An individual may purchase/own almost any AR15 provided the following:
1) “Colt AR15” and “Colt Sporter” not allowed. These two models are specifically banned by name. Doesn’t matter if preban or postban.
2) If manufactured after 9.13.94, has to be AWB compliant. Meaning the AR15 can only have one (1) “evil feature.” In the case of the AR15 that feature is the pistol grip. Detachable magazines do not count as a feature. They are a qualifier.
3) If manufactured before 9.13.94 (preban) any and all features are allowed.
There are no special permits required. They are long guns just like any other.
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC PEACE AND SAFETY
Sec. 53-202. Machine guns. (a) As used in this section: (1) “Machine gun” shall apply to and include a weapon of any description, loaded or unloaded, which shoots, is designed to shoot or can be readily restored to shoot automatically more than one projectile, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger, and shall also include any part or combination of parts designed for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun and any combination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession of or under the control of a person. (2) “Crime of violence” shall apply to and include any of the following-named crimes or an attempt to commit any of the same: Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual assault and sexual assault with a firearm, assault in the first or second degree, robbery, burglary, larceny and riot in the first degree. (3) “Projectile” means any size bullet that when affixed to any cartridge case may be propelled through the bore of a machine gun.
(b) Any person who possesses or uses a machine gun in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime of violence shall be imprisoned not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.
(c) Any person who (1) possesses or uses a machine gun for an offensive or aggressive purpose, or (2) notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection (h) of this section, transfers, sells or gives a machine gun to a person under sixteen years of age, including the temporary transfer of a machine gun to such person for use in target shooting or on a firing or shooting range or for any other purpose, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten years or be both fined and imprisoned.
(d) The possession or use of a machine gun shall be presumed to be for an offensive or aggressive purpose: (1) When the machine gun is on premises not owned or rented, for bona fide permanent residence or business occupancy, by the person in whose possession the machine gun was found; or (2) when in the possession of, or used by, an unnaturalized foreign-born person, or a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence in any state or federal court of record of the United States of America, its territories or insular possessions; or (3) when the machine gun is of the kind described in subsection (g) hereof and has not been registered as therein required; or (4) when empty or loaded projectiles of any caliber which have been or are susceptible of use in the machine gun are found in the immediate vicinity thereof.
(e) The presence of a machine gun in any room, boat or vehicle shall be presumptive evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying such room, boat or vehicle.
(f) Each manufacturer shall keep a register of all machine guns manufactured or handled by the manufacturer. Such register shall show the model and serial number, and the date of manufacture, sale, loan, gift, delivery or receipt, of each machine gun, the name, address and occupation of the person to whom the machine gun was sold, loaned, given or delivered, or from whom it was received and the purpose for which it was acquired by the person to whom the machine gun was sold, loaned, given or delivered. Upon demand, any manufacturer shall permit any marshal or police officer to inspect such manufacturer’s entire stock of machine guns, and parts and supplies therefor, and shall produce the register, herein required, for inspection. Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars.
(g) Each machine gun in this state adapted to use projectiles of any caliber shall be registered in the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety within twenty-four hours after its acquisition and, thereafter, annually, on July first. Blanks for registration shall be prepared by said commissioner and furnished upon application. To comply with this subsection, the application as filed shall show the model and serial number of the gun, the name, address and occupation of the person in possession, and from whom and the purpose for which the gun was acquired. The registration data shall not be subject to inspection by the public. Any person who fails to register any gun as required hereby shall be presumed to possess the same for an offensive or aggressive purpose. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any machine gun which has been registered under the provisions of subsection (f) and which is still in the actual possession of the manufacturer.
(h) No provision of this section shall apply to: (1) The manufacture of machine guns for sale or transfer to the United States government, to any state, territory or possession of the United States or to any political subdivision thereof or to the District of Columbia; (2) the possession of a machine gun rendered inoperable by welding of all critical functioning parts and possessed as a curiosity, ornament or keepsake; or (3) a machine gun acquired, transferred or possessed in accordance with the National Firearms Act, as amended, provided such machine gun shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 8509; 1963, P.A. 652, S. 10; P.A. 76-336, S. 19; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 84-200; P.A. 00-99, S. 118, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 69, 181; P.A. 09-62, S. 1.)
History: 1963 act deleted provisions re issuance of search warrant and order for confiscation; P.A. 76-336 redefined “crime of violence” to delete rape, mayhem, housebreaking, breaking and entering and assault “to do great bodily harm” and to add sexual assault, sexual assault with a firearm and assault in the first or second degree; P.A. 77-614 replaced commissioner of state police with commissioner of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 84-200 replaced numeric Subsec. indicators with alphabetic indicators, replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators, amended Subsec. (a) by redefining machine gun, including riot in the first degree as a crime of violence and adding a definition of “projectile”, amended Subsec. (b) by providing a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years, amended Subsec. (c) by providing a maximum fine of $1,000 and a minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years or both a fine and imprisonment, amended Subsecs. (d) and (g) by replacing pistol shells or cartridges of 30 or larger caliber with “projectiles of any caliber”, and amended Subsec. (h) by adding Subdivs. (2) and (3) re exceptions for machine guns rendered inoperable by welding of all critical functioning parts and machine guns acquired, transferred or possessed in accordance with the National Firearms Act; P.A. 00-99 deleted reference to sheriff in Subsec. (f), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes in Subsec. (f), effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 09-62 amended Subsec. (c) to designate existing provision prohibiting a person from possessing or using a machine gun for offensive or aggressive purpose as Subdiv. (1) and add Subdiv. (2) prohibiting a person from transferring, selling or giving a machine gun to person under 16 years of age.
See Secs. 29-27 to 29-38, inclusive, re permits for pistols and revolvers.
See Sec. 54-33a et seq. re searches.
Cited. 237 C. 348.
Cited. 9 CA 330. Cited. 17 CA 556. Cited. 25 CA 433. Cited. 44 CA 40.
Cited. 224 C. 163.
Cited. 26 CA 698.
Sec. 53-202a. Assault weapons: Definition. (a) As used in this section and sections 53-202b to 53-202k, inclusive, “assault weapon” means:
(1) Any selective-fire firearm capable of fully automatic, semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user or any of the following specified semiautomatic firearms: Algimec Agmi; Armalite AR-180; Australian Automatic Arms SAP Pistol; Auto-Ordnance Thompson type; Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type; Barrett Light-Fifty model 82A1; Beretta AR-70; Bushmaster Auto Rifle and Auto Pistol; Calico models M-900, M-950 and 100-P; Chartered Industries of Singapore SR-88; Colt AR-15 and Sporter; Daewoo K-1, K-2, Max-1 and Max-2; Encom MK-IV, MP-9 and MP-45; Fabrique Nationale FN/FAL, FN/LAR, or FN/FNC; FAMAS MAS 223; Feather AT-9 and Mini-AT; Federal XC-900 and XC-450; Franchi SPAS-12 and LAW-12; Galil AR and ARM; Goncz High-Tech Carbine and High-Tech Long Pistol; Heckler & Koch HK-91, HK-93, HK-94 and SP-89; Holmes MP-83; MAC-10, MAC-11 and MAC-11 Carbine type; Intratec TEC-9 and Scorpion; Iver Johnson Enforcer model 3000; Ruger Mini-14/5F folding stock model only; Scarab Skorpion; SIG 57 AMT and 500 series; Spectre Auto Carbine and Auto Pistol; Springfield Armory BM59, SAR-48 and G-3; Sterling MK-6 and MK-7; Steyr AUG; Street Sweeper and Striker 12 revolving cylinder shotguns; USAS-12; UZI Carbine, Mini-Carbine and Pistol; Weaver Arms Nighthawk; Wilkinson “Linda” Pistol;
(2) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in subdivision (1) of this subsection, may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person;
(3) Any semiautomatic firearm not listed in subdivision (1) of this subsection that meets the following criteria:
(A) A semiautomatic rifle that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least two of the following:
(i) A folding or telescoping stock;
(ii) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii) A bayonet mount;
(iv) A flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and
(v) A grenade launcher; or
(B) A semiautomatic pistol that has an ability to accept a detachable magazine and has at least two of the following:
(i) An ammunition magazine that attaches to the pistol outside of the pistol grip;
(ii) A threaded barrel capable of accepting a barrel extender, flash suppressor, forward handgrip or silencer;
(iii) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to hold the firearm with the nontrigger hand without being burned;
(iv) A manufactured weight of fifty ounces or more when the pistol is unloaded; and
(v) A semiautomatic version of an automatic firearm; or
(C) A semiautomatic shotgun that has at least two of the following:
(i) A folding or telescoping stock;
(ii) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon;
(iii) A fixed magazine capacity in excess of five rounds; and
(iv) An ability to accept a detachable magazine; or
(4) A part or combination of parts designed or intended to convert a firearm into an assault weapon, as defined in subdivision (3) of this subsection, or any combination of parts from which an assault weapon, as defined in subdivision (3) of this subsection, may be rapidly assembled if those parts are in the possession or under the control of the same person.
(b) As used in this section and sections 53-202b to 53-202k, inclusive, the term “assault weapon” does not include any firearm modified to render it permanently inoperable.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 1; P.A. 01-130, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-130 amended Subsec. (a) to delete reference to Sec. 53a-46a(h), make technical changes in Subdiv. (2) and add Subdivs. (3) and (4) re physical characteristics criteria applicable to definition of “assault weapon” and amended Subsec. (b) to delete reference to Sec. 53a-46a(h).
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Defendant’s conviction under Sec. 53-202c did not violate his due process rights because, as a matter of law, a Maadi MISR is an “assault weapon” as defined in section. Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by trial court’s not concluding section is vague as applied to circumstances of his case. 93 CA 129.
Sec. 53-202b. Sale or transfer of assault weapon prohibited. Class C felony. (a)(1) Any person who, within this state, distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives any assault weapon, except as provided by sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a, shall be guilty of a class C felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years may not be suspended or reduced.
(2) Any person who transfers, sells or gives any assault weapon to a person under eighteen years of age in violation of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to the term of imprisonment imposed under subdivision (1) of this subsection.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to:
(1) The sale of assault weapons to the Department of Public Safety, police departments, the Department of Correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties;
(2) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d which is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a;
(3) The transfer by bequest or intestate succession of an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 2.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202c. Possession of assault weapon prohibited. Class D felony. (a) Except as provided in section 53-202e, any person who, within this state, possesses any assault weapon, except as provided in sections 29-37j, 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and 53-202o and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a, shall be guilty of a class D felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which one year may not be suspended or reduced; except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor if (1) the person presents proof that he lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993, and (2) the person has otherwise possessed the firearm in compliance with subsection (d) of section 53-202d.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of assault weapons by members or employees of the Department of Public Safety, police departments, the Department of Correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties; nor shall anything in sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a prohibit the possession or use of assault weapons by sworn members of these agencies when on duty and the use is within the scope of their duties.
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon by any person prior to July 1, 1994, if all of the following are applicable:
(1) The person is eligible under sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a to apply for a certificate of possession for the assault weapon by July 1, 1994;
(2) The person lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to October 1, 1993; and
(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a.
(d) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under section 53-202d, if the assault weapon is possessed at a place set forth in subdivision (1) of subsection (d) of section 53-202d or as authorized by the Probate Court.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 3; P.A. 02-120, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 02-120 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53-202o, effective June 7, 2002.
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Defendant’s conviction did not violate his due process rights because, as a matter of law, a Maadi MISR is an “assault weapon” as defined by Sec. 53-202a. 93 CA 129.
Sec. 53-202d. Certificate of possession of assault weapon. Certificate of transfer of assault weapon to gun dealer. Circumstances where possession of assault weapon authorized. (a) Any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a, prior to October 1, 1993, shall apply by October 1, 1994, or, if such person is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to apply by October 1, 1994, because he or she is or was on official duty outside of this state, shall apply within ninety days of returning to the state to the Department of Public Safety, for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon. The certificate shall contain a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks, the full name, address, date of birth and thumbprint of the owner, and any other information as the department may deem appropriate. The department shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 not later than January 1, 1994, to establish procedures with respect to the application for and issuance of certificates of possession pursuant to this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210 and 1-211, the name and address of a person issued a certificate of possession shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed, except such records may be disclosed to (1) law enforcement agencies, and (2) the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services to carry out the provisions of subsection (c) of section 17a-500.
(b) No assault weapon possessed pursuant to this section may be sold or transferred on or after January 1, 1994, to any person within this state other than to a licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of section 53-202f, or as provided in section 53-202e, or by bequest or intestate succession. Any person who obtains title to an assault weapon for which a certificate of possession has been issued under this section by bequest or intestate succession shall, within ninety days of obtaining title, apply to the Department of Public Safety for a certificate of possession as provided in subsection (a) of this section, render the weapon permanently inoperable, sell the weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the weapon from the state. Any person who moves into the state in lawful possession of an assault weapon, shall, within ninety days, either render the weapon permanently inoperable, sell the weapon to a licensed gun dealer or remove the weapon from this state, except any person who is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States, is in lawful possession of an assault weapon and has been transferred into the state after October 1, 1994, may, within ninety days of arriving in the state, apply to the Department of Public Safety for a certificate of possession with respect to such assault weapon.
(c) If an owner of an assault weapon sells or transfers the weapon to a licensed gun dealer, he shall, at the time of delivery of the weapon, execute a certificate of transfer and cause the certificate to be mailed or delivered to the Commissioner of Public Safety. The certificate shall contain: (1) The date of sale or transfer; (2) the name and address of the seller or transferor and the licensed gun dealer, their Social Security numbers or motor vehicle operator license numbers, if applicable; (3) the licensed gun dealer’s federal firearms license number and seller’s permit number; (4) a description of the weapon, including the caliber of the weapon and its make, model and serial number; and (5) any other information the commissioner prescribes. The licensed gun dealer shall present his motor vehicle operator’s license or Social Security card, federal firearms license and seller’s permit to the seller or transferor for inspection at the time of purchase or transfer. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall maintain a file of all certificates of transfer at his central office.
(d) A person who has been issued a certificate of possession of an assault weapon under this section may possess it only under the following conditions:
(1) At that person’s residence, place of business or other property owned by that person, or on property owned by another with the owner’s express permission;
(2) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets;
(3) While on a target range which holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range;
(4) While on the premises of a licensed shooting club;
(5) While attending any exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms; or
(6) While transporting the assault weapon between any of the places mentioned in this subsection, or to any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of section 53-202f, for servicing or repair pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53-202f, provided the assault weapon is transported as required by section 53-202f.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 4; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 19, 20; P.A. 98-129, S. 8.)
History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1 amended Subsec. (a) to extend from July 1, 1994, to October 1, 1994, the deadline for applying for a certificate of possession and add provision requiring any member of the military or naval forces who is unable to apply by said date due to official duty outside of the state to apply within 90 days of returning to the state and amended Subsec. (b) to add exception authorizing any member of the military or naval forces in lawful possession of an assault weapon who is transferred into the state after October 1, 1994 to apply for a certificate of possession within 90 days of arriving in the state, effective July 7, 1994; P.A. 98-129 added Subsec. (a)(2) authorizing disclosure of such records to the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services to carry out the provisions of Sec. 17a-500(c).
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202e. Relinquishment of assault weapon to law enforcement agency. Any individual may arrange in advance to relinquish an assault weapon to a police department or the Department of Public Safety. The assault weapon shall be transported in accordance with the provisions of section 53-202f.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 5.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202f. Transportation of assault weapon. Authorized actions of gun dealer. (a) While transporting an assault weapon between any of the places mentioned in subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of subsection (d) of section 53-202d, no person shall carry a loaded assault weapon concealed from public view or knowingly have, in any motor vehicle owned, operated or occupied by him (1) a loaded assault weapon, or (2) an unloaded assault weapon unless such weapon is kept in the trunk of such vehicle or in a case or other container which is inaccessible to the operator of or any passenger in such vehicle. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both.
(b) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of this section, who lawfully possesses an assault weapon pursuant to section 53-202d, in addition to the uses allowed in section 53-202d, may transport the assault weapon between dealers or out of the state, display it at any gun show licensed by a state or local governmental entity or sell it to a resident outside the state. Any transporting of the assault weapon allowed by this subsection must be done as required by subsection (a) of this section.
(c) (1) Any licensed gun dealer, as defined in subsection (d) of this section, may take possession of any assault weapon for the purposes of servicing or repair from any person to whom has been issued a certificate of possession for such weapon pursuant to sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a.
(2) Any licensed gun dealer may transfer possession of any assault weapon received pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, to a gunsmith for purposes of accomplishing service or repair of the same. Transfers are permissible only to the following persons:
(A) A gunsmith who is in the dealer’s employ;
(B) A gunsmith with whom the dealer has contracted for gunsmithing services, provided the gunsmith receiving the assault weapon holds a dealer’s license issued pursuant to Chapter 44, commencing with Section 921, of Title 18 of the United States Code and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.
(d) The term “licensed gun dealer”, as used in sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a means a person who has a federal firearms license and a permit to sell firearms pursuant to section 29-28.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 6.)
History: (Revisor’s note: In Subdiv. (2)(B) of Subsec. (c) the words “with whom” were substituted for “who” editorially by the Revisors for grammatical accuracy).
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202g. Report of loss or theft of assault weapon or other firearm. Penalty. (a) Any person who lawfully possesses an assault weapon under sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a or a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, that is lost or stolen from such person shall report the loss or theft to the organized local police department for the town in which the loss or theft occurred or, if such town does not have an organized local police department, to the state police troop having jurisdiction for such town within seventy-two hours of when such person discovered or should have discovered the loss or theft. Such department or troop shall forthwith forward a copy of such report to the Commissioner of Public Safety. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the loss or theft of an antique firearm as defined in subsection (b) of section 29-37a.
(b) Any person who fails to make a report required by subsection (a) of this section within the prescribed time period shall commit an infraction and be fined not more than ninety dollars for a first offense and be guilty of a class D felony for any subsequent offense, except that, if such person intentionally fails to make such report within the prescribed time period, such person shall be guilty of a class C felony. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section for the first offense shall not lose such person’s right to hold or obtain any firearm permit under the general statutes.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 7; P.A. 07-163, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 07-163 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and amended same to make provisions applicable to “a firearm, as defined in section 53a-3” and assault weapons or firearms that are “lost or stolen”, rather than “stolen”, require person to report loss or theft to “the organized local police department for the town in which the loss or theft occurred or, if such town does not have an organized local police department, to the state police troop having jurisdiction for such town”, rather than to “law enforcement authorities”, require department to forthwith forward a copy of report to Commissioner of Public Safety and exclude loss or theft of an antique firearm from reporting requirement and added Subsec. (b) to establish as the penalty an infraction for a first offense and a class D felony for a subsequent offense for failing to make report within prescribed time period and a class C felony for intentionally failing to make report within prescribed time period and provide that violation of Subsec. (a) shall not cause a person to lose right to hold or obtain any firearm permit.
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202h. Temporary transfer or possession of assault weapon for transport to out-of-state event. The provisions of subsection (a) of section 53-202b and subsection (a) of section 53-202c shall not apply to the temporary transfer or possession of an assault weapon, for which a certificate of possession has been issued pursuant to section 53-202d, for purposes of transporting such weapon to and from any shooting competition or exhibition, display or educational project which is about firearms and which is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms, which competition, exhibition, display or educational project is held outside this state.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 10.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202i. Circumstances in which manufacture or transportation of assault weapons not prohibited. Nothing in sections 29-37j and 53-202a to 53-202k, inclusive, and subsection (h) of section 53a-46a shall be construed to prohibit any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing assault weapons in this state from manufacturing or transporting assault weapons in this state for sale within this state in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 53-202b or for sale outside this state.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 11.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202j. Commission of a class A, B or C felony with an assault weapon: Eight-year nonsuspendable sentence. Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a, shall be imprisoned for a term of eight years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 8.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Sec. 53-202k. Commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm: Five-year nonsuspendable sentence. Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, except an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a, shall be imprisoned for a term of five years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony.
(P.A. 93-306, S. 9.)
Cited. 234 C. 455. Cited. 241 C. 665. Section is a sentence enhancer rather than a separate offense; a separate conviction under section is improper. 242 C. 143. When jury convicts based on an underlying felony, jury must also determine issue of whether a firearm was used in commission of the felony. 253 C. 210. Unarmed accomplice is subject to an enhanced penalty under this section. 255 C. 782. Where court failed to instruct jury as to elements of statute which provided for enhancement of sentence, enhanced sentence was vacated and case remanded for trial on that issue. 256 C. 785. Based on plain language of section, its legislative history, and prior court decisions interpreting its provisions, application of sentence enhancement to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, a class B felony, does not violate double jeopardy. 257 C. 544. Based on section’s language and its legislative history, trial court properly applied section’s sentence enhancement to defendant’s split sentence. Id. State need not prove that firearm was capable of discharging a shot to apply statute as sentence enhancement. 259 C. 799. Section imposes separate enhancements of five years each where defendant is convicted of multiple qualifying felonies arising from the same incident. 263 C. 136. Possession of firearm by one coconspirator is not attributable to other coconspirators for purposes of the enhancement statute. 276 C. 452.
Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 44 CA 561. Cited. 48 CA 361. Since section is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, conviction under section must be vacated. 49 CA 420. Trial court improperly rendered judgment convicting defendant of the crime of commission of class A, B or C felony with a firearm because statute does not establish a separate criminal offense but is a sentence enhancement provision. 51 CA 171. Section intended to serve as sentence enhancement provision, not as a separate crime. Id., 541. Reaffirmed ruling that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 52 CA 599. Reaffirmed prior holdings that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 54 CA 18. Under this section, state is not required to demonstrate that defendant actually has gun, but that defendant represented, by words or conduct, that he was holding a gun. 60 CA 487. Failure to instruct jury re elements of statute was harmless error, since evidence against defendant was overwhelming and uncontested, and not violative of due process. 61 CA 417. Trial court determination that defendant fulfilled requirements of sentence enhancement pursuant to this statute results in harmless error if jury would have, upon proper instruction, reached the same determination. 65 CA 551. Statute permits multiple enhancements. 69 CA 717. Failure of court to instruct jury that finding defendant used a firearm was harmless error where state has proven the elements necessary for the sentence enhancement. 74 CA 129. Plaintiff’s claim that trial court did not put issue of enhancement under statute to the jury was harmless error since verdict required finding that the murder was committed with a firearm. Id., 391. Court declines to create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the state seeks sentence enhancement pursuant to this section after defendant elects a jury trial. Sentence enhancement pursuant to this section not treated as essential element of the statute and state need only prove to jury the two elements of the statute and is not required to prove that length of defendant’s incarceration should be increased. 81 CA 824. Legislature’s use of “shall” in section, coupled with precedent, amply supports conclusion that legislature intended sentence enhancement to apply to conviction under Sec. 53a-59(a)(5). 90 CA 445. Since section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate offense, conviction under section must be vacated. 94 CA 715. Trial court properly applied sentence enhancement provisions of section in a matter where defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled nolo contendere to section’s provisions; in doing so defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the facts with respect to that charge. 103 CA 100.
Sec. 53-202l. Armor piercing and incendiary .50 caliber ammunition: Definition. Sale or transfer prohibited. Class D felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) “Armor piercing .50 caliber bullet” means any .50 caliber bullet that is (A) designed for the purpose of, (B) held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (C) generally recognized as having a specialized capability to penetrate armor or bulletproof glass, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M2 Armor-Piercing” or “AP”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”, “M903 Caliber .50 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator” or “SLAP”, or “M962 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator Tracer” or “SLAPT”.
(2) “Incendiary .50 caliber bullet” means any .50 caliber bullet that is (A) designed for the purpose of, (B) held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (C) generally recognized as having a specialized capability to ignite upon impact, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M1 Incendiary”, “M23 Incendiary”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, or “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”.
(b) Any person who knowingly distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale or offers or exposes for sale or gives to any person any ammunition that is an armor piercing .50 caliber bullet or an incendiary .50 caliber bullet shall be guilty of a class D felony, except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to the following:
(1) The sale of such ammunition to the Department of Public Safety, police departments, the Department of Correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties;
(2) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes such ammunition that is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court; or
(3) The transfer by bequest or intestate succession of such ammunition.
(d) If the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, it may order suspension of prosecution in accordance with the provisions of subsection (h) of section 29-33.
(P.A. 01-130, S. 2; P.A. 03-19, S. 122.)
History: P.A. 03-19 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003.
Sec. 53-202m. Circumstances when assault weapons exempt from limitations on transfers and registration requirements. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, sections 53-202a to 53-202l, inclusive, shall not be construed to limit the transfer or require the registration of an assault weapon as defined in subdivision (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of section 53-202a, provided such firearm was legally manufactured prior to September 13, 1994.
(P.A. 01-130, S. 3.)
Sec. 53-202n. Possession of specified assault weapon permitted under certain circumstances. Notice requirement. (a) For the purposes of subsection (a) of section 53-202c, this section and section 53-202o, “specified assault weapon” means any of the following firearms: Auto-Ordnance Thompson type, Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 type, or MAC-10, MAC-11 and MAC-11 Carbine type.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of section 53-202c shall not apply to any person who (1) in good faith purchased or otherwise obtained title to a specified assault weapon on or after October 1, 1993, and prior to May 8, 2002, in compliance with any state and federal laws concerning the purchase or transfer of firearms, (2) is not otherwise disqualified or prohibited from possessing such specified assault weapon, and (3) has notified the Department of Public Safety in accordance with subsection (c) of this section prior to October 1, 2003, that he or she possesses such specified assault weapon.
(c) A person complies with the notice requirement of subdivision (3) of subsection (b) of this section if such person provides the Department of Public Safety with: (1) A copy of the proof of purchase for such specified assault weapon, and (2) one of the following: (A) A copy of state form DPS-3 with respect to such specified assault weapon, (B) a copy of federal ATF Form 4473 with respect to such specified assault weapon, or (C) a sworn affidavit from such person that such specified assault weapon was purchased in compliance with any state and federal laws concerning the purchase or transfer of firearms; except that, if such person does not have a copy of the proof of purchase for such specified assault weapon, such person may satisfy the requirement of subdivision (1) of this subsection by, not later than January 1, 2003, providing such information as the department may require on a form prescribed by the department together with a sworn affidavit from such person that such specified assault weapon was purchased in compliance with any state and federal laws concerning the purchase or transfer of firearms.
(d) Any person who is a member of the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States and is unable to meet the notice requirements of subdivision (3) of subsection (b) and of subsection (c) of this section by October 1, 2003, because such person is or was on official duty outside this state, may file such notice within ninety days of returning to the state.
(e) As proof that a person has complied with the notice requirement of this section and that such notice has been received by the Department of Public Safety, the department shall issue a certificate of possession for such specified assault weapon. Such certificate shall contain a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks, and the full name, address and date of birth of the owner.
(P.A. 02-120, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 02-120 effective June 7, 2002.
Sec. 53-202o. Affirmative defense in prosecution for possession of specified assault weapon. (a) In any prosecution for a violation of section 53-202c based on the possession by the defendant of a specified assault weapon, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant (1) in good faith purchased or otherwise obtained title to such specified assault weapon on or after October 1, 1993, and prior to May 8, 2002, in compliance with any state and federal laws concerning the purchase or transfer of firearms, (2) is not otherwise disqualified or prohibited from possessing such specified assault weapon, and (3) has possessed such specified assault weapon in compliance with subsection (d) of section 53-202d.
(b) In any such prosecution, if such defendant proves such affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the specified assault weapon shall be returned to such defendant upon such defendant notifying the Department of Public Safety in accordance with subdivision (3) of subsection (b) and of subsection (c) of section 53-202n and obtaining a certificate of possession, provided such notification is made not later than October 1, 2003.
(P.A. 02-120, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 02-120 effective June 7, 2002.
Secs. 53-202p to 53-202z. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 53-202aa. Firearms trafficking: Class C or class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of firearms trafficking if such person, knowingly and intentionally, directly or indirectly, causes one or more firearms that such person owns, is in possession of or is in control of to come into the possession of or control of another person whom such person knows or has reason to believe is prohibited from owning or possessing any firearm under state or federal law.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class C felony if such person, on or after October 1, 2007, sells, delivers or otherwise transfers five or fewer firearms, and a class B felony if such person, on or after October 1, 2007, sells, delivers or otherwise transfers more than five firearms.
(c) For the purposes of this section, “firearm” means “firearm” as defined in section 53a-3, but does not include a rifle or shotgun or an antique firearm as defined in subsection (b) of section 29-37a.
(P.A. 07-163, S. 3.)
See Sec. 29-33 re requirements for sale or transfer of pistols or revolvers.
See Sec. 29-37a re requirements for sale or transfer of long guns.
See Sec. 29-37j re prohibition on purchasing firearm with intent to transfer same to person prohibited from purchasing or receiving.
See Sec. 53a-217 re criminal possession of a firearm.
See Sec. 53a-217c re criminal possession of a pistol or revolver.
Sec. 53-203. Unlawful discharge of firearms. Any person who intentionally, negligently or carelessly discharges any firearm in such a manner as to be likely to cause bodily injury or death to persons or domestic animals, or the wanton destruction of property shall be fined not more than two hundred fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than three months or both.
(1949 Rev., S. 8521; P.A. 73-457.)
History: P.A. 73-457 essentially rewrote provisions, which previously prohibited discharging firearms “in any city or borough, except on military occasions, without permission first obtained from the mayor of such city or the warden of such borough” and which had imposed fine for firing cannon without permit applicable to proprietors or persons in charge of private military schools, to forbid discharging firearm so as to harm persons, domestic animals or property and to increase maximum fine from $7 to $250 and maximum imprisonment from 30 days to 3 months.
Cited. 169 C. 309. Cited. 186 C. 574. Cited. 197 C. 602. Cited. 215 C. 739. Cited. 219 C. 363. Cited. 226 C. 497.
Cited. 24 CA 408.
Cited. 39 CS 359.
Sec. 53-204. Hunting or discharging firearm from public highway. Any person who hunts or discharges any firearm from any public highway shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars. This section shall not apply to any law or conservation enforcement officer in the performance of his duty. Enforcement officers of the Department of Environmental Protection are empowered to arrest for the violation of the provisions of this section.
(1955, S. 3290d; 1957, P.A. 344.)
Sec. 53-205. Loaded shotguns, rifles and muzzleloaders prohibited in vehicles and snowmobiles. (a) No person shall carry or possess in any vehicle or snowmobile any shotgun, rifle or muzzleloader of any gauge or caliber while such shotgun, rifle or muzzleloader contains in the barrel, chamber or magazine any loaded shell or cartridge capable of being discharged or when such muzzleloader has a percussion cap in place or when the powder pan of a flintlock contains powder. As used in this subsection, “muzzleloader” means a rifle or shotgun that is incapable of firing a self-contained cartridge and must be loaded at the muzzle end.
(b) The enforcement officers of the Department of Environmental Protection are empowered to enforce this section.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to members of the military departments of the government or state while on duty or while traveling to or from assignments, or to enforcement officers, security guards or other persons employed to protect public or private property while in the performance of such duties.
(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not less than ten dollars or more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or be both fined and imprisoned.
(1953, S. 3289d; 1969, P.A. 752, S. 11; P.A. 76-374; P.A. 10-36, S. 12.)
History: 1969 act prohibited carrying and possession of loaded shotguns and rifles in snowmobiles; P.A. 76-374 included muzzleloaders in prohibition and added provisions specifically applicable to muzzleloaders; P.A. 10-36 divided existing provisions into Subsecs. (a) to (d) and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2010.
See Sec. 14-379 for definition of “snowmobile”.
See Sec. 26-6a re constables for fish and game protection.
Cited. 163 C. 184. Cited. 195 C. 668. Cited. 197 C. 602.
Cited. 35 CS 659.
Sec. 53-206. Carrying of dangerous weapons prohibited. (a) Any person who carries upon his or her person any BB. gun, blackjack, metal or brass knuckles, or any dirk knife, or any switch knife, or any knife having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade of over one and one-half inches in length, or stiletto, or any knife the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or more in length, any police baton or nightstick, or any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. Whenever any person is found guilty of a violation of this section, any weapon or other instrument within the provisions of this section, found upon the body of such person, shall be forfeited to the municipality wherein such person was apprehended, notwithstanding any failure of the judgment of conviction to expressly impose such forfeiture.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to (1) any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace while engaged in the pursuit of such officer’s official duties; (2) the carrying of a baton or nightstick by a security guard while engaged in the pursuit of such guard’s official duties; (3) the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or more in length, by (A) any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined in section 27-103, or any reserve component thereof, or of the armed forces of the state, as defined in section 27-2, when on duty or going to or from duty, (B) any member of any military organization when on parade or when going to or from any place of assembly, (C) any person while transporting such knife as merchandise or for display at an authorized gun or knife show, (D) any person who is found with any such knife concealed upon one’s person while lawfully removing such person’s household goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, (E) any person while actually and peaceably engaged in carrying any such knife from such person’s place of abode or business to a place or person where or by whom such knife is to be repaired, or while actually and peaceably returning to such person’s place of abode or business with such knife after the same has been repaired, (F) any person holding a valid hunting, fishing or trapping license issued pursuant to chapter 490 or any salt water fisherman carrying such knife for lawful hunting, fishing or trapping activities, or (G) any person while participating in an authorized historic reenactment; (4) the carrying by any person enrolled in or currently attending, or an instructor at, a martial arts school of a martial arts weapon while in a class or at an authorized event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such class, event or competition; (5) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person taking part in a supervised event or competition of the Boy Scouts of America or the Girl Scouts of America or in any other authorized event or competition while taking part in such event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such event or competition; and (6) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person upon such person’s own property or the property of another person provided such other person has authorized the carrying of such weapon on such property, and the transporting of such weapon to or from such property.
(1949 Rev., S. 8540; 1953, S. 3287d; P.A. 86-287, S. 1; P.A. 87-220, S. 1; P.A. 98-129, S. 9; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 120, 121; P.A. 99-212, S. 12; P.A. 03-19, S. 123; P.A. 10-32, S. 148.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) by adding “or any martial arts weapon and electronic defense weapon as defined in section 53a-3” and amended Subsec. (a) by adding provision permitting person to carry any martial arts weapon anywhere within state if such person has been granted a permit to do so; P.A. 87-220 made technical changes; P.A. 98-129 replaced requirement that a permit be obtained for the carrying of certain dangerous or deadly weapons or instruments with prohibition on the carrying of such weapons or instruments, deleted slung shot, air rifles and sand bags from the list of prohibited weapons or instruments, added exception for the carrying of knives with blades of four inches or more by certain individuals and deleted requirement that the seller of any such weapon or instrument give written notice of any such sale to the chief of police of the city, warden of the borough or first selectman of the town where such weapon or instrument was sold or delivered; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 repealed all changes enacted by P.A. 98-129, effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-212 substantially revised section including replacing requirement that a permit be obtained for the carrying of certain dangerous or deadly weapons or instruments with prohibition on the carrying of such weapons or instruments, deleting slung shot, air rifle and sand bag from list of prohibited weapons and instruments, adding police baton or nightstick to list of prohibited weapons and instruments, making the exception for an officer charged with preservation of the public peace applicable while the officer is “engaged in the pursuit of such officer’s official duties”, adding exception for the carrying of a baton or nightstick by a security guard while engaged in the guard’s official duties, adding exception for the carrying of a knife having a blade of four inches or more by certain individuals under certain circumstances, adding exception for the carrying of a martial arts weapon by a student or instructor at a martial arts school under certain circumstances, adding exception for the carrying of a BB. gun by a person taking part in certain supervised or authorized events or competitions under certain circumstances, adding exception for the carrying of a BB. gun on private property with the authorization of the owner and the transporting of such weapon to or from such property and deleting the requirement that the seller of any such weapon or instrument give written notice of such sale to the chief of police of the city, warden of the borough or first selectman of the town where such weapon or instrument was sold or delivered; P.A. 03-19 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes, effective May 10, 2010.
See Sec. 29-32b re Board of Firearms Permit Examiners.
See Sec. 29-38 re weapons in vehicles.
Cited. 138 C. 485. Cited. 153 C. 584. Burden on prosecution to prove defendant did not possess a written permit. 179 C. 516. Cited. 195 C. 668. Cited. 208 C. 689. Cited. 209 C. 322. Cited. 210 C. 110; Id., 199. Cited. 211 C. 672. Cited. 217 C. 73. Cited. 226 C. 497. Offense of carrying a dangerous weapon is not constitutionally overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 287 C. 237. The circumstances surrounding an alleged threat are critical in determining if the threat is a true threat. The trial court should have instructed jury to consider the particular factual context in which the allegedly threatening conduct occurred, including the victim’s reaction to the defendant’s actions before and after the allegedly threatening conduct. Id. Defendant’s threatened use of a table leg to inflict serious bodily injury against victim, in the event that victim continued to bother him, constitutes a violation of this section and Sec. 53a-3 if the threat is found to be a true threat not protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
Cited. 1 CA 642. Cited. 9 CA 330. Cited. 10 CA 532. Cited. 11 CA 665. Cited. 17 CA 556. Cited. 21 CA 299. Cited. 25 CA 433.
Compared with Sec. 29-38. 10 CS 272. A razor is not a dangerous or deadly weapon per se. Whether it becomes one is a question of fact for the trier. The fact that a razor is specifically included in Sec. 53-207 does not mean that it is excluded from this section. 23 CS 425. History discussed; concealment is not an element of the crime. 24 CS 85. A .22 caliber air-operated single-shot pellet gun held to be a dangerous weapon. Id.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313. Knife not coming within description of statute cannot be included as “any other dangerous or deadly weapon” and is not within prohibition of this section. Id., 551.
Cited. 229 C. 691. Cited. 236 C. 189. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 7 CA 149. Cited. 27 CA 601. Cited. 39 CA 175. Cited. 41 CA 391. Cited. 43 CA 488.
Sec. 53-206a. Application for permit. Notice of decision to applicant. Section 53-206a is repealed, effective October 1, 1999.
(1963, P.A. 115; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 98-129, S. 21; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 120, 121; P.A. 99-212, S. 22.)
Sec. 53-206b. Unlawful training in use of firearms, explosive or incendiary devices or techniques capable of causing injury. Class C felony. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “Civil disorder” means a public disturbance involving acts of violence by a group of three or more persons which causes an immediate danger of or results in damage to the property of or injury to any other person.
(2) “Explosive or incendiary device” means (A) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, (B) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile or similar device, and (C) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb or similar device, including any device which (i) consists of or includes a breakable container which contains a flammable liquid or compound and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound, and (ii) can be carried or thrown by an individual.
(3) “Firearm” means a firearm as defined in section 53a-3.
(b) No person shall (1) teach or demonstrate to any person the use, application or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to a person, knowing or intending that such firearm, explosive, incendiary device or technique will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder; or (2) assemble with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to a person, intending to employ unlawfully such firearm, explosive, incendiary device or technique for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class C felony.
(d) Nothing in this section shall make unlawful any act of any peace officer, as defined in section 53a-3, performed in the lawful discharge of his official duties.
See chapter 505 (Secs. 27-101, 27-102) re private military forces.
Sec. 53-206c. Sale, carrying and brandishing of facsimile firearms prohibited. Class B misdemeanor. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) “Facsimile of a firearm” means (A) any nonfunctional imitation of an original firearm which was manufactured, designed and produced since 1898, or (B) any nonfunctional representation of a firearm other than an imitation of an original firearm, provided such representation could reasonably be perceived to be a real firearm. Such term does not include any look-a-like, nonfiring, collector replica of an antique firearm developed prior to 1898, or traditional BB. or pellet-firing air gun that expels a metallic or paint-contained projectile through the force of air pressure.
(2) “Firearm” means firearm as defined in section 53a-3.
(b) No person shall give, offer for sale or sell any facsimile of a firearm. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any facsimile of a firearm, which, because of its distinct color, exaggerated size or other design feature, cannot reasonably be perceived to be a real firearm.
(c) Except in self defense, no person shall carry, draw, exhibit or brandish a facsimile of a firearm or simulate a firearm in a threatening manner, with intent to frighten, vex or harass another person.
(d) No person shall draw, exhibit or brandish a facsimile of a firearm or simulate a firearm in the presence of a peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician or paramedic engaged in the performance of his duties knowing or having reason to know that such peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician or paramedic is engaged in the performance of his duties, with intent to impede such person in the performance of such duties.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53-206d. Carrying a firearm while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug prohibited. Hunting while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or while impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor prohibited. (a)(1) No person shall carry a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm, which is loaded and from which a shot may be discharged, upon his person (A) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, or (B) while the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.
(2) Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(b) (1) No person shall engage in hunting while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, or while impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor. A person shall be deemed under the influence when at the time of the alleged offense the person (A) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, or (B) has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this subdivision, “elevated blood alcohol content” means (i) a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight, or (ii) if such person has been convicted of a violation of this subsection, a ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person that is seven-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight. A person shall be deemed impaired when at the time of the alleged offense the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person was more than seven-hundredths of one per cent of alcohol, by weight, but less than ten-hundredths of one per cent of alcohol, by weight.
(2) Any person who violates any provision of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Enforcement officers of the Department of Environmental Protection are empowered to arrest for a violation of the provisions of this subsection.
(P.A. 98-129, S. 20; P.A. 00-142, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 00-142 amended Subsec. (a) by designating provisions as Subdiv. (1), making technical changes therein, designated former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (a)(2), making a technical change therein, and added new Subsec. (b) re hunting under the influence.
NBC Radio’s “Words at War”–The Road to Serfdom – 15 May 1945
Mises Daily: Monday, November 19, 2012 by Ludwig von Mises
… In the market economy, everyone serves his fellow citizens by serving himself. This is what the liberal authors of the 18th century had in mind when they spoke of the harmony of the rightly understood interests of all groups and of all individuals of the population.
And it was this doctrine of the harmony of interests which the socialists opposed. They spoke of an “irreconcilable conflict of interests” between various groups.
What does this mean? When Karl Marx — in the first chapter of the Communist Manifesto, that small pamphlet which inaugurated his socialist movement — claimed that there was an irreconcilable conflict between classes, he could not illustrate his thesis by any examples other than those drawn from the conditions of precapitalistic society.
In precapitalistic ages, society was divided into hereditary status groups, which in India are called “castes.” In a status society a man was not, for example, born a Frenchman; he was born as a member of the French aristocracy or of the French bourgeoisie or of the French peasantry.
In the greater part of the Middle Ages, he was simply a serf. And serfdom, in France, did not disappear completely until after the American Revolution. In other parts of Europe it disappeared even later.
But the worst form in which serfdom existed — and continued to exist even after the abolition of slavery — was in the British colonies abroad. The individual inherited his status from his parents, and he retained it throughout his life. He transferred it to his children. Every group had privileges and disadvantages.
The highest groups had only privileges, the lowest groups only disadvantages. And there was no way a man could rid himself of the legal disadvantages placed upon him by his status other than by fighting a political struggle against the other classes.
Under such conditions, you could say that there was an “irreconcilable conflict of interests between the slave owners and the slaves,” because what the slaves wanted was to be rid of their slavery, of their quality of being slaves.
This meant a loss, however, for the owners. Therefore, there is no question that there had to be this irreconcilable conflict of interests between the members of the various classes.
One must not forget that in those ages — in which the status societies were predominant in Europe, as well as in the colonies which the Europeans later founded in America — people did not consider themselves to be connected in any special way with the other classes of their own nation; they felt much more at one with the members of their own class in other countries.
A French aristocrat did not look upon lower class Frenchmen as his fellow citizens; they were the “rabble,” which he did not like. He regarded only the aristocrats of other countries — those of Italy, England, and Germany, for instance, as his equals.
The most visible effect of this state of affairs was the fact that the aristocrats all over Europe used the same language. And this language was French, a language which was not understood, outside France, by other groups of the population.
The middle classes — the bourgeoisie — had their own language, while the lower classes — the peasantry — used local dialects which very often were not understood by other groups of the population. The same was true with regard to the way people dressed.
When you travelled in 1750 from one country to another, you found that the upper classes, the aristocrats, were usually dressed in the same way all over Europe, and you found that the lower classes dressed differently.
When you met someone in the street, you could see immediately — from the way he dressed — to which class, to which status he belonged…
The Austrian School of economics is a school of economic thought which bases its study of economic phenomena on the interpretation and analysis of the purposeful actions of individuals. It derives its name from its origin in late-19th and early-20th century Vienna with the work of Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, and others.
Currently, adherents of the Austrian School can come from any part of the world, but they are often referred to as “Austrian economists” or “Austrians” and their work as “Austrian economics”.
The main tenets of the Austrian School are generally considered to be:
- The theory that economic events are best explained by a deductive study of human action.
- The theory that the use of economic models and statistical methods to model economic behavior are a flawed, unreliable, and insufficient means of analyzing economic behavior and evaluating economic theories.
- The theory that testability in economics and consistently accurate mathematical modeling of an economic market are impossible because mathematical modeling of any real market affects the decision-makers in that market and “testing” relies on real human actors who cannot be placed in a lab setting without altering their would-be actions.
- The theory that the way in which money is produced has real and not only nominal economic effects.
- The theory that the cost of any activity should be measured by reference to the next best alternative.
- The theory that, in a free market, interest rates and profits are determined by three factors: monetary gains or losses from a change in the consumption of a good or service, additional output that can be produced by additional inputs, and the time preference of the associated individual agents.
- The theory that markets clear if prices are allowed to adjust freely.
- The theory that inflation properly defined relates to an increase in the supply of money (including credit) which causes prices to rise.
- The theory that capital goods and labor are highly heterogeneous (diverse), that money allows different goods to be analyzed in terms of their cost effectively, that economic calculation requires a common basis for comparison for all forms of capital and labor, that this process is the signaling function of prices, and that it is also a rationing function which prevents over-use of inherently limited resources.
- The theory that the capital structure of economies consists of heterogeneous goods that have multi-specific uses which must be aligned to be effectively allocated, that the economic “boom-bust cycle” is caused by an artificial and unsustainable expansion of credit by the banks, and that this expansion causes businesses to make bad investment decisions which, in turn, necessarily cause major economic dislocation.
The Austrian School differs significantly from many other schools of economic thought in that the Austrian analysis of the observed economy begins from a prior understanding of the motivations and processes of human action.
To understand purposeful economic behavior and its consequences, the Austrian School follows an approach termed methodological individualism, or, as Ludwig von Mises termed it, “praxeology.” Mises was the first Austrian economist to present a theory of praxeology as such. Subsequently, Murray Rothbard presented a different version of praxeology in his work Man, Economy, and State.
Many theories developed by “first wave” Austrian economists have been absorbed into most mainstream schools of economics. These include Carl Menger’s theories on marginal utility, Friedrich von Wieser’s theories on opportunity cost, and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk’s theories on time preference, as well as Menger and Böhm-Bawerk’s criticisms of Marxian economics.
The former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, speaking of the originators of the School, said in 2000, “the Austrian School have reached far into the future from when most of them practiced and have had a profound and, in my judgment, probably an irreversible effect on how most mainstream economists think in this country.”
Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan has stated that he would not object to being identified as an Austrian economist. Republican U.S. congressman Ron Paul is a firm believer in Austrian School economics and has authored six books on the subject.
Paul’s former economic adviser, Peter Schiff, is an adherent of the Austrian School.Jim Rogers, investor and financial commentator, also considers himself of the Austrian School of economics.Chinese economist Zhang Weiying, who is known in China for his advocacy of free market reforms, supports some Austrian theories such as the Austrian theory of the business cycle.
Currently, universities with a significant Austrian presence are George Mason University, Loyola University New Orleans, and Auburn University in the United States and Universidad Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala. Austrian economic ideas are also promoted by bodies such as the Mises Institute and the Foundation for Economic Education.
Neoliberalism refers to economic liberalizations, free trade and open markets, privatization, deregulation, and enhancing the role of the private sector in modern society. Today the term is mostly used as a general condemnation of economic liberalization policies and its advocates.
The term was introduced in the late thirties by European liberal intellectuals to promote a new form of liberalism after interest in classical liberalism had declined in Europe.
In the decades that followed, neoliberal theory tended to be at variance with the more laissez-faire doctrine of classical liberalism and promoted instead a market economy under the guidance and rules of a strong state, a model which came to be known as the social market economy.
In the sixties, usage of the term “neoliberal” heavily declined. When the term was reintroduced in the following decades, the meaning had shifted. The term neoliberal is now normally associated with laissez-faire economic policies, and is used mainly by those who are critical of market reform.
The term “neoliberalism” was originally coined in 1938 by the German scholar Alexander Rüstow at the Colloque Walter Lippmann.The colloquium defined the concept of neoliberalism as “the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition and a strong and impartial state.”
To be “neoliberal” meant that – in the name of liberalism – a modern economic policy is required. Neoliberalism was not a monolithic theory. At the outset it drew on different academic approaches such as the Freiburg school, the Austrian School, the Chicago school of economics, and Lippmann´s realism.
In the 1930s the mood was decidedly anti-liberal. To join forces a group of 25 liberals organised the Walter Lippman Colloquium, an international meeting that took place in Paris in August 1938. Among them were Louis Rougier, Walter Lippmann, Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow.
Following the core message of Lippmann’s book The Good Society participants like Rüstow, Lippmann and Rougier agreed that the old liberalism of laissez faire had failed and that a new liberalism needed to take its place.
While for them it was a farewell to classical liberalism, which they thought to have failed, other participants like Mises and Hayek were not convinced to condemn the old liberalism of laissez faire. But all participants were united in their call for a new liberal project. Following Rüstow’s original recommendation they called this project neoliberalism.
The neoliberalism that came out of the Colloque Walter Lippmann was generally in line with Rüstow’s theories of turning away from conceptions of unrestricted liberty towards a market economy under the guidance and the rules of a strong state.
It was an attempt to formulate an anti-capitalist, anti-communist Third Way. Neoliberalism was originally established as something quite different from the free market radicalism with which it is usually associated today.
At the Colloque Walter Lippmann, the differences between ‘true neoliberals’ around Rüstow and Lippmann on the one hand and old school liberals around Mises and Hayek on the other were already quite visible. There occurred fundamental differences.
While ‘true neoliberals’ demanded state intervention to correct undesirable market structures, Mises had always insisted that the only legitimate role for the state was to abolish barriers to market entry. Similar differences of opinion also existed in other questions such as social policy and the scope for interventionism. After a few years the insurmountable differences between old liberals and the neoliberals become unbearable.
Rüstow was bitter that Mises still adhered to a version of liberalism that Rüstow thought had failed spectacularly. In a letter Rüstow wrote that Hayek and his master Mises deserved to be put in spirits and placed in a museum as one of the last surviving specimen of the extinct species of liberals which caused the current catastrophe (the Great Depression).
Ludwig von Mises became equally critical of the german neoliberals. He complained that Ordoliberalism really meant ‘ordo-interventionism’.
The Mont Pelerin Society was founded in 1947 by Friedrich Hayek to bring together the widely scattered neoliberal thinkers and political figures. “Hayek and others believed that classical liberalism had failed because of crippling conceptual flaws and that the only way to diagnose and rectify them was to withdraw into an intensive discussion group of similarly minded intellectuals.”
With central planning in the ascendancy world-wide and with few avenues to influence policymakers, the society served to bring together isolated advocates of liberalism as a “rallying point” – as Milton Friedman phrased it. Meeting annually, it would soon be a “kind of international ‘who’s who’ of the classical liberal and neo-liberal intellectuals.”
While the first conference in 1947 was almost half American, the Europeans concentration dominated by 1951. Europe would remain the “epicenter” of the community with Europeans dominating the leadership.
The first form of neoliberalism, classical neoliberalism, stems from classical liberalism and was chiefly created in inter-War Austria by economists, including Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. They were concerned about the erosion of liberty by both socialist and fascist governments in Europe at that time and tried to restate the case for liberty which became the basis for neoliberalism.
Hayek’s 1970s book, The Constitution of Liberty sums up this argument. In the introduction he states: If old truths are to retain their hold on men’s minds, they must be restated in the language and concepts of successive generations.
Hayek’s belief in liberty stemmed from an argument about information.He believed that no individual (or group, including the government) could ever understand everything about an economy or a society in order to rationally design the best system of governance. He argued this only got worse as scientific progress increased and the scope of human knowledge grew, leaving individuals increasingly more and more ignorant in their lifetimes.
As a result, he believed it was impossible for any person or government to design the perfect systems under which people could be governed. The only solution to this, he believed, was to allow all possible systems to be tried in the real world and to allow the best systems to beat the worse systems through competition.
In a liberal society, he believed, the few who used liberty to try out new things would come up with successful adaptations of existing systems or new ways of doing things. These discoveries, once shared and become mainstream, would benefit the whole of society, even those who did not directly partake of liberty.
Due to the ignorance of the individual, Hayek argued that an individual could not understand which of the various political, economic and social rules they had followed had made them successful.
In his mind, this made the superstitions and traditions of a society in which an individual operated vitally important,since in probability they had, in some way, aided the success of the individual. This would be especially true in a successful society, where these superstitions and traditions would, in all probability be successful ones that had evolved over time to exploit new circumstances.
However, this did not excuse any superstition or tradition being followed if it had outlived it usefulness: respect of tradition and superstition for the sake of tradition and superstition were not acceptable values to him. Therefore classical neoliberalism combined a respect for the old, drawn from conservatism, with the progressive striving towards the future, of liberalism.
In emphasising evolution and competition of ideas, Hayek highlighted the divide between practical liberalism that evolved in a haphazard way in England, championed by such people as David Hume and Adam Smith, versus the more theoretical approach of the French, in such people as Descartes and Rousseau.
Hayek christened these the pragmatic and rationalist schools, the former evolving institutions with an eye towards liberty and the later creating a brave new world by sweeping all the old and therefore useless ideas away.
Hayeks’s ideas on information and the necessity of evolving evolutions placed neoliberalism firmly on the pragmatic side against both rationalist socialists (such as communists, fascism and social liberals) and rationalist capitalists (such as economic libertarians, laissez-faire capitalists) alike.
At the centre of neoliberalism was the rule of law. Hayek believed that liberty was maximised when coercion was minimised. Hayek did not believe that a complete lack of coercion was possible, or even desirable, for a liberal society, and he argued that a set of traditions was absolutely necessary which allowed individuals to judge whether they would or would not be coerced. This body of tradition he notes as law and the use of this tradition and the Rule of Law.
In designing a liberal system of law, Hayek believed that two things were vitally important: the protection and delineation of the personal sphereand the prevention of fraud and deception, which could be maintained only by threat of coercion from the state. In delineating a personal sphere, individuals could know under what circumstances they would or would not be coerced under, and could make plans for the use of their resources in achieving their aims.
In designing such a system, Hayek believed that it could maintain a protected sphere by protecting against abuses by the ruling power, be it a monarch (e.g. Bill of Rights 1689), the will of the majority in a democracy (e.g. the US Constitution) or the administration (e.g. the Rechtsstaat).
He believed that the most important features of such protections were equality before the law, and generality of the law. Equality meant that all should be equal before the law and therefore subject to it, even those decisions of a legislature or government administration.
Generality meant that the law should be general and abstract, focusing not on ends or means, as a command would, but on general rules which, by their lack of specificity, could not be said to grant privileges, discriminate or compel any specific individual to an end.
General laws could also be used to transmit knowledge and encourage spontaneous order in human societies (much like the use of Adam Smith’s invisible hand in economics). He also stressed the importance of individuals being responsible for their actions in order to encourage others to respect the law.
Friedman’s chief argument about neoliberalism can be described as a consequentialist libertarian one: that the reason for adopting minimal government interference in the economy is for its beneficial consequences, and not any ideological reason. At the heart of economic neoliberalism are various theories that prove the economic neoliberal ideology.
Neoliberal economics in the 1920s took the ideas of the great liberal economists, such as Adam Smith, and updated them for the modern world. Friedrich Hayek‘s ideas on information flow, present in classical neoliberalism, were codified in economic form under the Austrian School as the economic calculation problem.
This problem of information flow implied that a decentralised system, in which information travelled freely and was freely determined at each localised point (Hayek called this catallaxy), would be much better than a central authority trying to do the same, even if it was completely efficient and was motivated to act in the public good.In this view, the free market is a perfect example of such a system in which the market determined prices act as the information signals flowing through the economy.
Actors in the economy could make decent decisions for their own businesses factoring in all the complex factors that led to market prices without having to understand or be completely aware of all of those complex factors.
In accepting the ideas of the Austrian School regarding information flow, economic neoliberals were forced to accept that free markets were artificial, and therefore would not arise spontaneously, but would have to be enforced, usually through the state and the rule of law. In this way, economic neoliberalism enshrines the role of the state and becomes distinct from libertarian thought.
However, in accepting the ideas of self-regulating markets, neoliberals drastically restrict the role of the government to managing those forms of market failure that the neoliberal economics allowed: property rights and information asymmetry.
This restricted the government to maintaining property rights by providing law and order through the police, maintaining an independent judiciary and maintaining the national defence, and basic regulation to guard against fraud. This made neoliberal economics distinct from Keynesian economics of the preceding decades.
These ideas were then developed further. Milton Friedman introduced the idea of adaptive expectations during the stagflation of the 1970s, which described why government interference (in the form of printing money) resulted in increasing inflation, as shop owners started to predict the rate of increase in the money supply, rendering the government action useless.
This developed into the idea of rational expectations, which showed that all government interference useless and disruptive because the free market would predict and undermine the government’s proposed action. At the same time, the efficient market hypothesis assumed that, because of catallaxy, the market could not be informationally wrong.
Or, to paraphrase the famous quote of Warren Buffett, “the market is there to inform you, not serve you”. Combined with rational expectations, this showed that markets would be self-regulating, and that regulation was unnecessary and disruptive.
Additionally, many theories were developed which showed that the free market would produce the socially optimum equilibrium with regard to production of goods and services, such as the fundamental theorems of welfare economics and general equilibrium theory, which helped prove further that government intervention could only result in making society worse off (see Pareto efficient).
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“Computers are incredibly fast, accurate, and stupid. Human beings are incredibly slow, inaccurate, and brilliant.
Together they are powerful beyond imagination.” – Albert Einstein
INDIANAPOLIS and ARMONK, N.Y., Sept. 12, 2011 /PRNewswire/ — WellPoint, Inc. (NYSE: WLP), and IBM (NYSE: IBM) announced an agreement today to create the first commercial applications of the IBM Watson technology. Under the agreement, WellPoint will develop and launch Watson-based solutions to help improve patient care through the delivery of up-to-date, evidence-based health care for millions of Americans. IBM will develop the base Watson healthcare technology on which WellPoint’s solution will run.
Watson, named after IBM founder Thomas J. Watson, is a computing system built by a team of IBM scientists who set out to accomplish a grand challenge – build a computing system that rivals a human’s ability to answer questions posed in natural language with speed, accuracy and confidence. Earlier this year, Watson competed and won against two of the most celebrated players ever to appear on Jeopardy!. This historic match is being rebroadcast over three days, beginning today.
Watson’s ability to analyze the meaning and context of human language, and quickly process vast amounts of information to suggest options targeted to a patient’s circumstances, can assist decision makers, such as physicians and nurses, in identifying the most likely diagnosis and treatment options for their patients.
In recent years, few areas have advanced as rapidly as health care. For physicians, incorporating hundreds of thousands of articles into practice and applying them to patient care is a significant challenge. Watson can sift through an equivalent of about 1 million books or roughly 200 million pages of data, and analyze this information and provide precise responses in less than three seconds.
Using this extraordinary capability WellPoint is expected to enable Watson to allow physicians to easily coordinate medical data programmed into Watson with specified patient factors, to help identify the most likely diagnosis and treatment options in complex cases. Watson is expected to serve as a powerful tool in the physician’s decision making process.
Medical conditions such as cancer, diabetes, chronic heart or kidney disease are incredibly intricate. New solutions incorporating Watson are being developed to have the ability to look at massive amounts of medical literature, population health data, and even a patient’s health record, in compliance with applicable privacy and security laws, to answer profoundly complex questions. For example, we envision that new applications will allow physicians to use Watson to consult patient medical histories, recent test results, recommended treatment protocols and the latest research findings loaded into Watson to discuss the best and most effective courses of treatment with their patients.
“There are breathtaking advances in medical science and clinical knowledge, however; this clinical information is not always used in the care of patients. Imagine having the ability to take in all the information around a patient’s medical care — symptoms, findings, patient interviews and diagnostic studies. Then, imagine using Watson analytic capabilities to consider all of the prior cases, the state-of-the-art clinical knowledge in the medical literature and clinical best practices to help a physician advance a diagnosis and guide a course of treatment,” said Sam Nussbaum, M.D., WellPoint’s Chief Medical Officer. “We believe this will be an invaluable resource for our partnering physicians and will dramatically enhance the quality and effectiveness of medical care they deliver to our members.”
Watson may help physicians identify treatment options that balance the interactions of various drugs and narrow among a large group of treatment choices, enabling physicians to quickly select the more effective treatment plans for their patients. It is also expected to streamline communication between a patient’s physician and their health plan, helping to improve efficiency in clinical review of complex cases. It could even be used to direct patients to the physician in their area with the best success in treating a particular illness…
Watson is an artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language, developed in IBM‘s DeepQA project by a research team led by principal investigator David Ferrucci. Watson was named after IBM’s first president, Thomas J. Watson.
In 2011, as a test of its abilities, Watson competed on the quiz show Jeopardy!, in the show’s only human-versus-machine match-up to date. In a two-game, combined-point match, broadcast in three Jeopardy! episodes February 14–16, Watson beat Brad Rutter, the biggest all-time money winner on Jeopardy!, and Ken Jennings, the record holder for the longest championship streak (75 days). Watson received the first prize of $1 million, while Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter received $300,000 and $200,000, respectively. Jennings and Rutter pledged to donate half their winnings to charity, while IBM divided Watson’s winnings between two charities.
Watson consistently outperformed its human opponents on the game’s signaling device, but had trouble responding to a few categories, notably those having short clues containing only a few words. For each clue, Watson’s three most probable responses were displayed by the television screen. Watson had access to 200 million pages of structured and unstructured content consuming four terabytes of disk storage, including the full text of Wikipedia.Watson was not connected to the Internet during the game.
Watson is a question answering (QA) computing system built by IBM.IBM describes it as “an application of advanced Natural Language Processing, Information Retrieval, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and Machine Learning technologies to the field of open domain question answering” which is “built on IBM’s DeepQA technology for hypothesis generation, massive evidence gathering, analysis, and scoring.”
According to IBM:
Watson is a workload optimized system designed for complex analytics, made possible by integrating massively parallel POWER7 processors and the IBM DeepQA software to answer Jeopardy! questions in under three seconds. Watson is made up of a cluster of ninety IBM Power 750 servers (plus additional I/O, network and cluster controller nodes in 10 racks) with a total of 2880 POWER7 processor cores and 16 Terabytes of RAM.
Each Power 750 server uses a 3.5 GHz POWER7 eight core processor, with four threads per core. The POWER7 processor’s massively parallel processing capability is an ideal match for Watson’s IBM DeepQA software which is embarrassingly parallel (that is a workload that is easily split up into multiple parallel tasks).
According to John Rennie, Watson can process 500 gigabytes, the equivalent of a million books, per second. IBM’s master inventor and senior consultant Tony Pearson estimated Watson’s hardware cost at about $3 million and with 80 TeraFLOPs would be placed 94th on the Top 500 Supercomputers list, and 49th in the Top 50 Supercomputers list. According to Rennie, the content was stored in Watson’s RAM for the game because data stored on hard drives are too slow to access
Watson’s software was written in both Java and C++ and uses Apache Hadoop framework for distributed computing, Apache UIMA (Unstructured Information Management Architecture) framework, IBM’s DeepQA software and SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 operating system. “[…] more than 100 different techniques are used to analyze natural language, identify sources, find and generate hypotheses, find and score evidence, and merge and rank hypotheses.”
The sources of information for Watson include encyclopedias, dictionaries, thesauri, newswire articles, and literary works. Watson also used databases, taxonomies, and ontologies. Specifically, DBPedia, WordNet, and Yago were used.
The IBM team provided Watson with millions of documents, including dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other reference material that it could use to build its knowledge. Although Watson was not connected to the Internet during the game, it contained 200 million pages of structured and unstructured content consuming four terabytes of disk storage, including the full text of Wikipedia.