FolhaOnline – FAB Nota/Podcast – FAA Upset Recovery Training Video
03/07/2009 – — 08h38
para a Folha (English Translation)
The Brazilian authorities performing the autopsy on the bodies of victims of the collapse of Airbus were the target of criticism for disclosure, in this Thursday, the report of the BEA (Bureau of Investigations and Analysis), which handles the investigation of the causes of the accident.
Alain Bouillard of BEA, said that the autopsy reports could provide more clues about the final moments of flight 447, but the [BEA] body has not had access to information. The application has already been done to the Brazilian authorities, but there is no date for receiving the reports,” said Bouillard.
The Secretariat of Social Defense of Pernambuco denied that he is hindering the access of the data to the French, but not informed that the reports have been delivered to BEA.
It was the second time in 15 days that the BEA is expressed on the supposed difficulty of France in obtaining information on the autopsies, which are being made in the IML (Institute of Legal Medicine) from Recife.
On June 17, the agency said that, besides the lack of data, a French doctor was not allowed to attend the examinations. According to the State Department, four experts from France – a commander of police, a researcher, a dental surgeon and a medical follow-on work since June 10.
These experts, informed, act as observers, but have free access to work and participate in daily meetings held by the coroner, when reports are prepared and defined conclusions. Of the 51 bodies found, 35 have been identified.
The BEA also raised doubts, in the airplane crash, to analyze the communications of flight controllers. To Bouillard was not “normal” a delay of six hours between the disappearance of the aircraft and the start of the alarm of disaster and their searches.
The plane made the last contact by radio with Brazil at 22h33. Should get in touch again at 23h20 at the point Tasil (1,200 km from Natal), the border area under control and the responsibility of the Brazilian Senegal.
As the plane was not reported to 23h20, Bouillard says that after three minutes there should be contact between the Brazilian and Senegalese drivers. “This is one of the axes of research: find out why took so long for the warning messages are launched,” he said.
Resgate de Corpos do navio da Marinha /
FORÇA AÉREA BRASILEIRA
03/07/2009 – 10h07
NOTE ON THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT OF AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 447 (AFR 447) (English Translated)(Emphasis mine)
On July 2, 2009 at 10am (schedule of Brasília), the Bureau d’Investigations et D’Analysis of I’Aviation Pour la Securite Civile (BEA) released the preliminary report on the investigation of the accident with the flight AFR 447, occurred on May 31.
Aiming to eliminate doubts about the procedures adopted by the Brazilian aviation authority in relation to that event, the Center states the following:
the AFR Flight 447, as most scheduled flights of commercial aircraft internationally, uses a flight plan called Plan regular flight, given that performance, the route and timing of aircraft are usually the same. Such plans are offered by their airlines to all the air traffic control instructed the control of the aircraft on the route planned for the flight, regardless of the country to which they belong. This procedure was followed in the case of the AFR 447.
- at 22h33 on 31 May, the crew of the AFR 447 was the last radio contact with the body of Brazilian air traffic control, telling the time estimated that over the next virtual positions specified in the route. Immediately after the body of Brazilian air traffic control (ACC ATLANTIC) reported to the Control Center of Dakar (ACC DAKAR) AFR 447 that would be in position to 23h20 virtual TASIL, given that from that position, it to Dakar control over the handling of the aircraft towards France. DAKAR The ACC confirmed the receipt of such information.
- it is noted that, through an operational agreement between the two countries (Brazil and Senegal), if an aircraft enters the airspace of Dakar in the schedule, or even three minutes after this time, does not need any communication between the bodies air traffic control in question to formalize the transfer of the flight. Consequently, at 23h20 on the AFR control 447 now, theoretically, to control the ACC DAKAR, since there was no question that the ACC aircraft.
- this is a region where air traffic control is performed mainly by communication, it DAKAR ACC to give the entrance of the aircraft in its airspace, at 23h20, and warn about possible problems such as lack of radio contact with the AFR 447.
- in the case of AFR 447 was not at any time capture satellite signal transmission of the emergency equipment (ELT), and also any aircraft over a route received request for assistance through the international emergency frequency (121.5 MHz ).
- only to 1:20 a.m. the day June 1, the ACC DAKAR asked the national air traffic control on the position of Brazilian AFR 447. Thus, at 2:20 a.m. the SALVAERO Recife initiated necessary actions for the start of the air operation to locate the missing aircraft, through the original procedures for finding information.
- accordingly, to 03h40 of the day June 1, the SALVAERO Recife triggered the means of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), and the first plane, at sunrise, was in the movement to perform visual searches the route overflown the AFR 447.
Finally, it emphasized that the entire recording of the wording related to AFR Flight 447 was sent to the BEA, which is a procedure which is part of the collection of data necessary to analyze the dynamics of flight.
Brigadeiro do Ar Antonio Carlos Moretti Bermudez
Chefe do CENTRO DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL DA AERONÁUTICA
Listen to the audio at the time the body of Brazilian air traffic control (ACC ATLANTIC) reported to the Control Center of Dakar (ACC DAKAR) AFR 447 that the virtual TASIL be in position to 23h20.
An aviation industry working group — headed by representatives of Airbus, The Boeing Co. and Flight Safety Foundation — in November 2008 introduced the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2, which includes a new supplement called “High Altitude Operations: Supplement #1 to the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid.” The first version of the training aid was published in 1998, and Revision 1 was published in August 2004.
The supplement says, “This document … addresses the issues associated with operations, unintentional slowdowns and recoveries in the high altitude environment [above Flight Level 250 (approximately 25,000 ft)]. While the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid addressed airplanes with 100 seats or greater, the information in this document is directly applicable to most all jet airplanes that routinely operate in this environment. … Consult the operations manual for your airplane type, as that information takes precedent to the following guidance.”
The training aid, which discusses high altitude aerodynamics and flight techniques, was developed at the request of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a result of safety recommendations issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board after its investigation of a high altitude loss of control accident, as well as other accidents and incidents that have occurred during the past 10 years in low altitude conditions and high altitude conditions.
The complete training aid (including the supplement and with 2008 changes marked in the margins), can be downloaded using the following link:
Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2 (November 2008) [443 pages, PDF 25.8M]
The supplement as a separate document can be downloaded using the following link:
The following items from the compact disc in the training aid binder can be downloaded separately using the following links:
Appendix 3-B, “Airplane Upset Recovery Briefing” [89 slides, PDF 12.7M]
Appendix 3-E, “Airplane Upset Recovery: High Altitude Operations” [54 slides, PPS 7.1M]
Download directly FAA Web site: