Eurocockpit – ACAR Msgs – Weather Chatter – Lenta News
publié le 19 juin 2009 à 07:04 par EuroCockpit.
AF447: analysis confirms ACARS messages (English Translation)
Following the EuroCockpit article published June 17, we received letters which shows abundantly [clear] that even if the debate is highly technical, many of our readers are interested in ACARS messages. But as everyone knows, the ACARS messages in question since the day of the accident were never broadcast. Only a [main line code vs sub-code lines] list of these messages (in different versions) has been distributed to the press – France2 in log 20h of June 4.
Without entering into details, in simplified terms, it should be noted that the ACARS message travels from the aircraft to [Air France] the company, or by VHF radio (when the aircraft is in an area where a contact can be established by datalink) or when SATCOM VHF contact is not possible (the scope of the VHF is the so-called “line-of-sight,” which is by definition quite limited: 1.23 x root of the height for those who would recall).
We should not rely on the BEA to have full knowledge of the ACARS messages. According to our information, “official version” of the tragedy is being developed (Announced watermark on the pages “opinions” of the world) and says essentially that: “the aircraft entered a storm”. In this case, the pilots are not only responsible for the path that leads into the storm cell, but they are doubly [responsible] for having lost control of the daircraft. A version that would fix everybody, but will not be easy to impose as the facts point to other causes.
Since [BEA] will not show the messages, we find the thought of FLR (Real Time Fault) up the chain of transmission. After all, why try to Roissy Bourget or information which has been around the world when it was sent by the plane?
To confirm, we have found the right documents, we show by example [below] that the aircraft left in technical tolerance following an exchange of RMP (control box radios), and departed with the INOP RMP3, this which is also perfectly consistent with the MEL.
To close the previous article, we can say today, in light of all the messages of misconduct, the origins of failure. For example:
- 34 2200 – ISIS (22FN-10FC) MACH SPEED OR FUNCTION (Source ISIS HARD Class 1) shows that-as we had announced reason to expect a wind problem.
- Regarding ATA213100 we can now confirm that this is an ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED, which concerns the vertical velocity of the cabin. It is possible to climb this message if the pressure differential (DeltaP) is high, or down if the break-up occurred at low altitude and with a negative pressure differential.
- As in the case of Air Caribbean, we find the WNG FLT REAC AUTO W / SDET FAULT. This discovery shows how the two situations are comparable, and we will come back.
- There are two messages: FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT et FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT on which we will return.
- And a FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV then FLAG ON FO PFD FPV (FPV Flight Path Vector =) which we will also.
Most importantly, there are of course the first mistake which has been discussed since it means … Pitot tubes!
By observing the following message:
Source EFCS2 Class : 1 HARD
Identifiers : EFCS1,AFS
341115 – PROBE-PITOT 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 (9DA)
Le TSM (Trouble Shooting Manual) used two days ago said
34-11-15 EFCS2 :
Disagree of the Pitot Probe Data in the FCPCs
1. Possible Causes
- pitot probe
2. Job Set-up Information
- A. Referenced Information
- AMM 34-11-15-000-801 Removal of the Pitot Probe (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)
- AMM 34-11-15-200-801 Inspection/Check of the Pitot Probe (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)
- AMM 34-11-15-400-801 Installation of the Pitot Probe (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)
3. Fault Confirmation
- A. Test
- (1)Not applicable, you cannot confirm this fault on the ground.
4. Fault Isolation
- A. If the crew made a report that the F/CTL ALTN LAW or F/CTL DIRECT LAW warning was shown on the EWD for some seconds only:
- – no trouble shooting is necessary.
- B. If the F/CTL ALTN LAW or F/CTL DIRECT LAW warning is shown and stays on during the flight:
- (1)Do the inspection of the pitot probe (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)
AMM TASK 34-11-15-200-801
- replace the defective pitot probe (9DA1 or 9DA2 or 9DA3)
AMM TASK 34-11-15-000-801 and AMM TASK 34-11-15-400-801
- (1)Do the inspection of the pitot probe (9DA1, 9DA2, 9DA3)
We have ample time and opportunity to review the content of ACARS messages. In the meantime, he’ll have a lot of ink and verve in the pages “Opinions” to get the world to convince, in view of the foregoing and following that do not delay, the aircraft is simply “entered a storm, “and then nothing.
Vous savez : “cet orage”… You know: “this storm” …
AF447: the number and extent of outages can be estimated (English Translation)
publié le 17 juin 2009 à 21:12 par EuroCockpit.
ACARS messages allegedly received by Air France are currently the only source of analysis of potential events that occurred before the disappearance of the aircraft. Even if it does not prejudge the causes of the disaster, it should be noted that the BEA seemed to get excited of “rumors” circulating around the pitot tubes.
In fact, the flexibility of the BEA is quite limited. The fact that the headers ACARS messages circulating on the Web allows people whose job it is to have every day an accurate reading of their potential significance. In addition, each company was able to compare the messages received in previous incidents in the probes, with the sequence assigned to the flight AF447. It does tell you for now …
It is possible to anticipate a little and look that might contain the famous ACARS messages regarding the flight AF447.
So by examining the headers only, and using a TSM (Trouble Shooting Manual) A330 that can partially restore what he could find from the contents of each message, starting from the first ” REAL TIME FAULT (FLR):
- 34 11 15 EFCS2 : indicates that the TSM is available PITOT PROBE-1 +2 / 2 +3 / 1 +3 (we see the letter P after the number of commas separating the IDs and the legend of the message) which causes the appearance of real time warning (WRN) “F / CTL ALTN LAW. The first failure is reported thus associated with Pitot tubes, as we maintain.
- 27 93 34 EFCS1 : The TSM stated that we should find FCPC1 or FCPC2 with a multitude of possibilities (the message is truncated after EFCS2X, it was the first two letters after the series CF commas)
- 34 22 00 ISIS : indicates that the TSM should read the ISIS (22FN-10FC) ALTITUDE FUNCTION or ISIS (22FN-10FC) ATTITUDE FUNCTION or ISIS (22FN-10FC) MACH SPEED OR FUNCTION. Again the message is truncated, we can not say which of these three possibilities is detected, although it can have a very clear idea on the subject …
- 34 12 34 IR2 : the TSM indicates ADIRU1 (1FP1) / ADIRU2 (1FP2) or ADIRU2 (1FP2) or ADIRU2 (1FP2) / ADR BUS 1 or ADIRU3 (1FP3) / ADIRU2 (1FP2). Again, the message is truncated, we can not say which of these 4 sub-systems is concerned.
- 22 83 34 AFS : in this case, we know that the problem is about FMGEC1 (1CA1). But not knowing what is stated after (1CA1), and also the failure of FMGEC1 himself, the MSM tells us that there are 38 other possibilities for the inoperative FMGEC1 for this code and this class of fault.
According to those we consulted, it is likely that the data transmitted by the Pitot tube and / or their respective pipelines have led to the failure of the EFCS2. It is likely that ISIS has been a failure of relevant information erroneous airspeed. What seems surprising is the FLR from the IR2 which is normally not affected by barometric information, since it is an inertial laser gyro and does not depend on the Air Data Reference (ADR) .. The warning “ADR disagree” is logical, since there are probably not match data in ADR ADIRU 3.
The warning following are logical because the systems are affected by information from the pitot tubes:
- F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
- AUTO FLT A/THR FAULT
- AUTO FLT
- AUTO FLT A/P OFF
- PRIM1 SEC1
There remains some doubt about the message ADVISORY ATA 21 31 00 because according to the TSM may be published either as an event linked to CABIN VERTICAL SPEED, but CABIN ALTITUDE or CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.
A tentative conclusion is required: if the rumor and speculation around indispose Pitot probes as the BEA, why not publish the full ACARS messages to stop it? Reading them would just put the Pitot finally exonerated and accredit probably the last official event date, brilliantly described in Le Monde by Gérard Feldzer which sold a little bit too early: it is a storm … A major storm. And “it” is entered in it.
NOTE: We ask all our friends in the art of all airlines that operate 330 and 340 to continue to give us their views on the ACARS messages. If other operators could also confirm the sequence ACARS they were at fault Pitot, this would allow us to compare with data from the flight AF447. Of course, as we have been doing for 10 years now, we guarantee anonymity and protection of our sources. Utiliser l’adresse firstname.lastname@example.org.
ON-LINE AVIATION CHATTER /
MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS
You never know what you may hear on the radio! Below are the most recent on-line weather / aviation chatter and message board discussions. Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).
Comment/Question: Therefore, the big blamed “weather” “lightning” and “pitot tubes icing” were all discharged. Pitot tubes icing (3 units) was almost completely discharged because after several works, and based on the information on the FDR/CVR and radar contacts it was not found any evidence of speed discrepancies and hence icing of the pitot tubes.
The thing is, the DC-9 didn’t have a CMC that interlined with ACARS that would send a blocked toilet or a minor glitch back to MX center… The thing is here, we have a little bit of data. We can only determine if one theory is likely or unlikely… we cannot rule things out (again, except for the aircraft being taken in by an alien spacecraft… coz then we wouldn’t find pieces of it would we? We can rule that one out for sure!). The data does point towards icing of the pitot tubes…
Same with the investigators, they work on the data in hand… and in cases of FDR data not available yet, they’ll work on what they have pending the data. Some of us, are working on the same principles… knowing that, the FDR and CVR data can change everything. But until then, we work with what we have. Again, FDR and CVR data cannot guarantee a solid conclusion either… how many disputes have there been on the case of 587? (interestingly, it too dived to the ground, very rapidly, and got swallowed up by the swamp after making a horrible impact).
Comment/Question: Therefore, bad weather did not brake it away; nor broke away while plunging to the earth.
Again, my speculative theories aside, we do NOT have any evidence proving that it didn’t break away before water impact or it did breakaway before water impact.
We can only determine the likelihood of each… again, cannot rule the other out. The problem with the aircraft breakup, the so called “transition B” and start of “phase 3”, has very little data to go on… so anything goes after 0214.
Comment/Question: Is it possible that AF447 flew into turbulence that was beyond design limits and just broke up? You know, forget pitot icing, Vne, coffin corner etc…
Yes, there’s always a possibility that we’ve missed out on something in the ACARS messages… the thing is… did we????
As I said before, there’s nothing preventing the aircraft entering the mother of all turbulences after 0214… and there’s an open chance it could happen between 0210 and 0214… but before 0210… unlikely but cannot be ruled out.
Comment/Question: If we have the technology to send automatic UHF signals to a home base regarding projected maintenance issues, then we potentially have the technology to send pilots flying in remote areas much more vital, very detailed and timely weather information gathered by satellites, etc., do we not? Are we headed in that direction, or is the industry (and the pilots) content with the status quo regarding the availability of wx info to pilots?
You are basically talking about the difference between a twitter type message and sending an MMS, the networks and hardware are just not up to it.
I do get SIGMET, TAFs, METARS. ASHTAMS (volcano reports) etc in flight, but no pictures, and I fail to see how the would be much good.
When cells are isolated, it is very easy to visually (even at night) to navigate around them. The Wx radar and wind direction on the ND is an aid in the decision making process.
Through the ITCZ it is common for cells to be “embedded”, that is, you cannot see them out the window as the aircraft is in a constant layer of cloud. the Wx radar is the main method used for avoidance. Training and experience will enable one to effectively to adjust the radar tilt and gain, and know how to build a mental model of what is infront.
Most flights I do are in the tropics for some part, and this Wx avoidance is now second nature. It is not unusual for other airlines to follow the path our pilots take as it is reasonably well know we do so much of it. At times I have observed other airlines on TCAS go where I would have avoided by 20-40 nm. Techniques and exposure to conditions seem to vary significantly between airlines depending on what the “bread and butter” flying is.
Effective Wx avoidance is a “skill”, not something one can learn from reading a book, not everyone knows how to process the information that is available. I try and aim to do each flight without putting the seat belt sign on, if that means 50 nm off track, that is what it takes, if it is unavoidable, sit people down early enough so that everyone is seated, and the cabin crew have checked everyone is strapped in.
Wx radars are getting better, automatic vertical profiling is what manufacturers install on new models these days.
Lenta News -пятница, 19.06.2009, 18:56:00 (English Translation)(Emphasis mine)
The mystery of flight AF447 Alexei Demyanov
All this to say about the vast rejection of all systems and pointed out according to some experts, that Airbus collapsed into pieces still in the air. The French Le Monde article is reprinted edition of the authoritative Brazilian Estado de Sao Paulo, which published a partial decoding of the latest messages from the A330, allegedly received from a source close to the investigation of the disaster.
It can be concluded that the flight AF447 died for four minutes, and maybe, even less: according to some sources, the last message may have come at a time when the wreckage A330 dropped to the bottom.
Because of what appeared vast rejection of all systems, can only guess. It is possible that an explosion occurred on board. The Spanish newspaper El Mundo published an interview with a commander of flight crew 974 Lima – Madrid airline Air Comet.
His plane was flying near the A330 route at a time when Airbus Air France disappeared from the radar screen. The pilot said he saw a strong white flash, which then became a slide in a downward trajectory and fell six seconds. Outbreak seen as assistant pilot and passenger flight.
…now the representatives of France and Brazil does not exclude [terrorism] it 100 per cent.
maybe more excitement generated of newer version linked to possible equipment malfunction or crew error. Representatives of Air France said that the plane was flying unusually low speed, which ultimately could lead to stall and fall.
Presumably, having got into a zone of high turbulence, the crew dropped the speed and as a result of lost control. The airline in this situation, issued a warning to all its pilots did not slow down while passing the zone of turbulence.
This hasty move has caused mild surprise the experts and led them to suggest that Air France knows far more than said, and that the speed reduction could be due not so much the actions of the crew, but the technical problems of aircraft.
According to Le Figaro, decoding of the latest messages showed that the three measuring dynamic pressure, the so-called Pito tubes that are installed on Airbus, sent to a central computer various indications.
According to the tubes Pito experts judged on the speed of the liner, and in this case, variation of up to 50 kilometers per hour. As a result, the computer switched off the autopilot, and probably not in time: the pilots were unable to manage themselves, to improve the aircraft.
The reason why the tube Pito “svihnulis” could become a glaciation. In convergence zone – the so-called “blackhole”, where warm air from the ocean surface rises sharply up and cools down, turning into the dense cumulonimbus clouds – the plane could ice for a few seconds.
Of course, Pito tubes were equipped with special heating system that protects them from freezing. However, it turned out, despite that in the past they have had failures.
According to Le Figaro, in 1995, Pito tubes at Airbus has repeatedly froze, causing interruptions in the work from becoming airborne equipment and violation of speed: a sharp increase in the speed, deceleration, or vice versa, leading to dumping. In September 2007, Airbus recommended that all airlines using the machine A320, A330 and A340, to replace the meters are installed on the dynamic pressure on the more modern.
Explosion or pitot tubes? Unknown. All these versions can just as easily fall away, like the version of the lightning, which offered hot pursuit. It is hoped that the “black boxes” in the Atlantic are still found. And we wait.
Предыдущие материалы по теме (Previous material on the topic)
Поиски и версии [02.06.2009]
На поверхности Атлантики найдены обломки исчезнувшего аэробуса Air France
Как в воду канул [01.06.2009]
Над Атлантикой пропал пассажирский самолет Air France
Ссылки по теме
- Air France : les sondes de vitesse creent la polemique – Le Figaro, 09.06.2009
- Les capteurs de vitesse des avions sur la sellette – Le Figaro, 08.06.2009
- Vol AF 447 : le stabilisateur recupere – Europe 1, 06.06.2009
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