

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

0210 22-10-00-0 WRN AUTO FLT

AP OFF

Autopilot Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting autopilot into making the wrong actions.

Commence AP/FD FAULT ISOLATION PROCEDURE

System Filter & Check:

– DISAGREE AOA Sensor Data in FCPCs

– DISAGREE PITOT PROBE Data in FCPCs

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 2

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 3

– FAIL ADIRU 2 and 3

– FAIL ADIRUs

0210 22-62-01-0 WRN AUTO FLT

REAC W/S DET FAULT

Loss of 2 ADRs, autopilot cannot provide Windshear Protection.

0210 27-91-00-5 WRN F/CTL

ALTN LAW

2 ADR REJECTED, NAV DISAGREE NOT YET CONCLUDED – FAULT ISOLATION IN PROGRESS

0210 22-83-00-2 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for LEFT seat.

0210 22-83-01-2 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD SPD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for RIGHT seat.

0210 22-30-02-5 WRN AUTO FLT

A/THR OFF

Autothrust Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting Autothrust into making the wrong actions.

0210 34-43-00-5 WRN NAV

TCAS FAULT

Loss of ADR1 to Transponder 1 (if selected) or Loss of ADR2 to Transponder2 (if selected)

Loss of Mode C.

This is downstream of loss of ADR.

0210 22-83-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

0210 22-83-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

0210 27-23-02-0 WRN F/CTL

RUD TRV LIM FAULT

Loss valid of ADR Data (require 2 ADRs) for FMGC/AFS

FMGC Flight Envelope Module locks in Rudder Travel for safety.

0211 34-12-34-0 FLR IR2

EFCS1X,IR1,IR3, ADIRU2 (1FP2)

ADIRU2(1FP2) – ADR2 self monitoring & PHC rejects own data

Loss of discrete data from ADR2 = PITOT 2, STATIC 2L, STATIC 2R, TAT 2, AOA 2.

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

0211 34-12-00-0 FLR ISIS

ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION

SUSPECT LOSS OF ADIRU1 AND/OR ADIRU3 FOR ISIS MACH

Suspect Loss of ADIRU3

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

0211 34-12-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO FPV

0211 34-12-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO FPV

0212 34-10-40-0 WRN NAV

ADR DISAGREE

NAV DISAGREE DISCOVERED – FAULT ISOLATION COMPLETED

Due to no further ADR faults occuring.

0213 27-90-02-5 WRN F/CTL

PRIM1 FAULT

0213 27-90-04-0WRN F/CTL

SEC1 FAULT

0213 22-83-34-9FLR AFS

FMGEC1(1CA1)

0214 34-10-36-0WRN MXSTAT

ADR2

RESULT OF 32-12-34-0

0214 21-31-00-2WRN ADVSRY

CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

LOSS OF ADR DATA

————

Be warned, the above is still incomplete. More cross checking is needed. The failures here aren’t simply upstream faults leading to downstream failures, but there are some “same level” data feed, and “upstream” data feeds… and I do not guarantee the above is correct.

HKG to NRT Synopsis – Brazilian Navy To Honor 447 Victims – French Press Arrogance – Chatter


ferriswheelAll calm in Paris this lazy Sunday before the storm comes next week.  As expected, except for Michael Jackson coverage, the French Press has taken off for the weekend since most have been busy with the “Paris fair” and their European vacations.

The only articles appearing in the French newspapers are those headlined such as: “Brazilian military abandons the Search”.  The arrogance out of Paris is starting to smell like rot.! Too bad we must go to ChinaView to find any sort of appreciation to the Brazilian military for their efforts.

Guess what Paris?  The public has been paying attention!  The NTSB is watching and will be paying close attention to your Thursday BEA press conference.  The NTSB also has the flight data on the two incidents included in their press release.

BEA – You cannot hide the truth any longer!!!  When will the Paris Ferris wheel stop spinning?


naritahead_pic

Is the below flight from Hong Kong to Tokyo the reason NTSB is investigating this second Airbus?

Synopsis: Tuesday 23, 2009 10am enroute HKG to NRT. Entering Nara Japan airspace.

FL390 mostly clear with occasional isolated areas of rain, clouds tops about FL410. Outside air temperature was -50C TAT -21C (your not supposed to get liquid water at these temps). We did.

As we were following other aircraft along our route. We approached a large area of rain below us. Tilting the weather radar down we could see the heavy rain below, displayed in red. At our altitude the radar indicated green or light precipitation, most likely ice crystals we thought.

Entering the cloud tops we experienced just light to moderate turbulence. (The winds were around 30kts at altitude.) After about 15 sec. we encountered moderate rain. We thought it odd to have rain streaming up the windshield at this altitude and the sound of the plane getting pelted like an aluminum garage door. It got very warm and humid in the cockpit all of a sudden.

Five seconds later the Captains, First Officers, and standby airspeed indicators rolled back to 60kts. The auto pilot and auto throttles disengaged. The Master Warning and Master Caution flashed, and the sounds of chirps and clicks letting us know these things were happening.

The Capt. hand flew the plane on the shortest vector out of the rain. The airspeed indicators briefly came back but failed again. The failure lasted for THREE minutes. We flew the recommended 83%N1 power setting.

When the airspeed indicators came back. we were within 5 knots of our desired speed. Everything returned to normal except for the computer logic controlling the plane. (We were in alternate law for the rest of the flight.)

We had good conditions for the failure; daylight, we were rested, relatively small area, and light turbulence. I think it could have been much worse. The Capt did a great job flying and staying cool.

We did our procedures called dispatch and maintenance on the SAT COM and landed in Narita.


logo_chinaview

Brazil Navy to honor crashed Air France jet victims with frigate ceremony

BRASILIA, June 27 (Xinhua) — Brazil’s Navy will honor the victims of Air France flight by holding a ceremony on a frigate next Monday, a local report said Saturday.

The ceremony will be held aboard the frigate Bosisio, which participated in the month-long search operation.

Relatives of victims are invited to the ceremony and flowers will be thrown into the sea, the report said.

0616_0306foto_c130_2


The below Le Monde article is fairly typical of the arrogance of the French Press’s towards the Brazilian SAR mission… Don’t the French people know how to simply say “Thank You?”

lemonde_fr_grd

Flight AF447: Brazil abandons search

0627_h_4_ill_1212286_6d6b_074925

Le Monde pic caption: Brazilian Marine and Aviation officials decide to abandon research on the area of the crash of the AF447 (AP / Eraldo Peres)

LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 27.06.09 | 09h13  •  Mis à jour le 27.06.09 | 10h09 LEMONDE.FR with AFP and Reuters | 27.06.09 | 09h13 • Mis à jour le 27.06.09 | 10:09

The Navy and the Brazilian Air Force announced Friday June 26 they ended the search for bodies and debris AF447 flight of Air France which crashed at sea between Rio and Paris on the night of 31 May to 1 June with 228 people on board. “No body has been found for nine days,” explained Lt. Col. Henry Munhoz during a press conference in Recife (north-east).

Operations conducted with the help of french ships and aircraft from Spain and U.S. to date recovered 51 bodies. Giucemar Tabosa, commander of the Brazilian Navy, said that the buildings remain on french area to try to locate the black boxes from the aircraft.

The reasons for the accident is still undetermined. The Office of Investigations and Analysis (BEA), responsible for the technical investigation into the disappearance of the Airbus announced Thursday June 25 that he would present a “factual report” on Thursday, July 2.


radio_images

ON-LINE AVIATION CHATTER /

MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS

You never know what you may hear on the radio! Below are the most recent on-line  aviation chatter and message board discussions.  Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).

———–

“It strikes me that Lindbergh had more useful and accurate data available than these poor guys had at their disposal”.

———–

COMMENT/QUESTION: Yeah? Haven’t you noticed that most of these media sources originate from aviation sites?

Always possible. But, on the other hand, there’s a technique in PR known as ‘information management.’ It basically consists of ‘trailing your coat’ with some of the conclusions a few days ahead of a formal statement, so you can get an idea of the likely press reaction and fine-tune your draft accordingly, if the reaction differs from the one you want and expect. This could be one of those cases.

Interesting that they appear already to be opening up the old, tried and trusted, ‘pilot error’ avenue – in this case, ‘lack of training.’ I think we can both agree that the implications of this accident, combined with the increasing number of similar such incidents being reported, begin to point to a more complicated problem than just that?

———–

COMMENT/QUESTION: I agree. The point being that some here have already gotten a conviction and are arguing it’s impossible someone (something) else was responsible – and we still haven’t the full details of the “crime”.

Yes… we’ll continue to build the case based on the scant evidence… but, until we obtain conclusive data that the suspect did the killing, we can’t say “yeaps, he killed the plane!” We can only say “We think it’s him, but we don’t have enough for a penal case to obtain a conclusive conviction.”

Just because the robber knocked the plane in the crime, we can’t conclude by the shortcut thinking of “well he hit the victim, so the victim died this time… he must be guilty of the murder”… Just ludicrous!

COMMENT/QUESTION:  I appreciate that whatever conclusion you and others are approaching, it is done after arduous and very careful analysis.

Systematic sleuthing, is an arduous task. At times, I have been tempted to take the shortcut method… but we’d be muddying the waters and tarnishing our respective professions that way.

———————

COMMENT/QUESTION:  So we are looking for the fingerprint or the eyewitness in the face of the FDR/CVR, the major defendant being the pitot tubes. Is it 100% certain that after hopefully retrieving the FDR/CVR, this theory will be able to be then validated?

Warning: Analogical comparison

If this was a crime… the suspect is Mr. Icing and Mr. Turbulence… or Mr. Godfather CB cell with his accomplices Mr. Icing and Mr. Turbulence. Past crimes, the method has been to perform the crime by Mr. Turbulence grappling the aircraft and shaking him, with mr. Icing using his baseball bat beating the pitot tubes. Past cases (in particular Mr. Air Caraibes F-OFDF) came out dazed and confused after the crime and he made it home (destination) before reporting the crime to the police (Airbus)…

Mr. Air France F-GZCP was reported to have been shaken by Mr. Turbulence… We know Mr. CB was in the area, and there trauma injury indicating the Pitot being beated by Mr. Ice (the ACARS messages)…

Does tht mean Mr. Ice killed Mr. GZCP? No… The most Mr. Ice can be guilty for is beating the Pitots… but we know past victims made it home (be the dazed and confused)… we know that Mr. Ice doesn’t intend on killing the victim, we wants to rob, not to kill…

For all we know, Mr. victim, if it was a person, could have been dazed and confused, walked to a bridge and accidentally fell off causing his death. Can we charge the mafia or Mr. Ice with murder? NO.

This is the difference between our various intentions in discussing the accident of GZCP…

All of us want to find the cause of death…

Some of us, construct the case…

But some of us, just want to blame Mr. Ice for the killing and some of us blame Mrs. GZCP for not dispatching her husband with protective armour.

Sounds silly? Well, it’s happening right?

———————-

COMMENT/QUESTION:  So how does the aircraft handle in extreme weather with its systems reverting to various laws? Does a skillful pilot even know the difference? Or do things get real touchy? Mushy? That’s what I’m wondering.

They’d know they’d be in degraded law, ALT law… ALT 1 or ALT 2 we know know if they knew which… The point is, there isn’t that much of a difference if the aircraft was still actually within safe envelopes (and there’s no reason to doubt that for the moment). The difference is, ALT 2 doesn’t prevent you from exceeding the envelope… If they did exceed the envelope at some stage, we want to know why and how…

COMMENT/QUESTION: Yeah, not the ideal analogy.

Can someone come up with a better one then… I think we might all need a better analogy…  Smile

COMMENT/QUESTION: Add to that that the ‘low speed stability protection’ in ‘Alternate Law’ would presumably have reacted to the low ‘indicated’ speed by pushing the nose down, which you’d have had to counter with the sidestick? And you’d have to avoid any use of the rudder like the plague – eighty-three knots being below takeoff speed, the Travel Limiter would have removed all limits – so the rudder would have been free to go to 30 degrees of deflection or so?

What low speed stability protection? Alt 1 or Alt 2? I think Alt 2 is what happened. You mean stall warning? If you have the stall warning under ALT2 the plane will not “protect itself” by a nose down command. So, under ALT 2, if the plane is stalling, and you don’t do anything to the stick… the plane WILL stall… See my post #15… No low energy, no high AOA, no Pitch Att protection…

(Load factor protection means no matter what you do with the stick, it won’t let you go beyond a limited G loads).

Now, back to the rudder… The yaw dampening action goes no further than 4degs rudder travel in ALT 2 Law. And as you said… avoid using the rudder like a plague….

COMMENT/QUESTION: The idea that you could easily overstress the structure through un-protected full deflection of the flight controls is a red herring.

Let me elaborate from the post before…

On pitch yes… Load Factor protection remains… ie: it won’t let you do +6Gs and break the aircraft… (or do most of us have a difficulty in understanding what “G-Load demand” controls of Airbus FBW pitch???)

On roll? Nothing stopping you from going inverted… but why would you do that? On this, and 20 – 25deg / sec roll, that’ll mean from wings level, it’ll take >3 secs of FULL STICK deflection to reach 90deg bank.

On Yaw… well, as someone said above “avoid using the rudder like a plague”…

Red herring? Yes and No…

Over controlling into excess loads resulting in a breakup? Unlikely…

Over/under controlling into an abnormal situation leading to out of envelope situation (which then can cause a breakup, NOT by excess control surfaces load), more likely than the above. (note: “more likely” and not “is likely”.

COMMENT/QUESTION: But it honestly never occurred to me before just how absolutely fundamental knowing your correct airspeed is to flying an aeroplane. And it now appears that it is may be equally fundamental to the ‘systems.’

The system is still designed by humans… and human logic is programmed into the computer logic… otherwise, the crew would have difficulty in handling even a toilet failure. Humans or computers, it needs airspeed data for flight. We’re talking about a plane, not a ballistic missile (which only needs to rely on inertials)… however, the good thing about the computerized system is that it can detect unreliable airspeed without human input… the technology exist for the aircraft to fly without airspeed data… but it won’t be as accurate as with airspeed data. We can go on and on about this  Smile

COMMENT/QUESTION: “Based on initial physical evidence and information from automatic maintenance messages sent by the aircraft, these people said, the plane bucked through heavy turbulence created by a thunderstorm without the full protection of its flight-control systems — safeguards that experts say pilots now often take for granted.

I’d put a red flag on such a statement. Many aircraft today still fly through bad weather without the so called “protections”.

COMMENT/QUESTION: “Relying on backup instruments, the Air France pilots apparently struggled to restart flight-management computers even as their plane may have begun breaking up from excessive speed, according to theories developed by investigators.”

Again, a red flag. It’s not that simple. Statements such as that has a risk in ending up with public hysteria!

COMMENT/QUESTION:  I wonder – if the rudder limiter got an erroneous low-speed as its last valid input – that would allow rudder deflection much larger than would be considered safe for cruise speed. A) can such a scenario exist and b) if so, would that overstress the tail, rudder, or airframe?

Again…

1. I’ve written this before, for the above to happen, the ADR monitoring function of the system would have had to fail, allowing an unlikely simultaneous, slow and progressive reduction of the indicated airspeed on at least 2 ADRs… the AOA comparison feature of the ADR monitoring function, would pick up this error before long. Did that fail? If so, this puts 2 extremely unlikely events to occur together (ie: near impossible)… can we attribute aircraft accidents to “Bad Luck” ?

2. Why use the rudder? The yaw damping feature is still there (up to 4degs deflection, sufficient).

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COMMENT/QUESTION: Above you mean the investigating authorities are doing PR and writing their reports to get a specific press reaction???

Nothing at all wrong with that. Best description of PR I ever heard was, ‘telling the truth in the best light.’ In practical terms the investigators have a duty to say what they know (or, in this case, what they consider most likely at this stage). But it would do no-one any good if a carelessly-drafted phrase started needless waves of alarm.

So yes – it’s part of their job to make sure that they get the relevant facts over clearly and without ambiguity. And, often enough, the best way to check that is to run it past some responsible journalists.

———————-

COMMENT/QUESTION: All of us want to find the cause of death…

Some of us, construct the case… But some of us, just want to blame Mr. Ice for the killing and some of us blame Mrs. GZCP for not dispatching her husband with protective armour.

I find it difficult to consider Mr. Ice, Mr. Turbulence or Mr. CB as contributing factors to an air crash. Human has to cheat nature in order to fly in some way….human can’t blame nature for falling out of the sky. Unfair.

Afterall, it is people building planes, people running airliners and people flying them. Commercial aviation has been making huge steps as far as air safety and passenger comfort are concerned as well as making huge profits. Accidents will continue to happen for a lot of years. Cheating nature is a hell of a task. But in order to take incident and accident rate to zero (or very close to zero, even closer than it is today), at least regarding the top carriers managed in developed countries, one has to turn to people when talking about allocating responsibilities after an incident/accident. That has been and will always be the only way in humans’ fight to make flying even safer.

It is up to people to figure out the way to protect flights against hazardous weather, terrorism, poor aircraft maintenance, unreliable parts and software glitches and to find the balance between alert, well trained pilots and automatisations.

—————–

COMMENT/QUESTION: “Based on initial physical evidence and information from automatic maintenance messages sent by the aircraft, these people said, the plane bucked through heavy turbulence created by a thunderstorm without the full protection of its flight-control systems — safeguards that experts say pilots now often take for granted.

I can’t believe that a crew consisting of any two out of three experienced captains would not be able to deal with reasonable turbulence flying in Direct Law.

But some significant turbulence (“forte” or even heavier maybe close to these white spots in Tim’s analysis?) getting into the picture after the failure of the speed sensors? The crew would have to deal with two hazards related to identifying true airspeed at the same time: faulty airspeed readings (and maybe a stall warning) and heavy turbulence which affects airspeed in the first place. That is a pretty complex situation that could cause confusion, couldnt it? That could explain Airbus direction some days after the accident regarding maintaining a minimum thrust when in turbulence (please correct me if I am wrong).

————-

COMMENT/QUESTION: I find it difficult to consider Mr. Ice, Mr. Turbulence or Mr. CB as contributing factors to an air crash. Human has to cheat nature in order to fly in some way….human can’t blame nature for falling out of the sky. Unfair.

It’s just an analogy… We’re not trying to find who/what’s to blame with the analogy… as you said, can’t blame the sky or nature…

BUT, it’s just an analogy used when comparing to how some have pointed to weather as the cause of the accident…

COMMENT/QUESTION: I can’t believe that a crew consisting of any two out of three experienced captains would not be able to deal with reasonable turbulence flying in Direct Law.

2 Captains and 1 F/O or 1 Captain and 2 F/Os? And… did the aircraft go to direct law? (I know someone asked about the difference between ALT2 and Direct earlier).

COMMENT/QUESTION: But some significant turbulence (“forte” or even heavier maybe close to these white spots in Tim’s analysis?) getting into the picture after the failure of the speed sensors? The crew would have to deal with two hazards related to identifying true airspeed at the same time: faulty airspeed readings (and maybe a stall warning) and heavy turbulence which affects airspeed in the first place. That is a pretty complex situation that could cause confusion, couldnt it? That could explain Airbus direction some days after the accident regarding maintaining a minimum thrust when in turbulence (please correct me if I am wrong).

Be careful about being overwhelmed by the discussion… you seem to be getting muddled… (which is easy to do given the recent developments in the discussion)… if you don’t have a “likely sequence”, one would be open to risks of being muddled.

Please have a look at Tim’s analysis and see where the “last position” is… which Tim has pointed out but did not use (as his analysis was more on the meteorological front), that “Last Position” was originally thought to be at 0214UTC but has since been declared as 0210…

The so-called “failure of the speed sensors” happened at 0210, the message sent regarding turbulence is at 0200, 10 minutes beforehand. If turbulence was so bad at that time, the crew would have difficulty typing the message.

Please see where my previous weather analysis derived from Tim’s findings (which you commented on earlier), which at 0200, the arcraft was abeam and close to (about 5NM) from the edge of a rapidly developing small but dense cluster which came and went quickly…

This I point as a likely cause of the turbulence they were experiencing. It’s either that, or because they were effectively downwind of the convective cloud, and the 1 of the 3 core clusters within.

You can see the small dense cluster here, according to Tim, it is likely to contain a very strong updraft… the big white blobs he indicate as “updraft” cold spots… that small dense cluster is noted as “very strong updraft”…

af447-radarsim

And below, you can find the last position as per ACARS transmission at 0210UTC, marked “ACARS POSITION”… ignore the “extrap position”. Note, the estimated weather radar paint the aircraft could have shown…

af447-0215-zoom

Assuming the predicted path was valid. I currently have little reason to belief that the aircraft continued under so called “heavy turbulence” between about 0200 and 0210… although light to moderate is likely throughout the time.

I would go along with what others on this board said about the context of the message… they were abeam of a rapidly developing dense mini cluster… which I doubt they didn’t see as too bad before the aircraft was abeam of it… got over the “forte turbulence”, and saw the big formation(s) ahead and Ops Center to provide them with an update of the situation…

By 0210 was at the edge or had passed the edge of the big cluster… they’ve past the “white spots”…

COMMENT/QUESTION: It is my understanding that generally, pilots do not make any inputs to the rudder at all once airborne. Is this correct?

I’m not sure I understand how rudder deflection based on input could have been a factor in the crash…

The rudder input discussion was caused by the discovery of the tailfin intact… we’ve discussed it with hundreds of posts on it… because some thought (and some were convinced) that it was the cause of the airplane’s demise… based on the AA A300-600 accident at JFK… In cruise, you don’t normally use the rudder… you let the yaw damper and if fitted let the turn coordinator take care of required rudder deflection in the turn… This aircraft (like other Airbus FBW aircraft) has the turn coordinator function… If the aircraft degraded to Alternate Law, you’d loose that (until you’re on approach), but that doesn’t mean you need to use the rudder in turns in cruise… Boeings (at least the non-FBW ones) don’t have a turn coordinating function under autopilot or under manual flight…

Why have some thought the use of rudder might have caused the aircraft’s demise? If you want to know about it, I suggest you’d read the hundreds of previous posts on it… I’m just getting tired of repeating it allover again, only for someone to forget about it and try to put that argument forward again with nothing new to back it up… I don’t know if this is a discussion or “one trying to grind the other to wear them down and concede to silly/good ideas with little relevant basis”…

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COMMENT/QUESTION: Does not have to be a “Fault” with the ADR, The ADR’s could be operating perfectly normal. They just dont agree with each other.

Doesn’t this require 1 ADR to be rejected/switched off and the 2 remaining disagrees?

COMMENT/QUESTION: Unless the ADRs indicated a low-speed condition prior to fault due to the issue with the pitot tubes?

There is an ADR monitoring function… Airbus have added functions of “internal ADR monitoring” to detect failure cases on static and pitot probes.

Not sure if they’ve installed the AoA Estimator, this would greatly enhance fault self detect of each ADR by using speed from each, then a theoretical AOA is computed and compared to the AoA from the ADRS voted by the system…

The AoA estimator would prevent a simultaneous slow drift of the speed from the ADRs (which could go undetected.

COMMENT/QUESTION: My question was only to confirm my understanding, that pilots do not use the rudder in flight (normally) due to automatic coordination and the yaw damper.

Affirm… answer is… yes, no need for it.

COMMENT/QUESTION: This is what I did not know. In Boeing cable controlled aircraft (non FBW), isn’t the gain schedule portion of the yaw damper, in essence a turn coordinator? It utilizes Qc, or impact pressure.

You’re right… I seem to have been eaten up in the wording…

From the 737CL… I got 2 versions… one says it “assists in providing turn coordination”, and 2 other manuals and all my NG manuals says “provides turn coordination”…

The 767 manual says “the yaw damper system improve turn coordination” (not provides)

I gotta thank you for that… something I’ve missed all these times!

330maxrudderdeflection

A330 RUDDER TRAVEL LIMIT

Rudder deflection is limited as a function of speed. In case of three ADR or three FCPC failure, maximum rudder deflection remains at the value reached before the failure. Therefore, maximum deflection is available when the slats are extended.


END

Drudge Report continued for hours displaying “The King Is Dead”.  I knew this was not true!  The real king is not dead.  I saw him yesterday in the Savannah Mall.   As the twitter kids keep breaking down the twit server due to the untimely death of their “pop king”, the rest of the baby boomers offer our condolences.

The websites of CNN, FNC, ABC, and NBC are in full Jacko funeral alert mode.  Since many of my younger readers are not aware of the “real king” and his influence on their younger Jackson 5 singer.  I offer the following favorite youtube videos of both the “pop king” and the real King–“Elvis”.  Now tell me who taught Jacko to dance?

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Related Links:

HotAir – Video: House holds moment of silence for Michael Jackson

Michelle Malkin:  Remembering Michael Jackson

PC Magazine:  Jackson’s Death Prompts Record Traffic for Yahoo

LA Times:  Michael Jackson’s last rehearsal: ‘just beaming with gladness’

La Times:  Michael Jackson 911 call: ‘He’s not breathing’

WSJ (Blames Computers-Lack of Pilot Training) – ESTADAO (2 Additional Burials) – FINAL FAB NOTA (SAR Mission Terminated)


The Brazilian Navy and Air Force have announced the termination of the SAR mission for Air France Flight 447.  All hope for solving the mystery of Flight 447 now rests on finding the “black boxes”.  Very few noticed the  Le Figaro article late Thursday night which stated:

According to several sources contacted Thursday, French forces have captured a signal, “they revolve around the past few days to locate it,” said a military source.

Selon plusieurs sources contactées jeudi, les forces françaises ont bien capté un signal, elles tournent autour depuis quelques jours pour le localiser, explique une source militaire.

“The question now is rather whether the issuer is still attached to the black box view of the circumstances of the accident,” says a close source.

La question est dorénavant plutôt de savoir si l’émetteur est toujours solidaire de la boîte noire vu les conditions de l’accident», explique un proche du dossier.

As noted on June 23rd , (Flight 447 Search For Black Boxes: French Sub Hears “Faint’ Signal), Le Monde reported that French ships had picked up a signal from the black boxes and the submersible was in the water.  Common sense says that if the submersible was lowered, the Navy had obviously detected a ping.  However, immediately the French Government and their Press Office (BEA) said this was not true.  Who do we believe?

Several newspapers and aviation bulletin boards continue to say that both “black boxes” are in the tail section.  As posted back on Jun 6, (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation), per the Los Angeles Times,  I’m not sure if this is totally accurate according to the below diagram since there are additional recordings in the cockpit section:

AFundersea


wsj_images

Computer Failures Are Probed in Jet Crash

By ANDY PASZTOR and DANIEL MICHAEL, June 27, 2009

Aviation investigators, running out of time to find the “black boxes” with key information on the crash of Air France Flight 447, suspect a rapid chain of computer and equipment malfunctions stripped the crew of automation today’s pilots typically rely on to control a big jetliner.

An international team of experts is building a scenario in which it believes a cascade of system failures, seemingly beginning with malfunctioning airspeed sensors, rapidly progressed to what appeared to be sweeping computer outages, according to people familiar with the probe…

Based on initial physical evidence and information from automatic maintenance messages sent by the aircraft, these people said, the plane bucked through heavy turbulence created by a thunderstorm without the full protection of its flight-control systems — safeguards that experts say pilots now often take for granted.

Relying on backup instruments, the Air France pilots apparently struggled to restart flight-management computers even as their plane may have begun breaking up from excessive speed, according to theories developed by investigators.

… Unlike jetliners built in previous decades — which required pilots to frequently manipulate controls and often manually fly the planes for long stretches — newer computer-centric aircraft such as the A330 and Boeing’s 777 are designed to operate almost entirely on automated systems.

From choosing engine settings and routes to smoothing out the ride during turbulence and landing in low visibility, pilots essentially monitor instruments and seldom interfere with computerized commands. So when those electronic brains begin to act weirdly at 35,000 feet, the latest crop of aviators may be less comfortable stepping in and grabbing control of the airplane.

Airlines typically use simulators to train cockpit crews for such events, but a pilot may only hone skills to deal with major computer problems every few years. Pilots hardly ever experience multiple computer failures in real-world conditions.

After the initial speed warnings, the Air France pilots are believed to have quickly lost the autopilot and automated throttle-controls, which are designed to instantly disengage when speed readings are suspect. Soon after, according to people familiar with the investigation, cockpit instruments showed a series of warnings about various other equipment failures and the crew apparently shut down or tried to reboot their primary and secondary computer systems….


Sexta-Feira, 26 de Junho de 2009 | Versão Impressa Friday, June 26, 2009 (English Translation)

Two more victims of Flight 447, Air France, are buried

luke_2469171The body of Luke Gagliano Jucá of 24 years, steward of the Air France flight 447, was buried yesterday in the afternoon of Sao Joao Batista cemetery in Botafogo, Rio southern Around one hundred people attended the funeral, including co-workers of the airline, which came standard. Many were moved.

On the coffin of Luke, relatives placed the flag of the Botafogo and two portraits of the couple. Photos and posters in honor of the boy were also pasted on the wall of the chapel during the wake, held in closed coffin. “Luke, you really were not of this world. I had to have died near the sky to get faster,” he said, excited, Professor Fernando Gama.

Lucas lived in France. He came to Brazil in May for the funeral of his father. He spent 15 days on the side of the mother and returned on May 31 for the French capital, where the Airbus crashed.

Air France confirmed yesterday that the body of the pilot is one of 11 that were identified by the Institute of Legal Medicine of the reef last week, but did not reveal his identity. A union of pilots said that the commander was Marc Dubois. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany said that three Germans were also identified but not released their names.

Deise Possamai 2In addition to Lucas, the body of the public official Deise Possamai was also buried on the afternoon of yesterday in New Venice, 180 km from Florianópolis. Around 500 people, including relatives and friends, attended the funeral, which had also sealed coffin. Amilton, his uncle, recalled a childhood of Deise, referring to a person sweet and fragile. As soon as the Mass ended, the coffin was carried to a cemetery in the back of the chapel, less than one block from where he was born and where his parents currently reside.

“The opportunity for a farewell leaves everyone in general, a little relieved,” said a former co-worker. Deise had achieved a license to the City of Criciúma to do a course abroad.  She was separated and had no children.

More Here :

Sonia Gagliano, whose grandson Lucas Gagliano was an air steward on the flight, told the O Globo newspaper.

“He was a young boy, just 23 years old, and he spoke eight languages.”

Nightmare’ for flight 447 familiesafribbon


a1-5_1024

Resgate de Corpos do navio da Marinha /

FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA

26/06/2009 – 19h02 FAB Final Nota – 26.06.09 (English Translation)(Emphasis mine)

TERMINATION OF THE SEARCHES OF AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 447

The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command report that at the end of today, June 26, was officially given by the end of the largest and most complex operation of Search and Rescue has already carried out by Brazilian armed forces in sea area, both in appearance duration as the magnitude of the means employed.

In these 26 days to search the passengers and crew of Air France flight 447, which disappeared when they flew on the route Rio de Janeiro (RJ) – Paris (France), on the night of May 31, 2009 were 51 bodies and rescued more than 600 parts and structural components of the aircraft, and several bags.

The technical reason that determined the end of the search is the impracticability of sights survivors or bodies, primary objective of the operation, already 26 days after the accident. The day on June 12th to 26th, a period of 15 days, only two bodies were recovered, and the last on 17. In the last nine days, no body has been sighted or prey.

The 51 recovered bodies were delivered to the Federal Police and the Department of Social Defense of Pernambuco to the work of identification. The wreckage of the aircraft and luggage collected were delivered to the Bureau d’Investigations et D’Analysis of I’Aviation Pour la Securite Civile (BEA). Research on the factors that contributed to the accident is also the responsibility of the BEA and has the support of the corresponding sector, the Brazilian Center for Research and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents (CENIPA).

In 26 days of continuous operation under the responsibility of Brazil, in response to the international search and rescue, the Brazilian Air Force used 12 aircraft and had the support of aircraft from France, U.S. and Spain. The Brazilian Navy has served in rotation with 11 ships in the area of search, totaling about 35 thousand miles navigated, approximately eight times the size of the Brazilian coast.

Were flown around 1500 hours and was conducted visual searches in an area corresponding to 350 thousand square kilometers, more than three times the size of the state of Pernambuco. The R-99 aircraft, in turn, electronic search conducted in an area corresponding to two million square kilometers, eight times the size of the state.

Were directly involved in the 1344 military operation of the Brazilian Navy and 268 from FAB, totaling more than 1,600 professionals in the tasks of search, rescue and support of these [SAR} activities.

Remain in the area to search the resources dedicated to marine capture emissions data and voice boxes of rugged aircraft, coordinated by France.

All the search operation was under the direct responsibility of the Department of Control of the airspace (DECEA) by means of Recife SALVAERO saved in coordination with the Northeast and attended to the provisions of Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention, effective in 1950, which establishes the commitment of signatory countries to the search and rescue operations in their areas of jurisdiction.

Mindful of its mission, the crew and other members of the the Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command make your way to work that day just [remember] to offer reverence to the pain that mark Brazilian families and the international community.

CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA

Salutei09610151542142794


END