The Global Context and International Effects of the TARP

The Congressional Oversight Panel’s August oversight report, “The Global Context and International Effects of the TARP,” recommends that Treasury collect data on cross-border flows of funds, increase the scope and frequency of stress testing on financial institutions, and collaborate with foreign policymakers on a cross-border resolution regime and for regular crisis planning and financial “war games.”

The financial crisis that began in 2007 exposed the interconnectedness of the global financial system. Although the crisis began with subprime mortgage defaults in the U.S., its damage spread rapidly overseas. The Panel found that policymakers were ill-prepared for such a worldwide crisis and that “the internationalization of the financial system has outpaced the ability of national regulators to respond.”

Executive Summary*

The financial crisis that peaked in 2008 began in the United States one mortgage at a time. Millions of people, attracted by the prospect of home ownership or refinancing and low initial rates, signed mortgages that they could afford only so long as home prices continued to rise. The mortgages were bundled, chopped into fractional ownership, sold and re-sold, and used as the basis for huge financial bets. When the housing market collapsed, many borrowers faced foreclosure, and many investors faced huge losses.

In an earlier era, a mortgage crisis that began in a few regions in the United States might have ended there as well. But by 2008, the global financial system had become deeply internationalized and interconnected. Mortgages signed in Florida, California, and Arizona were securitized, repackaged, and sold to banks and other investors in Europe, Asia, and around the world. At the same time, other countries were experiencing their own housing booms fueled by new financial products. The result was a truly global financial crisis.

The conventional wisdom in the years immediately before the crisis held that banks that operated across global markets were more stable, given their ability to rely on a collection of geographically dispersed businesses. The crisis showed, however, that links within the financial system could magnify, rather than reduce, risks, by, for example, allowing financial firms to become overexposed to a single sector in a single country.

When subprime borrowers began to default on their mortgages, banks around the world discovered that their balance sheets held the same deteriorating investments. The danger was amplified by the high leverage created by layers of financial products based on the same underlying assets and by the fact that banks around the world depended on overnight access to funding in dollar-denominated markets. When short-term lenders began to question the ability of banks to repay their obligations, markets froze, and the international financial system verged on chaos.

Faced with the possible collapse of their most important financial institutions, many national governments intervened. One of the main components of the U.S. response was the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which pumped capital into financial institutions, guaranteed billions of dollars in debt and troubled assets, and directly purchased assets.

The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve offered further support by allowing banks to borrow cheaply from the government and by guaranteeing selected pools of assets. Other nations‟ interventions used the same basic set of policy tools, but with a key difference: While the United States attempted to stabilize the system by flooding money into as many banks as possible – including those that had significant overseas operations – most other nations targeted their efforts more narrowly toward institutions that in many cases had no major U.S. operations.

As a result, it appears likely that America‟s financial rescue had a much greater impact internationally than other nations‟ programs had on the United States. This outcome was likely inevitable given the structure of the TARP, but if the U.S. government had gathered more information about which countries‟ institutions would most benefit from some of its actions, it might have been able to ask those countries to share the pain of rescue.

For example, banks in France and Germany were among the greatest beneficiaries of AIG‟s rescue, yet the U.S. government bore the entire $70 billion risk of the AIG capital injection program. The U.S. share of this single rescue exceeded the size of France‟s entire $35 billion capital injection program and was nearly half the size of Germany‟s $133 billion program.

Even at this late date, it is difficult to assess the precise international impact of the TARP or other U.S. rescue programs because Treasury gathered very little data on how TARP funds flowed overseas. As a result, neither students of the current crisis nor those dealing with future rescue efforts will have access to much of the information that would help them make wellinformed decisions.

In the interests of transparency and completeness, and to help inform regulators‟ actions in a world that is likely to become ever more financially integrated, the Panel strongly urges Treasury to start now to report more data about how TARP and other rescue funds flowed internationally and to document the impact that the U.S. rescue had overseas. Going forward, Treasury should create and maintain a database of this information and should urge foreign regulators and multinational organizations to collect and report similar data.

The crisis also underscored the fact that the international community‟s formal mechanisms to resolve potential financial crises are very limited. Even though the TARP legislation required Treasury to coordinate its programs with similar efforts by foreign governments, the global response to the financial crisis unfolded on an ad hoc, informal, countryby- country basis.

Each individual government made its own decisions based on its evaluation of what was best for its own banking sector and for its own domestic economy. Even on the occasions when several governments worked together to rescue specific ailing institutions, as in the rescues of European banks Dexia and Fortis, national interests often came to the fore. These ad hoc actions ultimately restored a measure of stability to the international system, but they underscored the fact that the internationalization of the financial system has outpaced the ability of national regulators to respond to global crises.

In particular, the crisis revealed the need for an international plan to handle the collapse of major, globally significant financial institutions. A cross-border resolution regime could establish rules that would permit the orderly resolution of large international institutions, while also encouraging contingency planning and the development of resolution and recovery plans. Such a regime could help to avoid the chaos that followed the Lehman bankruptcy, in which foreign claimants struggled to secure priority in the bankruptcy process, and the struggles that preceded the AIG rescue, in which the uncertain effect of bankruptcy on international contracts put the U.S. government under enormous pressure to support the company.

Additionally, the development of international regulatory regimes could help to discourage regulatory arbitrage, instead encouraging individual countries to compete in a “race to the top” by adopting more effective regimes at the national level. Such regimes would also provide a plan of action in the event that a financial crisis hit an internationally significant institution in a country that was too small to bear the cost of a bailout. In the most recent crisis, the Netherlands‟ rescue efforts totaled 39 percent of its GDP, and Spain‟s totaled 24 percent, raising the specter that a future crisis could swamp the ability of smaller nations with large banking sectors to respond in absence of an international regime.

Moving forward, it is essential for the international community to gather information about the international financial system, to identify vulnerabilities, and to plan for emergency responses to a range of potential crises. The Panel recommends that U.S. regulators encourage regular crisis planning and “war gaming” for the international financial system. This recommendation complements the Panel‟s repeated recommendations that Treasury should engage in greater crisis planning and stress testing for domestic banks.

Financial crises have occurred many times in the past and will undoubtedly occur again in the future. Failure to plan ahead will only undermine efforts to safeguard the financial system. Careful policymakers would put plans in place before the next crisis, rather than responding on an ad hoc basis at the peak of the storm.

*The Panel adopted this report with a 5-0 vote on August 11, 2010.

About the Congressional Oversight Panel

In response to the escalating crisis, on October 3, 2008, Congress provided the U.S. Treasury with the authority to spend $700 billion to stabilize the U.S. economy. Congress created the Office of Financial Stability (OFS) within Treasury to implement a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). At the same time, Congress created a Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) to “review the current state of financial markets and the regulatory system.”

COP is empowered to hold hearings, review official data, and write reports on actions taken by Treasury and financial institutions and their effect on the economy.

Through regular reports, COP must:

  • Oversee Treasury’s actions
  • Assess the impact of spending to stabilize the economy
  • Evaluate market transparency,
  • Ensure effective foreclosure mitigation efforts
  • And guarantee that Treasury’s actions are in the best interest of the American people.

Lastly, Congress has instructed COP to produce a special report on regulatory reform that will analyze “the current state of the regulatory system and its effectiveness at overseeing the participants in the financial system and protecting consumers.”

Other oversight bodies examining TARP include the Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Further information on TARP is available through the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the official TARP website, FinancialStability.gov.

Related Links:

Wiki:  Troubled Asset Relief Program

HOT AIR: HUD offers interest-free $50K loans to unemployed homeowners to stem foreclosures

end

Executive Summary*
The financial crisis that peaked in 2008 began in the United States one mortgage at a
time. Millions of people, attracted by the prospect of homeownership or refinancing and low
initial rates, signed mortgages that they could afford only so long as home prices continued to
rise. The mortgages were bundled, chopped into fractional ownership, sold and re-sold, and used
as the basis for huge financial bets. When the housing market collapsed, many borrowers faced
foreclosure, and many investors faced huge losses.
In an earlier era, a mortgage crisis that began in a few regions in the United States might
have ended there as well. But by 2008, the global financial system had become deeply
internationalized and interconnected. Mortgages signed in Florida, California, and Arizona were
securitized, repackaged, and sold to banks and other investors in Europe, Asia, and around the
world. At the same time, other countries were experiencing their own housing booms fueled by
new financial products. The result was a truly global financial crisis.
The conventional wisdom in the years immediately before the crisis held that banks that
operated across global markets were more stable, given their ability to rely on a collection of
geographically dispersed businesses. The crisis showed, however, that links within the financial
system could magnify, rather than reduce, risks, by, for example, allowing financial firms to
become overexposed to a single sector in a single country. When subprime borrowers began to
default on their mortgages, banks around the world discovered that their balance sheets held the
same deteriorating investments. The danger was amplified by the high leverage created by
layers of financial products based on the same underlying assets and by the fact that banks
around the world depended on overnight access to funding in dollar-denominated markets.
When short-term lenders began to question the ability of banks to repay their obligations,
markets froze, and the international financial system verged on chaos.
Faced with the possible collapse of their most important financial institutions, many
national governments intervened. One of the main components of the U.S. response was the
$700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which pumped capital into financial
institutions, guaranteed billions of dollars in debt and troubled assets, and directly purchased
assets. The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve offered further support by allowing banks to
borrow cheaply from the government and by guaranteeing selected pools of assets. Other
nations‟ interventions used the same basic set of policy tools, but with a key difference: While
the United States attempted to stabilize the system by flooding money into as many banks as
possible – including those that had significant overseas operations – most other nations targeted
*The Panel adopted this report with a 5-0 vote on August 11, 2010.
4
their efforts more narrowly toward institutions that in many cases had no major U.S. operations.
As a result, it appears likely that America‟s financial rescue had a much greater impact
internationally than other nations‟ programs had on the United States. This outcome was likely
inevitable given the structure of the TARP, but if the U.S. government had gathered more
information about which countries‟ institutions would most benefit from some of its actions, it
might have been able to ask those countries to share the pain of rescue. For example, banks in
France and Germany were among the greatest beneficiaries of AIG‟s rescue, yet the U.S.
government bore the entire $70 billion risk of the AIG capital injection program. The U.S. share
of this single rescue exceeded the size of France‟s entire $35 billion capital injection program
and was nearly half the size of Germany‟s $133 billion program.
Even at this late date, it is difficult to assess the precise international impact of the TARP
or other U.S. rescue programs because Treasury gathered very little data on how TARP funds
flowed overseas. As a result, neither students of the current crisis nor those dealing with future
rescue efforts will have access to much of the information that would help them make wellinformed
decisions. In the interests of transparency and completeness, and to help inform
regulators‟ actions in a world that is likely to become ever more financially integrated, the Panel
strongly urges Treasury to start now to report more data about how TARP and other rescue funds
flowed internationally and to document the impact that the U.S. rescue had overseas. Going
forward, Treasury should create and maintain a database of this information and should urge
foreign regulators and multinational organizations to collect and report similar data.
The crisis also underscored the fact that the international community‟s formal
mechanisms to resolve potential financial crises are very limited. Even though the TARP
legislation required Treasury to coordinate its programs with similar efforts by foreign
governments, the global response to the financial crisis unfolded on an ad hoc, informal, countryby-
country basis. Each individual government made its own decisions based on its evaluation of
what was best for its own banking sector and for its own domestic economy. Even on the
occasions when several governments worked together to rescue specific ailing institutions, as in
the rescues of European banks Dexia and Fortis, national interests often came to the fore. These
ad hoc actions ultimately restored a measure of stability to the international system, but they
underscored the fact that the internationalization of the financial system has outpaced the ability
of national regulators to respond to global crises.
In particular, the crisis revealed the need for an international plan to handle the collapse
of major, globally significant financial institutions. A cross-border resolution regime could
establish rules that would permit the orderly resolution of large international institutions, while
also encouraging contingency planning and the development of resolution and recovery plans.
Such a regime could help to avoid the chaos that followed the Lehman bankruptcy, in which
foreign claimants struggled to secure priority in the bankruptcy process, and the struggles that
5
preceded the AIG rescue, in which the uncertain effect of bankruptcy on international contracts
put the U.S. government under enormous pressure to support the company. Additionally, the
development of international regulatory regimes could help to discourage regulatory arbitrage,
instead encouraging individual countries to compete in a “race to the top” by adopting more
effective regimes at the national level. Such regimes would also provide a plan of action in the
event that a financial crisis hit an internationally significant institution in a country that was too
small to bear the cost of a bailout. In the most recent crisis, the Netherlands‟ rescue efforts
totaled 39 percent of its GDP, and Spain‟s totaled 24 percent, raising the specter that a future
crisis could swamp the ability of smaller nations with large banking sectors to respond in
absence of an international regime.
Moving forward, it is essential for the international community to gather information
about the international financial system, to identify vulnerabilities, and to plan for emergency
responses to a range of potential crises. The Panel recommends that U.S. regulators encourage
regular crisis planning and “war gaming” for the international financial system. This
recommendation complements the Panel‟s repeated recommendations that Treasury should
engage in greater crisis planning and stress testing for domestic banks.
Financial crises have occurred many times in the past and will undoubtedly occur again
in the future. Failure to plan ahead will only undermine efforts to safeguard the financial system.
Careful policymakers would put plans in place before the next crisis, rather than responding on
an ad hoc basis at the peak of the storm.
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