FAB Honors Victims – Family Compensation Lawsuit – Chatter: ACARS Msgs Decoded & FCOM Reports


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29/06/2009 – — 19h39 19h39 (English Translation)

Navy search teams to honor victims of Flight 447, families do not attend

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Navy official who worked in the searches by the Air France plane that made Monday a tribute to the victims of the tragedy with the flight 447, which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean on May 31 with 228 people on board. The ceremony took place in Recife, on board the frigate Bosísio, boat which carried the majority of the 51 bodies recovered.

The act also sought ecumenical official FAB (Brazilian Air Force) who also acted in the search operation, closed this Friday (26) after 26 days. According to the advice of the Navy, the families of the relatives of victims were invited to attend the ceremony, but no family attended.

According to the agency, the costs of travel to Recife are be assumed by their families, because the Navy was not able to bear those costs. The Navy reported that some family members welcomed the invitation, but informed that they could not attend.

At the ceremony today, the official Navy threw overboard three crowns of flowers in tribute to the victims. Other five boats participated in the searches that followed the frigate during the tribute.

In the event, military authorities speak on the operation of search and made a prayer in tribute to the victims. By this Monday, only 14 of the 51 bodies recovered had been identified.

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29/06/2009  – —  15h01 15h01 (English Translation)

Air France has until tomorrow to anticipate the family of victim compensation Flight 447

Air France has until this Tuesday (30) to deposit the value of 30 minimum wages – R $ 13,950 – monthly for women and children of the engineer Walter Carrilho Nascimento Junior, 42, killed in the crash of the Airbus company , on May 31 this year. The plane carrying 228 people when they fell into the Atlantic Ocean.

The decision by Judge Magno Alves de Asuncion, the 28th Civil Vara Rio, published in the last 17 days. He partially accepted the request in advance of the amount made by the widow on behalf of three children and minors. If the airline breaks the decision until the trial’s final action, [Air France] is subject to a fine of $ 1,000 [per day]. The company has been notified and has not appealed, according to the ECJ (Court of Justice).

According to the court, the 30 minimum wages were calculated based on gross monthly income of the victim and should be available to the familys for 24 months by means of monthly judicial deposit. By this action, the widow claimed that she and the children are financially dependent on the engineer to household expenses, including the payment of school tuition and was also attached to the process of finding a psychiatrist who contends that she and the children need treatment for the initial period of two years.

“If there is no doubt that the victim get on the plane of the defendant company [Air France], which is required to provide the transport service, so why not apply, in addition to the provisions of the Civil Code, the rules of the Code of Consumer Protection , said the judge.

The first hearing between the company and the family of Walter Carrilho was designated for the day July 30, 2009. According to TJ, accepts the appeal decision.


radio_imagesRadio Chatter/ MSG BOARDS / DISCUSSIONS

You never know what you may hear on the radio! Below are the most recent on-line  aviation chatter and message board discussions.  Please understand the below are only chatter/discussions among aviation professionals world-wide and should not be considered fact until all official information is released by Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Disinformation (BEA).

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After a lot of research through dozens – if not hundreds of pages – from the A330 manuals, coming from different sources, others, and I have managed to identify the meaning of the ACARS messages.

To explain it simply is not easy. Let’s just say that the messages represent two of the functions of the CMC – Central Maintenance Computer – of the airplane :

1/- A report from the flight warning computer on what is showing on the instrument panels : PFDs, ECAM…etc…

2/- A report from the different BITEs that are present in each system, comparators…etc… They are , I repeat once again, totally transparent to the flight crew, but for us they could give a better picture of what is happening.

I confess I had a terrible problem sorting things out as I started with the assumption that the messages came out on the ground telex machine in their order of detection…It is not so, and we’ve arrived at a logical linkage of all the messages.

I also had to very carefully take caution as to whether these messages are genuine failures or just transients. I now believe that these faults / failures are for real and there was no indication – or logical explanation – of a return to normal functions.

So I propose that first we’d introduce the messages as they appeared on the initial summary document, then  we will walk through what we think was the actual chain of events.

Bear with us, it’s quite interesting.

So here is the decode of all the messages in the order of the first summary :

0210Z

A/P OFF : The AFS monitors the air data from the ADRs. Any brutal variation of CAS, ALT, Mach causes the A/P to disengage : here, as the pitot system is suspect, a variation of 20kt or Mach.04 for .45 second is enough to disconnect both FDs and the A/P.

Reactive windshear detection: with the ADRs been rejected by the AFS,, AoA is not accessible any more.

F/CTL Alternate Law : is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition. The flight Control Laws revert , from “Normal Law” to “Alternate Law 2”. The Prims are in charge of the voting and elimination of a duff ADR, but it takes them 10 seconds to do so (threshold is 16 kt / 10 sec.

Flight Director Flag on captain’s PFD

Flight Director Flag on F/O’s PFD

Auto Throttle OFF (These last three should have appeared at the same time as the A/P OFF warning.)

TCAS Fault : Result of the loss of the associated ADR (for altitude data)

Speed Limit Flag on Captain’s PFD

Speed Limit Flag on F/O’s PFD ( these two result of rejected Airspeed information by the EFCS, might be a sign of the PROT LOST, which hasn’t been indicated)

Rudder Travel Limiter Fault is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition.

EFCS 1 Fault on Maintenance Status

EFCS 2 Fault on Maintenance Status

Probe-Pitot 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 / (9DA. Relates to Heating element PITOT 1

Primary Flight Computer #2 (ADIRU1 signal to Prim 2)

———-

0211Z

FPV Flag on Captain’s PFD

FPV Flag on F/O’s PFD

Speed or Mach function on ISIS (Suspect loss of ADIRU 3 for ISIS MACH )

IR2 Fault (Discrete data streams = Pitot, Static , TAT, OAT to ADIRU 2)

———-

0212Z

ADR DISAGREE : TOOK IT A LONG TIME TO APPEAR NOW !

———-

0213Z

Primary Flight Computer #1 Fault (Crew manipulation suspected, on ADR DISAGREE C/L )

Secondary Flight Computer #1 Fault ——Idem———————-

ADR2 Fault on Maintenance Status Another very late message

Intermittent Fault on FMGEC #1

———-

0214Z

Cabin Vertical speed Advisory. We now believe that this advisory message is just a result of ADR data

There is a glaring conclusion : there is no way that the ACARS have been transmitted in the order of the summary.

First, because we find a 0212z event in the middle of the 0211 ones, and the same for two 0213Z’s between 0214z messages…

Secondly, it is also obvious that the ADR DISAGREE message/warning is too late in view of all the happenings that should have been its consequences.

But looking at the system, we can see in fact the trouble-shooting “reasoning” of the system facing multiple incoherent data at the same time.

The explanation will come in the second part, in which we deal with the time tags and propose one – for us the most logical – chain of events.

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In the discussions I’ve had with several other parties, it did appear that the ACARS decode done by the Eurocockpit is definitely not in order (which isn’t surprising)…

BUT, it also appeared that the leaked ACARS Headers List we saw early on that was leaked to the press, also was not in order, which baffled most of us

We have so far believed that the messages would be timestamped in order… Which was, correct, but, it was correct to the minute… within the minute, nothing guarantees it.

Here is the “original” list:

acarsaf447d

It appears that there are some prioritizing of messages within the same minute. This can explain why in the latter parts, there were some stuff not in order but the minutes were still stamped to time of occurence.

Certain parts really gave some puzzling and befuddlement (is that even a word?)… stuff like, why did the NAV DISAGREE come out so late, and why was there an IR problem when we’re suspecting an ADR problem… etc, etc, etc.

The clues lie much deeper than originally thought, and again, the Air Caraibes internal technical note provided one of the best assistance in understanding the AF447 ACARS messages… of course, technical drawings, wirings, fault isolation possibilities of the CMC messages… the documents I have (which is still far from what’s required) already 153 pages… with many more pages to print and scour through.

This is still far from finished… The data  posted still have some further reading to cross check, like, how does the Air Data Module work such as air data sampling rates, self data storage, how it starts and reboots when needed, data filtering functions, and what functions it carries in each probe (certain documents reveal multiple functions), etc, etc….

And then how come an ADR affect the IR functions of the ADIRUs, etc etc, denergizing ADIRU after ADR switch off doesn’t give the OFF light, etc etc… and many many more stuff…

All the above, must then be cross checked with the background systems information and general logic (from the FCOMs) to cross check further interrelationships between components and modules, where the data is pooled and channeled to downstream users and via which processors etc.

This does put a test to my systems engineering knowledge to the limit from previous works (which coincidentally, involved ADRs and IRs, and integration into NAV and output displays, etc)…

We have some way to go… but this is what’s deduced for the moment… The expanded explanation is incomplete, it is subject to change, subject to ammendments, and albeit backed by documentation, there’s no guarantee that this is correct… but then, it’s better than just picking stuff out of the air.

This is the list reordered…

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0209 START

0210 34-11-15-0 FLR EFCS2

EFCS1, AFS – PROBE PITOT 1+2/2+3/1+3 (9DA)

9DA=HEATING ELEMENT PITOT 1 (6DA1/PHC1)

Heating Element Pitot 1 suspected failed.

———-

0210 27-93-34-0 FLR EFCS1

EFCS2-FCPC2(2CE2) WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2

No Data from ADIRU 1, ADR 1 & 2 no sending signal to FCPC2

No ADR Data from ADIRU 1 to PRIM2.

———-

0210 27-90-45-5 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS1

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

———-

0210 27-90-45-0 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS2

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

———-

0210 22-10-00-0 WRN AUTO FLT

AP OFF

Autopilot Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting autopilot into making the wrong actions.

Commence AP/FD FAULT ISOLATION PROCEDURE

System Filter & Check:

– DISAGREE AOA Sensor Data in FCPCs

– DISAGREE PITOT PROBE Data in FCPCs

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 2

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 3

– FAIL ADIRU 2 and 3

– FAIL ADIRUs

———-

0210 22-62-01-0 WRN AUTO FLT

REAC W/S DET FAULT

Loss of 2 ADRs, autopilot cannot provide Windshear Protection.

———-

0210 27-91-00-5 WRN F/CTL

ALTN LAW

2 ADR REJECTED, NAV DISAGREE NOT YET CONCLUDED – FAULT ISOLATION IN PROGRESS

———-

0210 22-83-00-2 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for LEFT seat.

———-

0210 22-83-01-2 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD SPD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for RIGHT seat.

———-

0210 22-30-02-5 WRN AUTO FLT

A/THR OFF

Autothrust Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting Autothrust into making the wrong actions.

———-

0210 34-43-00-5 WRN NAV

TCAS FAULT

Loss of ADR1 to Transponder 1 (if selected) or Loss of ADR2 to Transponder2 (if selected)

Loss of Mode C.

This is downstream of loss of ADR.

———-

0210 22-83-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

———-

0210 22-83-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

———-

0210 27-23-02-0 WRN F/CTL

RUD TRV LIM FAULT

Loss valid of ADR Data (require 2 ADRs) for FMGC/AFS

FMGC Flight Envelope Module locks in Rudder Travel for safety.

———-

0211 34-12-34-0 FLR IR2

EFCS1X,IR1,IR3, ADIRU2 (1FP2)

ADIRU2(1FP2) – ADR2 self monitoring & PHC rejects own data

Loss of discrete data from ADR2 = PITOT 2, STATIC 2L, STATIC 2R, TAT 2, AOA 2.

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

———-

0211 34-12-00-0 FLR ISIS

ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION

SUSPECT LOSS OF ADIRU1 AND/OR ADIRU3 FOR ISIS MACH

Suspect Loss of ADIRU3

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

———-

0211 34-12-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO FPV

———-

0211 34-12-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO FPV

———-

0212 34-10-40-0 WRN NAV

ADR DISAGREE

NAV DISAGREE DISCOVERED – FAULT ISOLATION COMPLETED

Due to no further ADR faults occuring.

———-

0213 27-90-02-5 WRN F/CTL

PRIM1 FAULT

———-

0213 27-90-04-0WRN F/CTL

SEC1 FAULT

———-

0213 22-83-34-9FLR AFS

FMGEC1(1CA1)

———-

0214 34-10-36-0WRN MXSTAT

ADR2

RESULT OF 32-12-34-0

———-

0214 21-31-00-2WRN ADVSRY

CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

LOSS OF ADR DATA

————

******Be warned, the above is still incomplete******

******More cross checking is needed******

The failures here aren’t simply upstream faults leading to downstream failures, but there are some “same level” data feed, and “upstream” data feeds… and I do not guarantee the above is correct.*****


** DISCLAIMER ** CANNOT VERIFY ACCURACY OF THE BELOW FCOM CURRENCY**

A330diagramaFunções

Description extracted on the whole as written on A330-200 FCOM (=Flight Crew Operating Manual)

(Original Author Note: All Images relating to this Post not  uploaded)
Airbus 330-200 ACARS FLIGHT REPORTS
Flight reports provide real time information to the ground concerning the aircraft current situation and position.
Several types of flight reports are available :
the Position report: provides current aircraft position
the Progress report: provides data relative to the destination
the Flight-Plan report: provides the active route
the Performance Data report: provides performance data currently used by FMS. (=Flight Management System)
These reports may be manually initiated via a dedicated prompt or automatically sent in response to a ground request or upon specific conditions.
POSITION REPORT
This report is sent:
manually via a MCDU prompt or (=Multi Function Control & Display Unit) following a ground request or automatically upon sequencing a designated reporting fix (designated by the ground in a uplink message).
The manual POSITION REPORT downlink prompt is displayed on the REPORT page POS prompt.
Img1.
Note: Position report are initiated from active flight plan only.
Img2.
POSITION report content
The downlinked message contains exactly the REPORT page data.
PROGRESS REPORT

A progress report contains data relative to the aircraft arrival time and EFOB (=Estimated Fuel On Board) at destination for the active F-PLN. (=Flight Plan)
This downlink message is automatically sent following : a ground request or a change of destination or a change of runway or a specific event. The possible events that can be selected in the navigation database policy file are:
X minutes to Top of Descent
Z minutes to Destination
ETA changes more than
W minutes from the previous report. (=Estimated Time Arrive)
X, Z and W are minutes of time set in the navigation database policy file.
The progress report cannot be manually sent by the crew via a dedicated MCDU prompt. =MultiFunction Control & Display Unit)
PROGRESS report content
Flight Number
Arrival Airport Ident
Destination Runway Ident
Predicted remaining fuel
ETA at destination
Reason for report (specific event, ground request…).
FLIGHT PLAN REPORT
The F-PLN report broadcasts flight plan data to the ground. Only data from the active flight plan can be sent.
This downlink message is sent to the ground : automatically following a ground request manually by the crew using a prompt displayed on the ACARS FUNCTION page. (Refer to ACARS page description). This prompt may be invalidated through the navigation database policy file.
The Flight Plan report can be downlinked either while on ground or in flight during any flight phase.
FLIGHT PLAN report content
The report contains the active and alternate flight plan.
PERFORMANCE DATA REPORT
The Performance Data report is a downlink message that allows the transmission of performance data (GW, FUEL, CG…) relative to the active F-PLN. (= Gross Weight, Center of Gravity)
This message is automatically sent following a ground request. Manual sending is not possible.
PERFORMANCE DATA report content
Sends to the ground :
Current GW
Cruise Altitude
Current CG
Fuel on Board
Block Fuel
Reserve Fuel
Cost Index
Top of Climb Temperature
Climb Transition Altitude
Tropopause Altitude
Taxi Fuel
ZFW (=Zero Fuel Weight)
ZFWCG (=Zero Fuel Weight Center of Gravity)
TURBULENCE DAMPING FUNCTION
The purpose of the turbulence damping function is to damp the structural modes induced by atmosphere turbulence.
The function uses the Nz accelerometer and two dedicated Ny accelerometers. The PRIMs compute a turbulence damping command, which is added to the normal law command for the elevator and the yaw damper.
This function is automatically monitored and becomes inoperative for the remainder of the flight, when a failure is detected. In addition, it may be manually inhibited by switching off the TURB DAMP pushbutton on the overhead panel, when it is considered that comfort is degraded instead of being improved, and no failure is detected.
It is only available if the following conditions are met:
Aircraft in flight.
Aircraft speed greater than 200 knots.
Autopilot engaged or normal law active.
Aircraft within the normal flight envelope.
LATERAL CONTROL

LATERAL NORMAL LAW

When the aircraft is on the ground (in “on ground” mode), the sidestick commands the aileron and roll spoiler surface deflection. The amount of control surface deflection that results from a given amount of sidestick deflection depends upon aircraft speed. The pedals control rudder deflection through a direct mechanical linkage.
When the aircraft is in the “in flight” mode, normal law combines control of the ailerons, spoilers (except N° 1 spoilers), and rudder (for turn coordination) in the sidestick. While the system thereby gives the pilot control of the roll and heading, it also limits the roll rate and bank angle, coordinates the turns, and damps the dutch roll.
The roll rate requested by the pilot during flight is proportional to the sidestick deflection, with a maximum rate of 15° per second when the sidestick is at the stop.
When the aircraft is in “flare” mode, the lateral control is the same as in “in flight” mode.
BANK ANGLE PROTECTION
Inside the normal flight envelope, the system maintains positive spiral static stability for bank angles above 33°. If the pilot releases the sidestick at a bank angle greater than 33°, the bank angle automatically reduces to 33°.
Up to 33°, the system holds the roll attitude constant when the sidestick is at neutral. If the pilot holds full lateral sidestick deflection, the bank angle goes to 67° (indicated by a pair of green bar lines “=” on the PFD) and no further.
Img3.
If the angle-of-attack protection or high speed protection is operative, the bank angle goes to 45° and no further, if the pilot holds full lateral sidestick deflection.
If high speed protection is operative, the system maintains positive spiral static stability from a bank angle of 0°, so that with the sidestick released, the aircraft always returns to a bank angle of 0°.
When bank angle protection is active, auto trim is inoperative.
If the bank angle exceeds 45°, the autopilot disconnects and the FD bars disappear. The FD bars return when the bank angle decreases to less than 40°.
SIDESLIP TARGET

Should an engine failure occur, the sideslip indication is slightly modified to ensure that optimum pilot rudder application is made to achieve optimum climb performance (ailerons to neutral and spoilers retracted).
In takeoff configuration, when asymmetrical thrust is detected (30 % N1 (GE) or 0.25 EPR (PW/RR)), and at least one engine is above 80 % N1 (GE) or 1.3 EPR (PW/RR), the sideslip indication will change from yellow to blue.
Img4.
Crew response is normal and instinctive:
Zero, beta target value for optimum performance with appropriate rudder application.
Accelerate if beta target cannot be zeroed with full rudder. The computation is made by the PRIM. (=Primary computer)
PITCH CONTROL
A330sidestick
GROUND MODE
Ground mode is active on ground. It is a direct relationship between sidestick deflection and elevator deflection without auto trim.
The THS is automatically set at 4° UP (inside the green band). Manual setting according to CG has priority for take off.
The rotation maneuver is flown in direct law with full authority.
Immediately after the aircraft becomes airborne the flight mode is progressively blended in.
The reverse process occurs after touch down.
FLIGHT MODE
The normal law flight mode is a load factor demand law with auto trim and full flight envelope protection.
It provides control of elevator and THS from the side stick controllers to achieve a load factor proportional to stick deflection, independent of speed.
With the side stick at neutral, wings level, the system maintains 1 G in pitch corrected for pitch attitude, and there is no need for the pilot to trim with speed or configuration changes.
Pitch trim is automatic in both manual mode and when the autopilot is engaged.
In normal turns (up to 33° of bank) no pitch correction is required once the turn is established.
The flight mode is active from TO to landing according to the logic (page 1).
Automatic pitch trim is frozen in the following cases:
Manual trim order
Radio altitude below 100 ft for flare
Load factor lower than 0.5 g
In high speed protection
When angle of attack protection is active, THS is limited between setting at entry in protection and 2° nose down (i.e. further nose up trim cannot be applied).
Similarly when the load factor is higher than 1.3 g, or when the bank angle gets outside ± 33°, the THS is limited between the actual setting and 2° nose down.
Control with autopilot engaged


The autopilot orders are limited by the PRIM
A force must be overcome to move the sidestick with the autopilot engaged. If the pilot moves the side stick to overcome this force the autopilot will disconnect.
All protections remain effective.
FLARE MODE
The flight mode changes to flare mode at landing, when passing 100 feet.
Flare mode is a direct stick-to-elevator relationship (with some damping provided by load factor and pitch rate feedbacks). In addition, at 50 feet, a slight pitch down elevator order is applied, so that the pilot has to move the stick rearwards to maintain a constant path, so as to reproduce conventional aircraft aerodynamic characteristics.
PROTECTIONS
Normal law provides complete flight envelope protection as follows :
Load factor limitation
Pitch attitude protection
High angle-of-attack (AOA) protection
High speed protection
LOAD FACTOR LIMITATION
The load factor is automatically limited to:
+ 2.5 g to – 1 g, slats retracted
+ 2 g to 0, slats extended
PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION

Pitch attitude is limited to 30° nose up (progressively reduced to 25° at low speed), and to 15° nose down (indicated by green symbols “=” on the PFD pitch scale (Refer to 1.31.40)).
HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

Under normal law, when angle of attack becomes greater than prot, the system switches the elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode in which the angle of attack is proportional to the sidestick deflection.
That is, in the prot range, from prot to max, the side stick commands directly. However the angle of attack will not exceed max, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick the angle of attack returns to prot and stays there.
This protection, against stall and windshear, has priority over all other protections.
The autopilot will disconnect if the protection is active.
V prot, V max and V floor conditions vary according to the weight and the configuration
V prot and V max displayed on the PFD are computed by the PRIM. (=Primary computer) floor activation logic is provided by the PRIM.
Note:
At takeoff prot is equal to max for 5 seconds.
FLOOR

is activated through autothrust system when:
is greater than a threshold depending on the aircraft configuration, the ground speed variation, and the difference between ground speed and air speed or, Sidestick deflection above 14° and:
pitch altitude greater than 25°, or
AOA protection active
FLOOR inhibition: (Refer to 1.22.30).
To leave the angle of attack protection the sidestick must be pushed :
More than 8° forward, or,
More than 0° forward for at least 1 second when <>
HIGH SPEED PROTECTION
The aircraft automatically recovers following a high speed upset. Depending on the flight conditions (high acceleration, low pitch attitude), the High Speed Protection is activated at/or above VMO/MMO.
When it is activated, the pitch trim is frozen. Positive spiral static stability is introduced to 0° bank angle (instead of 33° in normal law), so that with the sidestick released, the aircraft always returns to a bank angle of 0°. The bank angle limit is reduced from 67° to 45°.
As the speed increases above VMO/MMO, the sidestick nose-down authority is progressively reduced, and a permanent nose-up order is applied to aid recovery to normal flight conditions.
The High Speed Protection is deactivated when the aircraft speed decreases below VMO/MMO, where the usual normal control laws are recovered.
The autopilot disconnects when high speed protection goes active.
Note:
OVER SPEED ECAM warning is provided at:
VMO + 4 kt MMO + 0.006
LOW ENERGY WARNING
A low energy aural warning “SPEED SPEED SPEED” repeated every 5 seconds indicates to the pilot that the aircraft energy becomes lower than a threshold under which to recover a positive flight path angle through pitch control, the thrust must be increased.
It is available in configuration 2, 3 and full between 100 and 2000 ft.
The low energy warning is computed by the PRIM’s from the following inputs:
Aircraft configuration
Air speed deceleration rate
Flight path angle It is inhibited when:
TOGA is selected
Below 100 ft RA Above 2 000 ft RA
Alpha floor or GPWS alert is triggered
In alternate or direct law
If both RA are failed.
The low energy warning is triggered during deceleration before alpha floor (unless alpha floor is triggered by stick deflection), the delay between the two warnings depends on deceleration rate.
NORMAL LAW

GENERAL
Flight control normal law provides:

3 Axis control

Flight envelope protection

Maneuver load alleviation

DESCRIPTION
The Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) supplies temperature, anemometric barometric and inertial parameters to the EFIS system (PFD and ND) and to other user systems (FMGC, FADEC, PRIM, SEC, FWC, SFCC, ATC, GPWS, CMC, CPC).

ADIRs

the message IRS IN ALIGN becomes amber if engines are running or flashes green if IRS alignment is faulty.

The system includes: three identical ADIRU’s (Air Data and Inertial Reference Units).

Each ADIRU is divided in two parts, either of witch can work separately in case of failure in the other:

the ADR (Air Data Reference) part which supplies barometric altitude, speed, Mach, angle of attack, temperature and overspeed warnings.

the IR (Inertial Reference) part which supplies attitude, flight path vector, track, heading, accelerations, angular rates, ground speed, vertical speed and aircraft position.

Note:

The ADIRU gives the true heading instead of magnetic heading:

above 82° North

above 73° North between 90° and 120° West (magnetic polar region)

above 60° South

one ADIRS control panel located on the overhead panel for modes selection (NAV, ATT, OFF) and failure indications.

2 GPS receivers, which are connected to the IR part of the ADIRU’s for GP/IR hybrid position calculation. four types of sensors :

pitot probes (3) static pressure probes (STAT) (6)

angle of attack sensors (AOA) (3)

total air temperature probes (TAT) (2)

These sensors are electrically heated to prevent from icing up.

eight ADMs (Air Data Modules) which convert pneumatic data from pitot and static probes into numerical data for the ADIRUs.

a switching facility for selecting ADR3 or IR3 for instrument displays in case of ADIRU 1 or 2 failure.

a MAG / TRUE pushbutton switch for polar navigation.

AC BUS provides to normal electrical supply. DC BUS provides a back up possibility through internal inverter.

PROBES LOCATION

Img6.

PROBES SCHEMATIC

Img7.

Note: ADIRU

ADIRU 1 is supplied by CAPT probes,

ADIRU 2 is supplied by F/O probes

ADIRU 3 is supplied by STBY probes and CAPT TAT

ADIRS SCHEMATIC

Fig8.

CONTROLS AND INDICATORS

OVERHEAD PANEL

Img9.

1 ADR pb sw OFF :

Air data output disconnected FAULT lt:

This amber light comes on associated with an ECAM caution if a fault is detected in the air data reference part.

2 IR pb sw

OFF: Inertial data output disconnected.

FAULT lt: This amber light comes on associated with an ECAM caution when a fault affects the respective IR.

steady : the respective IR is lost. flashing: the attitude and heading information may be recovered in ATT mode.

3 IR 1(2) (3) mode rotary sel

OFF: The ADIRU is not energized.ADR and IR data are not available.

NAV: Normal mode of operation.Supplies full inertial data to aircraft systems.

ATT: IR mode supplying only attitude and heading information if the system loses its ability to navigate.The heading must be entered through the MCDU and has to be reset frequently (about every 10 minutes).

4 ON BAT lt

Comes on amber when one or more IRS is supplied only by the aircraft battery.

It also comes on for a few seconds at the beginning of the alignment but not for a fast realignment.

Note:

if, when the aircraft is on the ground at least one ADIRU is supplied by batteries:
an external horn sounds the ADIRU light comes on amber on the SERVICE INTERPHONE BAY panel.

PEDESTAL

Img10.

1 AIR DATA and ATT HDG sel

NORM: ADIRU 1 supplies data to PFD1, ND1, DDRMI and ATC 1.ADIRU 2 supplies data to PFD2, ND2 and ATC2.

CAPT ON 3 : ADR 3 or IR 3 replaces ADR 1 or IR 1 F/O

ON 3 : ADR 3 or IR 3 replaces ADR 2 or IR 2

MAIN INSTRUMENTS PANEL
At high latitude above 82.5° North or 60.5° South (or entering the north magnetic polar region :

latitude 73.5° N and longitude between 117.5° W and 92.5° W) the ADIRUs replace magnetic heading by true heading on EFIS and DDRMI.

In addition the GRID track appears on ND.

When the aircraft is in close proximity to these regions (latitude above 82° North or 60° South or approaching the north magnetic polar region :

73° N and longitude between 90° W and 120 W) the ADIRU will trigger a message on ND “SELECT TRUE REF” requesting to change north reference.

1 NORTH REF pb sw TRUE (in): Pressing this pushbutton selects the true heading for instrument displays.

TRUE light comes on blue. The ND displays GRID track values if position is above 65° N or S. MAG (out): Magnetic heading is selected.

WARNINGS AND CAUTIONS


E / WD: FAILURE TITLEconditions

AURAL WARNING MASTER LIGHT SD PAGE CALLED LOCAL WARNING FLT PHASE INHIB

STALL WARNING (No ECAM message)

An aural stall warning is triggered when the AOA (=Angle Of Atack) is greater than a predetermined angle

This angle depends on– the Slats / Flap position– the Speed / Mach– the F / CTL law (normal, alternate / direct) Cricket + STALL (synthetic voice)

MASTER WARN NIL NIL NIL

OVERSPEED– VMO / MMO

aircraft speed / mach greater than VMO + 4 kt / MMO + 0.006

– VLE aircraft speed greater than VLE + 4 kt with L / G not uplocked or L / G doors not closed

– VFE aircraft speed greater thanVFE + 4 kt with slats or / and flaps extended.

CRC ADR 1(2)(3) FAULT SINGLE CHIME MASTER CAUT

ADR FAULT lt 1, 4, 8, 10 ADR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT

IR 1(2)(3) FAULT IR FAULT lt 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10

IR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT 1, 4, 8, 10

HDG DISCREPANCY

difference between heading on CAPT and F / O displays greater than 5° in TRUE or than 7° in MAG CHECK HDG (on ND and PFD) 4, 8

ATT DISCREPANCY

difference between roll or pitch angle displayed on CAPT and F / O PFD greater than 5° CHECK ATT (on PFD)

ALTI DISCREPANCY

difference between altitude displayed on CAPT and F / O PFD greater than:

– 500 ft if baro ref STD is selected

– 250 ft if QNH is selected CHECK ALT (on PFD)

E / WD: FAILURE TITLE

conditions

AURAL WARNING MASTER LIGHT SD PAGE CALLED LOCAL WARNING FLT PHASE INHIB

EXTREME LATITUDEA / C enters in polar area, the crew must select true reference

SINGLE CHIME MASTER CAUT NIL NIL 4, 5, 7, 8

IR NOT ALIGNED

Problem detected during IR alignment NIL

FM/IR POS DISAGREE

discrepancy between a/c position computed by FMS and position given by IRs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10

BARO REF DISCREPANCY

discrepancy between F/O and captain baro ref. 3, 4, 8

MEMO DISPLAY
IRS IN ALIGN XXX IR XXX IN ATT ALIGN

messages appear in green during an IR alignment.

TRUE NORTH REF appears in green when the NORTH REF pushbutton switch is at TRUE. The message is pulsing during 10 seconds in phase 1 or 2 or at slats extension.

ADIRS SWTG appears in green when either AIR DATA or ATT HDG selector is not in NORM position.

** DISCLAIMER ** CANNOT VERIFY ACCURACY OF THE ABOVE CHATTER/FCOM CURRENCY**

end

S.280 Report Full Briefing Package

After a lot of research through dozens – if not hundreds of pages – from the A330 manuals, coming from different sources, others, and I have managed to identify the meaning of the ACARS messages.

To explain it simply is not easy. Let’s just say that the messages represent two of the functions of the CMC – Central Maintenance Computer – of the airplane :

1/- A report from the flight warning computer on what is showing on the instrument panels : PFDs, ECAM…etc…

2/- A report from the different BITEs that are present in each system, comparators…etc… They are , I repeat once again, totally transparent to the flight crew, but for us they could give a better picture of what is happening.

I confess I had a terrible problem sorting things out as I started with the assumption that the messages came out on the ground telex machine in their order of detection…It is not so, and thanks to Mandala’s good work, we’ve arrived at a logical linkage of all the messages.

I also had to very carefully take caution as to wheter these messages are genuine failures or just transients. I now believe that these faults / failures are for real and there was no indication – or logical explanation – of a return to normal functions.

So I propose that first we’d introduce you to the messages as they appeared on the initial summary document, then Mandala would walk you through what we think was the actual chain of events.

Bear with us, it’s quite interesting.

So here is the decode of all the messages in the order of the first summary :

0210Z

A/P OFF : The AFS monitors the air data from the ADRs. Any brutal variation of CAS, ALT, Mach causes the A/P to disengage : here, as the pitot system is suspect, a variation of 20kt or Mach.04 for .45 second is enough to disconnect both FDs and the A/P.

Reactive windshear detection: with the ADRs been rejected by the AFS,, AoA is not accessible any more.

F/CTL Alternate Law : is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition. The flight Control Laws revert , from “Normal Law” to “Alternate Law 2”. The Prims are in charge of the voting and elimination of a duff ADR, but it takes them 10 seconds to do so (threshold is 16 kt / 10 sec.

Flight Director Flag on captain’s PFD

Flight Director Flag on F/O’s PFD

Auto Throttle OFF (These last three should have appeared at the same time as the A/P OFF warning.)

TCAS Fault : Result of the loss of the associated ADR (for altitude data)

Speed Limit Flag on Captain’s PFD

Speed Limit Flag on F/O’s PFD ( these two result of rejected Airspeed information by the EFCS, might be a sign of the PROT LOST, which hasn’t been indicated)

Rudder Travel Limiter Fault is normally a result of the “ADR DISAGREE” condition.

EFCS 1 Fault on Maintenance Status

EFCS 2 Fault on Maintenance Status

Probe-Pitot 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3 / (9DA. Relates to Heating element PITOT 1

Primary Flight Computer #2 (ADIRU1 signal to Prim 2)

0211Z

FPV Flag on Captain’s PFD

FPV Flag on F/O’s PFD

Speed or Mach function on ISIS (Suspect loss of ADIRU 3 for ISIS MACH )

IR2 Fault (Discrete data streams = Pitot, Static , TAT, OAT to ADIRU 2)

0212Z

ADR DISAGREE : TOOK IT A LONG TIME TO APPEAR NOW !

0213Z

Primary Flight Computer #1 Fault (Crew manipulation suspected, on ADR DISAGREE C/L )

Secondary Flight Computer #1 Fault ——Idem———————-

ADR2 Fault on Maintenance Status Another very late message

Intermittent Fault on FMGEC #1

0214Z

Cabin Vertical speed Advisory. We now believe that this advisory message is just a result of ADR data

There is a glaring conclusion : there is no way that the ACARS have been transmitted in the order of the summary.

Firstly because we find a 0212z event in the middle of the 0211 ones, and the same for two 0213Z’s between 0214z messages…

Secondly, it is also obvious that the ADR DISAGREE message/warning is too late in view of all the happenings that should have been its consequences.

But looking at the system, we can see in fact the trouble-shooting “reasoning” of the system facing multiple incoherent data at the same time.

The explanation will come in the second part, in which we deal with the time tags and propose one – for us the most logical – chain of events.

————-

In the discussions I’ve had with several other parties, it did appear that the ACARS decode done by the Eurocockpit is definitely not in order (which isn’t surprising)…

BUT, it also appeared that the leaked ACARS Headers List we saw early on that was leaked to the press, also was not in order, which baffled most of us…

We have so far believed that the messages would be timestamped in order… Which was, correct, but, it was correct to the minute… within the minute, nothing guarantees it.

Here is the “original” list:

pic

It appears that there are some prioritizing of messages within the same minute. This can explain why in the latter parts, there were some stuff not in order but the minutes were still stamped to time of occurence.

Certain parts really gave some puzzling and befuddlement (is that even a word?)… stuff like, why did the NAV DISAGREE come out so late, and why was there an IR problem when we’re suspecting an ADR problem… etc, etc, etc.

The clues lie much deeper than originally thought, and again, the Air Caraibes internal technical note provided one of the best assistance in understanding the AF447 ACARS messages… of course, technical drawings, wirings, fault isolation possibilities of the CMC messages… the documents I have (which is still far from what’s required) already 153 pages… with many more pages to print and scour through.

This is still far from finished… The data posted still have some further reading to cross check, like, how does the Air Data Module work such as air data sampling rates, self data storage, how it starts and reboots when needed, data filtering functions, and what functions it carries in each probe (certain documents reveal multiple functions), etc, etc….

And then how come an ADR affect the IR functions of the ADIRUs, etc etc, denergizing ADIRU after ADR switch off doesn’t give the OFF light, etc etc… and many many more stuff…

All the above, must then be cross checked with the background systems information and general logic (from the FCOMs) to cross check further interrelationships between components and modules, where the data is pooled and channeled to downstream users and via which processors etc.

This does put a test to my systems engineering knowledge to the limit from previous works (which coincidentally, involved ADRs and IRs, and integration into NAV and output displays, etc)…

We have some way to go… but this is what’s deduced for the moment… The expanded explanation is incomplete, it is subject to change, subject to ammendments, and albeit backed by documentation, there’s no guarantee that this is correct… but then, it’s better than just picking stuff out of the air.

This is the list reordered…

0209 START

0210 34-11-15-0 FLR EFCS2

EFCS1, AFS – PROBE PITOT 1+2/2+3/1+3 (9DA)

9DA=HEATING ELEMENT PITOT 1 (6DA1/PHC1)

Heating Element Pitot 1 suspected failed.

0210 27-93-34-0 FLR EFCS1

EFCS2-FCPC2(2CE2) WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2

No Data from ADIRU 1, ADR 1 & 2 no sending signal to FCPC2

No ADR Data from ADIRU 1 to PRIM2.

0210 27-90-45-5 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS1

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

0210 27-90-45-0 WRN MXSTAT

EFCS2

ERROR NOTICED – Air Data Fluctuation/Inconsistency

0210 22-10-00-0 WRN AUTO FLT

AP OFF

Autopilot Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting autopilot into making the wrong actions.

Commence AP/FD FAULT ISOLATION PROCEDURE

System Filter & Check:

– DISAGREE AOA Sensor Data in FCPCs

– DISAGREE PITOT PROBE Data in FCPCs

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 2

– FAIL ADIRU 1 and 3

– FAIL ADIRU 2 and 3

– FAIL ADIRUs

0210 22-62-01-0 WRN AUTO FLT

REAC W/S DET FAULT

Loss of 2 ADRs, autopilot cannot provide Windshear Protection.

0210 27-91-00-5 WRN F/CTL

ALTN LAW

2 ADR REJECTED, NAV DISAGREE NOT YET CONCLUDED – FAULT ISOLATION IN PROGRESS

0210 22-83-00-2 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for LEFT seat.

0210 22-83-01-2 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD SPD LIMIT

Rejected ADR still feeding data to PFD

If there is valid ADR, it’s not being selected for RIGHT seat.

0210 22-30-02-5 WRN AUTO FLT

A/THR OFF

Autothrust Shut off for safety, result loss of 2 Valid Air Data Channels.

This prevents faulty Air Data from affecting Autothrust into making the wrong actions.

0210 34-43-00-5 WRN NAV

TCAS FAULT

Loss of ADR1 to Transponder 1 (if selected) or Loss of ADR2 to Transponder2 (if selected)

Loss of Mode C.

This is downstream of loss of ADR.

0210 22-83-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

0210 22-83-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO F/D

Automatic Flight System (AFS/FMGC) loss of 2 ADR sources.

Safety mechanism, prevents erroneous F/D for pilot to follow

0210 27-23-02-0 WRN F/CTL

RUD TRV LIM FAULT

Loss valid of ADR Data (require 2 ADRs) for FMGC/AFS

FMGC Flight Envelope Module locks in Rudder Travel for safety.

0211 34-12-34-0 FLR IR2

EFCS1X,IR1,IR3, ADIRU2 (1FP2)

ADIRU2(1FP2) – ADR2 self monitoring & PHC rejects own data

Loss of discrete data from ADR2 = PITOT 2, STATIC 2L, STATIC 2R, TAT 2, AOA 2.

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

0211 34-12-00-0 FLR ISIS

ISIS (22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION

SUSPECT LOSS OF ADIRU1 AND/OR ADIRU3 FOR ISIS MACH

Suspect Loss of ADIRU3

NAV DISAGREE CONCLUSION DELAYED – ADDITIONAL FAILURES – RECOMMENCE FAULT ISOL

0211 34-12-00-1 WRN FLAG

LEFT PFD NO FPV

0211 34-12-01-1 WRN FLAG

RIGHT PFD NO FPV

0212 34-10-40-0 WRN NAV

ADR DISAGREE

NAV DISAGREE DISCOVERED – FAULT ISOLATION COMPLETED

Due to no further ADR faults occuring.

0213 27-90-02-5 WRN F/CTL

PRIM1 FAULT

0213 27-90-04-0WRN F/CTL

SEC1 FAULT

0213 22-83-34-9FLR AFS

FMGEC1(1CA1)

0214 34-10-36-0WRN MXSTAT

ADR2

RESULT OF 32-12-34-0

0214 21-31-00-2WRN ADVSRY

CABIN VERTICAL SPEED

LOSS OF ADR DATA

————

Be warned, the above is still incomplete. More cross checking is needed. The failures here aren’t simply upstream faults leading to downstream failures, but there are some “same level” data feed, and “upstream” data feeds… and I do not guarantee the above is correct.

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