USCG SAR – Alt Law/RTL Linked to F/CTL ADR DISAGREE

FIGARO -L’EXPRESS – FOLHA ONLINE -FAB Nota 27 – CHATTER

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gI_ASAScreen1.bmpPRweb South Kingstown, RI (Vocus/PRWEB ) June 11, 2009

Air France Flight 447 Recovery Assisted by U.S. Coast Guard and Advanced Search & Rescue Technology

The U.S. Coast Guard assisted the French authorities with the search for Air France Flight 447 by applying their new, advanced SAR software system called the Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System (SAROPS) that generates optimized search area predictions for objects missing at sea.

The Coast Guard assisted the French authorities by applying their new, advanced SAR software system called the Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System (SAROPS) that generates optimized search area predictions for objects missing at sea. Recovery of bodies and debris is significant not only for families, but for crash investigators, said Mary Schiavo, a former inspector general for the U.S. Department of Transportation.

SAROPS includes a “reverse drift” capability, which predicts a search area based on the location where floating wreckage is found…

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Alternate Law and the Rudder Travel Limiter

Linked to F/CTL ADR DISAGREE

f-clt adr disagree

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No link” between the probes and the crash of the A330

Par LEXPRESS.fr, publié le 11/06/2009 14:26 – mis à jour le 11/06/2009 19:04 (English Translated)

There is “still no link” between the Pitot probe measures speed equip the A330 and the crash of the aircraft of Air France between Rio and Paris on 1 June, reaffirmed on Thursday a spokeswoman Bureau of Investigations Analysis (BEA), responsible for the technical investigation.” It has been said. There is still no link between the pitot and causes of the accident,” she told AFP. The spokesman also referred to statements of the Director Saturday the BEA, Paul-Louis Arslanian. “Problems, incidents were recorded, we are studying,” he explained about the pitot probes. But “this does not mean that without the replacement, the aircraft is dangerous, and that it is not,” he said.

Not satisfied

The spokesperson for the BEA has however refused Thursday to comment on an article in the Figaro, referring to a possible break a window of the A330 accident, following the disruptions caused in the aircraft by Pitot probes malfunctioning.

Meanwhile, the CEO of Air France-KLM, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, has said this morning “not convinced” that the probes are the cause of the accident. At the same time, he confirmed the accelerated replacement program Pitot probes on A330/A340.This program has been accelerated because we know that when this accident, there was a problem with the measurement of speed, “he said.

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AF 447: the scenario of the breakup in flight (English Translation)

INFO FIGARO – According to several experts, the failure of computers could speed trigger a chain leading to the fatal disintegration of the aircraft of Air France. What has actually happened a few minutes before the tragic accident that struck the Airbus A 330 Air France Flight 447 from Paris to Rio? …

… giving a probability slightly higher in the scenario of in-flight breakup the device. Dislocation which would be the ultimate consequence of the failure of the three-speed computers, called pitot tubes.

Because under this scenario, it is the first failure that resulted in the fatal sequence. All aircraft are fitted with three sensors including a relief. The system is redundant. These tubes are placed face-to-walk “. The air and shoves it enables computers to establish the speed of the device. But the tube is also collected from the rain.

The drainage of water from Pitot was not properly calibrated. Standing waterEveryone knew the weak point. There were six to seven incidents over a dozen boundaries in the world in recent months, the most severe was that of Qantas, “said a specialist in aircraft accidents.

Apparently, the three probes of the Air France Airbus, which crossed a zone of high turbulence – the so-called zone of Pot-au-noir – frosted and have provided contradictory information to the onboard computer.

Therefore any s’enchaîne: autothrottle which manages the thrust engine is disconnected and also the autopilot. “Then the two drivers to play,” says Gerard Feldzer, former captain instructor Airbus A 330-340 and director of the Musée de l’Air Le Bourget.

Pilots must withstand alarms and return to the “back to basics” ie the traditional steering. And they apply the basic aircraft without pilot computer forever. Remains whether the structural limit of the aircraft in these exceptional storms. Without any further indication, there is a final checklist to help to maintain the horizontal plane with a capacity suited. “

The problem is that drive without any measuring instrument is very difficult, especially in extreme conditions such as the Pot-au-noir. The risk is to drop out if we fly too slowly, or to inflict extreme pressure to the device if it flies too fast. “A tear surpilotage can drift a block,” says Gerard Feldzer. T

The wings and fins which are used to operate under extremely high pressures. The danger is then to “focus” too loud at full speed and break. “The aerodynamic pressures are so strong then that large pieces can break,” says an expert in crashes.

A possible depressurization

In these conditions, a hole could be formed in the fuselage, or a window or several explode. This would explain that the latest warning of the device has indicated a vertical velocity equal to or greater than 1 800 feet per minute.

This speed may mean in fact a sudden and rapid depressurization of the cabin. The cabin was empty artificial air – equivalent to the one breathes between 1 500 and 1 800 meters above sea level – and the pressure will fall to that found at an altitude of 10 000 meters, which was the plane. “Therefore, given the forces the cell of the plane may have broken the aircraft and spray flying,” says this expert.

“It must be very careful. We face a puzzle and in view of the evidence collected to date, it is impossible to be categorical. The Bureau investigation and analysis will carry out tests, but it will eventually know what really happened, “says Gerard Feldzer.

There remains the question raised by some unions of drivers: Airbus why did he not been stronger and not recommending requiring Pitot probes to first generation are replaced? Why Air France is not gone soon to make these changes? Why ASEAN, the European Aviation Safety Agency she said that “the replacement of these probes was not formally binding on the security front,” according to the formulation of a pilot?

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lgo-folha_online-210x45-ffffff-2Air Force says it has found 37 pieces of the Air France Airbus” (English Translated)

The aircraft returned on the afternoon of Thursday that 37 pieces of the Air France flight 447 were found in the Atlantic Ocean so far…

The aircraft, the parts will be sent to the port of Recife and will be available to research teams led by France, as well as other pieces which are eventually collected by vessels of other countries that also participate in searches.

The Brigadier Ramon Cardoso, the Decea (Department of Air Control), said that Brazil is responsible for bodies of victims of the accident. Today, a French vessel that participates in search and rescue work to the occupants and the wreckage of Air France flight 447 more bodies spotted in the Atlantic Ocean.

Still according to Brigadier is still not possible to know how many bodies were sighted and they have been rescued. Between Saturday (6) and Tuesday were removed 41 bodies from the ocean…

Ramon came the second time yesterday, 19 June to the end of the searches can be reviewed. Everything will depend on further analysis to be performed next week.

If necessary the teams can be refit to stay until at least the 25th this month. The extension of time will depend on analysis to be performed by technicians about the feasibility of meeting of bodies.

There are no clear hypotheses about what may have overthrown the aircraft, but there are already certain that the plane suffered a depressurization and electrical breakdown because the aircraft of the type sent automatic alarm during the flight. It is also known that the aircraft encountered strong turbulence.

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From AF website 11 June 2009:

Air France Chief Executive Officer Pierre-Henri Gourgeon today met with members from the AJPAE (French Professional Aviation and Space Journalists Association).

This meeting, planned some time ago, was devoted to the current situation and outlook for air transport.

In his opening speech, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon reiterated to the thirty French and foreign media present that all Air France staff have remained totally mobilized since the tragic accident of Air France flight 447. Every member of the staff shares the deep distress of the families and friends of the victims, crew and colleagues who were lost on this flight, and there has been a feeling of great solidarity throughout the Company.

The CEO reminded journalists that the investigation will be long and difficult, given the location of the accident. Analysis of the initial results of the searches being carried out may give us an indication of the circumstances of the catastrophe. Various scenarios could then be built by the experts. In addition to which, we hope to recover the flight recorders. As for the assumptions made by some of the media, they are pure speculation.

Air France launched its programme for replacing the anemometric sensors on Friday, 29 May, as soon as it received the stock of parts. Due to the problem concerning speed measurement, which had been observed in the last automatic messages from the aircraft, the replacement programme was stepped up.

We cannot, however, assume any link between the sensors and the causes of the accident. Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency maintain that the A330/A340s are safe with any one of the three types of existing sensors.

Air France will be totally transparent in dealing with the investigators and, in agreement with them, in communicating with the general public and its passengers, concluded the Chief Executive Officer.

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11/06/2009 – 19h03 Nota 27 – 11.06.09

INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE

The Command of the Navy and the Air Command announced that three more bodies were recovered in recent times and therefore the total of bodies found up to 44. The last three bodies are on board the Frigate Constitution, the Brazilian Navy.

In the morning, has completed the transfer of the 25 bodies that were in Frigate Bosísio to Fernando de Noronha, which pass through preliminary expertise. The bodies will be transported to Recife in two stages, as the progress of expertise. The first step should be completed on the morning of Saturday, June 13.

On the occasion of the transfer of bodies, the H-60 Blackhawk helicopter, the Brazilian Air Force, carried 15 soldiers aboard the Air Detachment (DAE), the Brazilian Navy for the Frigate Bosísio, which will operate a helicopter AH-11A Lynx, in the searches.

At the request of the French Navy, the Blackhawk also led two psychologists to French Frigate Bosísio so that are transported to the Frigate Ventoso.

The effective current Navy in the operation reaches 585 military. The FAB is with the 255th The means employed, and used to conduct search operations, remain unchanged in relation to information provided previously.

CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA

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ON-LINE AVIATION CHATTER /

MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS

Below are the most recent on-line aviation chatter and message board discussions.  Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).

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We do not know if there were any radio messages from the crew. The crew may well have broadcast on the emergency channels and being out of range of VHF communications, would not have been picked up except by nearby aircraft / ships. The nearest aircraft that I have heard was approx 150 km away. That may not be close enough in stormy weather to be heard.

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Were there any radio messages from the crew?

one report of an ACARS text message to AF before the MX messages

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Do we have any evidence that AF 447 was actually traveling at thirty something thousand feet?

Apparently so, since it didn’t leave radar surveillance until 0148Z (if the media got that right).

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Another question: Was the relief pilot in the cockpit at the time replacing the captain or the f/o. I mean, how certain are we that there was no sabotage attempt in the cockpit by a crew member that knows how to disable protection systems (like pulling circuit breakers) and set the course for this disaster?

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Question. According to the ACARS messages, is it possible that they lost ADI in addition to airspeed info on both primary PFDs and the standby PFD?

Being looked into, but some suspect the loss of ADIs was caused by crew following the checklist. None of the information in the ACARS suggest that ADI function of the standby instrument (ISIS) was lost… The fault likely to be the loss of airspeed data into the ISIS (ISIS has an independent gyro set up for the attitude referencing).

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Back to Yaw damping and turn coordination provided by the FBW…

There is no feedback to the rudder pedals from these functions… There is no need to use them unless you’re in direct law on all 3 axis… This accident does not appear to be such a case.

Under ALTN law, the yaw control is interestingly… (for ALTN2 law)

“The dutch roll damping function is available, and damper authority is limited to +/-4degs rudder (Conf 0) and +/-15degs rudder (other CONF).

Turn coordination is also provided, except in CONF 0.”

The thing is, why press the rudder? Who’d press the rudder? Given the conditions, so what if the turn is not coordinated… it’s not crucial…

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The Three (3) Phases up to the “Event.”  (See Previous Post)

You have:

1. Normal phase

A. Transition into trouble phase

2. Trouble phase

B. Transition to outcome

3. Outcome…

Outcome can be “problem solved”, “problem remained but safe outcome”, “survivable accident”, and “insurvivable accident”.

There are cases where phases can repeat itself, although it is I believe, rare… often, the transitions overlap into the phases, but normally does not extend beyond 2 phases or a phase and the following transition (in cases of multiple phases, that is). Terrorist bombing of aircraft is unique because it overlaps A, 2 and B into one.

The facts that we have remain on the phases (normal flight, phase2 began in 0210, and phase 3 is that we’re now finding bodies and aircraft pieces), and nothing in the transitions.

Phasing does ease discussions and investigations in a LOT of accidents and incidents. I must stress however, that the root cause can be before Phase 1… however, that is for the investigators… when causes start way before Phase 1, it requires data not available to the public domain.

I do wish that we discuss it in a systematic manner, such as the division into phases as above. It will make things much easier. So, where are we now?

We know that the ACARS messages point towards problems with the pitot static system. This is not definite, albeit likely. As many professionals have stated, these messages can only explain what may have happened. This is Phase 2.

We know that pieces of the aircraft/bodies are found and so have bodies. Phase 3 is therefore an accident. We do not know whether it is a survivable accident, or an insurvivable one. It is safe however, to assume that this is an insurvivable accident based on the information available.

So, this leaves the transitions… A and B.

Transition A has a few possibilities.

A1. Loss of reliable airspeed data. This explains some of the ACARS messages. This however, if the procedures are carried out promptly, should not have caused in loss of aircraft.

A2. Loss of all Air Data... This explains further the ACARS messages. Procedures following this extends beyond that of A1, and can (not does) explain the cabin pressure controller ACARS message as it is part of the QRH/ECAM action… amongst other things.

A3. Total loss of all ADIRU... This means loss of Air Data and Attitude Reference data. This, is extremely unlikely to happen. If someone can explain why TCAS was in the ACARS message then we can theorize objectively whether this was a likely scenario or not.

A4. Bomb. Only a small explosion can explain what then happened in phase 2, albeit in my opinion, explains less when in comparison with A1, A2 and A3.

A5. Lightning strike. It is unlikely to have affected a transition into phase 2, based on data for phase 2.

A6. Tailfin separation. It is unlikely to have affected a transition into phase 2, based on the data for phase 2.

A7. Excessive turbulence resulting in attitude upset. This has been deemed unlikely due to data supporting A1 and A2. Should this have happened, A1 and/or A2 and/or A3 is unlikely to have continued after aircraft recovered normal attitude.

A8. Pilots switching off the autopilot and autothrust. Whilst switching off autothrust is an option to the crew as part of the QRH for severe turbulence encounter, human action to switch off the autopilot and auto thrust does not produce an ACARS maintenance message. This is therefore deemed as unlikely.

Note that A1 – A8 only goes to explain what may have caused entry to phase 2. Possible causes for the transition to happen, will be discussed below.

How about Transition B?

B1. Bomb, if in transition B, cannot be dismissed based on current info.

B2. Lightning strike, this is possible due to lack of ACARS messages from the aircraft after 0214UTC which can mean electrical failure. This can explain further resulting failures as per B3 and B4.

B3. Electrical failure. See above and B5.

B4. Further loss of ADR or IR. This is possible.

B5. Wing separation. This can explain the lack of ACARS messages after 0214UTC due to lack of AC power based on engine electrical generators being severed from the fuselage (see B3).

B6. Loss of control. This is possible due to the flight control laws degrading to alternate or alternate 2 in bad weather. However, it is deemed unlikely that transition B is simply explained by crew inability to maintain control. Loss of control coupled with B3 and/or B5 is possible as with B3, aircraft would further degrade to direct law, and with B4, loss of attitude information in the dark.

B7. Tailfin separation. This is possible if after 0214UTC but require B6 as prerequisite(s).

B8. Airframe disintegration. This is possible with B6 as prerequisite.

B9. Crew task saturation. This is possible as in previous incidents, crew involved has cited overwhelming ECAM messages as a likely hindrance to prompt action to rescue the situation. This can easily explain B6, and subsequent possibilities.

Please note that anything in transition B would mean it is not a single failure, as it requires transition A. So before jumping to simplistic conclusions, bear that in mind.

Also note that B1 – 9 is a collection of what may have happened and what may have caused entry to phase 3 (different rules apply to phase 3). Any causes cited in phase 3 cannot be used as root cause, as it is “subsequent cause arising from the occurence of previous causes”.

I do hope that reading this, one would realize that anything is possible for transition B.  So, if we want to discuss what may have caused transition A to happen, we will be discussing probable causes… which if we catalogue it.

O.1. Excessive Icing: This is possible and explains A1 and A2, and subsequently possibly explain several items in transition B. Icing is also hard to pick up on radar (if not impossible).

O.2. Radar insensitivity: No failure information was sent by the ACARS, however, manipulation of gain control do pose a risk of the colors produced in the displays depicting water precipitation no longer representative of the normal calibrated values.

Radar attenuation in areas of heavy precipitation (where water sticks to the radome surface) is known to have resulted in poor ability for radar to detect clouds. The same applies for extremely dense precipitation may result in radar waves not reflecting back to the antennae but is instead “absorbed”, resulting in no radar return for that particular location. This possibility can lead to O.1. above.

O.3. Lightning strike. Some may ask why this is again listed here. A lightning strike on the radome can cause damage not apparent to the ear (subtle increase in aerodynamic noise) or eyes. The damage, can lead to O.2, however this is deemed unlikely because of the lack in (voice/crew) communication.

If I am to bet… my bets will be: O.1/O.2, A.2. and B.5. leading to B.7.

*** DISCLAIMER:  ABOVE IS PERSONAL OPINION/THEORY/CONJECTURE ***

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I do wonder though, why does this problem with the Pitot tubes only happen to Air Caraibes and Air France.

I see the Qantas A330 whilst being similar, is different.

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I wonder who else have the same Pitot-static, ISIS, ADIRU set up (in terms of… “they got the same components”) as AF and whether AF and Air Caraibes have the same set up.

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The pitot tubes must have been certified to the required specs… otherwise they shouldn’t be on the planes in the first place. The old and new Thales probes would have passed the certification as they did end up on planes carrying paying passengers. If they degrade in time, the lifetime of the tubes should have been included on the specs, but they wouldn’t fail together for no other apparent reason.

Unfortunately, regulations that is used as standard settings by various countries, are based on those made for countries which don’t have the excessive precipitations that happens from time to time in tropical regions. Manufacturers overbuilt components partly for that reason… but how overbuilt are they can be quantified, the problem is, freak conditions rarely do… they’re rarely defined as freaky and excessive enough to require a research.

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There is another problem that I’ve noticed in the forums regarding this matter. It seems that the aviation community is slow to pick up on these things. I’ve read time and time again, pilots saying that “severe icing cannot happen at X temperature” or “severe icing cannot happen at altitude X”…

We learn something new everyday in aviation, the question is whether those up on the hierarchy openly embrace this or not… (I have had several heated exchanges with those types whose mindsets are literally “boxed in”).

Several cases in the past regarding excessive precipitation have been dismissed by the industry’s majority as “a freak occurence”… One 737-300 ditched in a river because of it (despite a previous no-engine landing because of the same thing years earlier)…

There were calls to have another look at water ingestion required standards… not sure if they’ve been modified since, but I remember the industry initially saying it was a freak occurence and that the crew made an error.

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Other Misc Comments/Chatter Down South

The United States has also cooperated in the search, since “someone”, is not known whether or Tupinambá Gaul; asked the Pentagon … to move the Earth observation satellite to help find the Air Force aircraft. **NOTE:  Assume this should be Air France aircraft mistranslation**

The commentator Sergio Rodrigues cites a trafficker of arms on board…

The relatives of the passengers are “isolated” in a hotel and can only speak when the company permits.

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Moving Sidewalk

Paris Moving Sidewalk

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