AF 447: the reliability of Pitot probes in doubt
Le Figaro – Fabrice Amedeo 17/12/2009 (English Translation)
The office of investigations and analysis of the charge of air safety investigation into the crash of flight AF 447 on Thursday issued its second report.
In the absence of black boxes, which were not recovered after research conducted last summer, the office of investigations and analysis of the charge of air safety investigation into the accident flight 447 AF supports the hypothesis already issued but does not shine new light on the ongoing investigation.
No scenario is preferred
The autopsy of the body and analysis of the 640 wreckage of the plane failed to establish the chronology of events leading to the accident. “It still does not understand how one type of airplane flying at cruising speed has been falling almost as an iron,” says one close to the investigation.
Pitot probes have played a role in the accident
Receiving 24 messages Acars establishes maintenance information loss anemometer (speed and attitude of the aircraft) due to icing of the pitot probes. “The messages are sent Acars packet, said a source close to the investigation. So, it is not obvious that the icing on pitot probes takes place early in the sequence. “We’ve always said that the probes were a factor in the chain of events, but this could not be the only cause, “says his side Troadec Jean-Paul, director of BEA.Investigators still believe that the certification criteria probes are “not suitable” and recommend to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to conduct further studies. The new recommendation comes four months after a recommendation from the EASA asking airlines to change the pitot probes Brand Thales by laméricain probes manufactured by Goodrich.
FA 447 crashed flat
The fact that authorities have recovered the bodies of passengers seated in all parts of the aircraft and debris across the plane indicates that there was no decay in flight and that the the plane was intact before impact. The deformation elements recovered indicates “a high vertical speed at contact with the surface of the water.”
The aircraft was flying at a speed standard before the tragedy
Measurements of angle (the deflection) drift fished in June helped to establish the speed of the aircraft before the accident. It flew at Mach 0.8 (980 kph), that is to say to a cruising speed a little slow quite match the proper speed when an aircraft enters a zone of turbulence.
The accident happened very quickly
Belts cabin crew who were recovered were not used. This fact indicates that the crew was taken by surprise.
BEA Progress Reports
Press release issued on 17 décembre 2009
Investigation Update, December 17, 2009
Research Wed, December 17th, 2009
BEA Interim Report n°2
BEA Interim Report n°2 (English)(PDF)(78 PAGES)
BEA Interim Report (French) (PDF)(106 PAGES)(Appendices Starts On Page 75)
Flight AF 447 on 1st june 2009
A330-200, registered F-GZCP
The Director of the BEA will be in Rio de Janeiro on 12 December, accompanied by the Investigator-in-Charge, M. Bouillard. He will be meeting the families of the Brazilian victims, to whom he will give an update on the progress achieved in the AF 447 accident investigation.
The second interim report will be published on Thursday 17 December. On this occasion, the BEA will hold a press briefing at its HQ at Le Bourget from 15 h to 17 h. Journalists who wish to attend are asked to confirm their presence as soon as possible with Martine Del Bono, preferably by e-mail.
Previous to this, the BEA will present an update on the progress of the investigation and the sea searches to the representatives of the vol AF 447.
This document presents an update on the progress of the technical investigation as of 30 November 2009. It adds to the first Interim report published by BEA on 2 July 2009.
In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, with EC directive 94/56 and with the French Civil Aviation Code (Book VII), the investigation has not been not conducted so as to apportion blame, nor to assess individual or collective responsibility. The sole objective is to draw lessons from this occurrence which may help to prevent future accidents.
Consequently, the use of this report for any purpose other than for the prevention of future accidents could lead to erroneous interpretations.
This report has been translated and published by the BEA to make its reading easier for English-speaking people. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French should be considered as the work of reference.
UPDATE ON THE INVESTIGATION
Since the publication of the first Interim Report on 2 July 2009, the investigation has continued, still in close association with foreign investigation organisations and the companies involved and in coordination with those responsible for the judicial investigation. The working groups have continued their work of gathering and analyzing information useful to the investigation. Their activity has focused on
- the elements of wreckage recovered,
- the meteorological situation,
- the maintenance messages transmitted by ACARS,
- the certification and the continuing airworthiness of the Pitot probes,
- events where speed inconsistencies were encountered in cruise.
The results of this work have been integrated into this report. It has made it possible to complete the paragraphs of the first report published on 2 July 2009 and to introduce new paragraphs.
This second interim report presents the first safety recommendations. At this stage, in the absence of any data from the flight recorders, the main parts of the airplane and any witness testimony on the flight, the precise circumstances of the accident, and therefore its causes, have still not been determined. The investigative work is continuing with this objective.
The working group responsible for the sea searches is preparing the third phase aimed at localising the wreckage and recovering the flight recorders. This group is made up of the American, Russian, German, Brazilian and British investigation organisations and the Secrétariat Général de la Mer, and benefits from the participation of experts from Airbus, Air France and the US Navy. Two plenary meetings were held, the first on 12 and 13 October and the second on 10 November 2009. A third meeting is planned for the 15 December 2009, with the objective of putting in place the means required to begin the campaign in February 2010.
126.96.36.199.2 General examination of the vertical stabilizer
The vertical stabilizer was in generally good condition. The damage observed on the side panels and on the rudder was largely due to the recovery and transport operations. The damage due to separation from the fuselage was essentially located at the root of the vertical stabiliser.
The vertical stabilizer separated from the fuselage at the level of the three attachments:
- the forward attachment (male and female lugs) and part of the leading
- edge are missing;
- the centre and aft attachments are present: male and female lugs and parts
- of the fuselage frames (frames 84, 85, 86 and 87).
188.8.131.52.3 Examination of the fin structure
Rib 1 had almost completely disappeared.
Rib 2 was bent upwards with a right-left symmetry.
The front of the fin showed signs of symmetrical compression damage:
- failure of the leading edge right- and left-hand panels
- longitudinal cracking of the leading edge stiffener
- HF antenna support (attached to the forward spar): failure of the lower
- part, crumpling indicating bottom-upwards compression loads
184.108.40.206.4 Examination of the vertical stabiliser – rudder attachments
The vertical load pick-up arm in the rudder’s hinge axis (arm 36 g) broke at the level of the attachment lug on the rudder side.
The size of this arm is calculated to withstand a maximum load of 120,000 N, corresponding to a relative acceleration of 36 g of the rudder in relation to the vertical stabilizer.
Shear cracks, along a top-down axis, can also be seen on the rudder hinge arm attachment fittings close to arm 36 g.
These observations indicate that the vertical stabiliser was subjected to a load greater than 120,000 N in the rudder’s hinge axis.
220.127.116.11.5 Examination of the Rudder Travel Limiter Unit (RTLU)
The RTLU was found in its place in the fin and disassembled. An examination was performed at the manufacturer’s and showed that it would allow travel of the rudder measured as 7.9° +/- 0.1°. As an example, at FL350, this travel is obtained for Mach 0.8 +/- 0.004, corresponding to a CAS of 272 +/- 2 kt.
Note: the maximum travel of the rudder is calculated in relation to the airplane configuration, its speed and its Mach number. This travel can be commanded between 4 degrees and 35 degrees.
18.104.22.168.7 Examination of the fin-to-fuselage attachments
The centre attachment had pivoted backwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it. The aft attachment had pivoted forwards with the parts of the frames and web frames that were attached to it.
The aft attachment lugs (male on the fin and female on the airframe) had marks indicating a backwards movement of frames 86 and 87 as a whole.
The centre and aft lateral load pick-up rods showed damage that was consistent with this backwards pivoting of frames 84 to 87:
- tensile failure of the centre spar at the level of the centre rod attachments;
- compression failure of the aft spar at the level of the aft rod attachments
- and failure of the left-hand rod by buckling.
The cabin crew’s seatbelts that were found (three out of eleven) were not in use at the moment of impact.
The containers recovered closed showed that the passenger oxygen masks had not been released. There had been no cabin depressurisation.
Note: Depressurisation means pressure inside the cabin corresponding to an altitude of more than 14,000 ft.
The flaps were retracted at the time of impact with water.
The vertical stabiliser’s side panels did not show signs of compression damage.
The breaks seen at the level of the lateral load pick-up rods were the result of the backwards movement of the attachments and centre and aft frames. The observations made on the vertical stabiliser are not consistent with a failure due to lateral loads in flight.
The observations made on the debris (toilet doors, partitions, galleys, cabin crew rest module, spoiler, aileron, vertical stabiliser) evidenced high rates of compression resulting from a high rate of descent at the time of impact with the water.
This high rate of compression can be seen all over the aircraft and symmetrically on the right- and left-hand sides.
High levels of loading would be required to cause the damage observed forward of the vertical stabiliser (compression failure of the forward attachment).
These observations are not compatible with a separation of the aft part of the fuselage in flight.
The damage found at the root of the vertical stabiliser was more or less symmetrical, as were the deformations due to the high rate of compression observed on the various parts of the aircraft. This left-right symmetry means that the aircraft had low bank and little sideslip on impact.
The deformations of the fuselage frames at the root of the vertical stabiliser were not consistent with an aircraft nose-down attitude at the moment of impact.
From these observations it can be deduced that:
- The aircraft was probably intact on impact.
- The aircraft struck the surface of the water with a positive attitude, a low bank and a high rate of descent.
- There was no depressurisation.
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information
This section is based on examination of the autopsy reports and photographs of the victims made by the Brazilian authorities and provided to the BEA. It should be noted that interpretation of the injuries is disrupted by the effects of prolonged presence in water.
The autopsies performed made it possible to identify fifty persons: forty-five passengers, four flight attendants, including an in-charge flight attendant, and the Captain.
According to the assigned seat placements at check-in (appendix 1), the passengers were distributed around the cabin as follows:
- Eight were seated in business class between doors 1 and 2;
- Three were seated in business class aft of door 2;
- Twelve were seated in economy forward of the over-wing exits;
- Twenty-two were seated at the rear of the airplane, between the overwing exits and the number 3 doors.
Forty-three of the victims had fractures of the spinal column, the thorax and the pelvis. The fractures described were located mainly at the level of the transition vertebrae.
The compression fractures of the spinal column associated with the fractures of the pelvis(2), observed on passengers seated throughout the cabin, are compatible with the effect, on a seated person, of high acceleration whose component in the axis of the spinal column is oriented upwards through the pelvis.
Note: the information from the autopsies does not make it possible to reach a conclusion as to the location of the Captain at the time of the accident.
22.214.171.124.5 Partial conclusion on the analysis of the messages
At this stage of the investigation, analysis of the messages makes it possible to highlight an inconsistency in the speeds measured just after 2 h 10 which in that minute generated ten of the twenty-four maintenance messages. Eleven other messages generated between 2 h 10 and 2 h 14 can also be linked to anemometric problems (inconsistencies in the speeds, low speeds and/or erratic speed values).
The aircraft switched to alternate 2 law in the minute at 2 h 10 and remained in that law until the end of the flight..
No message present in the CFR indicates the loss of displays or of inertial information (attitudes).
Note: in addition, as the ATSB mentions in its second interim report(3) on the incident to the A330-300 that was performing flight QF72, in relation to problems with ADIRU’s, the maintenance messages relating to the events on flight AF447 and flight QF72 show significant differences, both in their sequence and in their content.
1.7 Meteorological Conditions
1.7.3 Meteorological Analyses
The additional analyses on the meteorological situation in the accident zone, based on the study of the observations made at 2 h 30 UTC by the Tropical Rain Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite, are included in appendix 3.
Though the TRMM lightning imager indicates an absence of lightning in the accident zone at 2 h 30 UTC, the infrared image taken at the same time is consistent with those of Meteosat 9: taken together, this information does not make it possible to conclude that there was a sudden and exceptionally intense development of the convective activity between 2 h 07 and 2 h 30 UTC.
Analysis of the observations by the TRMM TMI instrument, the only one operating in the microwave area, indicates the presence of strong condensation around 10,000 metres altitude, lower than the altitude of the cumulonimbus tops. This strong condensation would correspond to convective towers active at this altitude, which confirms the strong probability of notable turbulence within the convective cluster that was crossed by planned flight path of flight AF447.
New findings established since the Interim Report on 2 July 2009
FINDINGS (New findings established since the Interim Report on 2 July 2009 appear in italics)
- The crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to undertake the flight.
- The airplane possessed a valid Certificate of Airworthiness, and had been maintained in accordance with the regulations.
- The airplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro without any known technical problems, except on one of the three radio management panels.
- No problems were indicated by the crew to Air France or during contacts with the Brazilian controllers.
- No distress messages were received by the control centres or by other airplanes.
- There were no satellite telephone communications between the airplane
- and the ground.
- The last radio exchange between the crew and Brazilian ATC occurred at 1 h 35 min 15. The airplane was arriving at the edge of radar range of the Brazilian control centres.
- At 2 h 01, the crew tried, without success for the third time, to connect to the Dakar ATC ADS-C system.
- Up to the last automatic position point, received at 2 h 10 min 34, the flight
- had followed the route indicated in the flight plan.
- The meteorological situation was typical of that encountered in the month of June in the inter-tropical convergence zone.
- There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF447. Some of them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
- An additional meteorological analysis shows the presence of strong condensation towards AF447’s flight level probably associated with convection phenomena.
- The precise composition of the cloud masses above 30,000 feet is little known, in particular with regard to the super-cooled water/ice crystal diving, especially with regard to the size of the latter.
- Several airplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the same altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses.
- Twenty-four automatic maintenance messages were received between 2 h 10 and 2 h 15 via the ACARS system. These messages show an inconsistency in the measured speeds as well as the associated consequences.
- Before 2 h 10, no maintenance messages had been received from AF 447, with the exception of two messages relating to the confi guration of the toilets.
- Twenty-one messages present on the CFR are caused or can be caused by
- anemometric problems;
- None of the messages present in the CFR indicate loss of displays or inertial information (attitudes);
- The operator’s and the manufacturer’s procedures mention actions to be undertaken by the crew when they have doubts as to the accuracy of the speed indications,
- The last ACARS message was received towards 2 h 14 min 28,
- The flight was not transferred between the Brazilian and Senegalese control centres,
- Between 8 h 00 and 8 h 30, the first emergency alert messages were sent by the Madrid and Brest control centres,
- The first bodies and airplane parts were found on 6 June,
- The elements identified came from all over the airplane,
- The oxygen masks had not been released; there had been no in-flight depressurisation,
- All of the life jackets that were found were still in their containers,
- The airplane’s flaps were retracted at the time of the impact with the water,
- Three of the eleven cabin crew seats were found; they were not in use at the time of the impact,
- Examination of all of the debris confirmed that the airplane struck the surface of the water pitch-up, with a slight bank and at a high vertical speed,
- Analysis of thirteen previous events shows that:
- they occurred in air masses that were highly unstable and the seat of deep
- convection phenomena;
- autopilot disengaged in all of the cases;
- the maximum continuous invalid recorded speed duration was three
- minutes and twenty seconds;
- the uncommanded altitude variations remained within a range of more or
- less one thousand feet,
- the airplane always remained within its flight envelope
- The probes that equipped F-GZCP met requirements that were stricter than the certification standards,
- On 30 March 2009, analysis of previous events had not led EASA to make mandatory a change of the probes on the Airbus A330 / A340 fleet.
Flight AF 447 on 1st june 2009
A330-200, registered F-GZCP
The BEA has launched an investigation into the event that occurred during flight AF 445 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, during the night of 29 November 2009, to the A330-203 operated by Air France. An analysis of this event is likely to throw some additional light on the accident on 1st June 2009 between Rio de Janeiro and Paris to the A330-203, flight AF 447.
Le Figaro – LIRE AUSSI 09/12/2009
INFO LE FIGARO – November 29, a Rio-Paris flight encounters similar conditions to those in aircraft which crashed in June
This is an incident that investigators regard as an opportunity. Ten days ago, Flight AF 445, which is the new name given to the AF flight 447 from the accident of June 1, has suffered severe disruption in exactly the same area where the AF 447 has disappeared. Failure to have recovered the black boxes, always at the bottom of the South Atlantic, investigators are waiting to analyze data from the flight AF 445.
The Office of Investigations and Analysis (BEA) in charge of the investigation into the tragedy immediately launched an investigation. “The flight data may give us new information, said spokesman BEA. You can not miss such a coincidence. “
Le vol AF 445 a décollé de Rio de Janeiro le dimanche 29 novembre à 17 h 20 (temps universel) et rencontré une zone de fortes perturbations quatre heures après le décollage. Air France explique dans un communiqué, qu’en stricte application des procédures, l’appareil a «effectué une descente normale pour éviter une zone de turbulences sévères et rejoindre un niveau de vol moins turbulent».
Unable to obtain authorization from air traffic control in Dakar, the crew would have issued an emergency radio message indicating that the plane left its flight level.
No icing Pitot probes
Reportedly, the aircraft would be upgraded from 330 (33 000 feet, or 11 000 meters) in 280 (28 000 feet, 9 300 feet), a fall of 1 700 meters. However, if turbulence, the procedure does go down as 300 feet, that is to say 100 yards. A passenger on that flight (4 seat K) explains elsewhere on blogs have felt “the aircraft was more controlled” and evokes the panic of cabin crew.
The parallelism between the accident of June 1 and November 29 incident is startling. Flight AF 445 had experienced disturbed weather in the doldrums near those of the AF 447. It is also the same family of aircraft: Airbus A 330-203 for FY 447 and an A 330-200 for flight 445. The incident took place 10 nautical miles (18 kilometers) of the area alleged disappearance of the AF 447. The slot is near 21 h 30 (Universal Time) for flight AF 445 and 2 h 15 for the flight AF 447, so both of night. Another basic parameter: “Both flights are operated by Air France, and therefore the two crews are supposed to apply the same emergency procedures,” said one familiar with the matter. In contrast, the AF 445 has not been icing his pitot probes and information loss anemometer, unlike the flight AF 447. The parallelism of the two meteorological situations must be tempered, according to Eric Mas, director of information about the weather channel. “Looking at the photo of June, we see that the doldrums was very wide and very active, says he. In November, he shows very clearly that the doldrums is less marked and less extensive. Flying conditions were standardized. “
Paris, France (CNN) — French investigators said they are looking into problems encountered by an Air France jet last month in nearly the same spot over the Atlantic where another Air France jet mysteriously crashed in June.
Air France flight 445 was flying from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France, the night of Nov. 29 when it encountered the problems, the French accident investigation agency, BEA, said in a news release this week.
It is the same route taken by Air France flight 447 when it went down in the Atlantic Ocean in stormy weather June 1, killing all 228 people aboard. The investigation agency has not established the cause of the crash, and large parts of the plane — including both flight recorders — have never been found.
“The analysis of what happened could lead to complementary explanations about the accident of flight AF 447,” the investigation agency said.
Flight 445 encountered “severe turbulence” about four hours after takeoff on Nov. 29, forcing the pilots to descend, Air France said in a statement after the flight.
The crew sent out an emergency radio message to indicate it had left its flight level, Air France said.
The flight, with 215 people aboard, “continued normally” after half an hour of moderate to severe turbulence, the airline said.
Air France declined to comment on the investigation agency’s statement this week.
The BEA said the November flight was an Airbus A330-203, the same model involved in the June crash, but Air France said the November incident involved an Airbus A330-200.
While French authorities have not yet determined what caused the June crash, tests have brought into question the performance of pitot tubes, which are used to measure the pressure exerted on the plane as it flies through the air, and are part of a system used to determine air speed.
Flight 447 sent out 24 automated error messages before it crashed that suggested the plane may have been flying too fast or too slow through the thunderstorms, officials have said.
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a directive in late August requiring airlines to replace pitot tubes manufactured by Thales Avionics on Airbus A330s and A340s. It said airlines should replace them with other Thales tubes and those manufactured by Goodrich.
— CNN’s Luc Lacroix contributed to this report
Le Figaro – Fabrice Amedeo 18/12/2009 (English Translation)
INFO LE FIGARO – November 29, a Rio-Paris has struggled in the area of the supposed crash of AF447.
The case embarrassed the investigators but especially Air France. Reportedly, the company did not provide lights in time to the Office of Investigations and Analysis (BEA) data from an incident last November 29 in the area of the supposed crash of flight AF447. These data were, however, claimed by the investigators and considered crucial to unraveling the mystery of flight AF447 in the absence of black boxes still in the wreckage of the aircraft by 3 000 meters deep.
Flight AF445 is the new name of the AF447 since the accident last June 1, left Rio de Janeiro November 19 to 17 h 20 (GMT). According to the report (Air Safety Report) prepared by the captain and Le Figaro which has obtained a copy, the aircraft entered a “zone of turbulence 60 miles before the point Dekon” when he “was en route at 380 (11 500 meters altitude, Ed) on Route UN866.
The weather would have prevented “the aircraft to proceed” and forced to “descend at 360. Soit une descente de 2 000 pieds (620 mètres). The plane, which failed to prevent the control center Atlantico (Brazil) said the maneuver was preceded by a “Mayday”. This move is consistent with the procedure: when an aircraft leaves the emergency level flight, it should alert other planes crossing the area to avoid any risk of collision. “The crew applied the procedure in accordance with the Operations Manual of Air France,” confirmed the spokesperson of the BEA.
“The crew had perhaps overreacted”
On arrival at Roissy, the captain, Hugues Faure wrote his report and forwarded it, as is the procedure at his chief of division. In contrast, Air France did not immediately part of the incident to BEA and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) as required by law.
Reportedly, the BEA has not learned of the incident by Air France but by the pilot of flight TAM181 cruising off the area and had relayed the message of flight AF445 at the center of Atlantico. So the BEA has contacted Air France. The management company said his side as “the legal information should be forwarded to the BEA and the DGCA within 72 hours and that this deadline was met.
Once in Roissy, the aircraft would have been an “enhanced cleaning procedure, most passengers who became ill. A passenger on that flight (head 4T) told on blogs “have felt that the aircraft was more controlled” and evokes the panic of the passengers and cabin crew.
The BEA has launched an investigation on 1 December, two days after landing the plane. Air France has meant that when the plane had already left for Bangalore in India and the data of the CVR black boxes, the registration of trade in the cockpit, and DFDR, the parameters of the flight had been “crushed”.
An airplane is equipped with two black boxes supposed to provide flight details. Recording conversations is valid only 4 hours while recording parameters covers 25 hours of flight. After a return trip to India, there was nothing more data.
The companies also have an additional record the QAR to the use of its maintenance crews. Unable to access both legal records, the BEA has made the request of QAR was not available. “Air France has said that the data were not recorded because of poor formatting,” says spokesman BEA. For its part, Air France said that “the QAR was retrieved November 30 shortly before noon and the time of delivery and to realize that he was a virgin, the plane had left for Bangalore.
However, investigators have recently received a new report, fuller than the first. “It has no objective value,” says one close to the investigation. The company has just said it was a non-event and the crew had perhaps overreacted. Over at BEA, the investigators’ regret not having the AF445 flight data that would shed new light on what may have happened on flight AF447.
An Air France Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCK performing flight AF-445 (dep Nov 29th) from Rio de Janeiro Galeao,RJ (Brazil) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) with 203 passengers and 12 crew, was enroute at FL380 overhead the Atlantic on airway UN866 just before waypoint DEKON about 680nm northeast of Fortaleza,CE (Brazil) and 750nm southwest of Praia (Cape Verde), when the crew called Mayday on the international emergency frequency indicating, they encountered severe turbulence and were descending to a lower altitude.
The airplane was seen enroute at FL280 overhead France and landed safely at Paris Charles de Gaulle 6:40 hours after the emergency call.
The Mayday call was relayed by the crew of a TAM Airbus A330-200 registration PT-MVG performing flight JJ-8055 from Paris CDG to Rio de Janeiro,RJ (Brazil) at around 03:50Z (Nov 30th)…
According to radar recordings, The Aviation Herald obtained on December 1st, the airplane reached the mainland of Portugal at FL400.
Le Figaro – 09/12/2009
The Office of Investigations and Analysis has released a new report December 17.
Investigators have not given up finding the black box flight AF 447, who are still aboard the plane at the bottom of the South Atlantic.
Early research conducted in June in partnership with Ifremer were intended to capture the signal from the black box and locate the wreckage. The new campaign should be launched in early spring, is to detect the presence of the wreckage in the rugged area where funds may reach 4 000 meters.
Everything start from scratch “
The BEA, which has published its second survey report December 17, actively preparing this new phase of research. A tender must be launched very soon to find a provider that can track the wreckage and move the fish out. Reportedly, this will not be with Ifremer. “In the Emergency, it was normal to work between French and turning to Ifremer, said a close case. The Institute is highly qualified to go recover a wreck, but it is not the best to detect its presence in an area that is better known to U.S. scientists. German Geomar or the Scripps Institute on the West Coast of the United States. But sources close to the investigation, it would institute based in Woods Hole, Massachusetts would be the most qualified. “We will start again from the beginning and including studies of currents and drift debris of the aircraft, said a close case. We will not return to the sea until we have a new confined area. “
Contacted by Le Figaro, the BEA said to be in the phase of “preparation resources and research equipment specific”. According to the institute, the phases of preparation “should be completed in late January, which bodes well for a resumption of research in early spring.
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