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AF 447 : a Synopsis of a Synopsis

“I’m sure that Airbus and EADS and the FAA (as well as Thales) are now quietly aware that they each played their part in this accident. How? Well they never studied the possible ramifications of a Thales pitot icing event at high level – and what sort of confusion and control problems it could lead to. They came up with a quite innocuous Service Bulletin and a fatuous homespun procedure for pilots to simply fly “power and attitude” once the speed indication becomes suspect and the ADIRS turns introspective.”

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… now in case of a serious incident related to the pitot probes. In fact, (ref BEA Report Annex 5), in this case, the crew must perform 9 ECAM procedures, 1 procedure and 3 procedures QRH paper, hence the need for a single procedure “BLOCKING PITOT”Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien (Records of Black Aviation)

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da Folha Online 23/07/2009 – 17h17 (English Translation)

Identified 49 of the 50 recovered bodies of victims of the Air France flight 447

The Secretariat of Social Defense of Pernambuco announced on the afternoon of Thursday that six more bodies of victims of the accident with the aircraft of Air France – which fell into the Atlantic Ocean on May 31 this year, when 447 was the flight from Rio to Paris – were identified.

Therefore, up to 49 the number of bodies identified by the IML (Instituto Médico Legal) from Recife, a total of 50 bodies and rescued by Navy Aeronautics.

According to the Bureau, identified the six victims were male, three Brazilians and three foreigners. Three occupants were identified exclusively from DNA tests and the other three also with the aid of dental examinations.

Only one body has not yet been identified, a male victim. At the request of families, the names of the occupants of the plane of Air France identified are not disclosed. The nationalities of the three foreigners were not informed.

According to [Secretariat of Social Defense of Pernambuco], work to identify the six bodies were completed on the last Tuesday (21), but released only today.

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Crash of flight AF 447 – Published on 25/07/2009 07:56 | File Gil Bousquet

The CEAT has unveiled yesterday the remnants of the returnees Airbus in Toulouse.

The expertise will begin in August

It is in the quiet lobby of the 42 test center near Aviation Balma de Toulouse (CEAT) that are now stored the debris of the Airbus flight Rio-Paris. Yesterday, for the first time, investigators have released the 650 elements of the A330, which arrived by convoy on the outskirts of Toulouse last week for technical expertise. The first work of the investigators is the identification of various debris and the sealing of each of them. The soldiers of the gendarmerie of the air (GTA) who conduct the investigation under the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Xavier Mulot (see below) are supported by five to eight people in the Investigations Section after the incident or accident CEAT . Also with the help of four including two forensic experts were present at Balma, the dozen investigators begin toulousains expert “in the month of August.”

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Second convoy in August

These experts will analyze the documents carefully to try to understand what happened. The bending, deformation, breaks and cuts from different parts of the aircraft will be investigated through metallurgical tests and then used to develop hypotheses to explain the crash. The experts also looking for possible signs of combustion including electrical circuits. If doubts about traces of explosives appear, leave the room for the criminal research institute in Paris. In their work, investigators have attempted to reconstruct the skeleton of the plane wreck gathered Wednesday Through a serial number inscribed on the coins or their composition, the experts are able to determine what part of the plane corresponds debris.

They are among 650 (recovered by the Brazilian Army) in August which added 450 new pieces collected by the french ship Le Mistral. This second wave of parts arrive at Toulon in August and will be transported to Toulouse by road convoy. The personal items of passengers on the Airbus had already been repatriated at Roissy by diplomatic pouch. But a tiny part of the aircraft was recovered. It is especially lightweight often trade (galleys, seats …) that do not provide a decisive. The building blocks such as landing gear, wings and the nose of the aircraft are based by 3 000 to 5 000 meters deep. This investigation was entrusted to an elite aviation investigators with powerful tools coordinated by the policeman who led the investigation into the crash of the Concorde.

The slopes of the investigation

Without the black boxes (see above, against), experts have unfortunately little elements. In total, 1 100 debris collected represent only 2 to 3% of the A330 damaged at sea, at most. With so few elements, we will do that probabilities can not deduct any reliable scenario, “said Ronan Hubert, Director, Office of Archives of aircraft accidents (BAAA). Messages Accars who reported 24 outages in four minutes before losing contact with the Airbus will be very valuable. “It happened something very unusual” says a source close to the investigation. One of the specialties of CEAT is the resistance of the systems and subsystems for various electromagnetic attacks like lightning that could strike the aircraft. The BEA will continue to investigate the pitot probes.

The black boxes

Research continues on the area of the crash of the Airbus. Even if the transponders are no longer the objective of the research teams is to locate the wreckage of the aircraft. Housed in the rear part of the Airbus, the black boxes may be obtained through the submarine Ifremer and its arms. “It is quite feasible, it still must find the wreckage,” says one aviation expert. To find it, we must explore deep and relief using a sonar. Problem: The area to cover supposed to be the impact of aircraft on the water is immense and reaches 16 000 km2. The new grid will last four to six weeks. A sonar survey of the terrain is towed marine cable at the end of 1 500 meters long on the “Why not? “To locate the wreckage.

Air France : anger pilots

Four unions of pilots of Air France Tuesday wrote to the boss of the company to demand action “visible” to improve security in the daily operation of the airline. After the trauma created by the accident of flight AF447 Paris-Rio on June 1 which was 228 dead, Alter, R’Way, SPAF and Unpl believe it is “urgent and precautionary measures visible prior to more profound reform of the functioning of the company. Pilots talk of “failure of the company” on the flight safety and are demanding that the management of flight safety is directly linked to the Chief Executive. “Now it is a sub-fife who has no power” as the leader of one of the unions.

The families of victims

According to a judicial source, the National Federation of victims of disasters (Fenvac) and 36 families of victims have made civil parties in the investigation into the accident of flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro-Paris.

Lawyers for the families and the Fenvac will have access to file and will be able to make requests for investigative action. Counsel for the first family Civil Party, Me Sophie Bottai, had said in June that “some families of victims felt that the whole truth was not known” and “see a manifest filtering of information” . Since opening on June 5 in Paris of the investigation against X for manslaughter, no request for damages was rejected by one of the judges, Sylvie Zimmerman. The President of the Union of Air France pilots, Gérard Arnoux, who wants to Civil Party, has stated that it “did not believe the unions are welcome in this case” and feared that the trail of “the human error “is preferred.


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Investigators piece together wreckage from doomed Air France jet (Contains Investigation Video)

France 24 – July 25, 2009

The French bureau leading the technical side of the investigation into the crash of Air France flight 447 on June 1 said this month that an initial study of crash debris showed the plane was intact when it hit the Atlantic Ocean. The cause of the crash, however, is still unknown.

The flight’s black boxes have never been found. Over the next few months, four experts will be analyzing all the wreckage, which thus far includes 650 pieces of debris.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Xavier Mulot, chief investigator for AF flight 447, “We’re expecting a lot from this study because, thanks to the way the debris was broken and traces of burns, it’ll eventually allow us to understand what happened.”

Aeronautical specialists are combing through hundreds of pages of documents, examining everything from flight records to mechanical inspections.

They are also reviewing a map showing where the passengers were seated during the flight, with the seat assignments of the 51 bodies recovered marked in colour.

Since the tragedy occured, investigators have come up with more than 200 documents for their files.

Families of the victims of last month’s crash have registered as civil plaintiffs in the French courts to gain access to the case files, officials said on Thursday.

The head of an association representing families of those killed in the crash of flight 447 had earlier this month accused Air France of keeping relatives in the dark about the accident.


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English Version:  According to Lieutenant-Colonel Xavier Mulot, chief investigator for AF flight 447, “We’re expecting a lot from this study because, thanks to the way the debris was broken and traces of burns, it’ll eventually allow us to understand what happened.”  The video also stated  there were 650 pieces of aircraft and another 450 to arrive in August.

Caution: Most pilot forums have concluded that “Lieutenant-Colonel Xavier Mulot did not say that trace of burn were actually observed, only that he was merely exploring possibilities and… another BEA technical expert was interviewed (on other TV channels) and they were more cautious about this study given the available data.”  Other French TV (France2) channels apparently show a part of the landing gear were also recovered.

French TV (Videos) (JT video appears to be same as France24)(AF 447 begins approx 12-15 in middle of broadcast)

JT de 13h http://jt.france2.fr/player/13h/index-fr.php?jt=20090724&timeStamp=739

JT de 20h http://jt.france2.fr/player/20h/index-fr.php?jt=20090724&timeStamp=663

France 3 http://jt.france3.fr/player/soir3/index-fr.php?jt=20090724

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Disclaimer:  The following information is based on the above France 24 video and is speculative, however most respected pilot forum commenters have concluded based on the assumption the aircraft seated 219 passengers, and 216 passengers were on board, leaving 3 seats vacant:

Seats 29B and 39B are colored white and may have been vacant.

Assuming that 29B and 39B were vacant, the numbers are:

  • forward cabin: 8 of 40 seats is 20.0%
  • midships: 9 of 75 seats is 12.0%
  • aft: 21 of 102 seats is 20.6%
  • Aisles A,B: 8 of 58 seats is 13.8%
  • Aisles J,K 16 of 62 seats is 25.8%
  • Center aisles D,E,F,G: 14 of 97 seats is 14.4%
  • Starboard/Right side: 24 of 108 seats is 22.2%
  • Port/Left side: 14 of 104 seats is 13.5%

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Additional Pilot Forum Questions/Comments:

  • Where was the third vacant seat?
  • The Galley is from further back and not from the 2nd door area as we thought.
  • What I find interesting: “more in the section just rear of doors L3/R3… Which is where a split might occur in a nose up low forward velocity “pancake fall”… but then, maybe just a coincidence.”

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France24 Video Close-up of Identified Passengers/Seating


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AF 447: The crew of Air France had long warned …

Eurocockpit (English Translation)

BEA has launched the press on a siding track conditions of the impact of the plane, we can now avoid to address the conditions that led to the impact of the aircraft. Thus, the consequences of losing control of the aircraft that are preferred to the cause of this loss of control. The management of Air France is beginning to suggest that the crew could not know how to use his radar. The BEA and Air France and converge slowly towards the fault of the crew would have embedded in the huge huge storm, which seems to fix all the world … While Pitot probes have always temporary ban (permanently) to be the cause of the accident … While this fact of the failure of the Pitot is proved (ACARS) and that its consequences are already known, seems to be undertaken to be absolutely rejected.

According to the BEA and Air France, Pitot failure would be “a cause” but “not the cause” of the main accident … What would be so then the “other causes” and “THE” original cause another? Nobody said … It is just obviously necessary that there be other causes, or that asserts without evidence that there are others, because if only the Pitot as the main origin of this accident the responsibilities may be overwhelming for many …

We understand much better what obsessive behavior – to exclude any cost Pitot – the crew of Air France had previously warned the company by reporting incident particularly detailed. Clearly, they were not taken into account as they should have been.

These incident reports are called ASR (Air Safety Report) and the regulations are sent to the airline but also on BEA and the Authority (DGCA, EASA). The ASR should enable those entities to identify potential risks that reveal the reported situations and take preventive measures to avoid these risks. In addition, the RAS should be used to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents or accidents which reported the incident could be a precursor …

In retrospect of the occurrence of the AF 447 and given the formal role of these reports of an incident, it is more qu’édifiant to read the ASR previously created and transmitted … obviously for nothing …

Therefore, measuring the willingness to declare that the cause of the accident, allegedly unknown, can not and will never be the failure of the Pitot tube. One thing is certain in this investigation long, complicated and clear: this is not what we do not whether this, or anything but out of pity, not Pitot!

“Chronicles of a reported accident” has tragically been the title of each ASR Eurocockpit which delivers a prime example.

This is a flight of Air France, Paris (CDG) to Antananarivo (TNR) xx/08/2008 on the Airbus A340, registration F-GNIH.

Thus it is forbidden to think, except at the risk of criminalizing Pitot …, the sequence of ACARS messages for this flight – and they reflect failures – is the same as the AF 447 … Also on the flight day, the duration of the incident is about 4 minutes …

The crew was faced with the alarm stall (STALL) – announcing that the flight was driving dangerously affected – but did not appear voluntarily CLB and the power base of 5 ° – Cabrera – provided by the “Actuation of emergency.” Instead of responding as well, the captain brought the aircraft down. Moreover, the crew was fortunate to recover quickly enough indication of correct speed … What may be missed in the middle of the night, with the AF 447.

R is “translated” into plain language or accompanied by comments as to its place when it can facilitate our understanding for lay readers. For a better understanding of the situation, we suggest to all our readers to extinguish the bright lights, putting himself in a night and read the ASR in less than 4 minutes …

IMPORTANT NOTE: it is “in the right circles” that there were actually 10 ASR (not 6) written on the subject. Everyone will understand the exceptional collection of work that the profession must do if we do not want the BEA “forgets” a little too quickly on these issues Pitot probes. It is the honor of the profession, the memory of our colleagues and that of their passengers. If you have written, or if you know a colleague who wrote a RAS on the subject, if you have access to such a document, please contact us. We guarantee the anonymity of our sources, never betrayed a guarantee for 10 years now. crew@eurocockpit.com.


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AIR SAFETY REPORT – 1/6

FGNIH AF908 CDG – TNR – STALL ALARM INFORMATION AND LOSS OF SPEED ON THE PFD

CBD PF in the left seat and OPL XXXXX PNF in the right seat, OPL XXXXX rest.

The captain sits on the left seat, he is the driver function (PF) on this trip, a co-pilot seat is right and responsible tasks of the pilot not in function (PNF), while a other rests.

At FL 370 with a SAT to -51 ° C and a wind from 080 to about 18 Kts on AWY UB612 with an OFFSET 1R, between the OBD and MLK in radio contact with Khartoum, as we were at the edge of cloud with some slight turbulence, I tied PAX. We were at dusk with low brightness.

The aircraft was 000 feet at 37, moved along a nautical mile on the right of the route followed, in accordance with existing regulations in this region to prevent the risk of collision with other aircraft using the same route in reverse . The term “limit layer” means that the flight took place just above a cloud layer.

Then we entered the layer, and soon after we started having a slight burning smell that lasted about twenty seconds and that did not appear to be of volcanic origin (no smell of rotten eggs), but rather electrical smell to me and smell the air conditioning for the OPL. Then the smell has disappeared. The odor was confirmed by the PAX booth and PNC between rows 3 and 14 thereafter.

The aircraft did not change altitude, entering the cloud layer due to the diffuse and irregular aspect thereof, parts of which are higher than others.

We had the weather radar in motion on calibrated without echoes still apparent in the layer and approximately one minute after the smell of burning, we had severe turbulence. I did the message “Here the cockpit sitting PNC Attached turbulence. I reduced the speed of Mach 0.80 (a little over green dot).

The weather radar was no storm. When the aircraft entered a zone turbulence, the captain made the announcement for the rest of the crew sit and focus, the passengers having been preventively the same record in lighting of the light signal. The captain then slightly reduced speed (Mach) of the aircraft to bring it below the maximum recommended speed in turbulence. The captain pointed out that this reduction in speed brought the aircraft to fly with a low margin of speed over the speed called “green dot” corresponding to the minimum speed to meet operating and calculated according to a report to stall speed “down”.

A few seconds after the indication of speed on the PFD passes abruptly OPL 280 Kts to 100 Kts in the red band and it lasted for many seconds. At the same time on the PFD variation CBD high speed with speed 15Kts green dot less speed and a trend at least 50 Kts.

The speed shown on the screen of the first moves suddenly and abruptly from 280 knots (518 km / h) at 100 knots (185 km / h) and remains at this value for many seconds. At the same time on the screen of the Commander, the speed begins to vary with a very high amplitude, reaching a value of less than 15 knots at the minimum speed “green dot”. The display of the speed trend “(indication of the trend calculations speed) is below 50 knots, which means that the speed will be lower than 50 knots within 10 seconds if the force of acceleration (which is ie a deceleration) remains constant.

At the same time (it was 15:10 GMT) Red Alarm A / P OFF and then in the wake alarm amber ADR Disagree, IAS DISCREPENCY, ALTN LAW LOST PROT, W REAC / S FAULT DET.

15h11 monitoring of the alarm RUD TRV LIM amber FAULT.

At the same time, at 15.10 UTC, the autopilot disconnects and multiple alarms appear on the central screen. Editor’s note: These alarms are also messages on ACARS flight AF 447 …

Followed immediately by the alarm STALL STALL STALL (without the associated alarm cricket) with TOGA LK. As I always speed trend within 50 Kts, I steered the plane manually, with a call for light downhill and turn right to exit the AWY. The aircraft responding very weakly with the CBD several regressions PFD speed in the lower red stripe. At the same time I asked the OPL to send a MAYDAY. During the descent noise impact (hail?) Heard in the cockpit.

The stall alarm “STALL” immediately sounds and a message appears indicating that the engine thrust is fixed to the value of maximum thrust (TOGA). The captain pilot in the aircraft manual and the aircraft is descending into account the loss of speed which, if true, would only stall. In this logic, it must be down to try and retrieve speed. It also urges a turn to leave the route and avoid the risk of collision with a device located in a lower flight level on the same road.

Descent to FL 340. The aircraft speed is correct again I disconnected the ATHR out of TOGA LK. The rate is similar side CBD and OPL, but down 2 on the PFD speed scale indication SPD LIM red remained until the end of the flight.

Descent to FL 340. The aircraft speed is correct again I disconnected the ATHR out of TOGA LK. The rate is similar side CBD and OPL, but down 2 on the PFD speed scale indication SPD LIM red remained until the end of the flight.

After being in the emergency management of the aircraft, the crew focuses on the “IAS DOUBTFUL. Then, the speed seemed again consistent Commander rehire mechanics.

At no time have we had ice detection alarm.

I woke up the second OPL was at rest, then we addressed the ECAM checklist.

Descent to FL 330 and then cancel the MAYDAY and continued flight at this level.

The aircraft fell in ALT LAW (MAX IAS 330Kts/M.82) I have a favorite beach area expanded flight and continued the flight at Mach 0.80.

The deterioration of the Steering Law (Alternate Law) and the resulting loss of protection caused by this event led the Commander to increase its speed margin in relation to stall high and low. He therefore decided to continue the flight at a lower altitude (33 000 feet instead of 37 000 feet at the time of the incident) and at a speed of Mach 0.80.

At the balance sheet:

ALT LAW aircraft confirmed by the status and crosses on the PFD amber;

  • REAC W/S DET FAULT;
  • ALT LAW PROT LOST;
  • ADR DISAGREE et F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (2 NOGO);
  • FOR LDG USE FLAP 3.

The messages of failure and the aircraft configuration match what the messages reveal ACARS flight AF 477

It is important to note that the indication on the circuit of the screen SD of RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER was amber, but halfway between neutral and full deflection rudder. Contact with the CCP for what was the state of the cabin and PAX. Only the strong turbulence was felt by PAX. I called SAT COM maintenance to further research the issues and their subsequent recommendations we reset all the computers VOL PRIM and SEC without any result. (at that time we had the fuel for a return to NCE or FCO).

The crew finds that the excess deflection of the rudder is fixed at a value between neutral and full deflection. The loss of RUD TRV LIM (Editor’s note: also present in the messages of ACARS 447) led the blocking of excess travel. The Commander shall contact the Chief Cabine Principal to inquire about the situation in the cabin. The contact with the satellite communication services now resulted in the suggestion of an attempt to “reset” of computers to control flight (PRIM and SEC), which does not recover the operating system inoperative.

The crew finds that the excess deflection of the rudder is fixed at a value between neutral and full deflection. The loss of RUD TRV LIM (Editor’s note: also present in the messages of ACARS 447) led the blocking of excess travel. The Commander shall contact the Chief Cabine Principal to inquire about the situation in the cabin. The contact with the satellite communication services now resulted in the suggestion of an attempt to “reset” of computers to control flight (PRIM and SEC), which does not recover the operating system inoperative.  New call SAT COM QB who has not found any additional explanation on the difference in steering component, then the CCO to see them for the theft and troubleshooting of the aircraft, the return to Europe n ‘as much as possible with the remaining fuel, the problem then the decision to continue on TNR or divert to RUN. Decision to continue on TNR with a request for me to postpone the revival of colleagues who had to return the aircraft in view of CDG 05h00 minimum fault-finding to TNR.

The crew finds a contradiction between two checklists to be applied (Editor’s note: one more!), One seeking to land with the flaps in position 2 and the other with the flaps in position 3 (robberies involving different speeds and distances different landing …). Contacts with maintenance services (QB) do not provide an explanation. Editor’s note: The crew will have to “cope”. It provides a diversion to La Reunion (RUN) and decides to continue on Antananarivo.’’

We have continued the flight with the pitot heat on and on radar calibration MAX.

Is doubt as to the origin of the problem, but apparently in suspecting the Pitot …, the crew continued the flight with starting the manual heating Pitot probes, to overcome any possible malfunctioning of automatic heating and using the radar on the maximum sensitivity, to overcome a possible malfunction of the radar gain setting “calibrated”.

Is important to note that the indication on the circuit of the screen SD of RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER was amber, but halfway between neutral and full deflection rudder. Contact with the CCP for what was the state of the cabin and PAX. Only the strong turbulence was felt by PAX. I called SAT COM maintenance to further research the issues and their subsequent recommendations we reset all the computers VOL PRIM and SEC without any result. (at that time we had the fuel for a return to NCE or FCO).

The crew finds that the excess deflection of the rudder is fixed at a value between neutral and full deflection. The loss of RUD TRV LIM (Editor’s note: also present in the messages of ACARS 447) led the blocking of excess travel. The Commander shall contact the Chief Cabine Principal to inquire about the situation in the cabin. The contact with the satellite communication services now resulted in the suggestion of an attempt to “reset” of computers to control flight (PRIM and SEC), which does not recover the operating system inoperative.

On the checklist developed for F / CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST) could be read to APPR PROC FOR USE LDG FLAP 3. (There is no indication in the QRH on the table of correction after failure) by the developed against the F / CTL RUD TRV LIM in APPR PROC FAULT FOR USE LDG FLAP 2, which is confirmed by the QRH in the table of correction fail. As it appeared that discrepancies between the QRH requesting arise part 2 and the status which requires us to ask strands 3 and it was therefore necessary to conduct further research and therefore the decision of a later call to QB. New call SAT COM QB who has not found any additional explanation on the difference in steering component, then the CCO to see them for the theft and troubleshooting of the aircraft, the return to Europe n ‘as much as possible with the remaining fuel, the problem then the decision to continue on TNR or divert to RUN. Decision to continue on TNR with a request for me to postpone the revival of colleagues who had to return the aircraft in view of CDG 05h00 minimum fault-finding to TNR.

The crew finds a contradiction between two checklists to be applied (Editor’s note: one more!), One seeking to land with the flaps in position 2 and the other with the flaps in position 3 (robberies involving different speeds and distances different landing …). Contacts with maintenance services (QB) do not provide an explanation. Editor’s note: The crew will have to “cope”. It provides a diversion to La Reunion (RUN) and decides to continue on Antananarivo.

We continued the flight with the pitot heat on and on radar calibration MAX.

In doubt as to the origin of the problem, but apparently in suspecting the Pitot …, the crew continued the flight with starting the manual heating Pitot probes, to overcome any possible malfunctioning of automatic heating and using the radar on the maximum sensitivity, to overcome a possible malfunction of the radar gain setting “calibrated”.

It should be noted that throughout the down ALT LAW, the aircraft was not responding to my request regression speed via the control of the FCU SPD (we were in the Open), and I therefore disengage the AP for reducing speed. Piloting the plane gave me the impression of an airplane flying very soft, which was not the feeling of flying during takeoff and climb. Because of the difference between the QRH and status, so I followed the status and we laid 3 strands.

During the final descent to Madagascar, the pilot of the aircraft had to be manually taken in light of the failure modes as a result of the degradation of the Act Steering Alternate Law. The captain reported a feeling of a lack of response from the aircraft to the stresses on the flight.

Looking ACMS we saw indications of Pitot 1 & 2, 2 and 3 & 1 & 3 to 15h10TU fault.

A post-flight, reading the ACMS system of the aircraft (Aircraft Condition Monitoring System = system that monitors and records the malfunction of the plane), reveals the primary failure, one that has triggered first at 15.10 UTC PITOT 1 & 2, 2 & 3, 1 & 3 FAULT. Editor’s note: this is the primary message was transmitted ACARS flight AF447 …

In post flight report

  • 15h07 : BMC 3
  • 15h10 : AUTO FLIGHT AP OFF REAC W/S DET FAULT
  • IAS DISCREPENCY
  • NAV ADR DISAGREE
  • 15H11 : F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT

Editor’s note: the message PFR (Post Flight Report) reports the same messages of alarms that were sent successively by ACARS flight AF447 in CFR (Current Flight Report).

I did the tour of the aircraft with one of the OPL and both the radome pitot that appeared intact. Only the side impact sensor OPL was heavily tilted nearly vertical. There was no evidence of impact or scratches on the paint of the radome and on the windshields. I did, after meeting all the crew (TFN / PNC) a debriefing to explain what we had lived and reassure everyone and answer questions.

In matters of the DM

Flight to FL 370 not experienced wind shear (wind 080/18Kts) wind was stable for more than a half hour in strength and direction. Flight at mach 0.80 as slight turbulence (PAX Attached) No audible presence of hail in the early incidents (but we have heard during the descent of noise impacts to the cockpit (hail ???). SAT Temperature -51 ° C (we have never had ice detection alarm). No thunderstorms phenomenon (no weather radar was not calibrated and a flash of lightning visible). Top of strong turbulence to 15h09 followed alarms cited above and 15h11 to 15h10 GMT the speedometer OPL later rose from 280 to 100 Kts Kts in the red band and remained in as many seconds.

CBD side the speed is increased from green dot – 15 Kts with a speed trend to -50 Kts. STALL alarm (no alarm cricket) series with several incursions of speed shown in the lower red stripe. Stabilization aircraft at FL340 and continued flight to FL 330. Duration estimated 3 to 5 minutes.

Duration estimated 3 to 5 minutes.

Commander summarizes the conditions under which the incident that he is analyzed retrospectively by the Company – including maintenance services – for the Authority (DGAC / EASA) and the BEA . The ASR, like RAS, was used as feedback to generate a study of risks and prevent the occurrence of a new incident of same type, even a possible accident for which the incident could be harbinger …

Unfortunately, it did not happen …

published on 2009-07-19 17:59 by EuroCockpit.


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Family Website Portuguese (Under Construction) Informações no e-mail.: Info@afvv447.org


Updated Close-up pics (Landing Gear France3 — Hydraulics France24)

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Symbol Number 1: Note “Director” does not disappear!

PFD Special characters (Restrictions) are replaced by Orange Crosses!

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