Russia Today – 1st Flt 447 Burial – FAB Nota 40 & 41 – Latest Chatter
The bodies of Captain DuBois and a steward of Air France AF447 have been identified according to Air France-KLM Group in a statement on their Web site. So the question still remains – Was Captain DuBois in the cockpit and who made the “forte turbulence” radio call?
BEA is not scheduled to provide an update until July 2, 2009, which will be after the estimated 30 days that the “block boxes” batteries’ transmit a signal? The French government still has not discounted terrorism, the Brazilian Press seems to think there was an explosion, and now, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency Director General says we cannot completely rule this out. Seems odd to be making such a statement from a state intelligence agency? Too many questions and no answers to the mystery of Air France Flight 447.
Russia & CIS Military Newswire – IRKUTSK June 24, 2009 Wednesday 11:41 AM MSK
Brazilian special services do not rule out terrorism behind Flight 447 crash
Brazilian special services have not completely ruled out the possibility that Air France’s Airbus A330 crash over the Atlantic in early June this year could have been a terrorist attack.
“We are exploring all possible theories behind the plane crash. At the present time, we do not have signs confirming the possibility of a terrorist attack on board the plane. However, we cannot completely reject the possibility of a terrorist attack,” said Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) Director General Wilson Roberto Trezza.
Brazilian special services and law enforcement agencies are thoroughly examining the circumstances of the plane crash, and special services from a lot of countries investigating the accident are consulting them, Trezza told journalists in Irkutsk.
Trezza is taking part in an international conference of heads of special services, security bodies, and law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)’s partner-states in Irkutsk.
Related 2nd Confirmation (Finchannel) Brazil views terrorism as possible cause of Air France crash
Russia Today 25 June, 2009, 02:34
Security services from nearly 60 countries met in the Russian city of Irkutsk to discuss ways of strengthening anti-terrorism cooperation and creating an effective system of information exchange.
America’s FBI, Israel’s Mossad and Germany’s BND were just a few of the agencies that turned up in Irkutsk to discuss the problems of countering international terrorism
“One of the most important techniques and methods we have to prevent terrorist attacks is of course getting the right intelligence, and since terrorist groups work across borders, we have to have mechanisms which enable countries to share intelligence,” said Mike Smith, executive director of the UN counter-terrorism executive directorate.
Russia has not been immune to terrorism. In the last two months alone there has been a string of attacks in the Caucasus region. And, of course, there was the recent assassination attempt against the president of the country’s southern Republic of Ingushetia.
“Combating terrorism on one’s own is possible but very difficult, especially when we are talking about mercenaries, terrorists who migrate all over the world,” said Aleksandr Bortnikov, director of Russia’s Federal Security Service. “There are foreign mercenaries in the territory of North Caucasus. Of course, having comprehensive intelligence is only possible when there is exchange of information among partners involved.”
The idea for this unusual annual gathering was first raised by the Russian Federal Security Agency eight years ago, and Russia has hosted the annual event ever since.
This time, several new members decided to join the club. Among them are India, still reeling after the attacks in Mumbai, and Brazil, which decided not to wait for terrorists to knock on its door.
“Although Brazil does not suffer from terror acts, we want to express full solidarity with countries that have been hit by terrorists,” said Wilson Roberto Trezza, head of Brazil’s intelligence agency. “Brazil wants to help fight terrorism on the regional and international levels.”
The security services attending this year’s meeting noted that they have managed to move beyond words, and have established joint anti-terrorism programs. Two of the most important examples are the creation of a single international database on terrorist organizations and the adoption of an agreement on conducting joint operations.
The latest developments show that terrorism remains the top international security problem, and such annual meetings are a unique opportunity for the security services to synchronize their efforts.
Participants said that previous meetings helped prevent more terrorist acts from being committed, and that is now vital to broaden cooperation on counter-terrorism even further.
DANIELA FERNANDES da BBC Brasil, em Paris 25/06/2009 – 09h17 (English Translated)
The note, only two paragraphs, does not provide the names of two victims. According to French press agencies, the pilot would be Marc Dubois, 58 years. According to Air France, the pilot of the Airbus 330 had 11 thousand hours of flight. Of these, according to Air France, 1.7 thousand had been accumulated in Airbus A330 and A340. According to Jean Serrat, president of the association of pilots PNT 65 which supports the possibility that pilots work beyond the legal limit of 60 years set by law French, Dubois was two years of retirement and was a member of the association.
Serrat, who met Dubois in 1988, told Newsnight he had become pilots for long distance flights in 2005 and began flying the Airbus 330 model in 2007. Also according Serrat, the captain lived on the outskirts of Paris and began his career in the airline Air Inter, a subsidiary of Air France that was subsequently incorporated into a merger. ‘What Marc Dubois most liked to do, above all, was flying aircraft. For him, flying a plane was not working, “he said Serrat.
The BEA, French body that investigates the causes of the accident, reported in this Thursday, to make the first preliminary report on the accident on July 2.
Engineer victim of the accident to Airbus is buried in Barra Mansa.
The body of the engineer and manager of quality of the French multinational Saint-Gobain pipes, Luiz Cláudio Monlevade, 48, one of the occupants of the Air France Airbus was buried around 16h of Tuesday in municipal cemetery of Barra Mansa, in the south the State of Rio The plane crashed in the Atlantic Ocean on May 31.
Family and friends of the engineer carry the body in a sealed coffin at the funeral. The engineer was one of 11 bodies of the occupants identified by Airbus IML (Instituto Médico Legal) to Recife (PE). Monlevade was married with two children. Relatives said the victim’s body was embalmed and buried this Tuesday in Barra Mansa. He lived with his family in Santa Clara neighborhood in the city. Relatives of the engineer said that was not the first time that Monlevade traveled to Paris, where he was make a wedding engagement announcement to Nancy. “He went to another event of the company,” said a family member.
The doctor José Calvo, head of the team responsible for the embalming of the bodies said the victims died as a result of multiple trauma, or injuries caused by the impact. “The cause of death was defined by the coroner IML (Institute of Legal Medicine) from Pernambuco, “he said. “It reports on necroscopic, death certificate, certificate of death.” The Secretariat of Social Defense of Pernambuco indicated that the experts of the IML and the Federal Police comentarão only the result of the examinations after the identification of all victims…
Resgate de Corpos do navio da Marinha /
FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA
24/06/2009 – 18h00 FAB Nota 41 – 24.06.09 (English Translated)(Emphasis mine)
INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE
The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command report that, in this Wednesday, March 24, no bodies have been sighted in the areas of search. The view is limited and other material in small quantity.
The Frigate Bosísio was informed of the location of objects. Jaceguai The Corbeta berth today, at 9:30 am in the Port of Natal to perform routine maintenance and, in this period, await instructions from Command of the Navy regarding the operation in progress.
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA
24/06/2009 – 17h48 FAB Nota 40 – 23.06.09 (English Translated)(Emphasis mine)
INFORMAÇÕES SOBRE AS BUSCAS DO VOO 447 DA AIR FRANCE
The Brazilian Navy and Air Force Command report that, in this Tuesday, March 23, no bodies have been sighted in the area of search, and there was only viewing of different material, so sparse and in small quantity.
SALVAERO RECIFE The message received today the Center for Coordination of sauvetage (CCS DAKAR / Senegal) informing the definitive suspension of activities in air coordination in search of that country.
The document also highlights the assistance provided by Brazil, this basic support for the international community to search and rescue. Therefore, starting today, just under the coordination of aircraft SALVAERO RECIFE remain in searches.
Read in full, the message of CCS DAKAR:
AFR 447 SAR OPERATIONS – END OF SAR OPERATIONS
We inform you that we have stopped the search operations in our area. If you need supplementary means of assistant we could send you our research means.
We extend our great appreciations to all of you helpful support in fulfillment of our duties vis-à-vis the international SAR community.
POUR LE COLONEL, CHEF D´ETAT-MAJOR DE L´ARMEE DE L´AIR ET DIRECTEUR DU CCS.
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA MARINHA
CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA
ON-LINE AVIATION CHATTER /
MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS
You never know what you may hear on the radio! Below are the most recent on-line aviation chatter and message board discussions. Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).
QUESTION/COMMENT: I suspect they went from NORM to ALT 2 (there’s ALT 1, ALT 2, then DIR)… OK, I’m only going to answer the Abnormal Law part…
First, Abnormal Law is something different!!!! let me repeat:
Quote: ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAWS
An abnormal attitude law in pitch and roll is provided if the aircraft is in flight and in any of these conditions:
— Pitch attitude > 50° nose up or 30° nose down
— Bank angle > 125 °
— Angle of attack > 30° or < − 10°
— Speed > 440 kt or < 60 kt
— Mach > 0.96 or vious ones we see is that this one has the report version, not just the headline version.
The (Eurocockpit] page concludes with a warning/riddle/:
[Quote]in order to let you compare the events experienced by the flight AF447 with those described in the technical note mentioned above, we would like to expose the actual list of the contents of the famous ACARS messages sent by the plane. In order to keep our sources secret, we have transformed the appearance of the original file, but the content has remained exactly the same.
There are of course the alarms and warnings mentioned in the Air France technical note.
Take the headlines, and slap this version to explain the messages that are included in this version… Use the order that was in the headlines list.
Quote: This “Technical Note” comes from Air France and seems to be an authentic document. We audited the origins, dates, and metadata contained in the original file. We have confirmation that this document was valid, validated, and still current as at 31 May 2009. No one had heard from the plane and no one could have imagined that the plane was never going to land in Roissy and yet this document had been printed out, that same day, in order to advise the tech team on the ramp to get ready to change some probes on the aircraft’s arrival.
Again, what an irony… *sigh*…
There is one thing I agree with that [Eurocockpit] page:
Quote: What we need now is to understand why our colleagues flying the AF477 were unable to get the aircraft out of the mess. After consulting the pilots that have been faced with these same Pitot issues, we realize that a large amount of immediate judgement is needed to overcome the multiple alarms, in a very little time. The cockpit crew must execute long check-lists and procedures, complex and even somewhow contradictory… By night, in manual flight, without any speed reference, with the probable loss of attitude, and partial stand-by instruments… Only a donkey could state in public that a simple hold of «pitch and power» could be enough to solve the problem.
We can all sit here ranting on about pitch & power would solve the problem… it’s not as easy as it sounds… and hence the question remains… as per the underlined part… why didn’t they make it this time????
QUESTION/COMMENT: The detail of that version of ACARS decode, is very interesting… Just a quick take (haven’t looked into the stuff in detail)
EFCS 1 & 2 seems to be asking what’s this? (1-2, 1-3, 2-3) (Electronic Flight Control System)
EFCS 2 invalidates airspeed data for rudder travel limiter.
EFCS 1 sees EFCS2 having problems with the ADR 1 & 2 comparison
EFCS 2 sees sees EFCS having the same problem (not necessarily in the right order)
EFCS 1 & 2 goes to AFS with the problems. AFS shuts down A/P and A/T. (Automatic Flight System)
Both Flight Directors go blank (invalid speed data)
Multiple ADR faults, aircraft goes to ALTN Law…
Speed Limit flags on the PFDs (the same occured on Air Caraibes case)
An ADR source problem into the transponder gets picked up by the TCAS…
The FPV mode going blank to me seems that the ADIRU AoA from ADR and and IRU calculated AoA don’t match.
0211 (we previously saw this as 0212) ISIS looses speed/mach function… either the TAT’s frozen over, or this is a confirmation of problems in Pitot probe 3
0212 NAV ADR disagree (2 or more ADRs showing faults or has faults detected)
0213UTC PRIM1 & SEC1 fault needs a look at, as this likely causes or caused by FMGC 1 having problems (detected by AFS)… still searching for this link.
Then Cabin V/S gives an alert… (aircraft in dive? or crew doing ADR123 fault QRH? QRH says it may take 10 secs for changes in manual cabin setting to show a change in outflow valve position… or that the setting in manual by switching the cabin pressure to manual (as per QRH) was incorrect)
I still wonder why “IR2: EFCS1, IR1, IR3 — ADIRU2” message is shown and where the interlinkages are…
QUESTION/COMMENT: According to a poster on an other forum, there have been 9 other inflight upsets at AF with these pitot tubes that resulted in the exact same ACARS messages and those planes did not crash.
Load of bullocks. BIG BIG BIG difference between a blocked pitot tube and an upset. An upset is a extreme or abnormal flight attitude.
An upset is defined as:
1. Pitch attitude greater than 25 deg, nose up.
2. Pitch attitude greater than 10 deg, nose down.
3. Bank angle greater than 45 deg.
4. Within the above parameters, but flying at airspeed inappropriate for the conditions.
I am aware of ZERO other A330/A340s having an extreme or abnormal flight attitude (i.e. an upset) as a result of a pitot tube failure.
I have no idea if AF447 did have a pitot tube failure, or if it was in alternate law, or if the ADR disagree, what we have seen are MAINTENACE messages, we have NO idea if those same messages self cleared a second later, that is not reported back to base.
The QF72 incident WAS NOT an upset, the aircraft did not even go past about 3 degrees nose up, or 8.4 degrees nose down (i.e. well within +25/-10), it was not caused by a pitot tube, it had a totally different ECAM “fingerprint” to AF447.
NONE, NIL, ZIP, ZERO other events have had the SAME ECAM “fingerprint” as AF447.
QUESTION/COMMENT: how the deicing of the A330 works.
Every A330 does have three boxes called PHC (Probe Heating Controller). Channel No. 1 (CPT) and Channel No. 2 (F/O) are each in charge of the heating of one Pitot-Probe, two Static-Ports and one TAT-Probe. Channel No. 3 does the same for the Stby-Pitot-Probe and the two Stby-Static-Ports. The TAT-heating for Channel No. 3 is disabled due to the lack of a 3rd TAT-Probe.
Each heating circuit is constantly monitored against to low or to high current flow. So in case of a failing heating circuit, the PHC will broadcast a failure message to (im not completly sure) the SDAC or FWC. The Probe-Heating can only be operated by default in “AUTO” or “ON”.
Maybe a college of the flight deck can tell us something about how problems and reported failures of the Probe-Heating are covered within the MEL…..
QUESTION/COMMENT: On this basis, you don’t need to be 100% sure that the tube is faulty in order to bear the cost of replacement instead of taking the very remote risk of losing an airplane that would put your airliner’s further survival at stake.
But you need to assess the level or risk associated with the faulty tube, and also assess the risk of other problems that may be raised by the replacement. If AF did not go through the careful consideration process… if they decided to just change to the new tubes, and they loose an aircraft because of the new tubes… we’d be saying “they shouldn’t have changed it!”
QUESTION/COMMENT: My simple logic tells me: compare this more accurate ACARS list of AF447 with as many similar ACARS generated lists regarding the 35 previous incidents.
As said above…
“NONE, NIL, ZIP, ZERO other events have had the SAME ECAM “fingerprint” as AF447.”
The ACARS messages are similar, but NOT THE SAME! Even the Air Caraibes case where some have pointed as an “identical” problem, it did have differences!
QUESTION/COMMENT: No coordinated immediate action taken by ALL airliners, AIRBUS and pitot tubes manufacturers when first problems were diagnosed? WHY NOT? WHY did they have to wait for 35 incidents + 1 terrible accident? Was there 35 incidents beforehand?
The problem came back to 2002… let’s have a SIMPLIFIED explanation of the Pitot Tube saga…
1. A330s used Pitot X-1 and Y-1 in those days… and then there was X-2 available on the market.
2. A lot of carriers used X-1 and found problems with regards to precipitation and icing…
3. Several carriers decided to change from X-1 to X-2, or to Y-1
4. In 2002, Airbus issued an AD, citing that carriers using X-1 to change to X-2 or Y-1 and to complete those changes before end of 2007… Air France went to Y-1.
5. Airlines using X-2 had their rate of “unreliable airspeed data incidents suspected due to icing” going down almost to none.
6. Air France completed the change X-1 to Y-1 at end of 2007… then, it began to have a series of incidents with “unreliable airspeed data incidents suspected due to icing” (by this time, it was 2008).
7. Air France decided that, “we need to know why, after following the AD, we’re still getting these problems.”
8. Air France decided not to wait, and did lab tests themselves, which confirmed that Y-1’s improvement rates are (probably) lower than X-2… and that Y-2 was available in the market by that time.
9. Air France decided not to wait for another AD from Airbus, and decided to change from Y-1 to Y-2.
10. AF447 was still fitted with Y-1 when it happened.
OK, that’s the SIMPLIFIED version.
QUESTION/COMMENT: Anyway, I believe the cost of replacing them shouldnt be that high, I guess no serious airplane grounding is required just to change some tubes. So, maybe you could be right in some way. They would have replaced them earlier (given the relatively low cost of doing so), had it been definite that all these incidents were atribbuted to pitot tubes. But again, given the bad-looking economy maybe some other thought crossed their minds.
Now, go back above… #9 was at their own initiative. #4 was not. Several airlines did the equivalent of #9 years ago, by taking step #3.
AF suspected something was up with Y-1, and decided to do tests, to make sure that their decision based on those tests, would result in better safety. The tests analysed that the risk was there, but based on the incident rats as a % of the total flights, it was deemed that the risk was not immediately life threatening. Based on that, AF went from Y-1 to Y-2.
Why didn’t they do it before??? Well, they needed to know that the change was necessary and would not open the aircraft to NEW RISKS. One must look at both sides of making such a change (albeit a simple change)… Throw hindsight away from our brains, and think…
“Would the change from Y-1 to Y-2 improve the situation? or would it open us to more risks? Or are we better off keeping Y-1 for the time being?”
I agree with this poster on the following:
COMMENT: If you went back into the previous threads, you’d find out that in this respect – and people are jumping on the Pitot issue – airlines have been quite pro-active. And contrarily to your thinking, airlines know that a culture of safety is cheaper than cost-cuttings across the board.
QUESTION/COMMENT: ‘We’ were already aware of what the problem was the morning of the accident (the famous erroneous airspeed). There are passed records that display the exact ACARS messages sent by the AF477. The same causes had already produced the same effects. It is likely that the AF447 experienced the same problems as all the other aircraft that encountered a Pitot defect, the only difference being that those other aircraft managed to free themselves from that situation.
There are differences…
QUESTION/COMMENT: As far as AF447 is concerned, we only have strong indications that this same problem appeared in the beginning of a chain of events that brought the plane down.
CORRECT. But how it ended up at sea, we can only speculate (but not recklessly please).
QUESTION/COMMENT: And, if IF pitot icing does turn out to be a major cause of this accident, where does that leave other aircraft and pitot types, given that similar things can apparently happen to them?
As we’ve established, Pitot Icing should not have caused the aircraft’s demise… The same thing for other types. However, many other aircraft do not use the same level of ADR monitoring as the Airbus… God knows what can happen to the other aircraft… it’s just different.
QUESTION/COMMENT: There’s a huge difference between “horrendous pilot error under the circumstances” and “pilot error under horrendous circumstances”.
Very well put!!!!
QUESTION/COMMENT: I’m surprised that they were able to locate the Captain separately from the cockpit ?
The question is… was he in the cockpit at the time???
QUESTION/COMMENT: People expect pilots to be supermen and superwomen, able to pick the correct issue out of 37,000 pages of manual in two seconds and never make a mistake, never have to hunt for an answer.
Yes, people expect them to be supermen and superwomen yet people do not want to pay a superexpensive fare to pay these supermen and superwomen their supersalaries for being super and not just by mere human beings!
QUESTION/COMMENT: Just a thought. With every modern aircraft the automation is so high that a crew at cruise with the aircraft on autopilot in a situation similar to this may be getting handed an aircraft in a next to uncontrollable situation. The A/P shuts off and hands over a plane in a condition the pilots have very little time to, as another poster mentioned, go through a complex checklist in a very short amount of time to rectify the situation. Are scenarios like this practiced much in the simulator?
An A/P and A/T disconnection does not mean the aircraft is next to uncontrollable. In the case of Airbus FBW, as mentioned sometime ago that, “flying under ALT 2 Law” is no where near mission impossible. If your car’s cruise control disconnect, your speed control isn’t “next to uncontrollable” is it?
Now even if the A/P and A/T did not disconnnect (yes, let’s dream up a system that allows this), the crew would still have to trouble shoot those other stuff. In this case, and the other mentioned cases, the A/P and A/T disconnected because it no longer have source data that would guarantee the safety of the aircraft under automatic control… that is no way near aircraft next to an uncontrollable situation. The A/P and A/T shut off was done for the safety of the flight…
QUESTION/COMMENT: Are these scenarios practiced in the SIM? Let other more sim folks answer for these cases… but from what I know, several crew members (on other types) that had gone through a similar external (excessive pitot icing in turbulence) situation, in the sim… to varying degrees of problems… this ISN’T UNIFORM across the pilot pool. One had loss of airspeed data in turbulence, another had loss of airspeed data and the artificial in turbulence resorting to him trying to fly on standby ADI for pitch, and manual thrust… Wasn’t nice.
Remember, Air Caraibes was also at night, in turbulence with fluctuations in airspeed requiring large changes to engine thrust, hence A/T was switched off in that case…
QUESTION/COMMENT: Here, a bunch of old timers are quite vocal in saying that “this couldn’t have happened to them as they were trained to deal with piloting issues” – unreliable airspeed, abnormal or extreme upsets, partial panel flying…and all that -. They also claim that a modern pilot’s experience isn’t worth much as it includes bunk time, auto pilot time…etc…
That site means that if you’re licensed, you’re licensed to rant !