Internet Hoax – ACARS – Concord Investigation Review

On Monday I warned of the many hoaxes out there on the Internet.  My post, Russians Solve AF Flight 447 Mystery – A Link With “Another World” contained the TV series “Lost” video clearly showing the pictures from the Ukraine News Agency that were alleged to have been taken from baggage aboard Flight 447.

LB_A330-1 I have now noticed a few on-line professional aviation message boards posting these hoaxes and even saying something like: “the pictures were taken when there was lighting”.  Ok, sure!  Just because you see it on the internet does not mean it is true!

I have also included below in this post the notes on the Concord investigation since we have the same BEA investigators involved with the Flight 447 investigation.

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ACARS AF447 DATA COMPARED TO ACARS A330 (VH-QPA)

If we compare the existing ACARS AF447 data with 7 October 2008 ACARS Messages with the Australian Airbus A330-303 (VH-QPA), there area lot of matches including the sequence of failures and the systems themselves.

The only difference was that the Australians were during the day and in the absence of turbulence.

What has not prevented them poimet-0.8g (with a limit-1.0g (for the clean wing))

Table 3: Occurrence flight sequence of events

Time (UTC) Time relative to event:

01:32:02 -03:10:23 Takeoff at Singapore

02:01:16 -02:41:09 Aircraft reached top of climb (37,000 ft or FL370)

04:40:28 -00:01:57 Autopilot 1 disconnect (involuntary)

04:40:28 -00:01:57 First master warning was recorded. Warnings occurred during the remainder of the flight.

04:40:29 -00:01:56 First master caution was recorded. ‘Cautions occurred during the remainder of the flight.

04:40:31 -00:01:54 IR 1 Fail indication commenced (duration: remainder of the flight)

04:40:34 -00:01:51 First angle-of-attack (AOA) spike for the captain’s Left) AOA parameter – the spike value was +50.6 degrees. AOA spikes continued for the remainder the flight.

04:40:41 -00:01:44 First ADR 1 Fail indication (duration: less than 4 seconds)

04:40:50 -00:01:35 First stall warning (duration: less than one second)

04:40:54 -00:01:31 First overspeed warning (duration: less than one second

04:41:12 -00:01:13 Autopilot 2 engaged

04:41:14 -00:01:11 Aircraft reached 37,180 ft and began to descend to 37,000 ft

04:41:28 -00:00:57 Autopilot 2 disconnected

04:42:27 0:00:00 First pitch-down event commenced

04:42:28 0:00:01 Captain applied back pressure to the sidestick

04:42:28 0:00:01 A maximum nose-down elevator position of +10.3 was recorded

04:42:29 0:00:01 A minimum vertical acceleration of -0.80 g was recorded

04:42:29 0:00:04 A minimum pitch angle of -8.4 degrees was recorded

04:42:30 0:00:05 PRIM master changed from PRIM 1 to PRIM 2

04:42:31 0:00:05 A maximum vertical acceleration of +1.56 g was recorded

04:42:31 0:00:06 PRIM 3 Fault (duration: 120 seconds)

04:43:45 0:01:20 Captain switched his IR source from IR 1 to IR 3

04:45:08 0:02:43 Second pitch-down event commenced

04:45:09 0:02:44 Captain applied back pressure to the sidestick

04:45:10 0:02:45 PRIM master changed from PRIM 2 to PRIM 1

04:45:11 0:02:46 A maximum nose-down elevator position of +5.4 degrees was recorded

04:45:11 0:02:46 PRIM 3 Fault (duration: remainder of the flight)

04:45:11 0:02:46 Flight controls’ ‘normal law’ changed to ‘alternate law’ (duration: remainder of the flight)

04:45:12 0:02:47 A minimum vertical acceleration of +0.20 g was recorded

04:45:12 0:02:47 A minimum pitch angle of -3.5 degrees was recorded

04:45:13 0:02:48 A maximum vertical acceleration of +1.54 g was recorded

04:47:25 0:05:00 Autothrust disengaged

04:49:05 0:06:40 A radio transmission commenced. Correlation with the CVR showed that this was the PAN transmission.

04:54:24 0:11:59 radio transmission commenced. Correlation with the CVR showed that this was the Mayday transmission.

05:32:08 0:49:43 Aircraft touched down at Learmonth

05:42:12 1:02:47 Aircraft stopped at terminal

05:50:32 1:08:07 Power removed from FDR

Full report: http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/AAIR/pdf/AO2008070_interim.pdf

Other Source:  Lenta News

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New ACARS LINKS

Code Listing fault codes ACARS is for mechanics.

ACARS database search

Translated Page

http://64.233.187.132/translate_c?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.acarsd.org/acars_search.html&prev=hp&rurl=translate.google.com&usg=ALkJrhhJBHi59_Cw7eejhYudC0l0KpigKA

acarsd – ACARS Decoder for Linux and Windows

ABM option ACARS specific side of F-GZCP. It seems everything there was OK with the translation of the coordinates:

ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332] ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332]
Message label: B0 Block id: 2 Msg no: J29A Message label: B0 Block id: 2 Msg no: J29A
Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG] [Air France] Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG] [Air France]
Message content:- Message content: —
/KZWY.AFN/FMHAFR031,.F-GZCP,,045907/FPON38124W078339,1/FCOADS,01/FCOATC,01E36F / KZWY.AFN/FMHAFR031,. F-GZCP,, 045907/FPON38124W078339, 1/FCOADS, 01/FCOATC, 01E36F
——————————-[ 12/05/2009 06:59 ]- ———————— FPON38124W078339?—————————-

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Note: The below posting is translated from a foreign message board and is odd to me. Need ACARS expertise explaining the references to the toilet messages.

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Nevertheless, the first message after the toilet at 22:45 this post off autopilot

22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447 22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447
38 31/06 FLR FR0905312245 38310006VSC X2,,,,,,,LAV CONF 09-05-31 AF 447 38 31/06 FLR FR0905312245 38310006VSC X2 ,,,,,,, LAV CONF 09-05-31 AF 447

Bottom came first. Do not judge for errors in spelling, copy the text manually.  And remember, was a signal of problems with the toilet. Here you are, match the most important. I also think that this should start the investigation.

***Speculative Posting – Not Confirmed***

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June302008Concorde001

Do You Know Where GBOAD is Currently Located?

***Concord Investigation Report***

achead

Immediately after the accident on 25 July 2000, two teams of the BEA have made, one in Paris Charles de Gaulle, the other on the site of Gonesse, where, in coordination with the police aviation, they have to preliminary findings and research. Simultaneously, Alain Bouillard, principal investigator, was responsible for the technical investigation. As qu’enquêteur designated (according to ICAO), he provided the organization, conduct and control. He formed seven working groups

To attend the BEA’s work, Jean-Claude Gayssot, Minister of Equipment, Transport and Housing has appointed a Commission of Inquiry on 26 July 2000. This committee, composed of personalities known for their skills and chaired by Alain Monnier, head of the Inspectorate General of Civil Aviation and Meteorology, met eleven times. She advised the investigators on the work and direction of the investigation and contributed to the drafting and approval of reports. It held its last meeting on 19 December 2001.

Over the years, common rules to organize the investigation of accidents and incidents in aviation have been adopted by most countries, under the auspices of the Organization of International Civil Aviation (ICAO). These provisions are in Appendix 13 to the Chicago Convention, entitled “Investigation of accidents and incidents in aviation.” In this context, States are obliged to open an investigation technique in case of accident or serious incident of civil aviation in their territory and to involve the states which are responsible for the operator and the manufacturer of the aircraft. A European directive of 21 November 1994 (94/56/EC) and the Act of 29 March 1999 has clarified the application of these provisions as regards France.

It should be noted that the technical investigation has the sole purpose of preventing future accidents. To do this, it seeks to identify and understand the circumstances of an event, to identify causes and to infer lessons from security, without taking in any way to blame or liabilities. Its action is distinct from the approach that can drive their own judicial authorities.

The investigation may lead the department responsible for the technical investigation to issue safety recommendations, they are proposed actions considered relevant to aviation safety based on the findings of investigators, and which, as stated in the European Directive 94/56/EC, does not constitute a presumption of blame or liability.

A decree of 8 November 2001 confirmed that the BEA which, in France, the burden of conducting investigations. The Minister of Transport may appoint a Commission of Inquiry a dozen members to attend the BEA in its investigation (this was the case for the accident of the Concorde). The BEA also participates in investigations abroad on events relating to a device operating in English or a design or construction in France. It can provide technical assistance to foreign investigative services if they so wish.

The survey concludes with a report. This report is public. For public transportation accidents, presentation adopts an international level, defined in Annex 13, which revolves around four parts clearly identified: factual information, analysis, conclusions and safety recommendations. In some cases, a preliminary report or reports may be published before the end of the investigation.

The survey concludes with a report. This report is public. For public transportation accidents, presentation adopts an international level, defined in Annex 13, which revolves around four parts clearly identified: factual information, analysis, conclusions and safety recommendations. In some cases, a preliminary report or reports may be published before the end of the investigation.

The BEA itself has appeared between 1946 and 1948 within the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in March 1951 he was attached to the Inspection Générale de l’Aviation Civile. A decree of 20 June 1962 has set the organization and powers.

In the context of structural changes brought by the Law 99-243 of 29 March 1999 relating to investigations of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, the Decree of 8 November 2001 defined the new organization and clarified the powers of BEA. While confirming the initials BEA, world famous, this decree has changed its name from accident investigations bureau in the office of investigations and analysis for the Safety of Civil Aviation. Its director is appointed for a term of seven years.

The BEA is located on the site of the Le Bourget airfield, where he currently has 3 000 m² of offices, work room and laboratories. It also at the aerodrome of Melun and Bonneuil 7 000 square meters of workshops, sheds and a safe space for processing and storage of wrecks.

The BEA currently comprises 85 people including 35 investigators, 11 investigators and assistants a physician investigator. In 2000, in addition to the investigation into the crash of the Concorde, the BEA has handled 312 accidents in France, including 13 in public transport, and has about 71 accidents abroad, especially Guatemala, Côte d’Ivoire and Bahrain. One hundred and eight reports were published. This activity continued into 2001, particularly in France with the crash of a Twin Otter at St.

In addition, the BEA published a study on collisions and a study on the failure of gasoline in general aviation, and the balance of accidents gliding occurred in 1999 and 2000 to foreign pilots.

The report and complete factual information already published in the preliminary report published on 30 August 2000, the first report published on 15 December 2000 and the second report issued on 23 July 2001.

In particular, the work and trials have provided information regarding the process of rupture of the shell 5, the possible causes of inflammation of the flight and trajectory of the airplane at takeoff.

Some procedures from the Concorde flight manuals and operating manual Air France for the control of the aircraft (procedure or fire damage reactor) and to analyze the actions of the crew, were also incorporated into this document.

The report also includes a detailed analysis of the circumstances and causes of the accident, conclusions and recommendations of BEA after a year and a half of investigation.

The analysis begins with a detailed chronological review of the accident scenario, and then focuses on the actions of the crew, the sequence leading to inflammation of the leak, monitoring leads, and operating conditions of maintenance of Concorde Air France, Continental Airlines maintenance, followed by the airworthiness of the Concorde. It also examines two difficulties encountered during the investigation, the limitations of flight recorders and the risks associated with the presence of asbestos in a wreck.

Here are some excerpts from the analysis, followed by the full conclusions and recommendations:

The crew had no means at his disposal to become fully aware of the reality of the situation. He reacts instinctively to the perception of an unknown situation of exceptional severity estimated that through his feelings. Whenever the situation allowed it, he applied, in a professional, established procedures.

Rupture of the shell 5 was caused by a mechanism that had never been encountered on the aircraft before the accident. However, the work has identified the general scenario of the breakdown which combines the deformation of the bottom of the tank under the shock of a large piece of tire and the effect of convection related to the displacement of fuel produced by this deformation.

Given the chronology of events, only the assumptions of ignition by an electric arc or hot parts of the engine were selected for the accident.

Excerpts from final report

CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

The aircraft had a valid airworthiness certificate.

the Air France ensures that emergency procedures for the use of its Concorde operations manual are in accordance with the AFM.

Recording every four seconds of the engine parameters to determine the engine speed has slowed and complicated to some key technical investigation. This feature is also likely to hide certain facts during the examination of incidents in which it would not be possible to devote as much time and effort than the accident of July 25 2000. Unlike the Air France Concorde on the day of the accident, the British Airways aircraft are equipped with systems to record at least every second recording parameters of the four engines. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

Air France Concorde had its team of systems of records that can be sampled at least every second parameters in order to determine the type of all engines. –

The technical investigation has revealed various malfunctions in the operation of the aircraft, such as the use of certain data not updated in the initial phase of preparing the flights, the lack of archiving of certain documents or incomplete management of luggage. Similarly, the omission of the intermediate bogie of the left is the consequence of non-compliance with established procedures and not using appropriate equipment. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

Testing and research conducted as part of the investigation confirmed the fragility of the tires against foreign aggression and the inadequacy of the tests made in the context of certification. Recent examples on other aircraft as the Concorde showed that the bursting of tires could be the cause of damage. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

The investigation showed that a shock or perforation could cause damage to a reservoir through a process of transmitting energy from the projectile. Such indirect process, although known, are complex phenomena that have never been identified so far on civilian aircraft. Similarly, inflammation of the leak of kerosene, the possible increase of the flame, and hanging its stabilization were made through complex phenomena, which are far from fully understood. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

4.3.5 The technical investigation has once again highlighted the difficulty in identifying and analyzing certain actions of the crew, some selectors noise and visual alarms. On several occasions, the BEA or its foreign counterparts have recommended the installation of video recorders inside the cockpit. This point was discussed in September 1999 to ICAO at the meeting at the Divisional Investigation and Prevention of Accidents “(99 AIG) and the meeting had formulated Recommendation 1.2 / 4” video recordings in the cockpit “to refer proposals to the Panel of flight recorders (FLIRECP). Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

ICAO sets a clear timetable FLIRECP Group for the preparation of proposals on the implementation of video recorders on board appareilseffectuant public transport passengers. –

The investigation showed that the cabin crew had certainly seen significant changes in its environment. It is therefore possible that communications between PNC or attempts to communicate with the cockpit took place. However, trade in the PNC are not registered and the receipt posted announcements cab was stopped at time 14 h 14 min. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

ICAO is studying how a specific record of trade within the crew cabin and exchanges between the cockpit and cabin. —

4.3.7 The investigation revealed that the crew had probably never been aware of the origin of the fire or its magnitude. A comparable situation occurs frequently in accidents involving damage to the aircraft structure. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

DGAC, in conjunction with other competent authorities, to study the possibilitéd’installation displays parts of the structure hidden from sight of the crew or detection of damage to these parts of the aircraft. –

4.3.8 The investigation showed that the lateral acceleration experienced by the crew of the Concorde as a result of pumping engines 1 and 2 was different from the values recorded at the center of gravity of the plane, values that reproduce the flight simulators . However, the fidelity of the simulation is an important element of quality training. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

DGAC, in conjunction with other competent authorities are examining the possibility of changing regulatory requirements for future flight simulators to be more representative of the actual accelerations experienced in the cockpit.

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June302008Concorde002

(GBOAD) was given to the USS Intrepid Museum New York, however was moved to Floyd Bennett Field!

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Related Links:

BEA ACCIDENT REPORTS

Wikipedia – Concorde

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