Roger Vernon Scruton (born 27 February 1944) is a British philosopher specializing in aesthetics. He is the author of several books on philosophy and politics, including Art and Imagination (1974), The Meaning of Conservatism (1980), Animal Rights and Wrongs (1996), England: An Elegy (2000), and A Political Philosophy: Arguments For Conservatism (2006). He has also written several novels and two operas.

From 1971 to 1992 he was a lecturer and professor of aesthetics at Birkbeck College, London. In 1982 he was one of the founders of The Salisbury Review, a conservative political journal, which he edited for 18 years. He first embraced conservatism during the student protests of May 1968 in France: “When I asked my friends what they wanted, what were they trying to achieve, all I got back was this ludicrous Marxist gobbledegook. I was disgusted by it, and thought there must be a way back to the defence of Western civilisation against these things. That’s when I became a conservative. I knew I wanted to conserve things rather than pull them down.”

From 1992 to 1995 he was a professor at Boston University, from 2005 to 2009 research professor at the Institute for the Psychological Sciences in Arlington, Virginia, and in 2009–2010 a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. A.C. Grayling described him in 2000 as a “wonderful teacher of philosophy.”

In January 2010 he was awarded the title of visiting professor at the University of Oxford for three years, an unpaid appointment, where he teaches graduate classes on aesthetics, and in spring 2011 he takes up a quarter-time professorial fellowship in moral philosophy at the University of St Andrews. In 2010 he delivered the Scottish Gifford Lectures at St Andrews on the topic, “The Face of God.”

In The Meaning of Conservatism (1980), Scruton sought to shift the emphasis of the Right at that time away from economics towards moral issues, describing the book in 2005 as “a somewhat Hegelian defence of Tory values in the face of their betrayal by the free marketeers.” He told The Guardian that the book blighted his academic career. He was “vilified” by his colleagues at Birkbeck because of his political views, according to the newspaper, and as a consequence he left British academia in 1992 for a teaching post at Boston University.

In Gentle Regrets: Thoughts from a Life (2005), he writes that when he read Edmund Burke‘s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) he was persuaded by several of his arguments, particularly that socialism is accompanied by an abstract vision of the mind that bears little relation to the way most people think. Scruton argues that there is no direction to history, no moral or spiritual progress; that people think collectively toward a common goal only during a crisis, such as war, and that trying to organise society this way requires a real or imagined enemy.

Although society can be seen as a contract, most parties to the contract are either dead or not yet born—he writes that to forget this is to “place the present members of society in a dictatorial dominance over those who went before, and those who came after them.” He also argues that “our most necessary beliefs may be both unjustified and unjustifiable, from our own perspective, and the attempt to justify them will merely lead to their loss.”

In Arguments for Conservatism (2006), he marks out the areas in which philosophical thinking is required if conservatism is to be intellectually persuasive. He argues that human beings are creatures of limited and local affections. Territorial loyalty is at the root of all forms of government where law and liberty reign supreme. Every expansion of jurisdiction beyond the frontiers of the nation state leads to a decline in accountability. But he opposes elevating the “nation” above its people, which would threaten rather than facilitate citizenship and peace.

He argues that “conservatism and conservation” are two aspects of a single policy, that of husbanding resources. This includes both the social capital embodied in laws, customs, and institutions, and the material capital contained in the environment. According to Scruton criminal law depends upon moral consensus; the law should not be used as a weapon to advance special interests. He argues that people impatient for reform, for example in the area of euthanasia or abortion, are reluctant to accept what he writes may be “glaringly obvious to others—that the law exists precisely to impede their ambitions.”

He defines post-modernism as the claim that there are no grounds for truth, objectivity, and meaning, and therefore conflicts between views are nothing more than contests of power. He argues that, while the West is required to judge other cultures in their own terms, Western culture is adversely judged as ethnocentric and racist. He writes: “The very reasoning which sets out to destroy the ideas of objective truth and absolute value imposes political correctness as absolutely binding, and cultural relativism as objectively true.”

Scruton argues that we are in an era of secularisation without precedent in the history of the world. He writes that writers and artists such as Rilke, T.S. Eliot, Edward Hopper, and Schoenberg “devoted much energy to recuperating the experience of the sacred—but as a private rather than a public form of consciousness.” He argues that because they directed their art at the few, it has never appealed to the many. He defines totalitarianism as the absence of any constraint on central authority, with every aspect of life the concern of government.

Advocates of totalitarianism feed on resentment, he argues, and having seized power they proceed to abolish institutions, such as the law, property, and religion, that create authorities. He writes: “To the resentful it is these institutions that are the cause of inequality, and therefore the cause of their humiliations and failures.” He argues that revolutions are not conducted from below by the people, but from above, in the name of the people, by an aspiring elite.

He suggests that the importance of Newspeak in totalitarian societies is that the power of language to describe reality is replaced by language whose purpose is to avoid encounters with realities. He agrees with Alain Besancon that the totalitarian society envisaged by George Orwell in 1984 can be only understood in theological terms, as a society founded on a transcendental negation. He agrees with T.S.Eliot that true originality is possible only within a tradition, and that it is precisely in modern conditions—conditions of fragmentation, heresy, and unbelief—that the conservative project acquires its sense.

Source:  Wiki

 

Muslim Inbreeding: Impacts on intelligence, sanity, health and society

EuropeNews – By Nicolai Sennels

Massive inbreeding within the Muslim culture during the last 1.400 years may have done catastrophic damage to their gene pool. The consequences of intermarriage between first cousins often have serious impact on the offspring’s intelligence, sanity, health and on their surroundings

The most famous example of inbreeding is in ancient Egypt, where several Pharaonic dynasties collapsed after a couple of hundred years. In order to keep wealth and power within the family, the Pharaohs often married their own sister or half-sister and after a handful of generations the offspring were mentally and physically unfit to rule. Another historical example is the royal houses of Europe where royal families often married among each other because tradition did not allow them to marry people of non-royal class.

The high amount of mentally retarded and handicapped royalties throughout European history shows the unhealthy consequences of this practice. Luckily, the royal families have now allowed themselves to marry for love and not just for status.

The Muslim culture still practices inbreeding and has been doing so for longer than any Egyptian dynasty. This practice also predates the world’s oldest monarchy (the Danish) by 300 years.

A rough estimate shows that close to half of all Muslims in the world are inbred: In Pakistan, 70 percent of all marriages are between first cousins (so-called “consanguinity”) and in Turkey the amount is between 25-30 percent (Jyllands-Posten, 27/2 2009 More stillbirths among immigrants”

Statistical research on Arabic countries shows that up to 34 percent of all marriages in Algiers are consanguine (blood related), 46 percent in Bahrain, 33 percent in Egypt, 80 percent in Nubia (southern area in Egypt), 60 percent in Iraq, 64 percent in Jordan, 64 percent in Kuwait, 42 percent in Lebanon, 48 percent in Libya, 47 percent in Mauritania, 54 percent in Qatar, 67 percent in Saudi Arabia, 63 percent in Sudan, 40 percent in Syria, 39 percent in Tunisia, 54 percent in the United Arabic Emirates and 45 percent in Yemen (Reproductive Health Journal, 2009 Consanguinity and reproductive health among Arabs.).

A large part of inbred Muslims are born from parents who are themselves inbred – which increase the risks of negative mental and physical consequenses greatly.

The amount of blood related marriages is lower among Muslim immigrants living in the West. Among Pakistanis living in Denmark the amount is down to 40 percent and 15 percent among Turkish immigrants (Jyllands-Posten, 27/2 2009 More stillbirths among immigrants”.).


More than half of Pakistani immigrants living in Britain are intermarried:

The research, conducted by the BBC and broadcast to a shocked nation on Tuesday, found that at least 55% of the community was married to a first cousin. This is thought to be linked to the probability that a British Pakistani family is at least 13 times more likely than the general population to have children with recessive genetic disorders.” (Times of India, 17/11 2005 Ban UK Pakistanis from marrying cousins).

The lower percentages might be because it is difficult to get the chosen family member to the country, or because health education is better in the West.

Implications for the Western and the Muslim World

The consequences for offspring of consanguineous marriages are unpleasantly clear: Death, low intelligence or even mental retardation, handicaps and diseases often leading to a slow and painful death. Other consequences are:

Limited social skills and understanding, limited ability to manage education and work procedures and painful treatment procedures. The negative cognitive consequences also influence the executive functions. The impairment of concentration and emotional control most often leads to anti-social behavior.

The economic costs and consequences for society of inbreeding are of course secondary to the reality of human suffering. However, inbreeding among Muslims has severe implications for both the Western societies and the Muslim world.

Expenses related to mentally and physically handicapped Muslim immigrants drains the budget for other public services: “When cousins have children together, they are twice as likely to have a disabled child – it costs municipal funds dearly. Disabled immigrant children costs Danish municipalities millions.

In Copenhagen County alone, the number of disabled children in the overall increase of 100 percent at 10 years. … Meredith Lefelt has contacted 330 families with disabled children in Copenhagen. She estimates that one third of their clients have a foreign cultural background.” (BT, 10/11 2003 Immigrants inbreeding costing one million.

On top come the expenses for Muslim immigrants who – because of different consequences of being born from blood related parents – are not able to live up to the challenges of our Western work market: Muslim immigrants and their descendants in Europe have a very high rate of unemployment.

The same goes for Muslims in USA, where the Gallup Institute made a study involving 300.000 people concluding “The majority of Muslims in USA have a lower income, are less educated and have worse jobs than the population as a whole.” (Berlingske Tidende, d. 3. marts 2009: Muslims thrive in USA.

The cognitive consequences of Muslim inbreeding might explain why non-Western immigrants are more than 300 percent more likely to fail the Danish army’s intelligence test than native Danes: “19.3% of non-Western immigrants are not able to pass the Danish army’s intelligence test. In comparison, only 4.7% of applicants with Danish background do not pass.” (TV 2 Nyhederne, 13/6 2007 Immigrants flunk army test.

It probably also explains – at least partly – why two thirds of all immigrant school children with Arabic backgrounds are illiterate after 10 years in the Danish school system: “Those who speak Arabic with their parents have an extreme tendency to lack reading abilities – 64 percent are illiterate. … No matter if it concerns reading abilities, mathematics or science, the pattern is the same: The bilingual (largely Muslim) immigrants’ skills are exceedingly poor compared to their Danish classmates.” (Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, May 2007: Ethnic students does not make Danish children worse.

The high expenses on special education for slow learners consumes one third of the budget for the Danish schools. “Immigrant children are clearly overrepresented on Copenhagen’s schools for retarded children and children with physical handicaps. … 51 percent of the children on the three schools in Copenhagen for children with physical and mental handicaps har immigrant back ground and on one of the schools the amount is 70 percent. … These amounts are significantly higher than the share of immigrant children in the municipality, which is 33 percent. The many handicapped children are a clear evidence that there are many intermarried parents in the immigrant families.” (Jydske Vestkysten, 4/4 2009 Tosprogede i overtal på handicapskoler).

Our high level of education may also make it harder for inbred students to follow and finish their studies: “Young people with minority backgrounds have a significantly higher dropout rate at secondary schools than youth with a Danish background. For trade school education, the dropout rate among immigrants is 60 percent, twice as high among adolescents with a Danish background….

There is great variation in educational outcomes when compared with national origin. For example, dropout among young people with Lebanese or Iranian background is far greater than among people of Vietnamese background.” (Center for Knowledge on Integration in Randers, May 2005 “Youth, education and integration“). ”Among immigrant children that are born and raised in Denmark, more than a third has no education. Among native Danes it is less than one fifth that do not get an education. (Statistics Denmark: “Indvandrere i 2007”.

The negative consequences of inbreeding are also vast for the Muslim world. Inbreeding may thus explain why only nine Muslims ever managed to receive the prestigious Nobel Prize (5 of them won the “Peace Prize” – for peace that turned out not to last for very long).

The limited ability to understand, appreciate and produce knowledge following a limited IQ is probably also partly the reason why Muslim countries produce 1/10 of the World average when it comes to scientific research: “In 2003, the world average for production of articles per million inhabitants was 137, whereas none of the 47 OIC countries for which there were data achieved production above 107 per million inhabitants. The OIC average was just 13.” (Nature 444, p. 26-27, 1. November 2006 ”Islam and science: The data gap”.

The lack of interest in science and human development in the Muslim World is also clear in the UN Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR). AHDR concludes that there have been fewer books translated into Arabic in the last thousand years than the amount of books translated within the country of Spain every year:

“The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one fifth of the number that Greece translates. The cumulative total of translated books since the Caliph Maa’moun’s [sic] time (the ninth century) is about 100,000, almost the average that Spain translates in one year.” (Eugene Rogan ”Arab Books and human development”. Index of Censorship, vol. 33, issue 2 April 2004, p. 152-157). “70 percent of the Turkish citizens never read books.”(APA, 23 February 2009 “)…

Thoroughly Modern Mill

By ROGER SCRUTON

May 20 sees the 200th anniversary of the birth of John Stuart Mill, the greatest exponent of 19th-century liberalism, whose philosophy still dominates jurisprudence in the English-speaking world. Mill was a many-faceted intellectual who wrote on all aspects of philosophy, on law and morals, on political economy, and on poetry and the arts. His home-schooling at the hands of his father, the economist and historian James Mill, was a model of rigor, causing him to read and write Greek aged 6, to master Latin aged 9, and to have acquired a thorough grounding in history and mathematics aged 10, when he began work on a history of Roman government. Mill later developed a taste for poetry, acquired a perfect knowledge of French, and, despite his agnostic upbringing, read deeply in the Bible, which he believed to be one of the two Great Books, the other being Homer.

Mill was never a member of a university, but devoted his life to self-education while holding lucrative posts at the India Office. He suffered a serious nervous breakdown in 1836. This breakdown, described in Mill’s remarkable “Autobiography,” was in part a response to the hard-headed utilitarianism of his father and his circle of “Philosophical Radicals.” The cost-benefit morality that James Mill had inherited from Jeremy Bentham, and which he had instilled into his son, left Mill bereft of all emotional succor.

Utilitarianism (“that action is right which promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number”) was a philosophy of the head which seemed to make no room for the heart. Mill recovered through reading Wordsworth, found consolation with Harriet Taylor, the wife of a tolerant gentleman who no doubt had good grounds for trusting in his wife’s chastity, and subsequently married the widowed Mrs. Taylor to continue in an apparently sexless union.

Mill’s rebellion against utilitarianism did not prevent him from writing a qualified defense of it, and his “Utilitarianism” is acknowledged today as one of the few readable accounts of a moral disorder that would have died out two centuries ago, had people not discovered that the utilitarian can excuse every crime. Lenin and Hitler were pious utilitarians, as were Stalin and Mao, as are most members of the Mafia. As Mill recognized, the “greatest happiness principle” must be qualified by some guarantee of individual rights, if it is not to excuse the tyrant.

In response to his own wavering discipleship, therefore, he wrote “On Liberty,” perhaps his most influential, though by no means his best, production. At the time, Benthamite ways of thinking were influencing jurisprudence, and arguments based on the “general good” and the “good of society” appealed to the conservative imagination of the Victorian middle classes. It seemed right to control the forms of public worship, to forbid the expression of heretical opinions, or to criminalize adultery, for the sake of a “public morality” which exists for the general good. If individual freedom suffers, then that, according to the utilitarians, is the price we must pay.

According to Mill’s argument, that way of thinking has everything upside down. The law does not exist to uphold majority morality against the individual, but to protect the individual against tyranny — including the “tyranny of the majority.” Of course, if the exercise of individual freedom threatens harm to others, it is legitimate to curtail it — for in such circumstances one person’s gain in freedom is another person’s loss of it. But when there is no proof of harm to another, the law must protect the individual’s right to act and speak as he chooses.

This principle has a profound significance: It is saying that the purpose of law is not to uphold the will of the majority, or to impose the will of the sovereign, but to protect the will of the individual. It is the legal expression of the “sovereignty of the individual.” The problem lies in the concept of harm. How can I prove that one person’s action does not harm another? How can I prove, for example, that other people are not harmed by my public criticism of their religious beliefs — beliefs on which they depend for their peace of mind and emotional stability?

How can I prove that consensual sex between two adults leaves the rest of us unaffected, when so much of life’s meaning seems to rest on the assumption of shared sexual norms? These questions are as significant for us as they were for Mill; the difference is that radical Islam has now replaced Scottish puritanism as the enemy of liberal values.

Mill’s defense of liberty, which was enunciated with great force and seeming clarity, soon followed the path taken by his defense of utilitarianism, and died the death of a thousand qualifications. “On Liberty” sees individual freedom as the aim of government, whose business is to reconcile one person’s freedom with his neighbor’s.

“The Principles of Political Economy” by contrast, while pretending to be a popular exposition of Adam Smith, accords extensive powers of social engineering to the state, and develops a socialist vision of the economy, with a constitutional role for trade unions, and extensive provisions for social security and welfare. The book is, in fact, a concealed socialist tract. While “On Liberty” belongs to the 18th-century tradition that we know as classical liberalism, “Principles” is an example of liberalism in its more modern sense.

Mill’s hostility to privilege, to landed property, and to inheritance of property had implications which he seemed unwilling or unable to work out. His argument that all property should be confiscated by the state on death, and redistributed according to its own greater wisdom, has the implication that the state, rather than the family, is to be treated as the basic unit of society — the true arbiter of our destiny, and the thing to which everything is owed.

The argument makes all property a temporary lease from the state, and also ensures that the state is the greatest spender, and the one least bound by the sense of responsibility to heirs and neighbors. It is, in short, a recipe for the disaster that we have seen in the communist and socialist systems, and it is a sign of Mill’s failure of imagination that, unlike Smith, he did not foresee the likely results of his favored policies.

Taking “On Liberty” and “Principles” together we find, in fact, a premonition of much that conservatives object to in the modern liberal worldview. The “harm” doctrine of “On Liberty” has been used again and again to subvert those aspects of law which are founded not in policy but in our inherited sense of the sacred and the prohibited. Hence this doctrine has made it impossible for the law to protect the core institutions of society, namely marriage and the family, from the sexual predators. Meanwhile, the statist morality of “Principles” has flowed into the moral vacuum, so that the very same law that refuses to intervene to protect children from pornography will insist that every aspect of our lives be governed by regulations that put the state in charge.

Mill famously referred to the Conservative Party as “the stupider party,” he being, from 1865, a member of Parliament in the Liberal interest. And no doubt the average Tory MP was no match for the brain that had conceived the “System of Logic” — an enduring classic and Mill’s greatest achievement. Yet Mill suffered from the same defect as his father. He never understood that wisdom is deeper and rarer than rational thought.

He never understood that the intellect, which flies so easily to its conclusions, relies on something else for its premises. Those conservatives who upheld what Mill called “the despotism of custom” against the “experiments in living” advocated in “On Liberty” were not stupid simply because they recognized the limits of the human intellect. They were, on the contrary, aware that freedom and custom are mutually dependent, and that to free oneself from moral norms is to surrender to the state. For only the state can manage the ensuing disaster.

Forget the liberal hype about a comeback: 2010 was a stunningly bad year for Barack Obama, and 2011 could be even worse

Telegraph – By Nile Gardiner

Ignore the revisionist hype in sections of the liberal media about President Obama staging a (mythical) political comeback – this is a presidency with an approval rating of 45 percent (according to the RealClear Politics poll of polls), that presides over a nation where just 27 percent of voters think the country is moving in the right direction, and which just 29 percent of Americans think will be returned to power in 2012.

The White House may be claiming a couple of political wins in the dying embers of the lame duck Congress after expending a great deal of political capital in the Senate over the reckless ratification of the Moscow-friendly START Treaty and the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, but these are issues barely on the radar screens of most American voters in the lead-up to 2012, an election which will be dominated by the economy and health care reform.

The political landscape still looks strikingly bleak for the “transformational president” as he goes into 2011. 2010 was a stunningly bad year for Barack Obama, no matter how much the likes of The New York Times or The Washington Post might try to sugar coat it. Here are four key reasons why it was a year Obama will want to forget:

1. The midterm elections were a defeat of epic proportions for the Obama Presidency

When Barack Obama spoke of a “shellacking” at the midterms, it was a huge understatement. The Republicans scored a significantly bigger win than they did in 1994, with their biggest gain in the House of Representatives in 62 years – since 1948. Fortunately for the Democrats, just 37 Senate seats were up for election, preventing what would have been an almost certain handover of power in the upper house too. Republicans also made huge gains at the gubernatorial level, with the GOP now holding 29 governorships to the Democrats’ 20. Republicans also picked up 680 seats in state legislatures, the highest figure in the modern era.

2. Conservatism grew increasingly dominant in America

The midterms were certainly no flash in the pan, but part of a broader conservative revolution that swept America in 2010. As a recent Gallup survey showed, 48 percent of Americans now describe themselves as “conservative”, compared to 32 percent who call themselves “moderate”, and just 20 percent who call themselves “liberal”. Conservatives now outnumber liberals by nearly 2.5 to 1, a ratio that is likely to increase in 2011. The percentage of Americans who are conservative has risen six points since 2006 and eight points since 1994. Barack Obama, the most liberal US president of the modern era, has a natural liberal constituency comprised of just one in five Americans, which certainly does not bode well for 2012.

3. The Left lost ground and engaged in a brutal civil war

2010 was a monumentally bad year for the liberal establishment in the United States, not only in electoral terms but in terms of increasing divisions within its ranks, as well as the continuing decline of the “mainstream” liberal media. Conservative media, from Fox News to The Wall Street Journal, have had a tremendous year, increasing market share while establishment giants from CNN to network news outlets continue to decline.

The White House unwisely took on Fox in a major offensive, and spectacularly lost. Glenn Beck, Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh, and a constellation of conservative talk show hosts have had a bumper 2010. In the meantime, America’s disillusioned liberal elites are increasingly aiming their fire at each other, in scenes reminiscent of the bloodthirsty finale of Reservoir Dogs. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman perfectly captured the brutal post-midterm atmosphere on the Left in a fiery broadside against the president: “Whatever is going on inside the White House, from the outside it looks like moral collapse — a complete failure of purpose and loss of direction.”

4. The Tea Party became more powerful than the president at the ballot box

The Tea Party was the big victor of 2010, and spectacularly humiliated the White House by running rings around it. A small grassroots movement with barely any resources evolved into the most successful US political movement of this generation, sparking a national protest against the Big Government policies of the Obama administration, and a powerful call for a return to America’s founding principles.

The Tea Party was initially mocked and jeered by its political opponents, including the president, but later came to be feared by the Left as it flexed tremendous political muscle. As I noted in September, a CNN poll showed that “while just 37 percent of Americans are more likely to vote for a candidate if backed by Barack Obama, a far larger 50 percent will vote for a Tea-Party endorsed candidate.” The Tea Party continues to gain momentum following the midterms, where it scored significant successes, and a late November USA Today/Gallup poll showed the Tea Party virtually neck and neck with President Obama in terms of voter opinion on who should influence government policy.

Law in the Empathetic Society

American Thinker – By Jeremy Egerer

…So how do we, as a society, objectively determine on whom to bestow our empathy?  How do we know when the law should champion the cause of the suffering?  First, let us look to John Stuart Mill, the grandfather of the sexual revolution and one of the most influential philosophers of classical liberalism.

Mill proposed that the cause of freedom limits our legislative capacity to banning only that which harms others, an idea known as the Harm Principle (most clearly explained by philosopher Roger Scruton).

But this philosophy of harm isn’t nearly as clean and simple as we might think, especially considering the unlimited number of instances which may be considered “harmful” and the fact that many harmful behaviors do not necessarily inflict the prohibited harm 100% of the time (think “hate speech” and drunk driving, respectively).

In short, while the Harm Principle gives the initial appearance of government restraint, this restraint exists only as long as society remains culturally cohesive — as long as “harm” is a widely understood, clearly-defined concept.  Perhaps in Mill’s day, harm was understood this clearly.  Today, it is not.

But John Locke, one of the most influential natural rights philosophers, had an answer to the proposition of empathetic subjectivity.  In his philosophical masterpiece, Two Treatises on Government (section 136, including footnotes), he states that “The Law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions must … be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e., to the will of God.”

And, in his quoting of Richard Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity, “[l]aws human must be made according to the general laws of Nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of Scripture, otherwise they are ill made.”  Not such a popular statement these days, but Locke’s writings were revered by our founding fathers, and they provided the essential philosophy of our very Declaration of Independence and the understanding of unalienable rights.

My question to my readers is this: living in a secular, multicultural, postmodern world, we find an increasing cacophony within the world of compassion.  As a committed Christian, I know what the proper boundaries of compassion are.  My question to you is, do you know where to draw the line between compassion and injustice?  And if we are to combat American liberalism, which oftentimes confuses offenders with victims, can we necessarily proceed under a utilitarian method like Mill’s?  Or does the necessity of adequate government and the protection of unalienable rights demand a far different, objective standard?

end – 😉

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